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Analysis of the Reasoning Behind the Firings of Mike Leach and Jim Leavitt
ABSTRACT
This paper is a thematic analysis of press coverage surrounding the firings of coaches Mike Leach and Jim Leavitt from the 2010. In an effort to understand
the rationale behind their dismissals, this quantitative research uses attribution theory as the basis of the analysis. While the schools stated the firings were
due to the way these two coaches questionably handled a player, the press coverage displayed other reasons. This paper contextualizes the rationale behind their
firings in an effort to explain the current high stakes of major college football.
INTRODUCTION
There are very few professionals with less job security than major college football coaches. Entering the 2010 season, there were 24 new coaches in the
Division I Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS). That turnover represented 20% of all FBS programs. Two of the 24 coaches who lost their jobs following the 2009
season generated national attention from their relatively regional programs. Both Mike Leach of Texas Tech and Jim Leavitt from South Florida lost their
jobs amid controversy and intensive media coverage centering on their off-field actions with some of their players. Prior to the firings, both coaches were
hailed as successful leaders. Issues surrounding their departures cast doubt upon the official reasons stated by the universities. When perceived reality
contradicts public discourse, there is a tremendous opportunity for public relations scholarship. This paper uses thematic analysis of news coverage to demonstrate
how the meanings the universities tried to construct for these firings were essentially refuted in the sports press.
Relevance of Research
The rationale behind the firings of these coaches, beyond what was publicly stated by their employers, is an important topic for researchers
to analyze for multiple reasons. First, as it relates to the growing field of sport communication, it provides content that focuses on the expansive growth
of the college football industry, the salaries provided to coaches, and the overall investment schools are willing to make to be successful on the football
field. Additionally, this research is an important topic as it relates to the fields of mass media, public relations, and journalism. College football is
at such a prominent level in terms of revenue, advertising, and marketing that it shares an escalating symbiotic relationship with the mass media. This media
coverage helps raise the financial stakes of those schools participating at the highest level of college football. The sport has always had this relationship
but since the inception of the Bowl Championship Series (BCS) in 1998, the monetary rewards have risen exponentially. The BCS is the system that selects 12 schools
that participate in the top six post-season bowl games. Those 12 slots are highly coveted since they bring the most money and media attention to the participating
schools (Dunnavant, 2004). The power of the BCS has escalated to a point where politicians are now questioning its possible violation of anti-trust laws (Staples,
2010). This past bowl season, the six conferences that received an automatic bid to a BCS game garnered $145.2 million in revenue from the BCS. That sum
is compared to the $24.7 million awarded to the five conferences that didn’t receive an automatic BCS bid (Murphy, 2011). The manner in which college football
has become such an integral part of the mass media landscape makes any controversy that occurs in the industry worthy of address by academic researchers (Oriard,
2009).
College Football and Higher Education
The rise in college sports, in terms of revenue and media prominence, creates a public relations conundrum. Under the traditional educational perspective,
still touted in their marketing materials, colleges and universities have the primary mission of educating young people and preparing them for adult life.
For the select few student-athletes competing in the high-visibility sports at the Division I level, athletics is still presented as just another outlet
that prepares them physically and mentally for adulthood. However, the financial investments schools are making in their sports programs put this traditional
model in jeopardy. Now, athletes are more than students; they are necessary participants in the school’s profit motives (Sperber, 2000).
The role of the coach is also different in the evolving collegiate sports model. With the amount of money major colleges invest in football and the turnover
rate for head coaches, it is difficult to argue that winning isn’t the coach’s first priority (Stein, 2004). Because the multi-year contracts top coaches command
typically do not permit termination just for losing, a pretext may be needed to fire a coach. While schools are often forced to fire losing coaches because
of disgruntled fan bases, it remains a difficult financial decision. For an academic institution, it would appear that firing a coach for breaking rules
should be an easy decision to make. However, there are a number of college coaches who blatantly violated university or NCAA rules but still kept their jobs. Having
a rule-breaking coach remain on staff appears to violate the principles of an institution of higher learning. Yet, on the football and basketball sidelines
there remain a number of coaches almost impervious to being fired. There must be an underlying reason some schools are willing to be more lenient with rule-breaking
coaches.
LITERATURE REVIEW
From a theoretical perspective, research into the rationale behind the firings of Leach and Leavitt relates to attribution theory. An expert in attribution
theory, Bernard Weiner (1985), often wrote about the human characteristic in which people have a driving need to search for the cause of events. This theory
relates to the persuasive messages used to explain how people account for the actions of others (Woodward & Denton, 2009). Attribution theory is storytelling
and the belief that a persuader tries to figure out how certain behaviors or messages will be perceived by others. The resulting story communicated by persuaders
best suits their needs and goals (Coombs, 2007). Attribution theory relates to public relations and crises communication since responses made by an organization
during the time of crisis will frame the public perception and impact its overall reputation (Heath, Toth & Waymer, 2009). After researching the influence
Word of Mouth Communication (WMOC) has on brand recognition, Laczniak; DeCarlo and Ramaswami (2001) concluded that poor WMOC significantly devalues the public’s
perception of the brand.
Even though there is a relationship between attribution theory and crisis communications, scholarly analysis connecting the theory to sports-related issues is almost
non-existent. In fact, there is almost no academic research into the broad topic of sports coaches being fired. Most of the literature deals with the impact,
in terms of wins and losses when a coach is dismissed during the season (Koning, 2003; Frick, Barros & Prinz 2010; White, Persad & Gee, 2007). One case
addressed by a scholar was the dismissal of basketball coach Jim Valvano by North Carolina State University in 1990. Michael Selvaggi (1993) used legal
analysis to examine the lawsuit filed by the university asserting that it had proper grounds to fire Valvano because of the poor academic progress of his
players. This research determined that this was the first time a school had fired a coach because of a stipulation in his contract regarding players’
academic progress.
Legal scholar Martin J. Greenberg (1991) noted that there is no other business in which contracts are broken more often than the sports industry. Since there
is so much at stake in terms of revenue and publicity, colleges and universities are in a precarious situation when administering punishment for coaches and
players who break rules. Keeping a coach or player out of action because of a violation could endanger a school’s chance of winning a game. That in
turn would lead to economic ramifications (Stangel, 2000).
Based on the cases of Leach and Leavitt and the possibility that they were both fired for other reasons than stated by their employers, this paper will
look to connect attribution theory to each controversy. Based on the research of Laczniak; DeCarlo and Ramaswami (2001), these controversial cases impacted
the overall brand value for both Texas Tech and South Florida. The following research questions will be used to better rationalize the firings of Leach and
Leavitt.
RQ1: Were there other reasons for the firings of Leach and Leavitt besides the rationale provided by their employers?
RQ2: How do the cases of Leach and Leavitt compare to other BCS coaches who kept their jobs after violating NCAA rules during the same time frame?
METHOD
This qualitative research paper is a case study of the firings of both Leach and Leavitt in an effort to better explain the reasoning behind their dismissals.
A case study is expected to “catch the complexity of a single case” by “coming to understand its activity within important circumstances”
(Patton, 2002, p. 297). By using thematic analysis of press accounts, this paper will argue that the universities reasons for the firings of Leach and Leavitt
were not entirely supported by the media reports.
Since college football is still predominantly a regional sport, as noted by Cave and Crandall (2001), this research paper relies heavily upon the relevant
local media outlets that cover Texas Tech and South Florida football in-depth. Those outlets include the Dallas Morning News, Lubbock Avalanche-Journal, and
Tampa Tribune. In order to present a national perspective to this analysis, stories from noted publications such as ESPN.com, USA Today, Sports Illustrated
and The New York Times were also used. These media outlets in particular cover college football in depth and often include critical coverage of off-the-field
issues. Also, these media outlets are highly regarded as the premier sources of national sports journalism.
The research obtained for this paper was a result of a thorough LexisNexis search using the terms Mike Leach, Jim Leavitt, Texas Tech football, and South
Florida football. Due to the fact that both coaches received little national media attention for their programs prior to the 2008 season, the search was
limited to the time frame from 2008 to early 2010. This allowed for the collection of press accounts that detailed the rise of both coaches and then the ensuing
fallout from their crises that occurred in early 2010.
The resulting press accounts served as the data for a thematic analysis of the crises surrounding Leach and Leavitt. This method of collecting data enables
researchers to combine and catalogue related patterns into sub-themes (Aronson, 1994). This method enables researchers to search through data to identify any
recurrent patterns. Themes are then linked together to find similar meetings and patterns. Anne Golden (2003) also utilized a thematic analysis of the sports
media when she examined the differences in the press coverage of the 2002 Winter Olympics and the 2002 Winter Paralympics. Relating to the method used for this
research, Mirca Madianou (2002) conducted a thematic analysis of television news coverage to investigate the coverage of how Greeks are identified in the
media.
To contextualize possible motives underlying the schools’ decision-making, this paper will also compare the cases of Leach and Leavitt to four other contemporary
coaches who broke rules (during the same time frame as the incidents surrounding Leach and Leavitt) established by their employers and the National Collegiate
Athletic Association (NCAA). The four coaches examined in this research: Pete Carroll, Jim Tressel, Urban Meyer, and Nick Saban are universally regarded by
the sports media as the top college coaches in the country. Through the use of media reports, this element of the thematic analysis will exhibit the reasons
that these other rule-breaking coaches were able to maintain their employment during the time frame of the study.
CASE STUDIES
Mike Leach
Mike Leach was the Texas Tech head football coach from 2000 to 2009. His Red Raiders went 84-34 with nine bowl game appearances (5-4) because of their pass-centric
offense that featured the 11 offensive players on the field lining up further apart from each other than what was commonly used by other coaches. Leach’s
success culminated with the 2008 campaign which brought the school its first ever 11-1 season that included a win over top-ranked Texas and a share of the
Big 12 Conference South division title. He was named Co-Coach of the Year in the Big 12, but the Red Raiders were left out of a BCS bowl berth because of
a little known tie-breaking rule. Texas and Oklahoma represented the Big 12 in the BCS while Texas Tech played in the lesser Cotton Bowl, where it lost
to Mississippi.
Oklahoma wound up losing the National Championship Bowl against Florida. Not making a BCS bowl game is a major issue since the Big 12, like the Big East
where South Florida resides, gives a bigger share of the game’s profit to the schools that appear in one of the top post-season games. Other conferences
divide BCS bowl money evenly among all members. This is not the case for the Big 12 and Big East. Therefore, there is a tremendous financial incentive to
be a conference representative in a BCS bowl game for a Big 12 and Big East squad (Warmbroad, 2004).
During his career in Lubbock, Leach’s name was often mentioned with coaching vacancies at other larger programs. Leach stayed with the Red Raiders as he
received a pair of contract extensions. In 2008, he signed a five-year extension worth $12.7 million. This contract gave Leach unprecedented clout at the school
(Leach, 2009).
Crisis: Leach places player in shed
Leach’s crisis began in late December 2009 when Texas Tech suspended him after allegations arose that earlier in the month he had an injured player
sent to an equipment shed as a form of punishment. The player, Adam James, the son of ESPN announcer and former NFL running back Craig James, had suffered
a concussion and was unable to practice. This unconventional move by Leach became a newsworthy topic both locally in Texas and nationally (Dodd, 2009). The ensuing
media hype continued to rise when Leach refused to apologize for his actions and James became the spotlight of local and national sports media (Lubbock Avalanche-Journal,
2009). In just a matter of one season, in the eyes of the national and local media, Texas Tech went from being the upstart program that played a compelling
wide-open offense to the school that employed a coach who humiliated an injured player. This forced the school into an on-going crisis communication phase.
Ultimately, the organization’s crisis communication management would use public relations techniques to attempt to protect the institution’s reputation.
Texas Tech officially fired Leach on December 30th. The firing came one day before Leach was due a substantial $800,000 bonus and a guaranteed $1.7 million
salary for the upcoming season (ESPN, 2009). The amount of money paid to Leach was far more than Texas Tech had spent on coaches in the past. However, it is
similar to the salaries of the major national coaches also in the Big 12. For example, Mack Brown of Texas received $5 million per year and Bob Stoops of
Oklahoma received $4.2 million per year (Rohode, 2010).
After Leach was fired he went on the media offensive criticizing the school and its athletic department. He claimed that the school “conspired”
to fire him because of the $800,000 bonus he was due. In court documents, his lawyers argued “TTU would obtain the benefits of Leach’s performance
but chisel him out of his compensation” (Associated Press, 2010). He also said the animosity between him and the school was a result of the contract negotiations
he went through the previous year (Evans and Thamel 2009). Since Texas Tech had such a productive 2008 season going 11-2, Leach’s name was constantly
attached to openings at large programs including Auburn and Washington. Subsequently, in an effort to keep Leach in Lubbock, Texas Tech was forced to renegotiate
the coach’s contract. Larger football schools must commonly increase incentives in order to keep a head coach if he wins. Texas Tech was essentially in an unfamiliar
situation from a financial perspective to be bidding against itself to keep Leach.
Leach said of his relationship with Texas Tech administrators, “It’s shocking to me that there’s people working together that were trying to
get me fired last year after an 11-1 regular season,” Leach said. He added: “I believe in everybody working together and that together we could all
accomplish great things together, but then I discover that’s not the case and that the very foundation is crumbling out from under me. Betrayal’s
really hard” (Evans and Thamel, 2010). Providing support to Leach’s claims that the school’s top administrators did not want him running the
program regardless of the James situation, the Dallas Morning News acquired internal emails from 2008 to 2010 between Tech administrators, primarily Chancellor
Kent Hance and athletic director Gerald Myers, and athletic booster Jim Sowell of Dallas during Leach’s contract negotiations. The emails display a general
lack of support for Leach even though the school was going to offer him a major pay raise. One message had Sowell recommending to Hance and Myers that Tech
should stand firm in its negotiations with the coach. “You should sign a contract that would not cost us too much to fire him,” Sowell wrote.
“He has to have a big buyout. He has shown no loyalty” (Dallas Morning News, 2010). Leach’s attorney also stated that reports show that Hance
informed an attorney investigating James’ claims against Leach that they were “too milk toast” and “too mild” (USA Today, 2010).
Leach also contended that the celebrity status awarded to James because of his father’s NFL career and status as an ESPN commentator accelerated
the firing process. (Evans and Thamel, 2010). Texas Tech officials denied these claims and fired Leach with cause because of his insubordination and lack of
assistance during the James situation and the resulting investigation (Carver, 2010). The back-and-forth claims eventually led Leach to sue the university
on a number of claims. A district judge ruled that Leach could sue on one count of breach of contract. To date both sides are still entangled in a legal battle
(Blaney, 2010).
Jim Leavitt
Leach and Texas Tech’s national rise almost paralleled that of Jim Leavitt and the University of South Florida. Leavitt was ostensibly the godfather of
Bulls football. He coached at the school from 1997 to 2009. Beginning in 1997, South Florida was a I-AA program that eventually joined I-A’s Conference
USA in 2003. After just two seasons in the conference, South Florida made another significant jump, this time to the Big East and its BCS conference status. Once
again Leavitt was at the helm as the USF program grew and won simultaneously. South Florida made five straight post-season games from 2005 to 2009.
The peak of Leavitt’s career and the height of South Florida football came in September 2007 when the program made its first-ever appearance in the
Top 25. As the Bulls kept winning that season, they made it to No.2 in the BCS rankings. Only Ohio State had a better position than the Bulls. South Florida
lasted in that spot only one week as it fell to conference rival Rutgers in a nationally televised contest. Two more losses came in ensuing games as Leavitt’s
squad eventually dropped out of the rankings. The Bulls finished the season 9-4 with a loss to Oregon in the Sun Bowl.
Even with the late season dry spell, Leavitt was rewarded with a contract extension that would pay him $12.6 million from 2008 to 2014 (USA Today, 2010). Much like
Leach, other major programs also courted Leavitt prior to his signing this contract extension. Schools such as Alabama, Arizona State, Kansas State, and Miami were
reportedly interested in Leavitt’s services (Donahue, 2006). Leavitt often cited his allegiance to the university as the main reason he stayed in Tampa.
His allegiance was rewarded with a new contract, an uncommon policy for the school that only a few years prior had become a Division I program.
Crisis: Leavitt has altercation with player
The Jim Leavitt case mirrors Leach in many ways. Leavitt coached USF from 1997 to 2009 to a 94-57 record. Like Texas Tech, USF never made a BCS bowl appearance
even though it came very close. To stay competitive in an extremely difficult market, USF gave Leavitt a raise to keep him as its football coach. This raise
came just before a controversial incident, as was the case with Leach. On November 21, 2009, during halftime of a game against Louisville, Leavitt apparently struck
one his players, sophomore Joel Miller, a claim that Leavitt denied to school officials. Fanhouse.com first reported the story of the halftime incident (McMurphy,
2010). Afterwards, Leavitt responded: “It’s absolutely not true. It’s so wrong. It’s so far out there. I’m very disappointed something like this would
be written” (Auman, 2009). Leavitt contended that he was trying to raise the spirits of an upset player.
When first contacted by the media following the breaking story, South Florida representatives neither supported nor criticized Leavitt. “The University
of South Florida is aware of the story and will review the matter promptly,” said Michael Hoad, USF vice president for communications. “We’re committed
to ensuring due process for everyone involved. To ensure fairness, the university doesn’t comment during a review” (Auman, 2009).
An investigation followed and it was concluded that Leavitt grabbed Miller by the throat, slapped him in the face and then lied about it (ESPN.com, 2010).
USF made the findings first known to the media through a press release. The investigation conducted by the school also revealed that Leavitt lied to investigators
and had encouraged players and coaches to do likewise. In the wake of the report, Leavitt said he did not hit the player or ask others to lie on his behalf. USF
President Judy Genshaft and athletic director Doug Woolard asked Leavitt to admit to the incident as a result of his momentary loss of control. The coach
refused to do so, saying he was “sticking to his guns.” Just hours after he refused to admit to his misbehavior as stated in the investigation
to the school’s top administrators, Leavitt was fired on January 8, 2010 (Peterson, 2010). In a press conference announcing the firing, “neither
Genshaft nor Woolard took questions and specifics about Leavitt were not discussed” (Fox Sports, 2010).
Financial considerations were also present in the Leavitt firing. ESPN.com reported in January 2010: “Leavitt just finished the second season of
a seven-year, $12.6 million contract extension that calls for a base salary of $800,000 in 2010. The terms of the contract stipulate that if fired with
cause Leavitt is entitled to one month’s base pay, in this case $66,667. If fired without cause, the university would owe him 75 percent of what he’s owed
for the remainder of the contract.”
RESULTS
Table 1. Themes of press coverage surrounding firings of Mike Leach and Jim
Leavitt
Themes of Press Coverage of Leach and Leavitt |
1. Coaches are praised for putting their programs on the national stage.2. For the first time, Texas Tech and USF must keep renegotiating contracts with coaches. 3. Texas Tech and USF get close to BCS game but fail to make it. 4. Focus on Leach and Leavitt immediately goes from praise to their scandals. 5. Firings become national stories as journalists look to explain the situations. 6. Both schools attribute the firings to just the incidents in question. 7. Both coaches were due raises but were fired before they were paid. |
Even though both Texas Tech and USF in their press conferences and reports to the media stated that the firings were a result of the way the two coaches
handled the players in questions, other motives clearly emerged in the press. The amount of national media coverage regarding these two regionally based coaches
indicates journalists were in search of deeper meanings behind their dismissals. To answer RQ1, the other reasons appear to be financially motivated, along with
administrators from both schools growing discontented with the coaches’ behaviors.
In the Leach case, there is an email trail that clearly displays the displeasure Texas Tech administrators had with giving Leach so much money and prestige.
If Leach brought BCS riches, it’s likely the school would maintain its relationship with him despite its displeasure. Since Leach did not provide the
school with its ultimate goal of being in a BCS game, Texas Tech was unable to take the national criticism it received as a result of Leach’s actions
(Jonsson, 2009). Spencer Hall (2009) wrote” It makes sense in a world where Leach, an oddball among oddballs, finally reaches the limit of tolerance
both on his part and on the part of his bosses in the TTU administration. Leach’s contract negotiations were, to put it politely, contentious. His flirtations
with other jobs were brazen. The university’s patience with his high-profile antics was running low.” The idea that there was more to Leach’s
firing than just his behavior with James was further supported by Magary (2009), “Just last year, he was nearly dropped by the school in the wake of contentious
negotiations. Just as the James saga was likely the last straw for the school to keep Leach around.” Based on attribution theory, Texas Tech explained
Leach’s firing for just one reason, not for the multiple reasons as stated in the media.
This rationale also holds true for Leavitt, a coach without a BCS bowl game to his credit who got a big pay raise right before a controversial incident.
South Florida was unwilling to tolerate national criticism created by a high paid coach that did not deliver the school the coveted BCS prize. As deplorable
as it is for a coach to hit a player, conflicting stories about the incident, including statements by Miller, make Leavitt’s abrupt firing questionable
in its motives (Schad, 2009). Even though Leavitt listened to other job offers, it does not appear that the ill will between him and the school ran as deep
as it did between Texas Tech and Leach. Rather, Leavitt’s biggest mistake was not winning a conference championship prior to the incident with Miller.
"If his team was coming off a Big East title he might be able to survive this (for right or wrong), but when his teams routinely fizzled over the second halves of seasons, and with the way his team was a disaster in the classroom (with one of the nation’s worst rankings according to the Academic Progress Report), this wasn’t that tough a call for the university” (College Football News, 2010)."
Richard Cirminello echoed these sentiments with
"Leavitt had become a caricature in recent years, racing around the field as if he was that team trainer with less than all of his faculties. While it was a cute act when USF was climbing up the ladder in the early days, it stopped being endearing when the program stopped improving. The Bulls peaked in October of 2007, rising to No. 2 in the country. Since then, they’ve gone just 16-14, slipping into the middle of the Big East pack. As a program builder, Leavitt had an epic run. As a program elevator, he appeared increasingly out of his league. The incident involving Miller may have been just the ideal opening the administration needed in order to make a change” (College Football News, 2010)."
This “ideal opening” correlates with attribution theory since it allowed USF to tell a particular persuasive story about Leavitt’s firing
that was in the best interest of its stakeholders.
Comparison of Leach and Leavitt with BCS winning coaches
Around the same time Leach and Leavitt faced intense scrutiny from their employers; several other major coaches were also found to have violated rules. The coaches
used for comparison to address RQ2 are Pete Carroll (USC), Jim Tressel (Ohio State), Urban Meyer (Florida), and Nick Saban (Alabama). The media coverage
of these four coaches demonstrates each repeatedly violated NCAA rules and regulations. However, unlike Leach and Leavitt, these four coaches had success in bringing
their schools to BCS games. Also, these coaches did not lose their jobs after breaking the rules. Based on the research, as it relates to RQ2, there appears
to be a double standard for college football coaches. Winning coaches can withstand a crisis or rules violation unlike those coaches without the same BCS success.
For example, Carroll, the former coach of USC, was able to maintain his job from 2001 to 2009 even though he presided over the program that committed a
number of major NCAA violations. So much so, that in June 2010 the NCAA put USC on a two-year post-season ban while also forcing the program to eliminate
30 scholarships and forfeit a number of wins from 2004 to 2006 (Klein and Wharton, 2010). Most of the illegality of Carroll’s program came during the recruitment
of Reggie Bush.
Noted Los Angeles Times sports columnist Bill Plaschke (2009) criticized Carroll’s tenure and his knowledge of the recruiting illegalities by writing “he
goes from saint to scallywag. Carroll says he didn’t know about the Bush violations. That now seems impossible… …he made $33 million from violations that will
cost his old school its reputation, and folks here will never look at him the same.” Carroll was able to keep his job during a period of time the NCAA
was “troubled” by “the campus environment” that he created at USC (Lev, 2010). The NCAA also criticized USC for disregarding Carroll’s
blatant use of allowing influential visitors access to his team by stating in a critical report of the school “”the institution’s failure to regulate
access to practices and facilities” (Gardner, 2010). Clearly, Carroll’s BCS accomplishments helped insulate him from the immediate and harsh punishment
given to Leach and Leavitt.
Ohio State’s Tressel guided his team to three BCS championships, winning one, during his 10 years in Columbus. Those impressive numbers included five
straight Big 10 conference titles. Because of this success, he was one of the top paid coaches in the country with an annual salary that eclipses $3.7 million
(Berkowitz, 2010). However, Tressel faced scandals several times during his Ohio State tenure. Longman (2007) wrote that both his career first at Youngstown
State and then OSU have been tarnished by a number of issues. “At both colleges, his top quarterback took money from boosters in violation of NCAA
rules. Maurice Clarett, the running back who played a vital role in Ohio State’s national championship in 2002, sits in prison after a sad descent. A number
of other Ohio State players have encountered legal or disciplinary problems since Tressel became head coach in 2001, and his academic record, while improving,
remains mixed.” Longman (2007) also wrote that Ohio State’s athletic director was a “staunch ally” of Tressel. As it relates to Leach,
he certainly was not an ally of top Texas Tech officials.
There was a similar relationship at Florida between Meyer and athletic director Jeremy Foley. Meyer was the recipient in 2005 of a seven-year contract worth
$14 million handed out by Foley (Low, 2009). This salary was a result of Meyer’s two national championships and the highest winning percentage in the BCS. However,
during this time in Gainesville, 27 of Meyer’s players were arrested. The charges varied from larceny, stalking, to assault. The arrests forced Meyer
to defend himself by saying “it’s not a dirty program” (Associated Press, 2010). Tressel was fired by OSU in 2011 and Meyer retired in late 2010.
Alabama’s Saban, a winner of three BCS games and a national championship, encountered scandal in the summer of 2010 when a number of his players were
involved with illegal dealing with agents (Mandel, 2010). Saban did his best to distance himself from the issue, but this followed another scandal where
a number of Alabama players were caught in unauthorized selling of their free textbooks as a result of their scholarships (Miasel and Schlabach, 2010). During
his time at Alabama, Saban has dealt with “text book scandals and felonies” (Brizendine, 2008). While Alabama was forced to vacate 21 wins and placed on
three years-probation, Saban’s job was not in jeopardy as a result (Hooper, 2009).
DISCUSSION
The one-dimensional storytelling via the media conducted by both Texas Tech and South Florida regarding the firings of Leach and Leavitt has a direct relationship
with attribution theory. Since these schools omitted other relevant and significant factors, such as disputes with administrators, uneasiness about renegotiating
contracts, general odd behavior, and poor academic performance by the players, their messages to the media suggest they were doing so to protect themselves
and their stakeholders. These other factors were well documented by journalists.
For Texas Tech and USF, this protection was a manifestation of attribution theory in action. The rationale behind the firings of Leach and Leavitt was
public relations and marketing driven. Texas Tech and South Florida did not want to expand publicly on these other issues and instead focused their messages
on the intolerant behaviors Leach and Leavitt displayed in an effort to perpetuate the image that the schools are institutions of higher learning, not just football
academies. Also, by crafting a public story focused just on the singular activities of Leach and Leavitt, it gave the schools the rationale of firing a coach for
just cause. Texas Tech and South Florida called upon the persuasion techniques of attribution theory to create a story that would have fans, and some journalists,
believe the outcomes of the events were solely a result of the singular actions of both Leach and Leavitt.
These two schools were able to employ their crisis communication techniques of creating a favorable story line because so many media outlets were willing
to carry their message in an effort to gain more content and programming. The addition of ESPN’s Craig James into the story generated even more media
attention. Most of the coverage about the other issues surrounding the firings came from the national outlets. This finding is noteworthy as it underscores
the symbiotic relationship the local Texas and Florida news outlets share with Texas Tech and South Florida. The local media outlets may have shown restraint
in creating critical coverage of these two universities. The exception was the Lubbock Avalanche- Journal that did run a number of pieces illustrating the
problems between Texas Tech administrators and Leach.
In the context of this research, there appears to be a double standard within the highest ranks of college football. Coaches with BCS wins apparently can
withstand a crisis and receive greater support from their employer than those coaches without BCS wins. Unfortunately for Leach and Leavitt, they didn’t
have the same success as the likes of Carroll, Tressel, Meyer and Saban. Relating to the concepts of the attribution theory, a school is unlikely to make public
statements that a coach was able to keep his job because he won BCS games. The school would instead provide other reasons that supported its status as an institution
of higher learning.
CONCLUSIONS
The media coverage surrounding Leach and Leavitt in wake of their scandals demonstrates that the worst action a college coach can do is simply not win
enough. Universities, using the application of attribution theory, are not likely to publicly state this as it would tarnish their overall reputation. However,
it can serve as the foundation for a firing based on another incident that otherwise might not seem related. This idea of using an alternative rationale brings relevance
to this paper’s topic and attribution theory. As part of a school’s crisis communication plan, it might tell a public story that best serves itself
and its stakeholders.
APPLICATIONS IN SPORT
This paper expanded the literature of sport communication to include attribution theory. As previously stated in this paper, attribution theory is not often
included in sports media literature. This paper is one of the few works to introduce attribution theory to sports public relations. A better understanding of this
theory as it relates to sports crisis communication will benefit both academic scholars and professional journalists looking to interpret and contextualize
the issues surrounding the firing of a major college coach. Since schools have so much money riding on the success of their teams, they will continue to dismiss
coaches who do not win enough games in efforts of finding someone who will. Such competition in the industry of higher education that is supposed to both
educate young people and profit from athletic investments will continue to create a constant flow of financial, ethical, and media issues worthy of deeper analysis.
Even though both Texas Tech and South Florida scaled back the amount of money invested in their football coaches, other schools are still pouring millions
of dollars into their programs in search of BCS riches. However, there only a select few games and only half the teams participating in those games can
prevail as the winner. So, there will continue to be more schools that fail in their BCS quest than win. This financial arms race and the adjoining media
coverage should continue to create worthy areas of academic exploration for future researchers. This paper could lead other researchers into examining the
rationale of how and why a football coach was fired by a college or university. As college basketball continues to expand in popularity, similar research could
evolve with that sport as well.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
David Dewberry, Yun Xia, Cheryl Moore, Eliot Emert
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Female Athletes and Eating Disorders
Abstract
Sports should prevent athletes from having eating disorders not develop eating disorders. There is evidence that female athletes are at a risk of developing
disordered eating. The purpose of this study was to find how prevalent eating disorders are in female athletes and examine factors that may have a relationship
with eating disorders.
A questionnaire containing two instruments was distributed to volunteer female athletes in a Midwestern university. The EAT 26 was used to measure the prevalence
of eating disorders. The ATHLETE questionnaire was used to inquire some factors that may have a relationship with eating disorders among athletes. Results showed
14.3% of the respondents scored a 20 and above on the EAT 26 and thus considered at risk of having an eating disorder. The ATHLETE questionnaire showed that
there were some significant negative correlations between the EAT 26 score and participant’s feelings about their body, feelings about sports, feelings
about performance, and feelings about eating. The negative correlations meant that the more the participants scored high on their feelings about their body,
sports, performance, and eating, the less likely they scored low on the EAT 26 indicating they did not have a risk of an eating disorder.
This study implies that when athletes feel good about their body, sport, performance and their eating, the less likely they will have an eating disorder. This study
makes an important contribution in understanding female athletes and eating disorders as well as factors that may have a relationship to eating disorders
in female athletes.
Introduction
An eating disorder is a psychological disorder that many women can acquire, ncluding collegiate athletes. Participation in sports activity can be a healthy
and enjoyable experience that can enhance self-worth and self-image in female athletes (12). Many people may believe that because athletes participate in
sports and maintain high levels of physical activity, they are not as self-conscience about their bodies. Contrary to this belief, (1) stated in their study that
athletes are at a greater risk for developing eating disorders than non-athletes. Why female athletes have eating disorders when they are so active is a question
of interest to many people. The purpose of this study is to find how prevalent eating disorders are in female athletes and examine factors that may have a
relationship with eating disorders.
Incorrect weight perceptions are more common in young women, with persistent overestimation of weight and attempts to lose weight even when unnecessary (7).
(5) stated that female athletes are a group particularly at risk for developing eating disorders or engaging in unhealthy behaviors to control their weight.
These athletes not only face the typical social pressures to be thin, but they also are immersed in a social context that focuses on their bodies.
Eating disorders are behavioral syndromes associated with considerable mobility that present onset of the highest mortality rates among mental illnesses. The
prevalence of eating disorders’ has increased since the 1990s in both female athletes and non-athletes. Female athletes go through a lot of pressures
and conflicts playing collegiate sports. Female athletes are a group particularly at risk for developing eating disorders or engaging in unhealthy behaviors to
control their weight (13).
The western cultural emphasis given to weight and body shape points towards a “beauty standard” centered on thinness disorders (11). For some
female college athletes, college concerns and pressures may contribute to eating disorders or disordered eating behaviors (6). The sports environment can heighten
body and weight related concerns because of factors such as pressure from coaches and social comparisons, body dissatisfaction, physique anxiety, and perfectionism
(6, 11). A lack of professional guidance can make an athlete vulnerable to the onset of disordered eating (10). It appears that negative moods such as anxiety,
perfectionism, and negative comments about body shape or weight from coaches are related to disorder eating in female athletes (1). (9) found that social
pressure on body shape was strongly correlated with body dissatisfaction. Female athletes’ body dissatisfaction has shown correlation with bulimia (6).
According to (7), perfectionism, for example in sports has been found to be a risk factor for bulimic symptoms.
However, prevalence of clinical and subclinical eating disorders has been found to be higher-among female athletes than non-athletes (5). Young women, particularly
those in aesthetic sports are vulnerable to body dissatisfaction, eating disorders, and disordered eating (10). Situational factors specifically involvement in
individual sports or team sports, may put athletes in situations where social physique anxiety and disordered eating is likely to be heightened to manage
weight and shape concerns (13, 8).
This is an important topic because although physical activity enhances self-esteem and promotes physical and emotional well-being, there is evidence that female
athletes are at a risk of developing disordered eating. It is important to investigate some of the reasons why female collegiate athletes feel the need to have disordered
eating. Results of the study can assist in developing and executing suitable eating-disorder prevention and intervention programs for female college athletes.
The purpose of the study was twofold. First, it was to assess how prevalent eating disorders were among female college athletes. Secondly, it was to explore
some factors that may have a relationship with eating disorders.
Methods
Participants
There were 56 participants in total, including 11 freshman, 21 sophomores, 13 juniors and 11 seniors. The following sports were included: soccer (23.2%),
softball (23.2%), track and field (41.1%), and swimming (12.5%). The age range was between 18 to 22 years, with over 98% being between 18 and 21 years. The
entire sample was Caucasian with an exception of one participant.
Instruments
A questionnaire was used to collect data, it included a demographic section on age, sex, height, weight and race of the participants. Two instruments were
included in the questionnaire, the first being the EAT 26 by (4), which measured prevalence of eating disorders among athletes. The EAT 26 has been used extensively
in research as a reliable measure of prevalence of eating disorders. The EAT-26 scale is comprised of these dimensions: dieting, bulimia and food preoccupation,
and oral control. Each item on the scale is rated on a scale of 0-6 as follows: never=0, rarely=0, sometimes=0, often=1, usually=2, and always=3, except for
item 25 which is reverse scored.
Second was the ATHLETE questionnaire, which was used to inquire some factors that may relate with eating disorders among athletes. The ATHLETE questionnaire
is a reliable and valid measure of factors that may relate to disordered eating in athletes (9). The ATHLETE questionnaire has the following factors that have
shown association with disordered eating: feelings about being an athlete, the athlete’s body and sports, feelings about performance, team support, feelings
about one’s body, and feelings about eating.
Both instruments showed acceptable reliability. The EAT 26 included 26 items and yielded a reliability value of .76. The six factors in the ATHLETE questionnaire
demonstrated the following reliability values: feelings about being an athlete included five items with a reliability of .71, athlete’s body and sports
included 12 items with a reliability of .87, feelings about performance included seven items with a reliability of .67, team support included four items with
a reliability of .73, feelings about one’s body included six items a reliability of .85, and feelings about eating included four items with a reliability of
.85.
Procedures
The researchers first obtained Human subjects approval from the IRB before conducting the study. The questionnaire was distributed to the participants, and it contained
the demographic section of the questionnaire, the EAT 26, and the ATHLETE questionnaire. The questionnaire was given to volunteer female athletes at a Midwestern university.
A volunteer female athlete served as the monitor and distributed the questionnaires. The study was conducted in the absence of the coach and the researchers so that
the participants would not feel any coercion to participate in the study. The consent information for the participants was included at the beginning of the
questionnaire. The consent information explained that participating in the study was totally voluntary and that by completing the questionnaire, the participant
was giving consent to participate in the study. The questionnaire was completed anonymously and since there were no signed informed consent it was not possible
to identify individuals who participated in the study nor those whose scores indicated they were at risk of an eating disorder. Due to the sensitive nature
of the study, all participants were provided with referral information to their school’s health center and the crises hotline center, in case they realized
they were at risk of acquiring an eating disorder.
Statistical analysis
The data was entered into SPSS program – PASW Statistics 18. Reliability test for the EAT 26 and the ATHLETE questionnaire was analyzed. Descriptive statistics
were analyzed for the EAT 26. Those who scored EAT 26=20 were considered at risk of having an eating disorder. ANOVAs were computed to compare the means
of EAT 26 by year in school, age, weight, and sport participation. Correlations were completed between the EAT 26 and the factors of the ATHLETE questionnaire.
Results
There were 56 total participants who responded to the questionnaire. Frequencies were completed for EAT 26. If the participant scored EAT 26=20, then they were
considered at risk of having an eating disorder. Results showed that 8 female athletes, (14.3%) scored a 20 and above and were thus considered at risk of
having an eating disorder. The EAT 26 mean was 7.9 and standard deviation was 7.6. Figure 1 shows details of how the participants responded to the EAT 26.
ANOVAs were used to compare the means of EAT 26 by classification year, age, weight, and sports participation. Only age showed a significant difference in
means for the EAT 26. Further, Cross tabs were completed between those who had EAT26=20 and age. Results showed all of the 8 participants who had EAT 26=20
were 19 years of age.
Descriptive statistics were conducted on how the female athletes performed on the ATHLETE questionnaire, which can be seen in Table 1. Pearson correlation
was conducted to see whether there was a relationship between EAT 26 and ATHLETE questionnaire factors.
These four factors in the ATHLETE questionnaire demonstrated significant Pearson correlation values with EAT 26: feelings about body and sports with a correlation
of -.53, feelings about performance with a correlation of -.51, feelings about your body with a correlation of -.50, and feelings about eating with a correlation
of -.31. These two factors in the ATHLETE questionnaire did not demonstrate significant Pearson correlation values with EAT 26: feelings about being an
athlete, and team support. Table 2 shows details about correlations between EAT 26 and the ATHLETE questionnaire factors.
Discussion
This study found 14.3 % of female athletes were considered at risk of having an eating disorder. This study also reported that everyone found to have an
eating disorder was 19 years old. The ATHLETE questionnaire showed that there were some significant negative correlations between the EAT 26 score and participant’s
feelings about their body, feelings about sports, feelings about performance, and feelings about eating. The negative correlations meant that the more the
participants scored high on their feelings about their body, sport, performance, and eating, the less they scored on the EAT 26, indicating they did not have
an eating disorder.
Two of the factors in the ATHLETE questionnaire dealt with body image; the athlete’s body and sports, and feelings about one’s body. Both factors
had a significant negative correlation with EAT 26 scores. This indicated that the female athletes’ who scored high on the athlete’s body and sports,
and feelings about one’s body were likely to score low on the EAT-26. Hence, indicating they were not likely to be at risk of an eating disorders.
This finding concurs with the study by (2), which contended that body image dissatisfaction is the strongest predictor of eating disorder symptoms.
A study done (6) stated that sport-related pressures such as weight limits, teammates’ eating-related behaviors, judging criteria, revealing uniforms,
and coach expectations have been suggested as potential risk factors for an athlete to develop an eating disorder. Our study found that team support and
feelings about being an athlete did not have a relationship with eating disorders. Another study done by (10) stated that families, peers, and coaches can have
a major effect on female athletes. Our study did not show that pressures from the participant’s families, peers, and coaches had any effect on the athlete
and eating disorders.
This study found that ‘feelings about performance’ in the ATHLETE had a significant negative correlation with the EAT 26 total. This indicated
that the more the athletes felt good about their performance in sports, the less likely they were at risk of an eating disorder. This finding concurs with
(1) study that stated that negative moods such as anxiety and perfectionism were related to disordered eating in female athletes.
In the current study, all participants who scored EAT 26=20, were 19 years old, and were either sophomores or juniors in school. There were no freshman
or seniors found to have a risk of an eating disorder. This indicates that the female athlete participants felt more pressure or problems with their eating
in the middle of their college years. This finding concurs with the study by (2), which stated that eating and dieting problems in college freshman women
was fairly stable across the first year of college. The current study suggests that the female athletes develop some eating disorder as they try to lose weight
in the sophomore year and stabilize by the fourth year. More research is needed on eating disorders of female athletes through the four college years.
Since the participants is this study was were nearly all Caucasian, this study may have found higher levels of disordered eating concerns than a more diversified
sample. Future similar studies can build on this study by having a larger proportion of other ethnicities. In addition, future similar studies can have a wider range
of sport, especially sports where the athletes’ uniforms for competition are more revealing such as swimming, dance, and gymnastics.
Conclusion
This study shows that eating disorders are prevalent among female athletes. Some factors that have a relationship with eating disorders include feelings
about their body, sports performance, and eating. This study also shows that feelings about being an athlete such as being competitive and team support did
not show much relationship with eating disorders.
This study makes an important contribution in understanding females and eating disorders, as well the factors that may have a relationship in causing eating
disorders in female athletes.
Application to Sport
Eating disorders are still an issue of concern among female athletes. This study reveals that the more female athletes felt good about their body, sports,
performance, and eating, the more likely they would not have an eating disorder. Feelings about an athlete like being competitive and team support did not show
much relationship with eating disorders. To keep away from disordered eating, female athletes ought to have positive inner feelings about themselves.
Sports participation among college females should be encouraged because this will improve their ‘feelings about their body’ and in turn make
them less at risk of getting an eating disorder. Participation in sports activity can be a healthy and enjoyable experience that can enhance self-worth and self-image
in female athletes (12). Since body image dissatisfaction is the strongest predictor of eating disorder symptoms (2), then body image holds the most promise as a
focus for prevention programs of eating disorder among college female athletes.
Disordered eating prevention efforts offered by college counseling centers for female athletes should focus on promoting students’ acceptance of their own
bodies. Such efforts will counteract the media influences that propagates the extremely ‘thin ideal’ that is unattainable by most normal female
athletes. A school-based sport centered program can be useful in deterring females from disordered eating (3). For those working with athletes, they should avoid
equating thinness to sport performance. They should be encouraged to become more knowledgeable and responsible regarding the critical role of healthy eating
and nutrition in female athletes. Such knowledge will equip them to play a significant role identifying, managing, and preventing eating disorders among female athletes
and increase prospects of a positive sport experience for female athletes. Female athletes ought to be encouraged to regard their health first before sports performance.
Consequently, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) emphasizes an athlete’s health rather than weight and body composition (12).
Acknowledgements
Many thanks to the anonymous volunteer female athletes who agreed to participate in this study.
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Journal and Applied Sport Psychology, 18, 28-43. doi: 10.1080/10413200500471301.
11. Oliveria Coelho, G., Soares, E., & Ribeiro, B.(2010). Are female athletes
at increased risk for disordered eating and its complications. Appetite, 55,
379-387. doi:10.1016/j.appet.2010.08.003.
12. Sherman, R., & Thompson, R. A. (2006). Practical use of the International
Olympic Committee position stand on the female athlete triad; a case example.
International Journal of Eating Disorders, 39(3), 193-201. Doi:10..1002/eat.20232.
13. Sundgot-Borgen, J., & Torstviet, M.(2010). Aspects of disordered eating
continuum in elite high- intensity sports. Scandinavian Journal of Medicine
and Science in Sports, 20, 112-121. doi: 10.1111/j.1600-0838.2010.01190x.
14. Torstviet, M., Rosenvinge, J., & Sundgot-Borgan, J.(2008). Prevalence
of eating disorders and the predictive power of risk models in female elite
athletes: a controlled study. Scandinavian Journal of Medicine and Science in
Sports, 18, 108-118. doi: 10.1111/j.1600-0838.2001.00657x.
Figures and Tables
Fig 1- Eat 26 Performance
Legend: Figure 1 shows frequencies of the EAT 26 totals for the female athletes,N=56. If the participant scored EATS 26=20 then they were considered at risk
of having an eating disorder. Figure 1 shows that eight participants (14.3%) had EAT 26=20.
Table 2 – Descriptive Statistics of the ATHLETE Questionnaire
Legend: Table 2 shows the ATHLETE questionnaire which was used to inquire
some factors that may relate with eating disorders among athletes. The ATHLETE questionnaire
has six factors. Table 2 lists the six factors, sample questions on each factor,
as well as the descriptive statistics for the ATHLETE questionnaire.
Factors of the ATHLETE questionnaire | Sample Question on the ATHLETE QUESTIONNIARE | No of Items | Total Possible | Mean | SD |
Feelings about being an athlete | I cannot imagine what I will be like when I am no longer competing |
5
|
25
|
16.3
|
3.5
|
The athlete’s body and sports | I would be more successful in my sport if my body looked better and I often wish I were leaner so I could perform better |
12
|
60
|
41.1
|
9.4
|
Feelings about performance | No matter how successful I am, I never feel satisfied and my parents expect more of me athletically than I do for myself |
7
|
35
|
22.8
|
4.9
|
Team support | It is hard to get close to my teammates because we are constantly competing against each other |
4
|
20
|
16.9
|
2.4
|
Feelings about one’s body | My friends (non-athletes) make me feel I am too fat |
6
|
30
|
25.2
|
4.2
|
Feeling about eating | I feel uncomfortable eating in front of my friends |
4
|
20
|
17.6
|
4.3
|
Table 3- Correlations between EAT 26 and the ATHLETE questionnaire
Legend: Table 3 shows the Pearson correlation values between EAT 26 and
the ATHLETE questionnaire factors. These four factors in the ATHLETE questionnaire
demonstrated significant Pearson correlation values with EAT 26; feelings about
body and sports; feelings about performance; feelings about your body; and feelings
about eating. These two factors in the ATHLETE questionnaire did not demonstrate
significant Pearson correlation values with EAT 26; feelings about being an
athlete, and team support.
Factors of the ATHLETE questionnaire | Pearson Correlation With EAT 26 |
Feelings about being an athlete | .139 |
The athlete’s body and sports | -.530** |
Feelings about performance | -.507** |
Team support | .127 |
Feelings about one’s body | -.502** |
Feeling about eating | -.313* |
** .01 correlation is significant at the .01 level
*.05 correlation is significant at the .05 level
Investigation of Korean female golfers’ success factors on the LPGA Tour from 1998 to 2007
Abstract
Se Ri Pak is arguably the most famous Korean name ever to play on the LPGA Tour. Ten years after Pak’s debut in 1998, 42 Korean players are now playing on the LPGA Tour. This international phenomenon over the past decade has produced a lot of Korean players and many Korean victories. Nineteen-Koreans have won 64 LPGA Tour events over the past decade. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to analyze the reasons why Korean female golfers have been successful in securing such a dominant position on the LPGA Tour. The survey used in this study was distributed to Korean players who participated in a professional golf event (State Farm Classic Tournament). The results of this study revealed that hard practice, certain goal, and family support were selected as the most important factors to be success on the LPGA Tour by Korean players.
Key words: golf, marketing, consumer behavior, retail
Introduction
With the development of the internet, it is now possible to easily access international newspaper, magazines, blogs, and other media in order to secure news and information
from around the world. For instance, individuals in the United States who are interested in news about Korea and/or its citizens can go to Korean media outlets
and access information about myriad topics concerning Korea. While finding news through Korean media outlets was fairly easy, finding Korean news stories in
American television news programs or cable networks was relatively difficult and uncommon. (Yes, finding information was difficult) When Chan-Ho Park became
the first Korean Major League Baseball (MLB) to be signed by the Los Angeles Dodgers in 1994, and Se Ri Pak, became the first Korean to win the U.S. Open
Tournament and advance to the LPGA (Ladies Professional Golf Association) Tour in 1998, the Korean people could get more news about them through American television
programs or ESPN (Entertainment and Sport Programming Network) cable program. With South Korea’s economy in shambles in 1998, Chan Ho Park and Se Ri Pak gave
encouragement and hope to Korean people. When Chan Ho Park announced the starting pitcher for the L.A. Dodgers’ game or Se Ri Pak would participated in one of
the LPGA Tour tournaments, Korean television programs and big screens in Seoul city aired these game. As Korean people were watching Park and Pak’s victories
for the Major League baseball game and the LPGA Tour tournaments, Korean people felt some sense of satisfaction from them during the difficult Korean recession
period (16). Most Korean people believed that when these two players were signed to go into a major sports league, they would fail, because of differences related
to skill, physicality, culture, language, food, and a host of other potential challenges. However, Park and Pak overcame these supposed problems and were
very successful in their respective sports. The success of Park and Pak gave great hope to the Korean people to also overcome their serious economic problems
in the late 1990s (16). In addition, as Pak in her rookie season on the LPGA Tour collected four victories (including two major tournaments wins), other
Korean female golfers began to complete and eventually join the LPGA Tour.
As a result of the door opened by Pak and the record of her achievements, South Korea now has the largest international contingent on the LPGA Tour (14). One
of the interesting things about the Korean female golfers on the LPGA Tour is that while the Korean players have a large number of victories, they have not
turned out a dominant player since Pak burst on the scene a decade ago with victories in the 1998 McDonald’s LPGA Championship and the U.S. Women’s Open.
Ten years after Pak’s debut in 1998, 42 Korean players (i.e., Se Ri Pak, Mi-Hyun Kim, Grace Park, Shi-Hyun Ahn, Soo Yeong Kang, etc) are now playing on the LPGA
Tour. Every year, Korean female players are increasing on the LPGA Tour. Nineteen-Koreans (i.e., Se Ri Pak, Mi-Hyun Kim, Grace Park, Hee Won Han, Jeong Jang, etc) have
won 64 LPGA Tour events over the past decade. No other professional sports league in the world has as many Korean players. Only a few Korean female handball players
are playing on professional teams in Japan and Europe, and only one basketball player has played for the WNBA (Women’s National Basketball Association). The
numerous Korean players and victories on the LPGA Tour is a unique phenomenon. One may wonder why Korean female players are so prevalent on the LPGA Tour and
so good at the sport of golf. Therefore, the purpose of this study was to analyze the reasons why Korean female golfers have been successful in securing such
a dominant position on the LPGA Tour.
The History of the LPGA and the KLPGA
The Ladies Professional Golf Association (LPGA) Tour is the longest running women’s professional sport association (1). The LPGA Tour was founded in 1950
by 13 members (1). Based on the LPGA Tour history, in its first season, the LPGA Tour hosted 14 tournaments with $50,000 in total prize money. In 1959,
the LPGA Tour included 26 tournaments and played for more than $200,000 in total prize money. The LPGA Tour featured 33 events and prize money of more than $58
million which was the highest ever paid out in LPGA Tour history. The LPGA Tour players competed for an average purse of $1.7 million for the 2008 season (1).
While the LPGA Tour is over a half-century old, the Korean Ladies Professional Golf Association (KLPGA) Tour was founded in 1978. In its first season, the
KLPGA Tour held only one tournament. However, in the 2007 season, the KLPGA Tour hosted 22 tournaments with over $7 million in total prize money. About
1,003 members were registered as active members in 2006, and KLPGA Tour players, such as Se Ri Pak, Mi-Hyun Kim and Shi Hyun Ahn are also playing for the LPGA
Tour (6).
Korean Golf Circumstances
Despite the increasing popularity of golf in the world, golf has not always been a popular sport in Korea. The sport of golf was socially recognized as
a luxury in Korea because most Korean people believed that only wealthy people could participate in golf (8). Koreans have long associated golf with corruption
and greed (2). Government officials with meager salaries could never afford to pay the fairway fees; however they could play golf by receiving bribes (2).
The cost of participating in the sport of golf in Korea is very expensive, at least compared to playing golf in the United States. Compared to golf courses
green fees in the United States, where the average cost of playing an 18-hole is about $36 including cart, Korean golf course green fees are about $140 for
an 18-hole (5). Although Korean golf courses often provide better services than that received at typical golf courses in the United States (i.e., caddies, locker
rooms, saunas, other amenities), spending over $150 for participating in a one-time leisure activity is not easy money to come by for median-low income level people
in Korea. However, the golfing population has gradually increased from the late 1990’s. Shin and Nam (16) posit that since 1998, the number of Korean golfers
is gradually increasing because of the economic downturn in Korea which has forced golf courses to decrease membership and green fees. In 2004, there were
approximately 176 golf courses in Korea. According to Korea Golf Index (7), golf participation population was about 2.5 million.
Korean LPGA Tour Players
Ok Hee Ku is a pioneer of Korean women’s golf. She won 19 tournaments in Korea since 1980 and won 23 international tournaments since 1985. Ok-Hee Ku has mostly
played in Korea and Japan. Ok-Hee Ku was the first Korean winner on the LPGA Tour. She won at the 1998 LPGA Standard Register Turquiose Classic Tournament.
She had the record of the most wins in a single season until it was broken by Ji Yai Shin in 2007 (13). Woo-Soon Ko was the first player who won twice on
the LPGA Tour. She won at the Toray Japan Queen Cup in both 1994 and 1995 (17). Ten years later, Ok-Hee Ku won on the LPGA Tour, Se Ri Pak advanced to the LPGA
Tour and won two major tournaments (U.S. Women’s Open and LPGA Championship) and won two other tournaments during her rookie season. Pak won total 24 tournaments
on the LPGA Tour and six victories on the KLPGA Tour since 1996. In addition, Pak was inducted into the World Golf Hall of Fame in 2007. After Pak advanced
to the LPGA Tour, other Korean female golfers were also challenged to join the LPGA Tour because they gained confidence watching Pak’s successful entry into
the professional tournaments. Largely because of Pak’s achievements, South Korea now has the largest international contingent on the LPGA Tour. Ten years after
Se Ri Pak’s debut, 42 Korean players (not counting Korean-American women like Christina Kim or Michelle Wie), which is 23% of total players (179 LPGA players)
and 50% of international players from Korea in 2007 season, are playing on the LPGA Tour. Nineteen Koreans have won 57 LPGA Tour events, but 44 of those were
from four players: Pak (24), Mi Hyun Kim (eight), Grace Park (six) and Hee-Won Han (six) (18). From 1998 to 2007, five Korean players were named as Rolex Rookie
of the Year including Se-Ri Pak, Mi-Hyun Kim, Hee Won Han, Shi Hyun Ahn, and Seon Hwa Lee. Only three American players, one Mexican, and one Brazilian player
were named Rookie of the Year.
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Determining the success factors of Korean players on the LPGA Tour has not been easily accomplished. Shin and Nam (16) tried to explain the social structural
of Korean golfers’ success. They studied the golfing boom in Korea, Korean family structure, the goal-oriented nature of Korean people, the Korean psyche, and
other possible factors for success. One of the interesting issues was coming from Shin and Nam’s study related to the Korean family structure. According
to These scholars, one of the reasons the Korean players can focus and devote themselves to golf is the close involvement of parents, because Korean family
members usually live together in a single household until the children marry. This lengthy period of living together develops strong and close relationships
between parents and children. As Korean young female golfers come to the U.S. to learn golf or participate in a tournament, their father or mother, or both
of them, come to the U.S. together to fully support them. Therefore, young Korean players can play well and feel comfortable staying with their parents in a foreign
country. Usually, Korean players fathers’ roles are that of coach, caddy, adviser, manager or driver during the season. Their mothers are doing such things as
cooking Korean food or doing laundry for their daughter.
Lee, Kim, and Lee (9) credited factors such as Korean parents’ passion for education for their children, corporate sponsorships of players, and early golf education
as the sources of Korean female golfers’ successes on the LPGA Tour. Lee, et al. (9) explained that getting corporate sponsorships for players is one of
the most important factors in playing golf well on the Tour. According to Norwood (12), golfers need a minimum of $150,000 a year to play on the PGA Tour, $100,000
for the Champions Tour which is for Senior players, $75,000 for the LPGA Tour, $55,000 for the Nationwide Tour which is the developmental tour for the PGA
Tour. However, international players need at least $100,000 to play on the LPGA Tour because of international flight fares, staying at hotels and eating food
with their parents, tutoring in English, and other expenses. For example, an LPGA Tour player normally needs about $2,000 for travel, hotels, and meals per
event. In addition, a player should pay at least $1,000 for the first two rounds to her caddie. If a player makes the cut and plays three and four rounds of
the event, she needs to pay more to the caddie. Then, a player needs at least $5,000 to break-even for the event after receiving prize money and taxing. If
a player plans to participate in 20 events per year, she needs about $100,000 for the season. Therefore, players need to get corporate sponsors to be able
to play well on the LPGA Tour under stable financial conditions.
Recently, another study examined the success factors of Korean female professionals on the LPGA Tour. Ramstad (14) believed that hard practice, a passion for golf,
and family structures have led to Korea’s having the world’s best women golfers. In addition, Korean government’s elite sport system for young athletes and strong
spiritual strength are major reasons for their success on the LPGA Tour (9,11). A number of researchers have also suggested that culturalism, spiritual strength,
and sport globalization are added factors to the success (3,10). Korean LPGA Tour golfers had strong mental power and more confidence rather than do any
other LPGA players (9). Lee et al., (9) looked at a socio-cultural analysis on the success of Korean players on the LPGA Tour and Shin & Nam (16) looked
at the case of Korean players on the LPGA Tour as approaching to socio-cultural issues such as gender roles, culture, and sport. Lee et al., (9) anticipated
factors such as Korean parents’ passion for education for their children, corporate sponsorships of players, and early golf education as the sources of Korean female
golfers’ successes on the LPGA Tour, but never before has been studies to approach to experimental studies about the success factors of Korean LPGA players. This
research will be asked one question to Korean LPGA players that what is/are the most important factor/s to survive on the LPGA Tour. Therefore, the purpose
of this study is to analyze the reasons why Korean female golfers have been successful in securing such a dominant position on the LPGA Tour..
METHODS
Sample and data collection
In order to accomplish the goals of this study, there was a need to secure the involvement of Korean players on the LPGA Tour. Therefore, this study was conducted
in Springfield, IL, where the 2007 LPGA State Farm Classic tournament was held. A total of 145 players participated in this tournament. A questionnaire was
distributed to Korean players at the practice putting green and driving range. Twenty-five of 26 potential Korean players at the tournament event participated
in this survey for a response rate of 96%. The golfers who participated in this study were asked to answer one question. A total of 25 out of 26 Korean players
responded and only one player refused to answer a question because of practice. (Total 31 participated in the tournament, not survey. I distributed this questionnaire
to 26 players).
Instrumentation
Based on the review of academic literature (5,9,16) and the accounts in traditional media outlets (i.e., newspapers, magazines) that examined, Korean golfers’ success
factors, a questionnaire was developed that included comprised of 10 factors (hard practice, family support, sponsorship, Korean athlete elite education
system, confidence, turning professional early, the Korean chopstick culture, competitive Korean social circumstance, certain goals, and a passion to play
golf) in one question to find out which factors most influenced Korean players to achieve success on the LPGA Tour. After collection of the data, the analysis
of the results involved frequency counts and descriptive tabulations. For instance, “1” was a hard practice, “2” family support, “3” Sponsorship, “4” Korean elite
athlete system, “5” confidence, “6” Turned professional early, “7” Korean chopstick culture, “8” competitive Korean social circumstance, “9” certain goal, and “10”
passion to golf. The research question was to select the top three reasons why Korean female golfers have been successful in securing such a dominant position
on the LPGA Tour.
RESULTS
The study found that hard practice was the first reason for success on the LPGA Tour. 22 Korean players selected “1” (hard practice) as the top reason for dominating on the LPGA Tour. The second reason from 18 out of 25 Korean players was “9” (certain goals) and 15 players answered that “2” (Family support) was one of the top three reasons for success on the LPGA Tour. Korean players marked “10” (passion for golf) as the fourth reason by players. Four out of 26 players selected “6” (turned professional early). Six Korean players were selected “7” (Korean culture, two players), “8” (competitive Korean social circumstance, two players), and “5” (confidence, two players). Interestingly, only two players marked sponsorship or the Korean Athlete Elite Education System. Therefore, based on these results, sponsorship, Korean Athlete Elite Education System, competitive Korean Social Circumstance, the Korean Chopstick Culture, and confidence were not important factors to success on the LPGA Tour for Korean players. This study suggested that the social phenomenon or Korean culture was not the important factor but rather the individual’s talent or effort (hard practice, certain goal, and passion to golf) to success on the LPGA Tour.
DISCUSSION
Lee et al., (9) anticipated factors such as Korean parents’ passion for education for their children, corporate sponsorships of players, and early golf education as the sources of Korean female golfers’ successes on the LPGA Tour. However, this study found that hard practice, certain goal, and family support are the
most important factors to success on the LPGA Tour. This result described that individual’s skills, efforts, and abilities are more important factors than other factors (i.e., sponsorships, Korean chopstick cultures, or competitive Korean social circumstances).
This study also found that family support was also important factor to success on the LPGA Tour. Shin & Nam (16) also anticipated that family support is the one of the important factor. This result will help to young Korean golfers who are trying to advance to the LPGA Tour. If young Korean female golfers follow
the success factors which were selected by Korean LPGA players who advanced the LPGA Tour since 1998, young Korean female golfers might success easier than ever on the LPGA Tour. As noted above, hard practice, certain goal, and family support were the top three reasons to success on the LPGA Tour.
There are a number of limitations that should be considered when interpreting the results of the study. First this study used only one question to answer. One question to answer might not be generalized on the result. Future study should consider several questions to find the factors. Another limitation of
this study was sample size. This study collected twenty five samples. Total 42 Korean LPGA Tour players were playing for the LPGA Tour in 2007. Therefore, future study should also consider collecting more samples at the LPGA Tour tournaments which is the most Korean players participate in.
CONCLUSIONS
This study was to analyze the reasons why Korean female golfers have been successful in securing such a dominant position on the LPGA Tour. This study found that individual’s skills, efforts, and abilities are more important factors than other factors such as sponsorships, Korean chopstick cultures, or competitive Korean social circumstances.
APPLICATIONS IN SPORT
The significance of these finding is related to the work of sport marketing professionals. With the increasing numbers of Korean female golfers on the LPGA Tour, the LPGA Tour needs to consider Korean players as a marketing strategy. According to Blauvelt (4), the largest percentage of the LPGA Tour TV rights fees came from South Korea. In 1998, the majority of LPGA Tour TV rights came from the U.S. because there had been no Korean players on the LPGA Tour at that time. In addition, the LPGA Tour might consider using a Korean language version online as a way of increasing international traffic, because many Korean fans are visiting the LPGA Tour official website to check Korean players’ stats and information. If the LPGA Tour put products related to Korean players on the online pro shop, the sales of merchandise might greatly increase due to Korean fans. As many Korean players are playing on the LPGA Tour, Korean companies might want to sponsor the LPGA Tour. Before 1998 season, there had been no Korean sponsor on the LPGA Tour. However, since 1998, Cheil Jedang and Samsung (both of which are major corporations in South Korea) took title sponsors for inaugural events and regular tour tournaments. Koron also signed as title sponsor of Koron-LPGA cross-cultural professional development program. This program was designed to help all LPGA Tour players be successful on the LPGA Tour. Therefore, if the LPGA Tour focuses on increasing marketing around Korean players, Korean fans, TV right fees, sponsors, etc will increase and make more revenue for the LPGA Tour.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
None
REFERENCES
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TABLE 1
The LPGA Rookie of the Year from 1998 to 2007
Year | Name | Nationality |
1998 | Se Ri Pak | Korea |
1999 | Mi Hyun Kim | Korea |
2000 | Dorothy Delasin | U.S. |
2001 | Hee Won Han | Korea |
2002 | Beth Bauer | U.S |
2003 | Lorena Ochoa | Mexico |
2004 | Shi Hyun Ahn | Korea |
2005 | Paula Creamer | U.S. |
2006 | Seon Hwa Lee | Korea |
2007 | Angela Park | Brazil |
TABLE 2
Korean players’ success factors on the LPGA Tour
Factors |
The total number of times listed(For |
Hard Practice (“1”) | 22 |
Certain Goal (“9”) | 18 |
Family Support (“2”) | 15 |
Passion to Golf (“10”) | 7 |
Turned Professional Early (“6”) | 4 |
Confidence (“5”) | 2 |
Korean Chopstick Culture (“7”) | 2 |
Competitive Korean Social Circumstance (“8”) | 2 |
Korean Athlete Elite Education System (“4”) | 1 |
Sponsorship (“3”) | 1 |
Female Athletes and Eating Disorders
Abstract
Sports should prevent athletes from having eating disorders not develop eating disorders. There is evidence that female athletes are at a risk of developing disordered eating. The purpose of this study was to find how prevalent eating disorders are in female athletes and examine factors that may have a relationship with eating disorders.
A questionnaire containing two instruments was distributed to volunteer female athletes at a Midwestern university. The EAT 26 was used to measure the prevalence of eating disorders. The ATHLETE questionnaire was used to inquire some factors that may have a relationship with eating disorders among athletes. Results showed 14.3% of the respondents scored a 20 and above on the EAT 26 and thus considered at risk of having an eating disorder. The ATHLETE questionnaire showed that there were some significant negative correlations between the EAT 26 score and participant’s feelings about their body, feelings about sports, feelings about performance, and feelings about eating. The negative correlations meant that the more the participants scored high on their feelings about their body, sports, performance, and eating, the less likely they scored low on the EAT 26, indicating they did not have a risk of an eating disorder.
This study implies that when athletes feel good about their body, sport, performance and their eating, the less likely they will have an eating disorder. This study makes an important contribution in understanding female athletes and eating disorders as well as factors that may have a relationship to eating disorders in female athletes.
Description of Phases and Discrete Events of the Lacrosse Shot
Abstract
The lacrosse shot is a vital skill of the offensive player. Despite the growth of the sport of lacrosse, there is a paucity of research on describing the biomechanics of lacrosse specific skills. The purpose of this commentary is to describe the phases and discrete events during a lacrosse shot. Phases are logical groups of movements used to accomplish a common goal whereas discrete events are specific actions that occur during a movement. For the purpose of this commentary, the lacrosse shot described is one that is taken with the intent of shooting as fast as possible. Through inspection of practice, game, and publically available video (30-1000 Hz) for a variety of ability and ages, this lacrosse shot can be described using the following phases: Approach, crank-back, stick acceleration, stick deceleration, follow through, and recovery. Each phase is defined by specific discrete events that indicate the beginning/ending of the phase. This paper forms a frame work for research on the lacrosse shot as well as coaching tips for enhancement of the shot. The end-goal of this work is to assist coaches and players in identifying the critical features of the lacrosse shot that are important for achieving a high-velocity and accurate shot.
Introduction
Although the sport of lacrosse has a long and rich history, there is a paucity of research on the movements and skills that are part of the game. Participation in lacrosse has grown 10% per year on average from 2001 to 2010 (18). The total increase in number of players (male and female) has grown from 253,931 players in 2001 to 624,593 players in 2010 with the greatest growth in youth and high school levels (18). Overall, youth lacrosse growth has outpaced the growth of any other sport.
Along with this growth has come a need for coaching expertise to teach players critical skills and game play strategy. Interestingly, the sport is lacking in even basic kinematic description of certain key movements. For example, even though some research on lacrosse is emerging on injuries (4, 7, 8, 9, 12), conditioning/testing techniques (11, 15), accuracy (14), passing (13) and shooting (6) kinematics, ball (5), and player (16, 17) characteristics and some early work on teaching lacrosse skills (2, 3), there is no kinematic description of the phases and discrete events of the shot.
It makes sense to develop a description of certain key movements that are part of the shot in order to identify critical features that increase performance and/or skill acquisition. For example, baseball pitching has a strong body of research that includes description of phases and discrete events of the baseball pitch. Kinematic and Kinetic data are often analyzed within a phase in order to compare and contrast different types of pitches, for example (e.g., 10). Presently, there is no such description of the phases and discrete events of the lacrosse shot.
Part of the challenge in forming a model of the lacrosse shot is that there are many different techniques for shooting a lacrosse ball. For example, some players shoot overhand, some underhand, or side arm. Likewise, there are many game situations where the shot technique is unique due to the position of the player shooting as well as the interaction with the defender and/or goalie. For example, players may be positioned just outside the goal crease and will receive a pass and shoot in one continuous motion (i.e., “quick stick”). Likewise, during a game, players are often dodging defenders and shooting on the run while being checked, jumping, and/or having movements hindered in some manner by the defender. For that reason, it is difficult to fit all lacrosse shots into a single descriptive model. Nevertheless, it is important to form a model of the lacrosse shot as a framework for research to identify the critical aspects necessary for an accurate and high speed shot. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to provide a description of the phases and discrete events of the lacrosse shot.
The Lacrosse Shot
For the purpose of this paper, we will describe the phases and discrete events of a situation where a player is shooting at the goal with maximal velocity. In this scenario, the player is allowed to take approach steps. This would be analogous to a player shooting from the perimeter of the box with no defender hindering or restricting movement in any way. This type of shot is common in a game, especially off a fast break when a face off is won or during a man-up situation (i.e., the opposing team is playing with one less defender due to a penalty situation).
To gain an understanding of the kinematics, we reviewed game, practice, and publically available (YouTube) video taken from a wide range of ability and ages of players that used a variety of recording speeds (30-1000 Hz). In these videos, the camera placement was often unique which allowed for viewing the shot from different perspectives. Overall, the movements could be grouped into logical phases consisting of approach, crank-back (wind-up), stick acceleration, deceleration, follow-through, and recovery. We also felt it was important to further break down the crank-back phase into two smaller phases (i.e., A and B) since we think the preparatory movements in each of these sub-phases are important to shot performance.
In order to describe the phases and discrete events of the shot, it is necessary to first define some lacrosse specific terminology. Figure 1 is an illustration of a player in the act of shooting. We will use the term ‘stick’ when referring to the combination of two main equipment components: The shaft and the head. The head is firmly connected to the shaft (however, the head can be removed and placed on a different shaft). In this illustration, a short stick is used. There are times when a player is shooting using a long-pole or goalie stick; in these situations, the phases and discrete events are the same as presented here, but the movements in each phase may be unique due to the characteristics of the stick (e.g., length, mass, moment of inertia).
Figure 1: Illustration of a player in the act of shooting. Top arm, Bottom arm, Drive leg, and Lead leg are all illustrated.
For player specific terminology, we will use the phrase ‘bottom arm’ to refer to the entire limb distal to the shoulder (i.e., upper arm, forearm, hand) in which the hand is gripping the shaft near the end the shaft. We will use the phrase ‘bottom hand’ when referring specifically to the hand of the bottom arm. We will use ‘top arm’ and ‘top hand’ to refer to the arm/hand that grips the shaft between the bottom hand and stick head. A right handed shot is one in which the right arm is the top arm; a left handed shot is one where the left arm is the top arm.
For the lower extremity, we will use the term ‘drive leg’ to refer to the leg that is planted on the ground pushing the player forward. Likewise, we will use the term ‘lead leg’ to refer to the leg that is planted in front of the player while shooting. Analogous terms for ‘lead leg’ are ‘plant leg’ or ‘blocking leg.’ When shooting right handed, the drive leg is the right leg and the lead leg is the left leg (vice versa for shooting left handed).
The phases of the shot and the discrete events separating each phase are described in Table 1 and described in more detail below.
- Approach. The approach begins with the player initiating movement and ends when the foot of the drive leg contacts the ground. During this phase, the player is taking several steps advancing towards the goal with the intent to shoot. The number of steps, the style of the approach (e.g., stepping forward, sideways, backwards, cross-over, hopping, etc.), and the velocity of the approach varies between players. However, what is common among all the approach styles is that it ends when the drive leg contacts the ground.
- Crank back. The crank back is analogous to the wind-up or cocking phase of throwing a ball. This phase consists of the preparatory movements that proceed accelerating the stick (i.e., angular motion) with the intent of releasing the ball towards the goal. The crank back begins with the foot of the drive leg contacting the ground and ends when the top arm reaches maximum elbow flexion. If a 3D motion capture analysis is completed, an alternative ending discrete event would be the moment when stick angular acceleration velocity is continuously in the same direction as during the Stick Acceleration phase (next). We have further sub-divided the crank back phase into two sub-phases (A and B).
o Crank back – A. The Crank back – A phase begins when the foot of the drive leg contacts the ground and ends when the foot of the lead leg contacts the ground. This phase could also be described as a ‘drive step’ when focusing on the lower extremity.
o Crank back – B. The Crank back – B phase begins with lead foot contact and ends when the elbow of the top arm reaches maximum flexion. The movements in this phase are still preparatory movements to accelerating the stick towards the goal and would still be considered ‘wind-up’ movements.
- Stick acceleration. Stick acceleration begins when the elbow of the top arm has reached maximum flexion and then starts extending. This phase ends with ball release. The duration of this phase is very short and dynamic.
- Stick deceleration. Stick deceleration begins once the ball release has occurred and ends when the elbow of the top arm has reached maximum extension.
- Follow-through. The follow-through phase begins when the top arm has reached maximum extension and ends when trunk rotation has been terminated.
- Recovery. The recovery phase begins with the end of trunk rotation and represents the movements the player needs to make to prepare for the next task.
Table 1: The phases and discrete events that describe the lacrosse shot.
Figure 2 is an illustration of the discrete events for the lacrosse shot in a time lapse sequence. Although this gives a good visual of the separation of phases, the figure is limited in that it does not give a sense of the duration of each phase. It would be helpful through future research to document the timing of the phases for different skill levels as well as when comparing left and right handed shots of an individual player.
Figure 2: Phases (bottom) and Discrete Events (top) of the lacrosse shot.
Discussion
The intent of creating a model of the phases and discrete events for the lacrosse shot is to create a framework for research as well as constructing coaching tips for the enhancement of shot speed and accuracy. For example, recently we investigated muscle activity of the top and bottom arms during shooting (1). In that study, we examined the muscle activity ½ second before and after ball release. Although it was insightful to identify the different roles of muscles when considering the top and bottom arms and that the wrist flexors/extensors were more active than suspected, the meaningfulness of that work would be more significant if muscle activity were described for each phase. This type of research would provide insight into the importance of timing of muscle contractions that led to a faster shot velocity. Likewise, that research would lead to developing training programs and drills to develop a faster shot that is also accurate.
The advantage of using the phases as a framework for research is that movements that share a common goal are grouped together. For example, it makes sense to understand muscle activity magnitudes and patterns during the crank-back phase of the shot independent of the magnitudes and patterns during the time when the stick is being accelerated to release the ball. In our previous work (1), the ½ second analysis before ball release likely represented muscle activity during both crank back and stick acceleration phases. We now believe that analyzing muscle activity within each phase is important in identifying the critical features of a shot that allow for high ball velocity at release and/or accuracy of the shot. For example, the initial inspection of elbow flexion/extension patterns has lead to the hypothesis that peak elbow flexion velocity during the crank back-B phase is important to shot velocity (1). It may be that elbow flexion preceding elbow extension during the stick acceleration phase elicits a stretch-shortening reflex that increases elbow extension velocity during the acceleration phase. The analogy is that elbow flexion during crank back-B would serve to function similar in the same manner as the downward (i.e., counter-movement) movement during a vertical jump. The implications of this observation, if it is substantiated by research, is that training programs should be focused on strengthening exercises that incorporate elbow flexion preceding rapid extension vs. simply strengthening elbow extension.
By creating terminology for phases and discrete events, not only will research be given a context of which to formulate description of kinematics and kinetics of the shot, coaching tips may be more directed and purposeful. For example, some players might be able to increase shot speed if unnecessary crank-back movements are eliminated and/or the stick is positioned properly prior to the acceleration phase (i.e., during crank back-B phase). Research is needed to compare and contrast the kinematics during each phase between players with different level of skill as well as between shooting left and right handed. This type of research would likely be helpful to coaches and trainers in order that there is a better understanding of which movements to reinforce and which movements should be eliminated during a shot to maximize speed.
It is important to recognize that the phases and discrete event model presented is limited and there may be times when the model needs to be modified. For example, there may be some benefit to studying shot kinematics when there is no approach phase. This would be analogous to shooting while both feet are planted. Although shot speed is not maximized in this scenario, there are game scenarios when players have to shoot quickly vs. trying to shoot as fast as possible. In this case, the discrete events of drive leg and lead leg contact would need to be modified since both feet are in contact with the ground in this scenario. It is hoped that this commentary will stimulate further research on the lacrosse shot and other models of different styles of shooting are created.
There may also be a need to modify the discrete events used to define each phase. For example, depending on the instruments available to analyze the shot kinematics, the start of stick acceleration may be best defined based upon when the angular velocity of the stick is continuously in the direction of the shot (vs. maximum top arm elbow flexion). In order to capture that, either a 2D top-view or 3D kinematic analysis would need to be carried out. In the present model, we based the discrete event identification from a 2D camera placed either to the side or slightly behind/in front of the player.
It is important to also recognize that the discrete events themselves may not be critical movement characteristics. The importance of the specific discrete events, for this paper, is that they define the start and end of a phase. Biomechanical analyses can then be focused on maximum and/or minimum kinematic and kinetic parameters during each phase. We also believe that it makes sense to compare kinematics and kinetics of the upper and lower body at the occurrence of the discrete events. For example, the horizontal stick position at the moments of drive and lead leg contact may be important characteristics of the shot.
Summary
We have presented a model of the phases and discrete events of the lacrosse shot along with basic terminology (e.g., top arm, top hand, bottom arm, bottom hand, drive leg, lead leg) that can be used when describing movement characteristics during the lacrosse shot. The phases represent groups of movements that share a common goal that contributes to shot speed. Each phase is separated by a discrete event, which is a specific event that occurs in a brief moment in time. In the context of shooting the ball for to achieve maximum velocity, we described the shot using the approach, crank-back (A and B sub-phases), stick acceleration, stick deceleration, follow through, and recovery phases. This model will provide a frame work for lacrosse directed research as well as providing a context for coaching tips to improve shot speed.
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