Sports Facilities – Page 9 – The Sport Journal

Retaining Current Vs. Attracting New Golfers: Practices among the Class A Carolinas Professional Golf Association Membership

Submitted by: Dr. Michael Latta, Dr. Albert J. Taylor, Dr. Mark Mitchell & Charles Thrash

Abstract

Golf rounds declined in the U.S. from 2001 to 2004. The southeast region of the country has started to show increases in golf rounds. A possible explanation for this turn-around can be found in the theory of reasoned action. A survey among Professional Golf Association Class A Members in the Carolinas section of the PGA shows the utility of retaining current avid golfers is greater than the utility of attracting new golfers. Implications for managing golf clubs nationally are discussed.

Introduction

The golf industry in the U.S. has recently been stagnant or declining in the number of rounds of golf played annually. The National Golf Foundation (NGF) has reported a national decline from 2001 to 2004 of -4.5% (NGF, 2004). A similar trend (-4.3%) has been observed in the southeast region during that period. Some observers (Graves, 2006; Harrack, 2006) have suggested that concentrating on getting avid golfers to play more rounds is a better approach than trying to attract new golfers to a club.

More recently, the NGF (ngf.org, 2007) is reporting a national upturn in golf rounds of +0.8% with the southeast region showing a robust growth of +4.5%. The question of why the southeast region is doing so well is one of management priorities. The theory of reasoned action (Hawkins, Mothersbaugh, and Best, 2007) provides a framework for understanding how managers of business enterprises make decisions. Professional Golf Association (PGA) members who run golf club enterprises are no different than the chief executive officer of a Fortune 500 company in the decisions they need to make. A business manager needs to identify how to grow the business and make a profit. Operational goals have varying priority and utility in this effort, and golf club managers have intensified their commitment to growing rounds of golf (Staw, 1981).

Theory of Reasoned Action

The theory of reasoned action specifies the decision-making task confronting PGA members who manage golf clubs. Historically, psychologists (Baron, 2000), game theorists (Von Neuman and Morgenstern, 1972), sociologists (Homans, 1961), economists (Elster, 1986), and marketers (Johnson and White, 2004) have all embraced theory of reasoned action concepts.

The concepts embodied in the theory of reasoned action include: 1) bounded rationality (only a few evaluative criteria can be considered simultaneously implying limited capacity), 2) making trade-offs (applying the evaluative criteria to viable alternatives in a compensatory way), 3) the superior option is revealed as the one with the highest utility value to the business manager. Thus, the PGA member managing a golf club must decide what is important and which of those important goals will lead to the best business outcome.

The theory of reasoned action has a measurement methodology known as utility calculations (Baron, 2000). The basic concept, evaluative criteria, involves various dimensions, features, or benefits sought in attempts to solve a specific problem, such as reaching operational goals at a golf club. Managerial decisions involve an assessment of one or more evaluative criteria related to the potential benefits or costs that may result from a decision of which goals to pursue.

Thus, evaluative criteria are typically business activities associated with either benefits desired by managers or the costs they must incur. Depending upon the business situation, management evaluative criteria can differ in terms of type, number, and importance. Thus, a study of business management decision making involves an evaluation of both the importance of the business activity and the business performance resulting from specific criteria. Determining an evaluation of business activity options can be accomplished in two ways: 1) direct methods where PGA members are simply asked about the importance and satisfaction with performance concerning business activities they may use in a particular decision situation, and 2) indirect techniques, where it is assumed PGA members will not or cannot state their views on these issues. The approach taken here is direct assessment described below in the methodology.

The purpose of this project was to conduct a survey of PGA Class A professionals who manage golf course enterprises in the CPGA region to determine what their priorities are regarding operational goals they see as related to stimulating growth in rounds of golf played at their clubs.

Hypothesis

It is hypothesized that PGA Class A Members managing golf clubs in the CPGA will consider the utility of retaining current golfers to be larger than the utility of attracting new golfers.

Methodology

The Class A PGA members survey provided data concerning golf course management practices utilizing an e-mail recruitment and VOVICI (formerly WebSurveyor). The issues involved include:

1. Making the questions easy to understand and answer;

2. Measuring the relevant concepts such as importance and performance;

3. Asking appropriate demographic questions;

4. Having a relevant e-mail list;

5. Having a short and effective invitation;

6. Sending the e-mail invitation at an effective time; and

7. Using follow-ups as necessary.

Faculty handled items one through four above and utilized WebSurveyor to create the survey instrument. The e-mail recruiting list came from the PGA; thus it was relatively fresh and accurate. Items five, six, and seven were handled by the students after instruction from faculty.

There were 72 students in two Retail Management classes who participated in fielding the PGA web survey. Each student had a list of approximately 20 PGA members to contact through e-mail. The first round of e-mail invitations produced few completed survey responses without an endorsement letter. The second round of e-mail invitations included an endorsement letter from the Secretary of the Carolinas Section of the PGA. In addition, a specific subject line was provided that said, “A Message from Karl Kimball, Secretary of the Carolinas Section of the PGA.” Students were also required to copy the Retail Management professor on all outgoing e-mails to keep track of their efforts so they could receive course credit and so the PGA respondents could receive a summary of the results after the responses were analyzed.

This approach to survey control ensured that e-mail invitations were sent out in a timely fashion, had an appropriate and inviting subject line, included an endorsement by an appropriate source, and offered an incentive for participation in the form of a summary of the results (Goodman, 2006). As a result, 107 completed surveys were available for analysis.

Measuring business managerial judgments of the importance of and satisfaction with performance on specific operational goals can include rank ordering scales, Semantic Differential scales, or Likert Scales. Likert Scales were used here.

Using a Likert Scale to measure importance and satisfaction with performance against operational goals in the theory of reasoned action applied to golf club management comes in the form of a calculated utility score. Here, utility is defined as the product of each operational goal’s rated importance score and its rated satisfaction with performance score measured on a Likert Scale. For this study, it is the importance and satisfaction score associated with retaining current golfers as well as attracting new golfers using the Importance and Satisfaction Likert Scales below.

Importance

5 = Extremely Important
4 = Somewhat Important
3 = Neutral
2 = Not Very Important
1 = Not Important At All

Satisfaction with Performance

5 = Very Satisfied
4 = Somewhat Satisfied
3 = Neutral
2 = Somewhat Dissatisfied
1 = Very Dissatisfied

In addition to measuring importance and satisfaction with performance concerning retaining and attracting golfers to the club, a series of demographic items were included in the survey such as type of course, golf population served, tenure of the course manager as a Class A Member, and the time at the current club spent by the Class A Member of the PGA.

Results

Sample Characteristics

The results of the demographic items appear below and indicate the survey produced a wide variety of clubs where the PGA members are located.

Type of Course: The majority of PGA members were at either private (34.7%) or semi-private courses (28.7%), with some at public courses (17.8%), resorts (11.9%), or other type of courses (6.9%).

Golfing Population Served: Almost half of the PGA members described their golfing population as mostly permanent residents (49.5%) with few serving either mostly out-of-town visitors or mostly part-time residents (6.9% each), while close to a third (30.7%) have a golfing population balanced among these three groups.

Tenure as a PGA Class A Member: Few PGA members in the survey have been in Class A for 5 years or less (8.9%) or between 6 and 10 years (14.9%). Almost half have been in Class A between 11 and 20 years (48.5%) and less than a third have been in Class A for more than 20 years (27.7%).

Time Served at Current Club: Over a third of these Class A members have been at their current club for either 2 to 5 years (37.6%) or more than 10 years (38.6%). A minority have been in place either 6 to 10 years (18.8%) or 1 year or less (5.0%).

Importance of Retaining Current Golfers and Attracting New Golfers

The results for the importance of reaching the operational goals of attracting new golfers and retaining current golfers appear in Table 1. PGA members rated both operational goals as extremely important.

Table 1: Means and Standard Deviations for Operational Goal Importance

Operational Goals	Mean Response	Standard Deviation
Attracting New Golfers	4.64	0.622
Retaining Current Golfers	4.80	0.531

Satisfaction with Performance in Retaining Current Golfers and Attracting New Golfers

Results for satisfaction with performance with operational goals appear in Table 2. PGA members were somewhat satisfied with performance against the two operational goals.

Table 2: Means and Standard Deviations for Satisfaction with Performance in Reaching Operational Goals

Operational Goals	Mean Response	Standard Deviation
Attracting New Golfers	4.10	0.572
Retaining Current Golfers	4.19	0.741

Utility of Retaining Current Golfers and Attracting New Golfers

Results for the calculated utility scores for the two operational goals appear in Table 3. A paired-t test was done on the mean responses for the two operational goals and indicates retaining current golfers has significantly higher utility to the PGA members compared to attracting new golfers (t [90] = -2.44, p <.02 two-tailed).

Table 3: Means and Standard Deviations for Utility in Reaching Operational Goals

Operational Goals	Mean Response	Standard Deviation
Attracting New Golfers	19.02	3.85
Retaining Current Golfers	20.09	4.32

A final issue concerns whether or not reaching these operational goals is producing an increase in rounds played and how that utility is realized and that increase is accomplished.

Change in Rounds Played

A series of survey items dealing with number of rounds played per year at the club was also included. These items included total number of rounds played, number of rounds at a discounted price, number of rounds as part of a golf and lodging package, and number of complementary rounds. Table 4 shows the change in number rounds reported by the PGA members.

Table 4: Percentage Reporting Changes in Rounds Played

Percentage Reporting Changes in Rounds Played	Increasing	Stable	Declining
Number of Rounds Played Per Year	45.9%	42.9%	11.2%
Number of Rounds at a Discounted Price	24.4%	50.0%	25.6%
Number of Rounds as Part of Golf and Lodging Package	22.8%	63.3%	13.9%
Number of Complimentary Rounds Played	6.5%	76.3%	17.2%

The net percentage of PGA members reporting change in rounds played can be found by subtracting the percentage reporting a decline from the percentage reporting an increase in the number of rounds while ignoring those who are stable. Thirty-five percent of the PGA members reported net rounds are increasing. This increase was attributed to golf and lodging packages bringing more golfers to the course (+9%). In addition, declines in discounted (-1%) and complementary rounds (-11%) were reported. The figure below displays these results for the net percentage of PGA Class A Members reporting changes in net rounds played.

Net Percentage Reporting Change in Rounds Played
Conclusions and Implications:

Figure 1. Net Percentage Reporting Change in Rounds Played

Conclusions and Implications

Support for the hypothesis that CPGA Class A Members would show more utility for getting additional rounds from current golfers compared to attracting new golfers indicates they have solved the problem of declining rounds of golf in accordance with the theory of reasoned action. These club professionals realized that getting additional rounds of golf from golfers who patronize their clubs is more effective than trying to attract new golfers with discounted rounds and complementary rounds. Any costs associated with golf and lodging packages were more than compensated for by a substantial increase in rounds per year.

For the PGA membership to increase rounds nationally, the focus should be on retaining current avid golfers to increase rounds and get them to the club by offering golf and lodging packages and reducing discounted and complementary rounds to attract new golfers. Growth can be restored in this manner for golf rounds in the U.S.

References

Baron, J. (200). Thinking and Deciding, 3^rd edition, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Elster, J. Ed. (1986). Rational Choice. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell.

Fishbein, M. and Ajzen, I. (1975). Belief, Attitude, Intention, and Behavior: An Introduction to Theory and Research. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Goodman, G.F. (2006). Five common email marketing mistakes. http:// www.Entrepreneur.com>

Graves, R. (2006), Golf Ranges Drives Profits: Today’s range is a practice center, learning center, clubfitting center, Etc. PGA Magazine, (August 1), 37-57.

Harack, T. (2006), Pushing forward: A proactive recruitment program can help stimulate stagnant membership roles, Golf Business, 12 (August), 26-27.

Hawkins, D., Mothersbaugh, D., and Best, R. (2007). Consumer Behavior: Building Marketing Strategy, 10^th ed. Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill: Irwin.

Homans, G. (1961). Social Behaviour: Its Elementary Forms. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Johnson, D., and White, J. (2004). A new integrated model of noncompensatory and compensatory decision strategies, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 95, 1-19.

National Golf Foundation (2004), Rounds Played in the United States, 2004 Edition.

National Golf Foundation Press Release (2007), Rounds Played in the United States, 2007, <http://www.ngf.org/cgi/whonews.asp?storyid=191>

Staw, B.M. (1981). The escalation of commitment to a course of action. Academy of Management Review, 6, 577-587.

Von Neuman, J, and Morgenstern, O. (1972). Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

U.S. Sports Academy2016-10-19T11:00:39-05:00March 14th, 2008|Sports Facilities, Sports Management, Sports Studies and Sports Psychology|Comments Off

Professional Team Physicians Beware! Co-employee Status May Not Ipso Facto Confer Tort Immunity

Submitted by: Timothy J. Paterick, Barbara B. Paterick, JD & Timothy E. Paterick, MD, JD

Abstract:

The relationship between a professional athlete, his or her professional sports team, and a team physician is legally complex and has inherent potential for conflict. Although a physician should always consider an athlete’s best interest when determining an athlete’s fitness to participate in competitive sport, a physician also has a responsibility to his or her employer to act in the best interest of the team. The dual role of a team physician results in the potential for conflict if a professional sports team and the professional athlete’s best interests do not coincide. The workers’ compensation co-employee doctrine immunizes a professional sports team from vicarious liability in tort for its team physician’s negligence. Recent judicial opinions and legal commentary suggest that the workers’ compensation law barring tort suits between a professional athlete and a co-employee team physician for injuries caused within the scope of employment should not ipso facto confer absolute tort immunity for a physician. The argument being made is that if a team physician breaches the ethical and legal duty to provide the standard of care, the co-employee doctrine should not provide a shield from tort liability for harm caused to professional athletes. Physicians must be aware of legal opinions surfacing in the literature so they can understand that their most prudent approach, no matter what the circumstance, is to practice in a manner in which a professional athlete’s health interest supersedes all other interests.

Introduction:

Present-day judicial opinions and legal commentary suggest that the absolute tort immunity provided under the co-employee doctrine of workers’ compensation law may need limits to encourage the implementation of medical care that, above all other interests, protects the health and safety of professional athletes. Sport- medicine physicians involved as co-employees in the care of professional athletes must be aware of current opinions and commentary to better understand their risk of liability. The shield of workers’ compensation law may not be a fail-safe defense for employed team physicians. Judicial and legal commentary about tort immunity in the context of the co-employee professional sports physician demonstrates why a prudent approach by all professional team physicians, despite their co-employee status, would be to act as a fiduciary where an athlete’s health interest supersedes all other interests.

The Team Physician and the Professional Athlete

The most frequent claim raised against a team physician by a professional athlete is negligence. Negligence for sports medicine physicians may arise for 1) allegedly failing to diagnose a medical condition in an athlete, 2) failing to appropriately warn an athlete of a medical condition when the condition is diagnosed, or 3) improperly deeming an athlete medically safe for sports competition when a physician knows or should know of an imposing medical condition that should limit or suspend competition.

To establish a negligence claim, an athlete must prove four elements: first, that a duty of care exists between the athlete and the team physician; second, that the team physician has breached that duty; third, that the breach caused harm to the athlete; fourth, that the athlete has sustained injuries that can be quantified into damages.

Physician Duty

The existence of a patient-physician relationship legally establishes a physician’s duty to appropriately diagnose and treat patients. In the environment of sports medicine, this relationship also involves a duty to disclose any material information to an athlete about his or her physical condition and to sufficiently inform an athlete regarding potential risks of participating in the sport. This is, arguably, a variation on the doctrine of informed consent; that is, an athlete must have all available information to make an informed decision to participate in a sport. Team management should expect a sport-medicine physician to discuss with management and athletes the risks and benefits of playing a sport on the basis of a medical evaluation.

Breach

Demonstration of a breach of the duty of care requires establishment of the appropriate standard of care. A team physician should consider only an athlete’s best interest when determining an athlete’s fitness to participate in competitive sports. A physician’s determination should be based on a broad range of variables, including 1) the physical demands and intensity of the sport in relation to an athlete’s unique clinical condition; 2) whether an athlete has previously participated in a sport with similar physical demands; 3) all available clinical, personal, and family history and a comprehensive physical examination of an athlete; 4) available medical organization and national conference guidelines pertinent to participation in competitive sports; 5) the probability and potential severity of adverse health events from sports participation, given an athlete’s unique health status; 6) whether medication, monitoring, or protective equipment could mitigate the potential health risks and support safe sports participation; and 7) in the case of minors and young adults, whether an athlete has the capacity to make an informed decision if risks are present (Krueger v. San Francisco Forty Niners, 1987).

The standard of care has evolved as sports medicine has evolved from general medical practice to specialty practice. Supportive of the theory that sports medicine involves specialized practice and a potentially higher standard of care is the publication of guidelines by medical societies and specialty boards which have articulated medical clearance guidelines for use by clinicians making athletic participation recommendations (Maron et al., 1996). Courts have recognized standards and guidelines by national medical associations as evidence of acceptable medical practice (James v. Woolley, 1988).

Expert medical testimony is necessary to establish a breach of the standard of care. For example, an expert may testify that any treatment that benefits the short-term needs of a team but creates long-term damage to a competitive athlete is a breach of duty to an athlete (Keim, 1999).

Causation

The burden of proof that the breach caused injury or harm is an athlete’s. A physician’s failure to recognize or failure to warn of potential harm must result in injury to an athlete. Causation requires a nexus between a physician’s negligence and the actual damage an athlete has sustained.

Causation may be reviewed at two levels: 1) cause in fact and 2) proximate cause. Cause in fact occurs when a physician’s action is a cause of the actual harm to an athlete. Proximate cause considers whether a physician’s behavior is a substantial factor in causing the harm an athlete may have incurred as a result of a physician’s actions or inactions. For example, an argument can be made that a physician’s failure to identify risk factors for heat stroke was the proximate cause of an athlete’s death (Lapchick, 2006). Alternatively, failure to disclose the extent of an existing injury could be considered the proximate cause of a further injury (Krueger v. San Francisco Forty Niners, 1987).

Damages

Damages may include long-term recovery from an injury and loss of salary or limitations to other work capacity because of inability to play after injury. In the case of an athlete’s death, the claims are typically pursued by an athlete’s estate or surviving kin. It is their responsibility to prove what an athlete’s life may have been worth in order for a court or jury to award damages. Awarding damages is an attempt to make an athlete whole, that is, as though the injury never occurred. Expert medical testimonies, in conjunction with an economic analysis provided by an expert economist, are often necessary to measure damages.

Although negligence is the most frequent claim brought against team physicians, other claims have been successfully and unsuccessfully litigated, including, but not limited to, 1) fraudulent misrepresentation, 2) concealment of medical information, 3) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and 4) when an athlete is not cleared to play, discrimination under the Americans With Disabilities Act (1990) and the Rehabilitation Act (1973). Each of these claims deserves to be evaluated as a unique legal concept, and they are not discussed here.

Is the Shield of Workers’ Compensation Law a Myth for a Physician Employed by a Professional Sports Team?

Interaction of Workers’ Compensation and Tort Law

Workers’ compensation law is state defined. Thus, it varies by jurisdiction. Generally, in the case of an employee injured while acting within the scope of employment, workers’ compensation law is thought to be an efficient and adequate remedy to compensate injured employees without the necessity of proving fault of an employer. The law allows compensation for employees for work-related injuries. In exchange for the absolute requirement to pay injured employees, the law shields employers by setting recovery limits at modest amounts and specifying the remedy provided as the exclusive remedy (Workers’ Compensation Law, 1993). No tort liability is allowed.

A professional athlete is entitled to workers’ compensation benefits for aggravation of an athletic injury caused by the negligent care by a team’s medical personnel. A player whose injury is secondary to negligent medical care or the failure to provide reasonable medical care is barred from recovering tort damages against the team or its employees, including a team physician who has co-employee status (Keim, 1999; Mitten, 2002).

Generally, the exclusivity provided under workers’ compensation law bars all tort claims against physicians employed by professional sports teams. It is likely the defense on which most employed team physicians rely when sued for negligence by an employed athlete.

There is an exception in most jurisdictions for certain common law claims, such as injuries resulting from the fraud or defamation of an athlete by a team physician, team management, or both. Similarly, the exclusivity remedy provisions of the state workers’ compensation laws will not bar a medical malpractice claim against an employer or co-employee team physician for an injury caused by conduct intended to harm an athlete (Hertz, 2001; Mitten, 2002).

Beyond the exceptions carved out for fraudulent and intentional tort claims, some courts’ dissenting opinions, as well as some legal commentaries, argue for the erosion of the shield of workers’ compensation as a fail-safe defense for employed team physicians. One argument is that a special relationship exists between a team physician and a professional athlete, extending the duty of care beyond the duty of a company physician to a company employee. The argument is grounded in the belief that professional sports have elevated economic incentives, and the pressure to win causes a team physician to meet the teams’ immediate needs rather than the health interests of professional athletes. The belief is that potential tort liability creates a legal incentive which urges team physicians not to succumb to the pressures that are inherent in professional sports.

Korey Stringer, a professional football player for the Minnesota Vikings, died from complications of heat stroke during preseason training camp in 2001. His heirs alleged that the Vikings’ team physician provided negligent medical care. In Stringer v. Minnesota Vikings Football Club, LLC (2004), the trial court held that there is no immunity if a co-employee, in this case the team physician, owes a personal duty of care to a fellow employee, namely the football player, which is “not pursuant to the employer’s non-delegable duty to provide a safe workplace.” Thus, the trial court is saying that the employer has a duty to provide a safe workplace for all employees, and beyond that, team physicians have a separate duty of care to football players that goes beyond the owner’s responsibility to provide a safe workplace. Reversing the decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court (Stringer v. Minnesota Vikings Football Club, LLC 2005) subsequently ruled that the Minnesota Vikings team physician’s duty to the professional athlete was fulfilled within the employment relationship and the professional sports team’s effort to provide a safe workplace for its players. Thus, the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that, in the case of Korey Stringer’s death, the team physician did not have a separate duty of care to the football player beyond that of the team owner to provide a safe workplace. The dissenting opinion for the Minnesota Supreme Court expressed doubt that concealing the duty of a co-employee physician under the umbrella of an owner’s responsibility to provide a safe workplace is a reliable legal remedy when a physician co-employee provides medical care to employees. The dissent also articulated a policy argument stating that extending immunity to co-employee physicians would encourage them to neglect their duties. Of note, dissenting opinions do not define the law but can give authority to an argument supporting a change in the law.

The California case of Hendy v. Losse (1990) raised issues that make the absolute immunity of a co-employee team physician less certain. Hendy explored a dual-capacity theory, that is, when an employer has two separate relationships with employees. An employer, normally shielded from tort liability by the exclusive remedy principle, may become liable in tort to an employee if the employer occupies, in addition to its capacity as employer, a second capacity that confers additional obligations. California courts have long recognized that a physician, as an employee of a company, may operate in the dual capacity of co-employee and physician. In Hendy, a professional football player’s malpractice case against the team physician was allowed to proceed at the trial level on the basis of the dual-capacity doctrine. The California Supreme Court (1991) dismissed the claims, holding that the state’s workers’ compensation laws bar tort suits between co-employees for injuries caused within the scope of employment. However, the Supreme Court stated that if a co-employee provides medical care other than that contemplated by the employee’s employment, the physician co-employee no longer enjoys immunity from tort.

Some legal commentators have articulated the belief that if a team physician breaches his or her duty of care to a team’s athletes, the co-employee doctrine should not provide a shield from tort liability. According to Young (2003), “[A]ny notion that a doctor’s co-employee status will shield his liability to a patient he negligently treats should … be removed.” In Mitten’s opinion (2005), “[A] team physician should not have immunity from malpractice merely because he or she is characterized as an ’employee.'”

Conclusions:

Professional sport-teams physicians in charge of clearing professional athletes for competition and treating professional athletes’ injuries have a complex position with unique responsibilities to athletes. A co-employee professional team physician should be mindful of the best interests of athletes and sustain the appropriate standard of care. If physician negligence is alleged, workers’ compensation laws may shield a physician from tort liability arising from injuries occurring in the course of an athlete’s employment, so long as there is no finding of fraudulent or intentional misconduct. However, the dual-capacity doctrine articulated in Hendy, the dissenting opinion from the Minnesota Supreme Court in the Korey Stringer case, and expert legal commentary should give physicians, acting in the co-employee role for professional sports teams, reason to reflect on their potential liability. A prudent approach-in an attempt to reduce potential for tort liability-would be to understand that, despite the co-employee status of team physicians, all the inherent responsibilities of independent contractor physicians, who are not shielded from tort liability, may apply in a court of law, and an athlete’s medical interest should supersede all competing interests.

References:

Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 USC §§1210 et seq; 1990.

California Supreme Court 819 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1991).

Hendy v. Losse, No. D010557. Court of Appeals of California, 4th appellate District, Division One. 231 Cal. App. 3d 1149; 274 Cal. Rptr. 31; 1990.

Hertz, G. (2001). Professional athletes and the law of workers’ compensation: rights and remedies. Law of Professional and Amateur Sports, 2, 15-1.

James v. Woolley. 523 So. 2d 110, 112 (Ala. 1988).

Keim, T. (1999). Physicians for professional sports teams: Health care under pressure of economics and commercial interests. Seton Hall Journal of Sport Law, 9, 139-58.

Krueger v. San Francisco Forty Niners. 189 Cal. App. 3d 823, 2 Cal. Rptr. 579 (1987).

Lapchick, R. E. Dying for the game. Retrieved June 9, 2006, from http://www.northeastern.edu/csss/rel-article22.html.

Maron, B. J., Thompson, P. D., Puffer, J. C., McGrew, C. A., Strong, W. B., Douglas, P. S., et al. (1996). Cardiovascular preparticipation screening of competitive athletes: A statement for health professionals from the Sudden Death Committee (clinical cardiology) and Congenital Cardiac Defects Committee (cardiovascular disease in the young), American Heart Association. Circulation, 94, 850-856.

Mitten, M. J. (2002). Emerging legal issues: A synthesis, summary, and analysis. St John’s Law Rev, 76, 5.

Mitten, M. J. (2005). Team physicians as co-employees: A prescription that deprives professional athletes of an adequate remedy for sports medicine malpractice. St. Louis Univ Law J, 50.

Rehabilitation Act, 29 USC §§504, 794; 1973.

Stringer v. Minnesota Vikings Football Club, LLC. 686 N.W. 2d 545 (Minn. App. 2004).

Stringer v. Minnesota Vikings Football Club, LLC. 705 N.W. 2d 746, 762 (Minn. 2005).

Workers’ Compensation Law 68.13 (1993).

Young, J. D. (2003). Liability for team physician malpractice: A new burden shifting approach. Rutgers L Rec, 27:4.

U.S. Sports Academy2016-10-12T14:53:11-05:00March 14th, 2008|Sports Coaching, Sports Exercise Science, Sports Facilities, Sports Management|Comments Off

The NFL Rookie Cap: An Empirical Analysis of One of the NFL’s Most Closely Guarded Secrets

Submitted by: McDonald P. Mirabile

Abstract:

This article presented an empirical analysis of the relationship between the portion of the “Entering Player Pool” (Rookie Cap) for each of the 32 National Football League franchises and that franchise’s draft selections. Although the formula for determining each franchise’s Rookie Cap is closely guarded by the NFL, the author hypothesized that it should be possible to model the deterministic structure used to calculate franchise spending for each rookie’s contract. The OLS-estimated models revealed statistically significant relationships between groups segmented by draft selection order and each franchise’s Rookie Cap. The model was verified in an out-of-sample test using the Rookie Cap values for the 2007 NFL season. It was found to have a mean absolute percentage error of 2.1%. The implications of these findings were contrary to language in the NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement, as the majority of rookie contracts are implicitly determined by each franchise’s Rookie Cap. The published estimates of each selection’s NFL determined cap value will provide useful bargaining information for rookie contracts.

(more…)

U.S. Sports Academy2020-10-06T08:27:11-05:00March 14th, 2008|Contemporary Sports Issues, Sports Coaching, Sports Facilities, Sports Management|Comments Off

Location Model in the National Football League: Predicting Optimal Expansion and Relocation Sites

Submitted by: Thomas H. Bruggink & Doug Schiz

Abstract:

The National Football League has experienced both expansion and relocation of its franchises in the past decade. It is a dynamic market; the relocation of a NFL franchise is an annual possibility. This study looked at the demographic and economic factors that determine the current locations of NFL teams. The top 50 metropolitan areas were empirically examined to explain why some cities have an NFL team and others do not. These factors included population, per capita income, the number of other sports franchises, and the number of Fortune 500 companies, geographic factors, and television ratings for “Monday Night Football.” This model can identify cities for possible expansion and those that would serve as relocation sites in the future. Special attention was paid to the Los Angeles and New Orleans markets.

Introduction:

The National Football League has experienced a dynamic period of expansion and relocation in the past decade; the league seeks to position itself with the optimal configuration for long-term growth of the professional football market. Although expansion is not a current short-term goal for the NFL, the relocation of weak teams remains an annual possibility.

Moving an existing sports franchise is not new. After the 1995 season, Los Angeles lost both of its football teams. The Rams moved from the old Rose Bowl in Pasadena to the brand-new TWA Dome in downtown St. Louis. The Raiders moved from the Los Angeles Coliseum to the newly renovated Oakland Coliseum. In 1996, the Cleveland Browns moved into a new stadium in Baltimore and became the Ravens. Most recently, the Houston Oilers moved to Tennessee and became the Titans in 1999.

The city of Los Angeles, which lost its chance to gain an expansion team in 2002 to Houston because it was unable to approve financing for a new stadium, remains without a team. Although this leaves the second largest television market without its own team, it also offers a credible relocation threat for existing team owners in their new stadium negotiations with local authorities.¹

Expansion and relocation of franchises in professional sports leagues have been studied for baseball and basketball; however, as far as the researchers know, a location model had never been created for the National Football League. Bruggink and Zamparelli (1999) produced a location model for Major League Baseball. The top 50 metropolitan areas were chosen for the sample. The explanatory variables for the regression model are population, population growth, and per capita income, in addition to the number of other professional sports teams in the area, the number of headquarters for Fortune 500 companies in the area, and the distance to the closest city with a baseball team. As one would expect, all variables had positive coefficients in the regression model. A more recent sports model by Rascher and Rascher (2005) estimated the probability that a particular city will have a National Basketball Association team by using the same core set of variables and adding factors such as the average NBA Nielsen television ratings for each city.

One interesting application of our model was applied to the New Orleans Saints football team. Even before the Hurricane Katrina damage to the Superdome, the owners of the Saints hinted that a move to a new location was in the offing.² Of course, this is the typical ploy to gain public subsidies for a new or improved stadium, but the closure of the Superdome for the 2005 season made this relocation potential very real. The re-scheduled 2005 games found the Saints playing in the welcoming city of San Antonio with capacity attendance at the Alamodome. Although the Saints played the 2006 season in a repaired Superdome, they are in position to pursue one of two options after 2006: 1) stay in New Orleans with a long term city commitment to help build a new or improved stadium, or 2) move to a new location in Los Angeles (Maske and Shapiro, 2005) or San Antonio (Orsborn 2006). Our location model used estimates of New Orleans depopulation to give a perspective on the potential consequences for the city’s viability as a home to a NFL franchise.

Location Model

There are a number of factors that influence the selection of cities for NFL relocation or expansion. Based on demographic and economic factors in the largest 50 metropolitan areas, the researchers constructed a logit model to determine the relationship of these factors (X₁, X₂, X₃, X₄, X₅, X₆, X₇) to the expected conditional probability (P_i) that each city (represented as i) would have one or more NFL teams:

P_i = E (Y_i = 1| X_1i,X_2i, X_3i, X_4i, X_5i, X_6i, X_7i)

where

Y = 1 if metropolitan area has one or more NFL teams; 0 otherwise

X₁ = POP2000 = population in metropolitan area i (millions)

X₂ = POPGROWTH = % population growth of a city the decade before the current team
located in city i (if the city does not have a team, the current
decade of growth is used)

X₃ = INC = income per capita in metropolitan area i ($1000)

X₄ = DISTANCE = distance to closest football franchise city (miles) from city i

X₅ = F500 = the number of Fortune 500 company headquarters in metropolitan area i

X₆ = OTHER/POP2000 = the number of other professional sports teams per million
population in city i (men’s basketball, hockey, and baseball)

X₇ = NIELSEN = “Monday Night Football” Nielsen ratings in metropolitan area i using
the 2002-3 season

The NFL wants to expand or relocate to a metropolitan area with a large and growing population in order to maximize stadium revenues from attendance, concessions, and parking fees. The researchers expected positive coefficients for the population and population growth. In addition to market size, standard microeconomic demand theory suggests that per capita income will be a positive influence. According to a 2003 survey, football fans had the highest median salary in all sports at $55,115 (USA Today, 2003).

The distance to the closest NFL franchise city is a major aspect for the location of a franchise. The NFL does not want all of its teams in one part of the country because there will be interest only in that part of the country, not the whole United States. This is especially important for a sport driven by national television revenues. Furthermore, locating a new franchise close to an existing franchise (generally up to 75 miles) would financially hurt the owner of the latter. The league does not approve of these territorial infringements.

The number of other professional sports teams (baseball, basketball, and hockey) in the metropolitan area can have an impact on the demand for football games. The other sports could be considered substitute goods, or, on the other hand, a measure of fan interest for sports in general (a complement good). Rascher and Rascher (2005) found a negative and significant relationship between the number of other teams and the probability that a city had a professional basketball team. However, Bruggink and Zamparelli (1999) found just the opposite for baseball, supporting the fan intensity argument. The difference could be in overlapping the season with other sports. Basketball overlaps the most, competing with hockey, football, and the beginning of baseball. Baseball and football face less severe overlaps, and at times have the season to themselves.

Another location factor is the number of headquarters for Fortune 500 corporations in the metro area (F500). NFL owners are allowed to keep all the stadium revenue from luxury box receipts (i.e., no revenue sharing), and corporations are the largest patrons of these seating sections (which are also called corporate sky boxes). This is one of the reasons that owners desire new stadiums, because it affords them an opportunity to maximize the number of luxury box seats.

The last location factor is the number of households in the metro area watching football on television. In this study, the average Nielsen ratings³ for the 2002-3 “Monday Night Football” games are used for the 50 metropolitan areas. “Monday Night Football” games were selected because the same game is watched by the entire nation, whether a city has a NFL team or not. Nielsen ratings are particularly important for the National Football League because there are no local television contracts, only a national contract divided equally among the 32 teams, and it is the single largest source of income.

Empirical Results and Simulation:

The preliminary estimation of the model included the top 50 metropolitan areas (those with populations of approximately one million or more). About half had one or more teams. However, with Los Angeles in the data set the estimated coefficient of the population variable is negative instead of positive. This preliminary model showed how sensitive the population factor is to the inclusion of Los Angeles (by far, the largest metro area in the sample that has no team). As discussed earlier, league owners receive value from having a viable city without a team because it poses a credible threat for a team to relocate, allowing them to negotiate with local government for sports subsidies. In this sense, the no-team status of Los Angeles is not a market outcome but a strategic ploy. When Los Angeles was excluded, the researchers actually had a sample of cities that was more representative of market conditions. The estimated model without Los Angeles had a positive coefficient for population and a better overall fit. This sensitivity is the reason the researchers relied on this as the final model for the predictions.

In this study, the researchers: 1) examined the statistical results, 2) tested the within-sample predictions for each city, 3) determined a list of viable cities for the NFL expansion or relocation, and 4) ran a simulation on the effect of New Orleans’ recent depopulation on its viability of retaining its football team.

Table 1 shows all the statistical results for the fitted model using the logistic function shown below. The logistic function is the natural log of the odds ratio in favor of a metropolitan area having a team (P = 1 if the metro area has a team, P = 0 if it does not). There are three advantages to using the logistic curve rather than an ordinary least squares regression: (1) the predicted probabilities for a city having a team are constrained to lie between 0 and 1 for the logistic curve, whereas for a linear regression model the predicted probabilities could exceed 1 or fall short of zero, both of which are impossible values, (2) the slope coefficients in the logit model are more realistic than ordinary least square because they vary in magnitude, depending on the size of the corresponding explanatory variable, and (3) the variance is more constant in the logit model than with ordinary least squares, which makes the t-tests more valid.

log

(P / (1-P))

-17.6 + 0.98 POP2000 – 0.0063 POPGROWTH + 0.21 INC + 0.114 DISTANCE +
0.4573 F500 + 0.33 NIELSEN + 3.656 OTHER/POP2000

Table 1: Location Model

Logit Model

Included observations: 49
Convergence achieved after 8 iterations

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Stat	Prob.

C	-17.5895	8.8715	-1.983	0.0474
POP2000	0.9754	1.1482	0.849	0.3956
POPGROWTH	-0.0063	0.0363	-0.174	0.8619
INC	0.2096	0.2096	1.000	0.3173
DISTANCE	0.0114	0.0087	1.315	0.1884
F500	0.4573	0.2747	1.665	0.096
NIELSEN	0.3347	0.2401	1.394	0.1634
OTHER/POP2000	3.6594	2.3024	1.589	0.112

Mean dependent	0.59184	S.D. dependent	0.4966
S.E. of regression	0.27766	McFadden R-s	0.6609

All the coefficients but one have the correct sign. Four of the seven are statistically significant at a 10% level or better in a one-tailed test. The statistically significant coefficients are for the following variables: the distance from the nearest NFL city, the number of other sports teams in the city per million population, the “Monday Night Football” television ratings, and the number of Fortune 500 headquarters in the city. The income variable missed being significant at only a 10% level. The only high correlation among the independent variables is between F500 and POP2000. This may explain why the coefficient of POP2000 does not appear statistically significant.

Table 2 shows the standardized coefficients in the logit model. Standardized coefficients scale the coefficients in the model using the standard deviations of the each independent variable and the dependent variable. By this method, the Fortune 500 and population variables have the most effect on whether a city has a team or not. Each have more the twice the size and therefore twice the impact than the other standardized coefficients. Distance and the presence of other professional teams rank next in importance followed by Nielsen ratings and income.

Table 2: Standardized Coefficients

Variable		Standardized Coefficient
F500		11.33
POP2000		7.35
DISTANCE		3.01
OTHER/POP2000		2.56
NIELSEN		1.99
INC		1.89
POPGROWTH		-0.0024

Table 3 shows the results of the in-sample forecasts. The logit model correctly predicted the current NFL franchise status in 45 out of the 50 metropolitan areas. The missed predictions included Los Angeles (this outcome is made using an out-of-sample prediction), San Antonio, Salt Lake City, Buffalo, and Jacksonville. For the first three misses, the model predicted the cities would have teams but they do not (for our purposes, any probability greater than 0.50 means the city should have a team). Buffalo and Jacksonville have teams but the model predicted that they do not.

Table 3: Predictions* All predictions are within-sample, except for the out-of-sample forecast for Los Angeles.

Metropolitan Area	Actual Outcome	Probability of a Team
New York	1	1.00
Los Angeles*	0	1.00
Chicago	1	1.00
Washington- Baltimore	1	1.00
SF- Oakland-San Jose	1	1.00
Philadelphia	1	1.00
Boston	1	1.00
Detroit	1	1.00
Dallas	1	1.00
Houston	1	1.00
Atlanta	1	1.00
Miami	1	0.91
Seattle	1	1.00
Phoenix	1	0.95
Minnesota	1	1.00
Cleveland	1	0.99
San Diego	1	0.98
St. Louis	1	0.99
Denver	1	1.00
Tampa	1	0.79
Pittsburgh	1	1.00
Portland	0	0.22
Cincinnati	1	0.78
Sacramento	0	0.43
Kansas City	1	0.97
Green Bay-Milwaukee	1	1.00
Orlando	0	0.09
Indianapolis	1	0.60
San Antonio	0	0.56
Norfolk	0	0.03
Las Vegas	0	0.25
Columbus	0	0.39
Charlotte	1	0.80
New Orleans	1	0.85
Salt Lake City	0	0.51
Austin, TX	0	0.05
Nashville	1	0.85
Providence	0	0.00
Raleigh-Durham	0	0.09
Hartford	0	0.04
Buffalo	1	0.17
Memphis	0	0.35
West Palm	0	0.12
Jacksonville	1	0.03
Grand Rapids	0	0.00
Oklahoma City	0	0.04
Richmond	0	0.05
Greenville	0	0.00
Dayton	0	0.00
Birmingham	0	0.10

Table 4 shows the top five candidate cities to have teams either through expansion or relocation. The logit model predicted that Los Angeles would have a team with a probability of 1.0, which is not surprising given that it once had two teams. However, if NFL owners continue to use the city as a credible threat, and if a new stadium is not in the package for the Los Angeles team, then the other cities in this list deserve consideration. Next is San Antonio, where the Saints have already tested the waters with great success. The logit model estimated that San Antonio had a probability of 0.56 in obtaining an NFL franchise either through relocation or expansion. Salt Lake City is a more marginal candidate at 0.51, and the model suggests that both Sacramento and Columbus are not viable candidates (their predicted probabilities are less than 0.5).

Table 4: Predicted Probabilities for Candidate Cities from the Sample

CITY	PREDICTED PROBABILITY
Los Angeles	1.0
San Antonio	0.56
Salt Lake City	0.51
Sacramento	0.43
Columbus	0.39

League expansion and the open Los Angeles market have been discussed in the NFL by both the outgoing Commissioner Paul Tagliabue (NFL.com, 2004) and the new Commissioner Roger Goodell (Farmer, 2007), but there is no short term timetable for expanding to a 33^rd team or moving a troubled franchise there. Nonetheless, the league has been working with investor groups representing sites at the Los Angeles Coliseum and the Rose Bowl in Pasadena (NFL.com 2004). Besides New Orleans, Buffalo and Jacksonville are mentioned as cities that might lose their franchises (The Sports Economist, 2006).

Do the Saints Go Marching Back In?

Under pre-Katrina conditions, New Orleans had a probability of 0.85 for its in-sample prediction for having a team (see Table 3). But this changes when the potential depopulation of New Orleans is considered. The extensive damage to the city of New Orleans was not only to the industrial and commercial structures. Whole residential sections of the city were destroyed and depopulated.

The model prediction included depopulation in two parts. First, the New Orleans metropolitan area population was reduced by 10, 20, 25, and 30%.⁴ Second, the Nielsen television ratings were correspondingly reduced. No adjustment was made to the Fortune 500 headquarters because New Orleans has only one such company, Entergy Corporation, and it will remain in the area.

Table 5 shows the simulation results for different assumptions about permanent depopulation for New Orleans. The most recent population estimate from the Census Bureau dates from July 1, 2006. At this time, a 400,000 loss was announced (Whoriskey, 2006). This 30% decline would put the predicted probability for New Orleans at approximately 0.43. Only Buffalo and Jacksonville have teams with lower probabilities than this. But this worse case scenario is outdated. A portion of the 400,000 have returned to the metro area since June 2006⁵, but how many will ultimately return? At this time, there is no planned Census Bureau update for the New Orleans metropolitan population.⁶ Should half of the displaced 400,000 return, the model would put place a probability of 0.59 that New Orleans will have (in this case keep) a team. The most optimistic non-official estimate (as of December 20, 2006) put the metro area at 1.2 million (Savidge, 2006). This is less than 10% depopulation, and the model provided a more comfortable 0.74 probability of having (retaining) a football team.

Table 5: Predicted Probability of a Team in New Orleans with Depopulation

PERCENT POPULATION REDUCTION	PREDICTED PROBABILITY
10 %	0.74
20	0.59
25	0.51
30	0.43

Conclusion:

Expansion and relocation of franchises in the National Football League remains an active topic when one considers the fates of both the Los Angeles and New Orleans markets. Although expansion is not a current short term goal for the NFL, relocation of teams in weak markets remains an annual possibility. The researchers have estimated a model that identifies those weak teams based on economic and demographic factors, and, more importantly, identifies candidate cities for new or relocated teams. Buffalo, Jacksonville, and a depopulated New Orleans are vulnerable to losing their teams, while Los Angeles and San Antonio are viable candidates to offer new homes to teams. What happens next depends on the interests of the current owners and the investor groups in the candidate cities, as well as the state and local government support for new stadiums in the old or new locations.

Endnotes:

¹ “The most recent NFL expansion, when the league was deciding between Houston and Los Angeles, is instructive on this point. In general terms, the decision between the two locations hinged on two considerations regarding the Houston and Los Angeles markets. First, the league considered the financial contribution that either location would make to the league. Second, it considered the value of an open location and the negotiating advantages it provided to current league membership. Keeping the best believable threat location helps owners in negotiations with their current host cities (Fort, 2006, p. 393).

² Gary Roberts, a professor at Tulane University Law School and an expert in sports business issues, states “Everyone knows New Orleans was a marginal major league market. More and more, the NFL has come to rely on corporate dollars and New Orleans doesn’t have a very large corporate base” (Isidore, 2005).

Then Football Commissioner Tagliabue comments on whether New Orleans can support an NFL team long term: “[team owner] Benson has strong personal and professional ties to San Antonio, the suspicion remains that he would prefer to permanently locate the franchise there. Benson fears that the rebuilding of New Orleans, a process expected to take years, will threaten the team’s financial viability” (Pasquarelli, 2005).

³ A Nielsen TV rating is the percentage of households watching that particular television program out of all households with televisions. A TV share is the percentage of televisions in use that are watching that particular program.

⁴ The population growth variable was not altered because its coefficient 1) had the wrong sign, 2) a very small magnitude, and 3) was highly insignificant statistically.

⁵ “As a city in flux New Orleans remains statistically murky, but demographers generally that the population replenishment after the storm, as measured by things like the amount of mail sent and employment in main economic sectors, has leveled off” (Dewan. 2007).

⁶ The Census Bureau is “just not equipped to provide real time population estimates in a situation that is changing as rapidly as New Orleans” (Plyer, 2007).

References:

Brooks, Rick A celebration at the Superdome, Wall Street Journal Online September
23, 2006

Bruggink, Thomas H. and Justin Zamparelli Emerging markets in baseball: An
econometric model for predicting the expansion teams’ new cities, Economics:
Current Research Praeger Press (1999): 49-59.

Dewan, Shaila Fed-Up New Orleans residents are giving up, New York Times
February 16, 2007. www.nytimes.com/2007/02/16/us/nationalspecial/16orleans

Fort, Rodney, Sports Economics, Pearson Prentice-Hall (2006)

Hage, Jim A city is up and running, washingtonpost.com January 1, 2006

Isidore, Chris New Orleans’ muddy sports future, Money.cnn.com September 22,
2005

Maske, Mark, and Leonard Shapiro, Saints could end up in L.A.
Washingtonpost.com October 27, 2005

NFL.com NFL eyes Los Angeles for 2008, NFL.com wire reports May 25, 2004.

Orsborn, Tom. Football: The San Antonio…Chargers? Mysantonio.com January 13, 2006

Pasquarelli, Len. New Orleans Saints, ESPN.com December 30, 2005.

Plyer, Allison. Correspondence with Allison Plyer of Greater New Orleans Nonprofit
Knowledge Works (gnocdc.org) January 19, 2007.

Rascher, Daniel, and Heather Rascher Optimal markets for NBA expansion and
relocation, Sports Economics Perspectives Issue 2 November 2005

Savidge, Martin New Orleans returning slowly, MSNBC.com December 20, 2006.

Wetzel, Dan. Calling a T.O. for N.O., Sports.yahoo.com September 4, 2005

U.S. Sports Academy2016-10-12T14:55:37-05:00March 14th, 2008|Contemporary Sports Issues, Sports Coaching, Sports Facilities, Sports Management|Comments Off

A State Analysis of High School Coaching Certification Requirements for Head Baseball Coaches

Submitted by: Coop DeRenne, Ed.D., Charles F. Morgan, Ph.D., Ronald K. Hetzler, Ph.D. & Brad T. Taura, M.S.E.D.

Abstract:

The purpose of this study was two-fold: 1) to investigate the coaching certification status for high school athletic leagues’ head baseball coaches and 2) to recommend a model high school certification program for head baseball coaches in the State of Hawaii. To meet selection criteria, the participating high schools must compete in both varsity and junior varsity baseball. The population surveyed for this study included all 59 athletic directors from the five athletic leagues within the Hawaii High School Athletic Association (HHSAA). The 14-item survey instrument contained four sections: (1) certifications, (2) experience, (3) professional growth, and (4) education. The results indicated that a small percentage of HHSAA athletic directors required a national coaching certification. Secondary findings indicated that a small percentage of HHSAA athletic directors required previous playing and coaching experiences, attendance at coaching-training seminars, and a high school diploma. Importantly, 95% of HHSAA members required background checks from their head baseball coaches.

Introduction:

There are about 6.5 million U.S. athletes that participate in interscholastic sports each year (National Federation of High School Association {NFHSA, n.d.}, 2004). Approximately 800,000 men and women coached these athletes in the school system (NFHSA, 2004). Thirty years ago, the majority of coaches were certified teachers. Today, most high school coaches are not certified (National Association of State Boards of Education {NASBE}, 2003). Currently, less than 8% of school coaches receive a specific education to coach (Martens, Flannery, and Roetert, 2003). Only 13 states specify that coaches must have a teaching certificate, and all of these states allow exceptions to this rule (NASBE, 2003).

Advocating for U.S. quality coaching and coaching education began in the 1960’s from the National Association for Sport and Physical Education (National Association for Sport and Physical Education {NASPE}, 2006). Over the next 40 years, NASPE would partner with various national organizations in spearheading the national movement for high school coaching certification. By the mid-1980’s, this national coaching movement was advanced by the American Sport Education Program (American Sport Education Program {ASEP}, 2007). ASEP, founded by Rainer Martens in the early 1970’s, had by 1986, 1,400 certified instructors who trained more than 50,000 coaches across America (ASEP, 2006). In 1991, this coaching educational movement was expanded when AESP joined forces with the National Federation of State High School Association (NFHS) (ASEP, 2006).

In addition to ASEP advancing the coaching educational movement in the 1990’s, in 1991, another U.S. national coaching certification program, called the Program for Athletic Coaches Education (PACE), was adopted (Seefeldt and Brown, 1991). Currently, PACE consists of six coaching areas: (1) Philosophy, (2) Growth and Development, (3) Sports Medicine, (4) Psychology, (5) Litigation/Liability, and (6) Sports Management (Seefeldt and Brown, 1991).

As a result of the 1990’s coaching education movement, by 1998, 66% of state agencies provided funding for or offered staff educational development to high school coaches (Burgeson, Wechsler, Brener, Young, & Spain, 2001). By 2000, 40% of the states required coaches to be certified in first aid and CPR, and 34% required coaches to complete a coaches’ training course (Burgeson et al., 2001).

As a result of the lack of the states’ initiative of requiring or recommending CPR and first-aid certification for all coaches, in 2003, the NFHS recommended that all coaches (experienced and non-experienced): (1) possess a current and valid CPR and first aid certification and (2) complete a planned systematic coaching education curriculum by 2006 (NASBE, 2003). In addition, the NFHS recommended that even certified teachers serving as head coaches maintain their professional development by completing a minimum of one coaching education course per year during their coaching tenure (NASBE, 2003).

In 2005 the NFHS, in partnership with ASEP, adopted NASPE’s National Standards for Sport Coaches (NASPE, 2006). The purpose of the guide was to “provide direction for coaching educators, sport administrators, coaches, athletes and their families, and the public regarding the skills and knowledge that coaches should possess” (NASPE, 2006). In addition, NASPE oversees the National Council for Accreditation of Coaching Education (NCACE) (NASPE, 2006). NCACE reviews coaching education and certification programs that seek accreditation based on compliance with the National Standards for Athletic Coaches (NASPE, 2006).

Due to the relentless national efforts of NASPE, NCACE, NFHS, ASEP, and PACE, in 2001, high schools began emphasizing coaching education primarily for their respective head coaches. Among the co-ed middle/junior and senior high schools that offered co-ed interscholastic sports (99.2%), 51.7% required their head coaches to complete a coaches’ training course (Burgeson et al., 2001). In addition, 51.3% and 45.6% of these secondary schools required head coaches to be certified in first aid and CPR, respectively (Burgeson et al., 2001).

Currently, there are 40 states that have adopted, recommended, or required one of two national certification programs (ASEP or PACE) for their respective head coaches (Jackowiak, 2003). Currently, ASEP continues to work with 40 state high school associations to provide coaching educational information for more than 25,000 coaches per year (ASEP, 2006).

If Hawaii’s secondary high school coaching environments are similar to the U.S. coaching scene, Hawaii’s high school athletes may be exposed to unqualified coaches. Since baseball is played in all Hawaii’s high schools that compete in interscholastic sports, the investigators examined Hawaii’s head baseball coaches’ educational status to determine Hawaii’s high schools’ coaching certification status.

Purpose:

The purpose of this study was two-fold: 1) to investigate the coaching certification status for high school athletic leagues and 2) to recommend a model high school certification program for head baseball coaches in the State of Hawaii. To meet selection criteria, the participating high schools must compete in varsity and junior varsity baseball. The study specifically addressed the following research questions:

(1) What types of coaching qualifications or certifications exist within the 50 states’ high school athletic associations?

(2) What types of coaching qualifications or certifications exist in Hawaii’s public and private highs schools?

Method:

Every athletic director in all 59 public and private high schools in the state of Hawaii completed the survey. The 14-item survey contained four sections: (1) certifications, (2) experience, (3) professional growth, and (4) education. Each question had a yes or no response. Frequency distributions and percentages of the athletic directors’ responses were determined in order to compare the similarities and differences among the five high school leagues, and between public and private high school leagues. Data were analyzed using descriptive statistics.

Results:

A total of 59 athletic directors completed usable questionnaires, which represented a 100% return rate. Table 1 highlights the responses among HHSAA’s five high school leagues. Table 2 compares collectively the similarities and differences between public and private school leagues. In addition, Table 3 indicates the certification status among the 50 states.

Table 1: HHSAA League Comparisons

Requirement	BIIF (n=14)	MIL (n=9)	KIF (n=4)	OIA (n=23)	ILH (n=9)
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
#1 National Cert. Policy	0 (0%)	14 (100%)	2 (22.2%)	7 (77.8%)	1 (25%)	3 (75%)	3 (13%)	20 (87%)	1 (11%)	8 (89%)
#2 CPR/First Aid	2 (14%)	12 (85.7%)	2 (22.2%)	7 (77.8%)	2 (50%)	2 (50%)	12 (52%)	11 (47%)	1 (11%)	8 (89%)
#3 Strength/Cond. Coach	0 (0%)	14 (100%)	0 (0%)	9 (100%)	0 (0%)	4 (100%)	0 (0%)	23 (100%)	1 (11%)	8 (89%)
#4 H.S. Playing Experience	5 (35.7%)	9 (64.3%)	2 (22.2%)	7 (77.8%)	0 (0%)	4 (100%)	2 (9%)	21 (91%)	0 (0%)	9 (100%)
#5 College Playing Experience	0 (0%)	14 (100%)	0 (0%)	9 (100%)	0 (0%)	4 (100%)	0 (0%)	23 (100%)	0 (0%)	9 (100%)
#6 H.S. Coaching Experience	3 (21.4%)	11 (78.6%)	1 (11.11%)	8 (88.9%)	0 (0%)	4 (100%)	3 (13%)	20 (87%)	2 (22%)	7 (78%)
#7 Background Checks	14 (100%)	0 (0%)	8 (88.89%)	1 (11.1%)	4 (100%)	0 (0%)	22 (95%)	1 (4%)	8 (89%)	1 (11%)
#8 Annual Rules/Regulations Exam	1 (7.1%)	13 (92.9%)	0 (0%)	9 (100%)	0 (0%)	4 (100%)	20 (87%)	3 (13%)	0 (0%)	9 (100%)
#9 Coaching Ed. Prior to Employment	2 (14.3%)	12 (85.7%)	1 (11.11%)	8 (88.9%)	1 (25%)	3 (75%)	3 (13%)	20 (87%)	1 (11%)	8 (89%)
#10 Annual Coaching Education Seminars	4 (28.6%)	10 (71.4%)	3 (33.33%)	6 (66.7%)	2 (50%)	2 (50%)	8 (34%)	15 (65%)	3 (33%)	6 (67%)
#11 Offer Coaching Ed Seminars	9 (64.3%)	5 (35.7%)	8 (88.89%)	1 (11.11%)	3 (75%)	1 (25%)	22 (95%)	1 (4%)	8 (89%)	1 (11%)
#12 Parental Meetings	13 (92.9%)	1 (7.1%)	9 (100%)	0 (0%)	4 (100%)	0 (0%)	22 (95%)	1 (4%)	8 (89%)	1 (11%)
#13 High School Diploma	8 (57.1%)	6 (42.9%)	5 (55.56%)	4 (44.4%)	0 (0%)	4 (100%)	17 (73%)	6 (26%)	4 (44%)	5 (56%)
#14 College Degree	1 (7.1%)	13 (92.9%)	0 (0%)	9 (100%)	0 (0%)	4 (100%)	2 (8%)	21 (91%)	0 (0%)	9 (100%)

As indicated in Tables 1 and 2, comparison of HHSAA’s leagues’ athletic directors’ (n=59) responses with regards to their respective head baseball coaches’ four-area certification status is as follows: (1) In Certifications, HHSAA high school leagues’ athletic directors (88.14%) did not require any formal coaching certification for their respective head baseball coaches, and interestingly, 67.8% didn’t require CPR and First Aid certification; (2) In Experience, HHSAA (84.75% and 84.5%, respectively) did not require their respective head coaches to have any past high school playing experience nor previous coaching experience, but HHSAA (94.92%) did require their league officials to conduct substance abuse and criminal background checks on their respective head baseball coaches prior to their coaching; (3) In Professional Growth, only 13.56% of HHSAA required their respective coaches to participate in any coaching education-training program prior to becoming a head baseball coach. Only 33.9% and 35.59% respectively of HHSAA required annual coaching education-training seminars and passing a rules/regulations examination; in contrast, HHSAA (94.92%) required parental-coaching meetings where head coaches addressed team goals, parent-coaching behavior, team rules, player responsibilities, and player discipline issues; and (4) In Experience, HHSAA (57.63 %) required at least a high school diploma from their respective head baseball coaches.

Table 2: Private vs. Public

	Private (n=15)	Public (n=44)	HHSAA (n=59)
Requirement	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
#1 National Cert. Policy	1 (6.67%)	14 (93.33%)	6 (13.64%)	38 (86.36%)	7 (11.86%)	52 (88.14%)
#2 CPR/First Aid	2 (13.33%)	13 (86.67%)	17 (38.64%)	27 (61.36%)	19 (32.20%)	40 (67.80%)
#3 Strength/Cond. Coach	1 (6.67%)	13 (93.33%)	0 (0%)	44 (100%)	1 (1.69%)	58 (98.31%)
#4 H.S. Playing Experience	1 (6.67%)	14 (93.33%)	8 (18.18%)	36 (81.82%)	9 (15.25%)	50 (84.75%)
#5 College Playing Experience	0 (0%)	15 (100%)	0 (0%)	44 (100%)	0 (0%)	59 (100%)
#6 H.S. Coaching Experience	4 (26.67%)	11 (73.33%)	5 (11.36%)	39 (88.64%)	9 (15.25%)	50 (84.75%)
#7 Background Checks	14 (93.33%)	1 (6.67%)	42 (95.45%)	2 (4.55%)	56 (94.92%)	3 (5.08%)
#8 Annual Rules/Regulations Exam	0 (0%)	15 (100%)	21 (47.73%)	23 (52.27%)	21 (35.59%)	38 (64.41%)
#9 Coaching Ed. Prior to Employment	1 (6.67%)	14 (93.33%)	7 (15.91%)	37 (84.09%)	8 (13.56%)	51 (86.44%)
#10 Annual Coaching Education Seminars	5 (33.33%)	10 (66.67%)	15 (34.09%)	29 (65.91%)	20 (33.90%)	39 (66.10%)
#11 Offer Coaching Ed Seminars	13 (86.67%)	2 (13.33%)	37 (84.09%)	7 (15.91%)	50 (84.75%)	9 (15.25%)
#12 Parental Meetings	13 (86.67%)	2 (13.33%)	43 (97.73%)	1 (2.27%)	56 (94.92%)	3 (5.08%)
#13 High School Diploma	7 (46.67%)	8 (53.33%)	27 (61.36%)	17 (38.64%)	34 (57.63)	25 (42.37%)
#14 College Degree	1 (6.67%)	14 (93.33%)	2 (4.55%)	42 (95.45%)	3 (5.08%)	56 (94.92%)

Data in Table 2 revealed the following findings comparing the HHSAA pubic high schools’ and private high schools’ athletic directors’ collective responses in the four-area coaching standards: (1) Certification– Only public (13.64%) and private (6.67%) high schools’ athletic directors required their respective head baseball coaches to have national coaching certification and CPR/First Aid (38.64%, 13.33% respectively); (2) Experience– Interestingly, only a small remnant public or private high schools’ athletic directors’ required their respective head baseball coaches to have any previous high school playing experience (18.18% and 6.67% respectively) and previous coaching experience (11.36% and 26.67%, respectively); in contrast, HHSAA required substance abuse and criminal background checks (95.45% and 93.33%, respectively); (3) Professional Growth– Only public (15.91%) and private (6.67%) athletic directors required their respective head baseball coaches to attend coaching education-training seminars prior to employment and to attend annual coaching education-training seminars (34.09% and 33.33%, respectively); and (4) Education– The majority of public (61.36%) athletic directors required their respective high school head baseball coaches to have at least a high school diploma, in contrast to private athletic directors (46.67%).

Table 3: Head Coaching Requirements by StateX = Required, R=Recommended

State	Teaching Cert.	NFHS/ASEP	CPR	First Aid
Alabama	X	X	–	–
Alaska	–	X	–	–
Arizona	X	R	–	–
Arkansas	X	X	–	–
California	–	R	X	X
Colorado	X	X	R	R
Connecticut	R	–	X	X
Delaware	X	–	X	–
D.C.	–	–	X	X
Florida	X	–	–	–
Georgia	–	X	–	–
Hawaii	–	–	–	–
Idaho	X	X	–	–
Illinois	X	X	–	–
Indiana	X	X	–	->
Iowa	–	–	–	–
Kansas	X	X	–	–
Kentucky	X	X	X	–
Louisiana	X	–	–	–
Maine	–	X	X	–
Maryland	X	–	–	–
Massachusetts	X	X	–	–
Michigan	–	–	–	–
Minnesota	R	R	–	X
Mississippi	X	X	–	–
Missouri	X	X	–	–
Montana	–	–	–	–
Nebraska	X	R	–	–
Nevada	–	X	X	–
New Hampshire	–	X	X	X
New Jersey	X	X	–	–
New Mexico	X	X	–	–
New York	X	–	X	X
North Carolina	–	R	–	–
North Dakota	–	–	–	–
Ohio	–	R	X	X
Oklahoma	X	–	–	X
Oregon	–	X	–	–
Pennsylvania	–	R	–	–
Rhode Island	–	X	X	X
South Carolina	X	X	–	–
South Dakota	–	X	–	–
Tennessee	X	–	–	–
Texas	X	–	–	–
Utah	X	X	–	–
Vermont	–	X	–	–
Virginia	–	X	–	–
Washington	–	X	X	X
West Virginia	X	X	–	–
Wisconsin	X	X	–	–
Wyoming	X	X	X	X

Discussion:

In the Certifications section of the questionnaire, the findings indicated that a very small percent of HHSAA’s leagues’ athletic directors required a national certification policy and CPR/First-Aid certification. In contrast, HHSAA (84.75%) offered coaching education-training seminars for its head baseball coaches. If HHSAA doesn’t’ require its respective coaches to complete a recognizable national certification program, including CPR and First Aid, then coaches have to further their professional growth by attending their leagues’ recommended coaching education-training sessions.

In the Experience section of the questionnaire, a small percent of HHSAA’s athletic directors required previous high school playing and coaching experience in baseball. Nevertheless, nearly all (94.92%) HHSAA’s athletic directors required substance abuse and criminal background checks on their head baseball coaches. The difference in these requirements may be due to the importance of coaches’ character, rather than playing and coaching experience.

In the Professional section of the questionnaire, a minimal percent of HHSAA’s athletic directors required their head baseball coaches to attend coaching education-training seminars prior to employment, and to attend annual coaching education-training seminars after employment. A related finding revealed that a high percent of HHSAA’s athletic directors (84.75%) offered coaching education-training sessions for their head baseball coaches. Obviously, HHSAA recognized the importance of coaching education-training sessions, but HHSAA possibly encountered attendance problems in the past in coaches or baseball coaches who have not positively reviewed the coaching education-training curriculum.

The Education section of the questionnaire indicated that over half (57.63%) of the HHSAA’s athletic directors required at least a high school diploma for their head baseball coaches. This low percentage may be due to a lack in initiating a standard policy requiring all potential head baseball coaches to have a high school diploma. Certainly, high school dropouts would encounter more difficulties in obtaining high school head-coaching jobs than a high school graduate.

An interestingly supplemental finding revealed that there were only two nationally-certified high school strength and conditioning coaches. No HHSAA league athletic director required his or her respective high school to have a certified strength and conditioning coach on staff.

In Hawaii, 92 high schools compete in men and women interscholastic sports. In 2005, 34,758 student-athletes participated in Hawaii’s 24 state high school sports programs (K. Amemiya, personal communication, January 15, 2007). Not one head coach had a national strength and conditioning certification credential. Yet in any of these 92 high schools, if the athletes participated in any on-campus formal off-season or in-season strength and conditioning programs, unqualified sport-coaches conducted these regiments, thereby increasing the risk of injury to these 34,758 student-athletes. In a progressive state, like Hawaii, which was the first and only state to require every athletic high school to have on staff two-full time nationally certified athletic trainers, the HHSAA should recognize the need to require and fund one full-time certified strength and conditioning coach on every high school staff.

Conclusions and Recommendations:

In conclusion, there is a national movement toward high school coaching certification. To date, there are 40 states that have adopted, recommended, or required one of two national certification programs — ASEP or PACE. There seems to be a disparity in Hawaii’s high school athletic departments. There is no movement to adopt, recommend, or require national certification for Hawaii’s coaches, yet Hawaii is the only state to require two athletic trainers in every high school. Therefore, Hawaii’s athletic departments should seriously consider the following recommendations: (1) HHSAA should adopt either the American Sport Education Program’s (ASEP) or the Program for Athletic Coaches Education (PACE) national coaching certification requirements for their head baseball coaches; and (2) The National Standards for Athletic Coaches created by the National Association for Sport and Physical Education (NASPE) should be incorporated into HHSAA’s ASEP or PACE national accreditation-coaching program. The national standards should be used as a basis or framework for design of selection, evaluation, and education programs.

References:

American Sport Education Program (2006). ASEP’s Beginnings. Retrieved November 20, 2006, from http://www.asep.com/about.cfm

Brylinsky, J., (2002). National standards for athletic coaches. ERIC Digest, Oct.2002. Retrieved Nov. 12, 2005, from http://www.ericdigests.org/2004-1/coaches.htm

Burgeson, C., Wechsler, H., Brener, N.D., Young, J.C., & Spain, C.G. (2001). Physical education and activity: Results from the school health policies and programs study 2000. Journal of School Health, 71, 279-293.

Gilbert, W. & Trudel, P., (1999). An evaluation strategy for coach education programs. Journal of Sport Behavior, 22, 234-250.

Jackowiak, L., (2003). Developing an athletic program based on sound principles. Incorporating the national federation coaching education program. Retrieved Sept.23, 2006, from http://www.nfhs.org

Martens, R., Flannery, T., & Retort, P. (2003). The future of coaching Education in America, Retrieved May 11, 2006, from http://www.nfhs.org/cep/articles/future_coaching.htm

National Association for Sport and Physical Education (1995). National Standards for Athletic Coaches. Dubuque: Kendall/Hunt.

National Association of State Boards of Education (NASBE) (2003). Education requirements for athletic coaches. NASBE policy update, 11 (4). Retrieved May 12, 2006, from http://www.nasbe.org/Educational_Issues/Policy_Updates/11_4.html

National Council for Accreditation of Coaching Education (NCACE) (2006). NCACE program registry and approved program list. NASPE. Retrieved May 10, 2006, from http://www.aahperd.org/naspe/template.cfm?template=programs-html

National Federation of High School Association (NFHSA) (n.d.). Coaching education in America: A white paper. Retrieved May 13, 2006 from http://www.nfhs.org/staticContent/PDFs/cep/cep_whitepaper.pdf.

Seefeldt, V. & Brown, E. (1991). Program for athletic coaches’ education. Carmel: Benchmark Press, Inc.

U.S. Sports Academy2016-10-12T14:53:11-05:00March 14th, 2008|Contemporary Sports Issues, Sports Coaching, Sports Facilities, Sports Management|Comments Off