ISSN: 1543-9518

Location Model in the National Football League: Predicting Optimal Expansion and Relocation Sites

Submitted by: Thomas H. Bruggink & Doug Schiz

Abstract:

The National Football League has experienced both expansion and relocation of its franchises in the past decade. It is a dynamic market; the relocation of a NFL franchise is an annual possibility. This study looked at the demographic and economic factors that determine the current locations of NFL teams. The top 50 metropolitan areas were empirically examined to explain why some cities have an NFL team and others do not. These factors included population, per capita income, the number of other sports franchises, and the number of Fortune 500 companies, geographic factors, and television ratings for “Monday Night Football.” This model can identify cities for possible expansion and those that would serve as relocation sites in the future. Special attention was paid to the Los Angeles and New Orleans markets.

Introduction:

The National Football League has experienced a dynamic period of expansion and relocation in the past decade; the league seeks to position itself with the optimal configuration for long-term growth of the professional football market. Although expansion is not a current short-term goal for the NFL, the relocation of weak teams remains an annual possibility.

Moving an existing sports franchise is not new. After the 1995 season, Los Angeles lost both of its football teams. The Rams moved from the old Rose Bowl in Pasadena to the brand-new TWA Dome in downtown St. Louis. The Raiders moved from the Los Angeles Coliseum to the newly renovated Oakland Coliseum. In 1996, the Cleveland Browns moved into a new stadium in Baltimore and became the Ravens. Most recently, the Houston Oilers moved to Tennessee and became the Titans in 1999.

The city of Los Angeles, which lost its chance to gain an expansion team in 2002 to Houston because it was unable to approve financing for a new stadium, remains without a team. Although this leaves the second largest television market without its own team, it also offers a credible relocation threat for existing team owners in their new stadium negotiations with local authorities.1

Expansion and relocation of franchises in professional sports leagues have been studied for baseball and basketball; however, as far as the researchers know, a location model had never been created for the National Football League. Bruggink and Zamparelli (1999) produced a location model for Major League Baseball. The top 50 metropolitan areas were chosen for the sample. The explanatory variables for the regression model are population, population growth, and per capita income, in addition to the number of other professional sports teams in the area, the number of headquarters for Fortune 500 companies in the area, and the distance to the closest city with a baseball team. As one would expect, all variables had positive coefficients in the regression model. A more recent sports model by Rascher and Rascher (2005) estimated the probability that a particular city will have a National Basketball Association team by using the same core set of variables and adding factors such as the average NBA Nielsen television ratings for each city.

One interesting application of our model was applied to the New Orleans Saints football team. Even before the Hurricane Katrina damage to the Superdome, the owners of the Saints hinted that a move to a new location was in the offing.2 Of course, this is the typical ploy to gain public subsidies for a new or improved stadium, but the closure of the Superdome for the 2005 season made this relocation potential very real. The re-scheduled 2005 games found the Saints playing in the welcoming city of San Antonio with capacity attendance at the Alamodome. Although the Saints played the 2006 season in a repaired Superdome, they are in position to pursue one of two options after 2006: 1) stay in New Orleans with a long term city commitment to help build a new or improved stadium, or 2) move to a new location in Los Angeles (Maske and Shapiro, 2005) or San Antonio (Orsborn 2006). Our location model used estimates of New Orleans depopulation to give a perspective on the potential consequences for the city’s viability as a home to a NFL franchise.

Location Model

There are a number of factors that influence the selection of cities for NFL relocation or expansion. Based on demographic and economic factors in the largest 50 metropolitan areas, the researchers constructed a logit model to determine the relationship of these factors (X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7) to the expected conditional probability (Pi) that each city (represented as i) would have one or more NFL teams:

Pi = E (Yi = 1| X1i,X2i, X3i, X4i, X5i, X6i, X7i)

where

Y = 1 if metropolitan area has one or more NFL teams; 0 otherwise

X1 = POP2000 = population in metropolitan area i (millions)

X2 = POPGROWTH = % population growth of a city the decade before the current team
located in city i (if the city does not have a team, the current
decade of growth is used)

X3 = INC = income per capita in metropolitan area i ($1000)

X4 = DISTANCE = distance to closest football franchise city (miles) from city i

X5 = F500 = the number of Fortune 500 company headquarters in metropolitan area i

X6 = OTHER/POP2000 = the number of other professional sports teams per million
population in city i (men’s basketball, hockey, and baseball)

X7 = NIELSEN = “Monday Night Football” Nielsen ratings in metropolitan area i using
the 2002-3 season

The NFL wants to expand or relocate to a metropolitan area with a large and growing population in order to maximize stadium revenues from attendance, concessions, and parking fees. The researchers expected positive coefficients for the population and population growth. In addition to market size, standard microeconomic demand theory suggests that per capita income will be a positive influence. According to a 2003 survey, football fans had the highest median salary in all sports at $55,115 (USA Today, 2003).

The distance to the closest NFL franchise city is a major aspect for the location of a franchise. The NFL does not want all of its teams in one part of the country because there will be interest only in that part of the country, not the whole United States. This is especially important for a sport driven by national television revenues. Furthermore, locating a new franchise close to an existing franchise (generally up to 75 miles) would financially hurt the owner of the latter. The league does not approve of these territorial infringements.

The number of other professional sports teams (baseball, basketball, and hockey) in the metropolitan area can have an impact on the demand for football games. The other sports could be considered substitute goods, or, on the other hand, a measure of fan interest for sports in general (a complement good). Rascher and Rascher (2005) found a negative and significant relationship between the number of other teams and the probability that a city had a professional basketball team. However, Bruggink and Zamparelli (1999) found just the opposite for baseball, supporting the fan intensity argument. The difference could be in overlapping the season with other sports. Basketball overlaps the most, competing with hockey, football, and the beginning of baseball. Baseball and football face less severe overlaps, and at times have the season to themselves.

Another location factor is the number of headquarters for Fortune 500 corporations in the metro area (F500). NFL owners are allowed to keep all the stadium revenue from luxury box receipts (i.e., no revenue sharing), and corporations are the largest patrons of these seating sections (which are also called corporate sky boxes). This is one of the reasons that owners desire new stadiums, because it affords them an opportunity to maximize the number of luxury box seats.

The last location factor is the number of households in the metro area watching football on television. In this study, the average Nielsen ratings3 for the 2002-3 “Monday Night Football” games are used for the 50 metropolitan areas. “Monday Night Football” games were selected because the same game is watched by the entire nation, whether a city has a NFL team or not. Nielsen ratings are particularly important for the National Football League because there are no local television contracts, only a national contract divided equally among the 32 teams, and it is the single largest source of income.

Empirical Results and Simulation:

The preliminary estimation of the model included the top 50 metropolitan areas (those with populations of approximately one million or more). About half had one or more teams. However, with Los Angeles in the data set the estimated coefficient of the population variable is negative instead of positive. This preliminary model showed how sensitive the population factor is to the inclusion of Los Angeles (by far, the largest metro area in the sample that has no team). As discussed earlier, league owners receive value from having a viable city without a team because it poses a credible threat for a team to relocate, allowing them to negotiate with local government for sports subsidies. In this sense, the no-team status of Los Angeles is not a market outcome but a strategic ploy. When Los Angeles was excluded, the researchers actually had a sample of cities that was more representative of market conditions. The estimated model without Los Angeles had a positive coefficient for population and a better overall fit. This sensitivity is the reason the researchers relied on this as the final model for the predictions.

In this study, the researchers: 1) examined the statistical results, 2) tested the within-sample predictions for each city, 3) determined a list of viable cities for the NFL expansion or relocation, and 4) ran a simulation on the effect of New Orleans’ recent depopulation on its viability of retaining its football team.

Table 1 shows all the statistical results for the fitted model using the logistic function shown below. The logistic function is the natural log of the odds ratio in favor of a metropolitan area having a team (P = 1 if the metro area has a team, P = 0 if it does not). There are three advantages to using the logistic curve rather than an ordinary least squares regression: (1) the predicted probabilities for a city having a team are constrained to lie between 0 and 1 for the logistic curve, whereas for a linear regression model the predicted probabilities could exceed 1 or fall short of zero, both of which are impossible values, (2) the slope coefficients in the logit model are more realistic than ordinary least square because they vary in magnitude, depending on the size of the corresponding explanatory variable, and (3) the variance is more constant in the logit model than with ordinary least squares, which makes the t-tests more valid.

log (P / (1-P)) = -17.6 + 0.98 POP2000 – 0.0063 POPGROWTH + 0.21 INC + 0.114 DISTANCE +
0.4573 F500 + 0.33 NIELSEN + 3.656 OTHER/POP2000

Table 1: Location Model

Logit Model
Included observations: 49
Convergence achieved after 8 iterations
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Stat Prob.
C -17.5895 8.8715 -1.983 0.0474
POP2000 0.9754 1.1482 0.849 0.3956
POPGROWTH -0.0063 0.0363 -0.174 0.8619
INC 0.2096 0.2096 1.000 0.3173
DISTANCE 0.0114 0.0087 1.315 0.1884
F500 0.4573 0.2747 1.665 0.096
NIELSEN 0.3347 0.2401 1.394 0.1634
OTHER/POP2000 3.6594 2.3024 1.589 0.112
Mean dependent 0.59184 S.D. dependent 0.4966
S.E. of regression 0.27766 McFadden R-s 0.6609

All the coefficients but one have the correct sign. Four of the seven are statistically significant at a 10% level or better in a one-tailed test. The statistically significant coefficients are for the following variables: the distance from the nearest NFL city, the number of other sports teams in the city per million population, the “Monday Night Football” television ratings, and the number of Fortune 500 headquarters in the city. The income variable missed being significant at only a 10% level. The only high correlation among the independent variables is between F500 and POP2000. This may explain why the coefficient of POP2000 does not appear statistically significant.

Table 2 shows the standardized coefficients in the logit model. Standardized coefficients scale the coefficients in the model using the standard deviations of the each independent variable and the dependent variable. By this method, the Fortune 500 and population variables have the most effect on whether a city has a team or not. Each have more the twice the size and therefore twice the impact than the other standardized coefficients. Distance and the presence of other professional teams rank next in importance followed by Nielsen ratings and income.

Table 2: Standardized Coefficients

Variable Standardized Coefficient
F500 11.33
POP2000 7.35
DISTANCE 3.01
OTHER/POP2000 2.56
NIELSEN 1.99
INC 1.89
POPGROWTH -0.0024

Table 3 shows the results of the in-sample forecasts. The logit model correctly predicted the current NFL franchise status in 45 out of the 50 metropolitan areas. The missed predictions included Los Angeles (this outcome is made using an out-of-sample prediction), San Antonio, Salt Lake City, Buffalo, and Jacksonville. For the first three misses, the model predicted the cities would have teams but they do not (for our purposes, any probability greater than 0.50 means the city should have a team). Buffalo and Jacksonville have teams but the model predicted that they do not.

Table 3: Predictions* All predictions are within-sample, except for the out-of-sample forecast for Los Angeles.

Metropolitan Area Actual
Outcome		 Probability
of a Team
New York 1 1.00
Los Angeles* 0 1.00
Chicago 1 1.00
Washington- Baltimore 1 1.00
SF- Oakland-San Jose 1 1.00
Philadelphia 1 1.00
Boston 1 1.00
Detroit 1 1.00
Dallas 1 1.00
Houston 1 1.00
Atlanta 1 1.00
Miami 1 0.91
Seattle 1 1.00
Phoenix 1 0.95
Minnesota 1 1.00
Cleveland 1 0.99
San Diego 1 0.98
St. Louis 1 0.99
Denver 1 1.00
Tampa 1 0.79
Pittsburgh 1 1.00
Portland 0 0.22
Cincinnati 1 0.78
Sacramento 0 0.43
Kansas City 1 0.97
Green Bay-Milwaukee 1 1.00
Orlando 0 0.09
Indianapolis 1 0.60
San Antonio 0 0.56
Norfolk 0 0.03
Las Vegas 0 0.25
Columbus 0 0.39
Charlotte 1 0.80
New Orleans 1 0.85
Salt Lake City 0 0.51
Austin, TX 0 0.05
Nashville 1 0.85
Providence 0 0.00
Raleigh-Durham 0 0.09
Hartford 0 0.04
Buffalo 1 0.17
Memphis 0 0.35
West Palm 0 0.12
Jacksonville 1 0.03
Grand Rapids 0 0.00
Oklahoma City 0 0.04
Richmond 0 0.05
Greenville 0 0.00
Dayton 0 0.00
Birmingham 0 0.10

Table 4 shows the top five candidate cities to have teams either through expansion or relocation. The logit model predicted that Los Angeles would have a team with a probability of 1.0, which is not surprising given that it once had two teams. However, if NFL owners continue to use the city as a credible threat, and if a new stadium is not in the package for the Los Angeles team, then the other cities in this list deserve consideration. Next is San Antonio, where the Saints have already tested the waters with great success. The logit model estimated that San Antonio had a probability of 0.56 in obtaining an NFL franchise either through relocation or expansion. Salt Lake City is a more marginal candidate at 0.51, and the model suggests that both Sacramento and Columbus are not viable candidates (their predicted probabilities are less than 0.5).

Table 4: Predicted Probabilities for Candidate Cities from the Sample

CITY PREDICTED PROBABILITY
Los Angeles 1.0
San Antonio 0.56
Salt Lake City 0.51
Sacramento 0.43
Columbus 0.39

League expansion and the open Los Angeles market have been discussed in the NFL by both the outgoing Commissioner Paul Tagliabue (NFL.com, 2004) and the new Commissioner Roger Goodell (Farmer, 2007), but there is no short term timetable for expanding to a 33rd team or moving a troubled franchise there. Nonetheless, the league has been working with investor groups representing sites at the Los Angeles Coliseum and the Rose Bowl in Pasadena (NFL.com 2004). Besides New Orleans, Buffalo and Jacksonville are mentioned as cities that might lose their franchises (The Sports Economist, 2006).

Do the Saints Go Marching Back In?

Under pre-Katrina conditions, New Orleans had a probability of 0.85 for its in-sample prediction for having a team (see Table 3). But this changes when the potential depopulation of New Orleans is considered. The extensive damage to the city of New Orleans was not only to the industrial and commercial structures. Whole residential sections of the city were destroyed and depopulated.

The model prediction included depopulation in two parts. First, the New Orleans metropolitan area population was reduced by 10, 20, 25, and 30%.4 Second, the Nielsen television ratings were correspondingly reduced. No adjustment was made to the Fortune 500 headquarters because New Orleans has only one such company, Entergy Corporation, and it will remain in the area.

Table 5 shows the simulation results for different assumptions about permanent depopulation for New Orleans. The most recent population estimate from the Census Bureau dates from July 1, 2006. At this time, a 400,000 loss was announced (Whoriskey, 2006). This 30% decline would put the predicted probability for New Orleans at approximately 0.43. Only Buffalo and Jacksonville have teams with lower probabilities than this. But this worse case scenario is outdated. A portion of the 400,000 have returned to the metro area since June 20065, but how many will ultimately return? At this time, there is no planned Census Bureau update for the New Orleans metropolitan population.6 Should half of the displaced 400,000 return, the model would put place a probability of 0.59 that New Orleans will have (in this case keep) a team. The most optimistic non-official estimate (as of December 20, 2006) put the metro area at 1.2 million (Savidge, 2006). This is less than 10% depopulation, and the model provided a more comfortable 0.74 probability of having (retaining) a football team.

Table 5: Predicted Probability of a Team in New Orleans with Depopulation

PERCENT POPULATION REDUCTION PREDICTED PROBABILITY
10 % 0.74
20 0.59
25 0.51
30 0.43

Conclusion:

Expansion and relocation of franchises in the National Football League remains an active topic when one considers the fates of both the Los Angeles and New Orleans markets. Although expansion is not a current short term goal for the NFL, relocation of teams in weak markets remains an annual possibility. The researchers have estimated a model that identifies those weak teams based on economic and demographic factors, and, more importantly, identifies candidate cities for new or relocated teams. Buffalo, Jacksonville, and a depopulated New Orleans are vulnerable to losing their teams, while Los Angeles and San Antonio are viable candidates to offer new homes to teams. What happens next depends on the interests of the current owners and the investor groups in the candidate cities, as well as the state and local government support for new stadiums in the old or new locations.

Endnotes:

1 “The most recent NFL expansion, when the league was deciding between Houston and Los Angeles, is instructive on this point. In general terms, the decision between the two locations hinged on two considerations regarding the Houston and Los Angeles markets. First, the league considered the financial contribution that either location would make to the league. Second, it considered the value of an open location and the negotiating advantages it provided to current league membership. Keeping the best believable threat location helps owners in negotiations with their current host cities (Fort, 2006, p. 393).

2 Gary Roberts, a professor at Tulane University Law School and an expert in sports business issues, states “Everyone knows New Orleans was a marginal major league market. More and more, the NFL has come to rely on corporate dollars and New Orleans doesn’t have a very large corporate base” (Isidore, 2005).

Then Football Commissioner Tagliabue comments on whether New Orleans can support an NFL team long term: “[team owner] Benson has strong personal and professional ties to San Antonio, the suspicion remains that he would prefer to permanently locate the franchise there. Benson fears that the rebuilding of New Orleans, a process expected to take years, will threaten the team’s financial viability” (Pasquarelli, 2005).

3 A Nielsen TV rating is the percentage of households watching that particular television program out of all households with televisions. A TV share is the percentage of televisions in use that are watching that particular program.

4 The population growth variable was not altered because its coefficient 1) had the wrong sign, 2) a very small magnitude, and 3) was highly insignificant statistically.

5 “As a city in flux New Orleans remains statistically murky, but demographers generally that the population replenishment after the storm, as measured by things like the amount of mail sent and employment in main economic sectors, has leveled off” (Dewan. 2007).

6 The Census Bureau is “just not equipped to provide real time population estimates in a situation that is changing as rapidly as New Orleans” (Plyer, 2007).

References:

Brooks, Rick A celebration at the Superdome, Wall Street Journal Online September
23, 2006

Bruggink, Thomas H. and Justin Zamparelli Emerging markets in baseball: An
econometric model for predicting the expansion teams’ new cities, Economics:
Current Research Praeger Press (1999): 49-59.

Dewan, Shaila Fed-Up New Orleans residents are giving up, New York Times
February 16, 2007. www.nytimes.com/2007/02/16/us/nationalspecial/16orleans

Fort, Rodney, Sports Economics, Pearson Prentice-Hall (2006)

Hage, Jim A city is up and running, washingtonpost.com January 1, 2006

Isidore, Chris New Orleans’ muddy sports future, Money.cnn.com September 22,
2005

Maske, Mark, and Leonard Shapiro, Saints could end up in L.A.
Washingtonpost.com October 27, 2005

NFL.com NFL eyes Los Angeles for 2008, NFL.com wire reports May 25, 2004.

Orsborn, Tom. Football: The San Antonio…Chargers? Mysantonio.com January 13, 2006

Pasquarelli, Len. New Orleans Saints, ESPN.com December 30, 2005.

Plyer, Allison. Correspondence with Allison Plyer of Greater New Orleans Nonprofit
Knowledge Works (gnocdc.org) January 19, 2007.

Rascher, Daniel, and Heather Rascher Optimal markets for NBA expansion and
relocation, Sports Economics Perspectives Issue 2 November 2005

Savidge, Martin New Orleans returning slowly, MSNBC.com December 20, 2006.

Wetzel, Dan. Calling a T.O. for N.O., Sports.yahoo.com September 4, 2005

2016-10-12T14:55:37-05:00March 14th, 2008|Contemporary Sports Issues, Sports Coaching, Sports Facilities, Sports Management|Comments Off on Location Model in the National Football League: Predicting Optimal Expansion and Relocation Sites
Read More

A State Analysis of High School Coaching Certification Requirements for Head Baseball Coaches

Submitted by: Coop DeRenne, Ed.D., Charles F. Morgan, Ph.D., Ronald K. Hetzler, Ph.D. & Brad T. Taura, M.S.E.D.

Abstract:

The purpose of this study was two-fold: 1) to investigate the coaching certification status for high school athletic leagues’ head baseball coaches and 2) to recommend a model high school certification program for head baseball coaches in the State of Hawaii. To meet selection criteria, the participating high schools must compete in both varsity and junior varsity baseball. The population surveyed for this study included all 59 athletic directors from the five athletic leagues within the Hawaii High School Athletic Association (HHSAA). The 14-item survey instrument contained four sections: (1) certifications, (2) experience, (3) professional growth, and (4) education. The results indicated that a small percentage of HHSAA athletic directors required a national coaching certification. Secondary findings indicated that a small percentage of HHSAA athletic directors required previous playing and coaching experiences, attendance at coaching-training seminars, and a high school diploma. Importantly, 95% of HHSAA members required background checks from their head baseball coaches.

Introduction:

There are about 6.5 million U.S. athletes that participate in interscholastic sports each year (National Federation of High School Association {NFHSA, n.d.}, 2004). Approximately 800,000 men and women coached these athletes in the school system (NFHSA, 2004). Thirty years ago, the majority of coaches were certified teachers. Today, most high school coaches are not certified (National Association of State Boards of Education {NASBE}, 2003). Currently, less than 8% of school coaches receive a specific education to coach (Martens, Flannery, and Roetert, 2003). Only 13 states specify that coaches must have a teaching certificate, and all of these states allow exceptions to this rule (NASBE, 2003).

Advocating for U.S. quality coaching and coaching education began in the 1960’s from the National Association for Sport and Physical Education (National Association for Sport and Physical Education {NASPE}, 2006). Over the next 40 years, NASPE would partner with various national organizations in spearheading the national movement for high school coaching certification. By the mid-1980’s, this national coaching movement was advanced by the American Sport Education Program (American Sport Education Program {ASEP}, 2007). ASEP, founded by Rainer Martens in the early 1970’s, had by 1986, 1,400 certified instructors who trained more than 50,000 coaches across America (ASEP, 2006). In 1991, this coaching educational movement was expanded when AESP joined forces with the National Federation of State High School Association (NFHS) (ASEP, 2006).

In addition to ASEP advancing the coaching educational movement in the 1990’s, in 1991, another U.S. national coaching certification program, called the Program for Athletic Coaches Education (PACE), was adopted (Seefeldt and Brown, 1991). Currently, PACE consists of six coaching areas: (1) Philosophy, (2) Growth and Development, (3) Sports Medicine, (4) Psychology, (5) Litigation/Liability, and (6) Sports Management (Seefeldt and Brown, 1991).

As a result of the 1990’s coaching education movement, by 1998, 66% of state agencies provided funding for or offered staff educational development to high school coaches (Burgeson, Wechsler, Brener, Young, & Spain, 2001). By 2000, 40% of the states required coaches to be certified in first aid and CPR, and 34% required coaches to complete a coaches’ training course (Burgeson et al., 2001).

As a result of the lack of the states’ initiative of requiring or recommending CPR and first-aid certification for all coaches, in 2003, the NFHS recommended that all coaches (experienced and non-experienced): (1) possess a current and valid CPR and first aid certification and (2) complete a planned systematic coaching education curriculum by 2006 (NASBE, 2003). In addition, the NFHS recommended that even certified teachers serving as head coaches maintain their professional development by completing a minimum of one coaching education course per year during their coaching tenure (NASBE, 2003).

In 2005 the NFHS, in partnership with ASEP, adopted NASPE’s National Standards for Sport Coaches (NASPE, 2006). The purpose of the guide was to “provide direction for coaching educators, sport administrators, coaches, athletes and their families, and the public regarding the skills and knowledge that coaches should possess” (NASPE, 2006). In addition, NASPE oversees the National Council for Accreditation of Coaching Education (NCACE) (NASPE, 2006). NCACE reviews coaching education and certification programs that seek accreditation based on compliance with the National Standards for Athletic Coaches (NASPE, 2006).

Due to the relentless national efforts of NASPE, NCACE, NFHS, ASEP, and PACE, in 2001, high schools began emphasizing coaching education primarily for their respective head coaches. Among the co-ed middle/junior and senior high schools that offered co-ed interscholastic sports (99.2%), 51.7% required their head coaches to complete a coaches’ training course (Burgeson et al., 2001). In addition, 51.3% and 45.6% of these secondary schools required head coaches to be certified in first aid and CPR, respectively (Burgeson et al., 2001).

Currently, there are 40 states that have adopted, recommended, or required one of two national certification programs (ASEP or PACE) for their respective head coaches (Jackowiak, 2003). Currently, ASEP continues to work with 40 state high school associations to provide coaching educational information for more than 25,000 coaches per year (ASEP, 2006).

If Hawaii’s secondary high school coaching environments are similar to the U.S. coaching scene, Hawaii’s high school athletes may be exposed to unqualified coaches. Since baseball is played in all Hawaii’s high schools that compete in interscholastic sports, the investigators examined Hawaii’s head baseball coaches’ educational status to determine Hawaii’s high schools’ coaching certification status.

Purpose:

The purpose of this study was two-fold: 1) to investigate the coaching certification status for high school athletic leagues and 2) to recommend a model high school certification program for head baseball coaches in the State of Hawaii. To meet selection criteria, the participating high schools must compete in varsity and junior varsity baseball. The study specifically addressed the following research questions:

(1) What types of coaching qualifications or certifications exist within the 50 states’ high school athletic associations?

(2) What types of coaching qualifications or certifications exist in Hawaii’s public and private highs schools?

Method:

Every athletic director in all 59 public and private high schools in the state of Hawaii completed the survey. The 14-item survey contained four sections: (1) certifications, (2) experience, (3) professional growth, and (4) education. Each question had a yes or no response. Frequency distributions and percentages of the athletic directors’ responses were determined in order to compare the similarities and differences among the five high school leagues, and between public and private high school leagues. Data were analyzed using descriptive statistics.

Results:

A total of 59 athletic directors completed usable questionnaires, which represented a 100% return rate. Table 1 highlights the responses among HHSAA’s five high school leagues. Table 2 compares collectively the similarities and differences between public and private school leagues. In addition, Table 3 indicates the certification status among the 50 states.

Table 1: HHSAA League Comparisons

Requirement BIIF (n=14) MIL (n=9) KIF (n=4) OIA (n=23) ILH (n=9)
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
#1 National Cert. Policy 0
(0%)		 14
(100%)		 2
(22.2%)		 7
(77.8%)		 1
(25%)		 3
(75%)		 3
(13%)		 20
(87%)		 1
(11%)		 8
(89%)
#2 CPR/First Aid 2
(14%)		 12
(85.7%)		 2
(22.2%)		 7
(77.8%)		 2
(50%)		 2
(50%)		 12
(52%)		 11
(47%)		 1
(11%)		 8
(89%)
#3 Strength/Cond. Coach 0
(0%)		 14
(100%)		 0
(0%)		 9
(100%)		 0
(0%)		 4
(100%)		 0
(0%)		 23
(100%)		 1
(11%)		 8
(89%)
#4 H.S. Playing Experience 5
(35.7%)		 9
(64.3%)		 2
(22.2%)		 7
(77.8%)		 0
(0%)		 4
(100%)		 2
(9%)		 21
(91%)		 0
(0%)		 9
(100%)
#5 College Playing Experience 0
(0%)		 14
(100%)		 0
(0%)		 9
(100%)		 0
(0%)		 4
(100%)		 0
(0%)		 23
(100%)		 0
(0%)		 9
(100%)
#6 H.S. Coaching Experience 3
(21.4%)		 11
(78.6%)		 1
(11.11%)		 8
(88.9%)		 0
(0%)		 4
(100%)		 3
(13%)		 20
(87%)		 2
(22%)		 7
(78%)
#7 Background Checks 14
(100%)		 0
(0%)		 8
(88.89%)		 1
(11.1%)		 4
(100%)		 0
(0%)		 22
(95%)		 1
(4%)		 8
(89%)		 1
(11%)
#8 Annual Rules/Regulations Exam 1
(7.1%)		 13
(92.9%)		 0
(0%)		 9
(100%)		 0
(0%)		 4
(100%)		 20
(87%)		 3
(13%)		 0
(0%)		 9
(100%)
#9 Coaching Ed. Prior to Employment 2
(14.3%)		 12
(85.7%)		 1
(11.11%)		 8
(88.9%)		 1
(25%)		 3
(75%)		 3
(13%)		 20
(87%)		 1
(11%)		 8
(89%)
#10 Annual Coaching Education Seminars 4
(28.6%)		 10
(71.4%)		 3
(33.33%)		 6
(66.7%)		 2
(50%)		 2
(50%)		 8
(34%)		 15
(65%)		 3
(33%)		 6
(67%)
#11 Offer Coaching Ed Seminars 9
(64.3%)		 5
(35.7%)		 8
(88.89%)		 1
(11.11%)		 3
(75%)		 1
(25%)		 22
(95%)		 1
(4%)		 8
(89%)		 1
(11%)
#12 Parental Meetings 13
(92.9%)		 1
(7.1%)		 9
(100%)		 0
(0%)		 4
(100%)		 0
(0%)		 22
(95%)		 1
(4%)		 8
(89%)		 1
(11%)
#13 High School Diploma 8
(57.1%)		 6
(42.9%)		 5
(55.56%)		 4
(44.4%)		 0
(0%)		 4
(100%)		 17
(73%)		 6
(26%)		 4
(44%)		 5
(56%)
#14 College Degree 1
(7.1%)		 13
(92.9%)		 0
(0%)		 9
(100%)		 0
(0%)		 4
(100%)		 2
(8%)		 21
(91%)		 0
(0%)		 9
(100%)

As indicated in Tables 1 and 2, comparison of HHSAA’s leagues’ athletic directors’ (n=59) responses with regards to their respective head baseball coaches’ four-area certification status is as follows: (1) In Certifications, HHSAA high school leagues’ athletic directors (88.14%) did not require any formal coaching certification for their respective head baseball coaches, and interestingly, 67.8% didn’t require CPR and First Aid certification; (2) In Experience, HHSAA (84.75% and 84.5%, respectively) did not require their respective head coaches to have any past high school playing experience nor previous coaching experience, but HHSAA (94.92%) did require their league officials to conduct substance abuse and criminal background checks on their respective head baseball coaches prior to their coaching; (3) In Professional Growth, only 13.56% of HHSAA required their respective coaches to participate in any coaching education-training program prior to becoming a head baseball coach. Only 33.9% and 35.59% respectively of HHSAA required annual coaching education-training seminars and passing a rules/regulations examination; in contrast, HHSAA (94.92%) required parental-coaching meetings where head coaches addressed team goals, parent-coaching behavior, team rules, player responsibilities, and player discipline issues; and (4) In Experience, HHSAA (57.63 %) required at least a high school diploma from their respective head baseball coaches.

Table 2: Private vs. Public

Private (n=15) Public (n=44) HHSAA (n=59)
Requirement Yes No Yes No Yes No
#1 National Cert. Policy 1
(6.67%)		 14
(93.33%)		 6
(13.64%)		 38
(86.36%)		 7
(11.86%)		 52
(88.14%)
#2 CPR/First Aid 2
(13.33%)		 13
(86.67%)		 17
(38.64%)		 27
(61.36%)		 19
(32.20%)		 40
(67.80%)
#3 Strength/Cond. Coach 1
(6.67%)		 13
(93.33%)		 0
(0%)		 44
(100%)		 1
(1.69%)		 58
(98.31%)
#4 H.S. Playing Experience 1
(6.67%)		 14
(93.33%)		 8
(18.18%)		 36
(81.82%)		 9
(15.25%)		 50
(84.75%)
#5 College Playing Experience 0
(0%)		 15
(100%)		 0
(0%)		 44
(100%)		 0
(0%)		 59
(100%)
#6 H.S. Coaching Experience 4
(26.67%)		 11
(73.33%)		 5
(11.36%)		 39
(88.64%)		 9
(15.25%)		 50
(84.75%)
#7 Background Checks 14
(93.33%)		 1
(6.67%)		 42
(95.45%)		 2
(4.55%)		 56
(94.92%)		 3
(5.08%)
#8 Annual Rules/Regulations Exam 0
(0%)		 15
(100%)		 21
(47.73%)		 23
(52.27%)		 21
(35.59%)		 38
(64.41%)
#9 Coaching Ed. Prior to Employment 1
(6.67%)		 14
(93.33%)		 7
(15.91%)		 37
(84.09%)		 8
(13.56%)		 51
(86.44%)
#10 Annual Coaching Education Seminars 5
(33.33%)		 10
(66.67%)		 15
(34.09%)		 29
(65.91%)		 20
(33.90%)		 39
(66.10%)
#11 Offer Coaching Ed Seminars 13
(86.67%)		 2
(13.33%)		 37
(84.09%)		 7
(15.91%)		 50
(84.75%)		 9
(15.25%)
#12 Parental Meetings 13
(86.67%)		 2
(13.33%)		 43
(97.73%)		 1
(2.27%)		 56
(94.92%)		 3
(5.08%)
#13 High School Diploma 7
(46.67%)		 8
(53.33%)		 27
(61.36%)		 17
(38.64%)		 34
(57.63)		 25
(42.37%)
#14 College Degree 1
(6.67%)		 14
(93.33%)		 2
(4.55%)		 42
(95.45%)		 3
(5.08%)		 56
(94.92%)

Data in Table 2 revealed the following findings comparing the HHSAA pubic high schools’ and private high schools’ athletic directors’ collective responses in the four-area coaching standards: (1) Certification– Only public (13.64%) and private (6.67%) high schools’ athletic directors required their respective head baseball coaches to have national coaching certification and CPR/First Aid (38.64%, 13.33% respectively); (2) Experience– Interestingly, only a small remnant public or private high schools’ athletic directors’ required their respective head baseball coaches to have any previous high school playing experience (18.18% and 6.67% respectively) and previous coaching experience (11.36% and 26.67%, respectively); in contrast, HHSAA required substance abuse and criminal background checks (95.45% and 93.33%, respectively); (3) Professional Growth– Only public (15.91%) and private (6.67%) athletic directors required their respective head baseball coaches to attend coaching education-training seminars prior to employment and to attend annual coaching education-training seminars (34.09% and 33.33%, respectively); and (4) Education– The majority of public (61.36%) athletic directors required their respective high school head baseball coaches to have at least a high school diploma, in contrast to private athletic directors (46.67%).

Table 3: Head Coaching Requirements by StateX = Required, R=Recommended

State Teaching Cert. NFHS/ASEP CPR First Aid
Alabama X X – –
Alaska – X – –
Arizona X R – –
Arkansas X X – –
California – R X X
Colorado X X R R
Connecticut R – X X
Delaware X – X –
D.C. – – X X
Florida X – – –
Georgia – X – –
Hawaii – – – –
Idaho X X – –
Illinois X X – –
Indiana X X – ->
Iowa – – – –
Kansas X X – –
Kentucky X X X –
Louisiana X – – –
Maine – X X –
Maryland X – – –
Massachusetts X X – –
Michigan – – – –
Minnesota R R – X
Mississippi X X – –
Missouri X X – –
Montana – – – –
Nebraska X R – –
Nevada – X X –
New Hampshire – X X X
New Jersey X X – –
New Mexico X X – –
New York X – X X
North Carolina – R – –
North Dakota – – – –
Ohio – R X X
Oklahoma X – – X
Oregon – X – –
Pennsylvania – R – –
Rhode Island – X X X
South Carolina X X – –
South Dakota – X – –
Tennessee X – – –
Texas X – – –
Utah X X – –
Vermont – X – –
Virginia – X – –
Washington – X X X
West Virginia X X – –
Wisconsin X X – –
Wyoming X X X X

Discussion:

In the Certifications section of the questionnaire, the findings indicated that a very small percent of HHSAA’s leagues’ athletic directors required a national certification policy and CPR/First-Aid certification. In contrast, HHSAA (84.75%) offered coaching education-training seminars for its head baseball coaches. If HHSAA doesn’t’ require its respective coaches to complete a recognizable national certification program, including CPR and First Aid, then coaches have to further their professional growth by attending their leagues’ recommended coaching education-training sessions.

In the Experience section of the questionnaire, a small percent of HHSAA’s athletic directors required previous high school playing and coaching experience in baseball. Nevertheless, nearly all (94.92%) HHSAA’s athletic directors required substance abuse and criminal background checks on their head baseball coaches. The difference in these requirements may be due to the importance of coaches’ character, rather than playing and coaching experience.

In the Professional section of the questionnaire, a minimal percent of HHSAA’s athletic directors required their head baseball coaches to attend coaching education-training seminars prior to employment, and to attend annual coaching education-training seminars after employment. A related finding revealed that a high percent of HHSAA’s athletic directors (84.75%) offered coaching education-training sessions for their head baseball coaches. Obviously, HHSAA recognized the importance of coaching education-training sessions, but HHSAA possibly encountered attendance problems in the past in coaches or baseball coaches who have not positively reviewed the coaching education-training curriculum.

The Education section of the questionnaire indicated that over half (57.63%) of the HHSAA’s athletic directors required at least a high school diploma for their head baseball coaches. This low percentage may be due to a lack in initiating a standard policy requiring all potential head baseball coaches to have a high school diploma. Certainly, high school dropouts would encounter more difficulties in obtaining high school head-coaching jobs than a high school graduate.

An interestingly supplemental finding revealed that there were only two nationally-certified high school strength and conditioning coaches. No HHSAA league athletic director required his or her respective high school to have a certified strength and conditioning coach on staff.

In Hawaii, 92 high schools compete in men and women interscholastic sports. In 2005, 34,758 student-athletes participated in Hawaii’s 24 state high school sports programs (K. Amemiya, personal communication, January 15, 2007). Not one head coach had a national strength and conditioning certification credential. Yet in any of these 92 high schools, if the athletes participated in any on-campus formal off-season or in-season strength and conditioning programs, unqualified sport-coaches conducted these regiments, thereby increasing the risk of injury to these 34,758 student-athletes. In a progressive state, like Hawaii, which was the first and only state to require every athletic high school to have on staff two-full time nationally certified athletic trainers, the HHSAA should recognize the need to require and fund one full-time certified strength and conditioning coach on every high school staff.

Conclusions and Recommendations:

In conclusion, there is a national movement toward high school coaching certification. To date, there are 40 states that have adopted, recommended, or required one of two national certification programs — ASEP or PACE. There seems to be a disparity in Hawaii’s high school athletic departments. There is no movement to adopt, recommend, or require national certification for Hawaii’s coaches, yet Hawaii is the only state to require two athletic trainers in every high school. Therefore, Hawaii’s athletic departments should seriously consider the following recommendations: (1) HHSAA should adopt either the American Sport Education Program’s (ASEP) or the Program for Athletic Coaches Education (PACE) national coaching certification requirements for their head baseball coaches; and (2) The National Standards for Athletic Coaches created by the National Association for Sport and Physical Education (NASPE) should be incorporated into HHSAA’s ASEP or PACE national accreditation-coaching program. The national standards should be used as a basis or framework for design of selection, evaluation, and education programs.

References:

American Sport Education Program (2006). ASEP’s Beginnings. Retrieved November 20, 2006, from http://www.asep.com/about.cfm

Brylinsky, J., (2002). National standards for athletic coaches. ERIC Digest, Oct.2002. Retrieved Nov. 12, 2005, from http://www.ericdigests.org/2004-1/coaches.htm

Burgeson, C., Wechsler, H., Brener, N.D., Young, J.C., & Spain, C.G. (2001). Physical education and activity: Results from the school health policies and programs study 2000. Journal of School Health, 71, 279-293.

Gilbert, W. & Trudel, P., (1999). An evaluation strategy for coach education programs. Journal of Sport Behavior, 22, 234-250.

Jackowiak, L., (2003). Developing an athletic program based on sound principles. Incorporating the national federation coaching education program. Retrieved Sept.23, 2006, from http://www.nfhs.org

Martens, R., Flannery, T., & Retort, P. (2003). The future of coaching Education in America, Retrieved May 11, 2006, from http://www.nfhs.org/cep/articles/future_coaching.htm

National Association for Sport and Physical Education (1995). National Standards for Athletic Coaches. Dubuque: Kendall/Hunt.

National Association of State Boards of Education (NASBE) (2003). Education requirements for athletic coaches. NASBE policy update, 11 (4). Retrieved May 12, 2006, from http://www.nasbe.org/Educational_Issues/Policy_Updates/11_4.html

National Council for Accreditation of Coaching Education (NCACE) (2006). NCACE program registry and approved program list. NASPE. Retrieved May 10, 2006, from http://www.aahperd.org/naspe/template.cfm?template=programs-html

National Federation of High School Association (NFHSA) (n.d.). Coaching education in America: A white paper. Retrieved May 13, 2006 from http://www.nfhs.org/staticContent/PDFs/cep/cep_whitepaper.pdf.

Seefeldt, V. & Brown, E. (1991). Program for athletic coaches’ education. Carmel: Benchmark Press, Inc.

2016-10-12T14:53:11-05:00March 14th, 2008|Contemporary Sports Issues, Sports Coaching, Sports Facilities, Sports Management|Comments Off on A State Analysis of High School Coaching Certification Requirements for Head Baseball Coaches
Read More

The Effects of Promotions on Attendance in Professional Baseball

Submitted by: Robert Aaron Browning, M.S. & Louisa S. DeBolt, Ph.D.

Abstract:

Professional baseball organizations use many types of promotions to increase attendance. The purpose of the study was to determine whether or not different types of promotions effected attendance in professional baseball. Promotions were categorized into price, non-price, and a combination of price and non-price. Attendance and promotion data were collected from four professional baseball organizations located in the Ohio River Area. The results indicated significant increases in attendance in two of the four teams when any promotion was used. Two teams also revealed attendance increases when non-price promotions were present, as well as when combination of price and non-price promotions were employed. Finally, this study supports previous research, which has found higher attendance at games with promotions than games without promotions and when non-price promotions are used rather than price promotions.

(more…)

2016-10-19T10:51:50-05:00March 14th, 2008|Contemporary Sports Issues, Sports Facilities, Sports Management, Sports Studies and Sports Psychology|Comments Off on The Effects of Promotions on Attendance in Professional Baseball
Read More

Non-Economic Societal Impacts of Intercollegiate Athletics

Submitted by: David Larimore, Ph.D & George Chitiyo, Ph.D

Abstract:

Intercollegiate athletics impact society in numerous positive ways. A number of studies have been done seeking to establish the effects of these sports programs on athletes, their institutions, and society at large. This paper is a synthesis of the literature concerning the non-economic impacts of sports. The findings largely support the notion that athletics are beneficial, not only to athletes, but to society in general. Many important lessons and virtues are derived from athletics. Among the many benefits to higher education institutions are the concepts of attracting more admissions applications and enhancing institutional name recognition and visibility.

Introduction:

Athletics provide entertainment, physical development, social interaction, and business (Cigliano, 2006). They create platforms for individual recognition and institutional visibility. There are many positive externalities associated with athletic activities. Attaching monetary value to these effects is difficult, as the value is based on societal satisfaction measures that are hard to measure.

Athletics Mould Virtues

Athletics help shape the social character of participants (Rudd and Stoll, 2004). A sample of 595 students from several universities was used in a causal-comparative study in which athletes and non athletes were compared concerning social and moral character. There were significant differences between athletes and non athletes. The main conclusion was that sport helps build character in terms of teamwork, loyalty, and self-sacrifice. There is no evidence to support the idea that athletics help build moral character, though neither is it proven that they do not do so.

Yiannakis, Douvis, and Murdy (2003) studied the perceived economic and non-economic impacts of sports. The findings are based on a survey of 702 residents and students of Connecticut attending two universities. They measured the perceived impacts of sports in terms of job creation, infrastructure, image promotion, economic impacts, environmental impacts, crime, and deviancy, among others. The authors conjectured that conflicts, issues, ideologies, pain, success, and tragedy are all blended in sports. People identify with these and are able to better handle the challenges of life as they see teams fighting on the field of play.

Athletes learn the principles of self discipline, teamwork, winning and losing, hard work, and self confidence. They have their self esteem boosted (National Federation of High Schools, 2003). One athletics director at a community college within the Tennessee Board of Regents (TBR) said, “Athletics fulfill major commitments of our mission statement to educate the whole person, to develop teamwork and leaders, and to contribute to the personal health and well-being of our students” (Cigliano, 2006, p45).

Yiannakis et al. (2003) established that the perceptions of people regarding the positive impacts of sport differed based on whether one was a fan or not. Non fans tend to regard sports as a nuisance that causes traffic jams and pollution. Enthusiasts savor the joy brought by the victories of their teams. A relationship may exist between the degree of interest and the extent to which sports are perceived to be beneficial.

Cigliano’s (2006) qualitative study was done at two community colleges in the TBR to examine the economic, institutional, and human impacts of athletic programs. The participants from each college included the president, the athletics director, two coaches, and four student-athletes. Coaches from the colleges said they viewed athletics as vehicles that help some students stay in school. The discipline and structure in athletic programs help motivate student-athletes to take advantage of educational opportunities. The coaches spoke of employing discipline, monitoring class and study hall attendance, and using encouragement to motivate student-athletes to achieve academic goals and become academically successful. Indirectly, the study addressed the apparent conflict of goals between academic interests and athletics. As long as there is a good relationship between the sports departments and academics, goal conflict exists only as an abstract concept.

Student-athletes participating in Cigliano’s (2006) study stated the following as virtues they received: recognition, patience, becoming better persons, self-discipline, maturity, motivation, teamwork, knowing people better, working hard, perseverance, working together, self-confidence, and leadership. The presidents, athletic directors, and coaches identified leadership development, a sense of civic responsibility, loyalty, punctuality, team work, cooperation, winning and losing with class and dignity, being competitive, developing individual strengths and skills, getting along with people, obedience, discipline, learning to make independent decisions, adjusting to being on their own, and maturity as virtues learned from athletics.

In the words of one athlete:

As much as we have to be physically in shape…we definitely also need an attitude which enhances our performance. This…(is)…an inner attitude of confidence in your ability, determination to see what you can do, and delight in what may be possible. The positive vibes that surround a person with an attitude like this can spread (Depew1 , 1999).

The NFHS (2003) reported that sport promotes citizenship and sportsmanship by instilling a sense of pride in community, teaching lessons of teamwork and self-discipline, and facilitating the physical and emotional development of participants.

Bailey, Moulton, and Moulton (1999) compared athletes and non-athletes concerning levels of self-esteem and approval motivation. A sample of 492 university undergraduates participated in this study; ninety-four were athletes. The study used a multivariate analysis of variance to determine whether there was a significant difference between athletes and non-athletes on the variables of self-esteem and approval motivation. Athletes had significantly higher levels of self-esteem than non-athletes. There was also a statistically significant difference on approval motivation. Thus, athletes are “more likely to view themselves positively…and are less likely to engage in approval seeking behavior than non-athletes” (Bailey, Moulton, & Moulton, 1999).

The ability of physical exercise to eliminate anxiety in university youth was investigated by Akandere and Tekin (2002). The sample was comprised of 311 students from Konya Selcuk University of Turkey who had never been involved in physical exercise. A sub-sample of sixty students who had the highest anxiety scores was split in half, so that thirty became the experimental group (which participated in organized physical activity) and the other thirty became the control group. Participation in physical exercise and physical activities decreased the anxiety level of both sexes.

Basking in Reflected Glory

Athletic activities relax the mind and “function as psychological and spiritual havens where disorder and moral ambiguities are resolved and managed through communal sport ritual practices and traditions” (Yiannakis et al., 2003, p.5). One of the perceived impacts lies in a concept called ‘Basking in Reflected Glory’ (BIRG). In Yiannakis et al.’s study, a majority of the respondents reported feeling ‘really good’ when their teams won and feeling ‘really bad’ when their teams lost. However, the relationship between sport-induced mood states, social identity, empowerment, and pro-social behavior is not fully understood and may require further inquiry.

One of the most popular studies on ‘BIRG’ was done by Cialdini et al. (1976)2. College students were found to be more likely to use the pronoun ‘we’ and to wear clothing that identified with their schools after a successful athletic weekend than during times when they had drawn or lost. Cialdini posited that people had a predisposition to associate with positive outcomes and make them their own. When one is ‘BIRG’, the person on the receiving end would not have done anything to bring the team’s success. Theirs is just to bask in unearned grandeur. When one’s team does well, it results in feelings of happiness, well-being, and collective euphoria. It has also been suggested that ‘BIRG’ improves mood in both individuals and communities.

On the flip side of the concept of ‘BIRG’ is ‘Cutting-Off Reflected Failure’ (CORF). The main ‘CORF’ strategy is to minimize the association between oneself and the losing team via several means, including by refusing to attend the teams’ matches’ and using terms such as ‘they’ rather than ‘we’. ‘CORF’ can be said to have somewhat positive results. The pessimism that precedes crucial matches can have the positive impact of uniting fans in the face of the possibility that it can all go wrong. Such an acceptance of a possible negative outcome can have the effect of protecting fans against disappointment as a result of failure. Having a shared moan can be a way of bonding3.

Reputation and Institutional Image

The reputation of an academic institution is closely tied to its sports programs (Cigliano, 2006; Pulsinelli et al, 1989). Thrilling performances by teams score points for the institution. High ranking sporting colleges are also ranked high in the academic arena.

The majority of respondents from Cigliano’s (2006) study mentioned a variety of values of publicity that athletic programs brought to the colleges, including a sense of excitement, activity, focus, free advertising, media coverage, service area communication, recruitment enhancement, and identity for local support to the institutions. The institutional image generated was said to be very positive. Good coverage amounted to free advertising. One of the presidents commented that:

Whether it is right or wrong, many people out in the community do not see anything in your college other than athletics. I mean, you have a certain constituent group out there that will even evaluate your college on how your athletic program is and people read about athletics in the paper. (Cigliano, p62).

In the study, athletic directors noted that visibility of their colleges was due more to athletics than any other department. They pointed out that institutional recognition is a function of the athletics program.

In a 2004 study, Frank mentioned the effect that spending on big time sports has on a university’s name recognition. Because these institutions are constantly making headlines in the public media, their names become more familiar to prospective students than those which are not publicized. This is likely to influence them in the college decision-making process. In such instances, “a big-time athletic program serves much like a national advertising campaign” (Frank, p15).

While athletes are students, they are also considered role models by their fans. People identify with role models on the sports field (Yiannakis et al., 2003). James Sheridan, a cross country athlete at Kenyon College, said, “athletes represent (their institutions) across the country and the type of attitude (they) project reflects on (the) entire learning institution” (Depew, 1999).

Enrollment

Athletics have a positive effect on enrollment. Pulsinelli, Borland, & Goff (1989) postulated that in order for sporting teams to be self financing, athletic teams would have to ‘attract’ a certain number of non-athletic students to the university. Enrollment data for the years 1960 to 1988 were analyzed with winning percentages for football and basketball. Overall, high sporting performance was associated with increased enrollment. This study alluded to the fact that recruiting high profile athletes might increase enrollment because of the indirect ‘attracting influence’ exerted on non-athlete aspiring students. When choosing among schools that offer athletic programs, non athletes prefer schools that have winning records to those that do not.

An impact study of Nichols State University (NSU) by Coats and Cox (2004), found that athletics have an effect on enrollment apart from the economic impact. Nicholls State’s athletic programs directly supported 239 student athletes. It was estimated that these student athletes drew an additional forty-three friends or relatives to NSU. Furthermore, of the 105 members of the marching band, approximately a third would have enrolled elsewhere were it not for the existence of the athletics program. Thus, the NSU athletics and associated programs were directly responsible for attracting 322 students to NSU. These students, in turn, supported approximately fourteen faculty positions.

Toma and Cross (1996) examined undergraduate admissions applications for institutions that won the NCAA Division I-A national football championship and those that won the NCAA men’s basketball tournament for the years 1979 through 1992. Increases were recorded in undergraduate admissions applications in years following a championship season. Fourteen out of sixteen schools that won or shared championships in football recorded increases in the number of applications. In basketball, ten out of thirteen schools recorded increases in applications following the NCAA Tournament championship.

Frank (2004) analyzed the effects of successful athletic programs on soliciting additional applications and donations by alumni and others. He postulated that universities continue to expand expenditures when they may fail to cover direct costs because the athletic programs may generate indirect benefits in other domains of sufficient value to make up the shortfall. The study stated that, “If students are indeed more likely to apply to an institution with a successful athletic program…such schools will be more selective than others on…the average SAT scores of entering freshmen.” McCormick and Tinsley (1987) validated this by asserting that freshmen entering a school would have an average SAT score about thirty-three points higher than it would if it did not have a big-time athletic program. They estimated a multiple regression in which the average SAT score was dependent on several variables, including whether the school had a thriving athletics program. Their data came from about 150 schools for the year 1971, sixty-three of which had big time athletic programs.

The opportunity to participate in athletics is a primary consideration for students (Cigliano, 2006). One community college president stated that the athletic program attracted between eighty to one-hundred students who would not be attending college if the athletic program were not available for them. Another said that sports had a significant impact on enrollment because of the influence athletes had in attracting girlfriends, friends, and peers.

Academic Performance

Student athletes in Colorado were shown to have ‘significantly higher’ grade-point averages than their non-sporting counterparts (NHFS, 2003). Those in Jefferson County high schools were also shown to have higher grade-point averages than their non-sporting peers. The latter school district has matched the academic success of its students with success on the playing field (NHFS, 2003).

Schildnecht (2002) quoted studies by the North Carolina High School Athletic Association, the Colorado Department of Education, and the American College testing services to show that students who participated in sports performed better academically. Student athletes were also found to be more likely to graduate than their non-athletic counterparts.

In one study, which goes against the idea of athletics having a positive relationship with graduation rates, Mangold, Bean, and Adams (2003) explored the impact that athletic programs have on institutional graduation rates. Data on graduation rates for ninety-seven universities competing in NCAA Division IA basketball and football were regressed on several predictors. The results of the study did not support the hypothesis that colleges with successful sports programs would have higher graduation rates for students in general. On smaller campuses, involvement in a successful sports program was suggested to conflict with academic goals. This study provides an example of the post hoc fallacy. There’s probably some third variable that explains this negative relationship.

Lucas and Lovaglia (2002) found that non athletic scholars anticipated higher benefits from academic success than athletes. Their study, for which the sample was 135 students (of which thirty-three were athletes), sought to measure the perceptions of student athletes and non athletes regarding cost, benefit, and motivation towards academic success. They reported that student athletes had a lower motivation to perform academically than non athletes. This does not, however, necessarily support the notion that athletes struggle academically as compared to non athletes, as the authors suggested.

A study was done by Meier, Robinson, Polinard, and Wrinkle (2000) to see if pursuit of athletic goals had a negative impact on academic interests of universities as reflected by scores on the SAT and ACT. The data for the analysis came from Texas school districts for the years 1997-1998. Athletic budgets were found to have no relationship with school attendance. However, the study concluded that athletic budgets had a significant negative relationship with academic performance, although the statistical significance of the variables is unknown. The study acknowledges that there are positive benefits at the individual level. Whatever these impacts may be, it is tempting to suggest that these individual benefits, across the district, could collectively override the negative results of athletics across academic institutions.

Donations

Having reviewed literature pertaining to alumni donations, Frank (2004) concluded that there is evidence that links athletic success to alumni giving. Rhoads and Gerking (2000) also analyzed the role of success in intercollegiate football and basketball in attracting donations to universities from alumni and other sources. Results from regression analysis of panel data from eighty-seven universities showed that, year to year, changes in athletic success had a positive impact on alumni giving. Other donors were not as responsive. Longstanding athletic traditions were shown to attract charitable donations.

Clotfelter cited participation in extracurricular activities and athletics as one of the factors that affected alumni giving (2001). The study utilized a data set of graduates from fourteen private institutions and sought to establish factors associated with alumni donations. The data covered cohorts of individuals who entered the institutions in the fall of 1951, 1976, and 1989. The findings showed that over half of all donations were given by only 1% of all alumni, most of whom contribute annually.

In a 2000 study of 2,822 Vanderbilt University graduates, Dugan, Mullin, and Siegfried investigated alumni giving behavior during the eight years following their graduation. A probit model and a regression were run on the data of givers and non givers. Participation in athletics was found to generate a stronger sense of attachment to the university through group membership, a factor which would have a positive effect on giving. In addition, former athletes receive solicitations from special clubs of former athletes apart from the usual appeal for alumni contributions. For that reason, they are expected to contribute more than other graduates. Students who were members of athletic teams responded more favorably to requests for donations after graduation.

A Chance to Continue in Sport and Education

The awarding of scholarships to athletes affords the chance to further academic interests (Schildnecht, 2002). Athletic directors in Cigliano’s (2006) study expressed that athletics, “provides education for a group of people who might not be able to have an education.” Dropping athletic programs from state universities and community colleges would have the undesirable effect of removing opportunities for many student-athletes to follow their career goals and obtain an education while pursuing future success in athletics. For most, this will be the peak time of their sporting careers. Few venture into professional sports after college.

Negative Effects

A few issues can be raised concerning the negative effects of participation in college sports. Athletics consume time. Often, the athlete has to cope with the stress of attending to sporting obligations while fulfilling academic requirements. They have to submit assignments at the same time as every other student. For those who are not on scholarship, their families have to bear the increased burden of giving them pocket money, since they cannot manage jobs to supplement their incomes.

Stieber (1991) mentions the presence of a black market for athletes. In this situation, a supply and demand for cheaters exists coordinated by national sports bodies. The student athlete is generally discriminated against. The market for athletes is not a free market. It is, in reality, a monopoly. The buying cartel “exploits by eliminating the bidding process among its membership” (Stieber, 1991, p446). The resulting wage is lower for the athlete than what would be obtained in an uncontrolled market. The authors of this paper believe that Stieber’s argument would only hold for the very top tier of institutions, which have major revenue streams associated with football and basketball. For the other non-football and basketball athletes in those institutions and for the athletes in the rest of higher education, a full or partial scholarship may be more than the free market would generate.

Colleges have difficulty recruiting students who are good athletes and academically talented. Cigliano (2006) mentioned an apparent lack of preparation for college work for some of the student-athletes. However, this applied for the rest of the student body as well. Thus, it is not specific to student athletes.

Yiannakis et al. (2003) stated that sports were perceived to increase pollution by 62% of the respondents. Also, crime, gambling, alcohol abuse, and other illegal activities were viewed as increasing by up to 45%. Vandalism, assaults, and drug abuse were also feared to be increasing. There is a need, however, to establish the extent to which particular sports programs have a negative impact on a particular environmental setting.

Conclusions:

Athletics are beneficial to student athletes, to universities, and to society at large. Research points almost incontrovertibly towards the advantages associated with intercollegiate sports. National bodies responsible for sports are generally pleased with the results that athletics yield and would not support plans to reduce support for sports. However, athletes have to work under stressful conditions because of tight schedules and the demanding nature of their work. In some cases, student athletes are exploited by unscrupulous individuals and sports organizations. Ultimately, though, the benefits of athletics outweigh the disadvantages, albeit they are difficult to quantify.

Footnotes:

1 Gelsey Lynn, a cross country runner, as quoted by Depew, R (1999).

2 As cited by Posten, M. (1998).

3 The Mental Health Foundation: Football and Mental Health (n.d)

References:

Akandere, M. and Tekin A. (2002). The effect of physical exercise on anxiety: The Sport Journal Volume 5, Number 2.

Athletic policy manual of Duke University (2003). Retrieved May 18, 2006 from

Click to access Athletic%20Policy%20Manual.pdf

Bailey, K., Moulton, M., & Moulton, P. (1999). Athletics as a predictor of
self-esteem and approval motivation: The Sport Journal Volume 2, Number 2.

Chapin (2002). Identifying the real costs and benefits of sports facilities. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Working Paper.

Cigliano, L. M. (2006). A perceptual study of the impact of athletic programs in selected community colleges in the State of Tennessee: PhD Dissertation, East Tennessee State University.

Clotfelter, C. T. (1999). Who are the alumni donors? Giving by two generations of alumni from selective colleges. Nonprofit Management and Leadership. Vol 12(2). Pages 119-138

Coats, R. M., and Cox, K. C., (April 14, 2004). Economic impact of NSU athletics Retrieved May 29, 2006 from http://www.slec.org/uploads/EconomicImpact.pdf

Depew, R. (1999). Kenyon athletes define “Role Models” in their own words. Vol. 1(2). Retrieved June 12, 2006 from http://www2.kenyon.edu/orgs/Ksai/features/features11992.htm#sheridan

Dugan, K. Mullin, C. H. & Siegfried J. J. (2000). Undergraduate financial aid and subsequent giving behavior: Williams Project on the Economics of Higher Education. Discussion Paper No. 57. Retrieved June 15, 2006 from
http://opus.zbw-kiel.de/volltexte/2005/3672/pdf/DP-57.pdf

The Mental Health Foundation: Football and mental health (n.d) Retrieved June 23, 2006 from http://www.mentalhealth.org.uk/page.cfm?pageurl=football.cfm

Frank, R. H. (2004). Challenging the myth: A review of the links among college athletic success, student quality, and donations: Prepared for the Knight Foundation Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics.

Gerking, S., & Rhoads, T. A. (2000). Educational contributions, academic quality, and athletic success. Contemporary Economic Policy, 18, 248-254.

Lucas, J. W. and Lovaglia, M. J. (2002). Athletes’ expectations for success in athletics compared to academic competition: The Sport Journal Volume 5, Number 2.

McCormick, R., & Tinsley, M. (1987). Athletics versus academics? Evidence from SAT scores: Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 95: 1103-1116.

Mangold, William D. (2003). The impact of intercollegiate athletics on graduation rates among major NCAA Division I universities: Implications for college persistence theory and practice. The Journal of Higher Education Vol.74( 5), pp. 540-562. The Ohio State University Press.

Meier, K. J., Robinson, S., Polinard, J. L., & Wrinkle R. D. (2000). A question of priorities: Athletic budgets and academic performance. The Texas Educational Excellence Project.

National Federation of High Schools Association (NFHS), (2003). Survey resources: The case for high school activities. Retrieved September 3, 2005 from http://www.nfhs.org/scriptcontent/Va_custom/vimdisplays/contentpagedisplay.cfm?content_ID=163

Posten, M. (1998). Basking in glory and cutting off failure. Retrieved March 14, 2006 from http://www.units.muohio.edu/psybersite/fans/bc.shtml

Pulsinelli, R.W., Borland, M. V., & Goff, B. L., (1989). Western Kentucky University’s athletic program: Financial burden or boon? Department of Economics, Western Kentucky University.

Rudd, A. & Stoll, S. (2004). What type of character do athletes possess? An empirical examination of college athletes versus college non athletes with the RSBH Value Judgment Inventory: The Sport Journal Volume 7, Number 2.

Schildknecht, J. (2002). Benefits of interscholarstic athletics: schooling in American society. Retrieved September 23, 2005, from
http://filebox.vt.edu/users/jschildk/portfolio/documents/Benefits%20of%20Interscholastic%20Athletics.doc

Stieber, J. (1991). The behavior of the NCAA: a question of ethics. Journal of Business Ethics. Retrieved June 13, 2006 from http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=5&did=572547&SrchMode=1&sid=1&Fmt=6&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1130169395&clientId=28564

Toma, J. D. & Cross, M. (1996). Intercollegiate athletics and student college choice: understanding the impact of championship seasons on the quantity and quality of undergraduate applicants. ASHE Annual Meeting Paper. http://www.edrs.com

University of North Carolina at Charlotte. Institutional plan 2004 – 2009. Retrieved May 18, 2006 from http://www.provost.uncc.edu/planning/lrp/institutional.pdf

Yiannakis, A., Douvis, J., & Murdy, J. (2003). Perceived impacts of sport: measuring the impacts of sport: Methodological and policy considerations V6. 174.

2017-05-31T13:19:14-05:00March 14th, 2008|Contemporary Sports Issues, Sports Facilities, Sports Management, Sports Studies and Sports Psychology|Comments Off on Non-Economic Societal Impacts of Intercollegiate Athletics
Read More

Introducing a Risk Assessment Model for Sport Venues

Submitted by: Stacey Hall, Lou Marciani, Walter E. Cooper & Robert Rolen

Abstract:

With the ‘unknown certainty’ of terrorist actions and fan behavior, it is impossible to ensure a risk-free environment at America’s sporting venues. Incidents will happen and emergencies will arise. It is a matter of how one prepares, responds, and recovers to mitigate the consequences of emergencies at a sporting venue. Sport venue managers need to be aware of risk assessment methodologies to detect threats, identify vulnerabilities, and reduce consequences. Information gathered through this process is extremely valuable for enhancing security measures. This article discusses risk assessment and analysis, addresses the need for risk assessments at sporting venues, and describes the sport-specific risk assessment model developed while conducting research through a Homeland Security grant.

Introduction:

Sport lost its innocence on September 5, 1972, at the Olympic Games in Munich, Germany (CNN.com, 2002). A Palestinian group known as Black September crept into the Olympic Village and took nine members of the Israeli team hostage. The captors demanded a safe exit out of Germany and the release of Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli jails (2002). Unfortunately, a failed rescue attempt led to the death of all nine Israeli hostages, five terrorists, and one German policeman (2002). “For the first time, world sport had become a victim of terrorism, bringing with it a brutal reminder of the world’s harsher realities” (2). Terrorism struck again in 1996. A ‘domestic terrorist’ was responsible for the Centennial Olympic Park bombing at the Atlanta Games. This incident killed one person and injured more than 100 (CNN.com, 1996). Regardless of the motives for these attacks, terrorists chose to act on a world stage that offered global exposure for their cause. The incident in which an Oklahoma student prematurely detonated a bomb strapped to his body outside a football stadium packed with 84,000 in October 2005 (Hagmann, 2005), and the most recent threat of a dirty bomb attack on several NFL stadiums in October 2006 (CNN.com, 2006), emphasize the fact that sport venues are an attractive target for potentially catastrophic consequences. Besides terrorism, sport venue managers must plan for other incidents or unexpected disasters, such as fan/player violence or natural hazards.

One problem that sports venue manager’s face is determining the potential threat level, “causing leagues, teams and venues to prepare for a range of possible incidents at their facilities and to maintain close contact with federal, state and local law enforcement representatives regarding possible threats” (Hurst, Zoubek, Pratsinakis, n.d., p. 4). The risk assessment process is a way to determine risk and threat levels and identify vulnerabilities. “A good risk management approach includes three primary elements: a threat assessment, a vulnerability assessment, and a criticality assessment.” (Decker, 2001, p. 1). These assessments provide vital information for the protection of critical assets against terrorist attacks and other threats. Sport venue managers are able to identify vulnerabilities and thus harden the facility and improve physical protection systems. This may include implementing access controls, using CCTV security cameras, adding lighting, encouraging background checks, credentialing, checking backpacks, enhancing communication networks, and developing or updating emergency response and evacuation plans.

Understanding Risk

“Risk is the possibility of loss resulting from a threat, security incident, or event” (General Security Risk Assessment Guideline, 2003, p. 5). Risk is inherent in almost all aspects of life. Sport venue managers must continually attempt to minimize risk at their facilities. Risk cannot be totally eliminated from the environment, but with careful planning it can be managed. “Risk management is a systematic and analytical process to consider the likelihood that a threat will endanger an asset, individual, or function and to identify actions to reduce the risk and mitigate the consequences of an attack” (Decker, 2001, p. 1).

Risk is best understood as the product of the consequence of an event and the probability of the event occurring: Risk = Consequence x Probability (“Risk 101”, n.d). Risk increases as the consequences and probability of occurrence increases (n.d.). “In order to manage risk, it must first be identified, measured, and evaluated” (4). The Vulnerability Methodologies Report (2003) issued by the Office for Domestic Preparedness, Department of Homeland Security, identified three types of risk: mission or function risks, asset risks, and security risks. Mission risks prevent an organization from accomplishing a mission. Asset risks may harm an organization’s physical assets. Security risks have the potential to cripple actual data and people (2003).

Sport facility managers identify risks through various means. They can conduct surveys of attendees, conduct inspections of the facility, interview present employees, or ask experts in the field (Ammon, Southall, & Blair, 2004). Sport facility managers must address primary and secondary factors in order to reduce risk (2004). Primary factors are identified in the standard operating procedures. Facility staff is included among these factors (2004). An unsupervised or improperly trained ticket taker, usher, or cashier can become a risk for the facility manager (2004). “A well-trained staff, educated about proper risk management procedures, can help the risk manager to identify potential risks” (p. 108). Secondary factors of risk faced by most sport facilities include weather, type of event, patron demographics, and facility location (2004).

The essence of risk is dependent on the potential of threats. “A threat is a product of intention and capability of an adversary, both manmade and natural, to undertake an action which would be detrimental to an asset” (Vulnerability Assessment Report, 2003, p. 11). Vulnerabilities expose the asset to a threat and eventual loss. The General Security Risk Assessment Guideline (2003) defines vulnerability as “an exploitable capability; an exploitable security weakness or deficiency at a facility, entity, venue, or of a person” (p. 5). A risk analysis evaluating the potential of loss from a threat will determine whether risk should be reduced, re-assigned, transferred, or accepted (Vulnerability Assessment Report, 2003). “An acceptable risk is the risk level that an individual or group considers reasonable for the perceived benefit of an activity” (“Risk 101”, n.d., Acceptable Risk 1). An acceptable level of risk is usually determined by the asset manager or owner (2003). Severe risks that cause a high degree of loss and occur frequently should be avoided (Ammon, Southall, & Blair, 2004). Average frequency and moderate severity risks can be transferred to someone who’s willing to assume the risk. The facility manager may decide to pay an insurance company to cover physical and financial damages (2004). Some facility mangers may decide to keep or retain the risk. In so doing, they become financially responsible (2004). Facility managers can reduce risk through staff training, preventative maintenance, and development of a risk management plan to be included in the standard operating procedure (SOP) (2004). “The SOP is a set of instructions giving detailed directions and appropriate courses of action for given situations. SOP’s should be developed for all risks,” (Farmer, Mulrooney, & Ammon, 1996, p. 81).

In order to determine threats and vulnerabilities, an organization must undergo a risk assessment. The Department of Homeland Security issued a ten-step risk assessment methodology criterion (Vulnerability Assessment Report, 2003):

  • Clearly identify the infrastructure sector being assessed.
  • Specify the type of security discipline addressed, e.g. physical, information, operations.
  • Collect specific data pertaining to each asset.
  • Identify critical/key assets to be protected.
  • Determine the mission impact of the loss or damage of that asset.
  • Conduct a threat analysis and perform assessment for specific assets.
  • Perform a vulnerability analysis and assessment to specific threats.
  • Conduct analytical risk assessment and determine priorities for each asset.
  • Be relatively low cost to train and conduct.
  • Make specific, concrete recommendations concerning countermeasures.

This is general in nature and may be adapted to meet the needs of a specific organization. Several other risk assessment models exist today. For example, Sandia National Laboratories developed the RAM-Chemical to assess chemical facilities in the United States. Sports facilities in the U.S. must embrace risk management processes. Identifying the greatest threats and eliminating or reducing vulnerabilities will help minimize risk at sports events. “A sports arena is always critical as a high value terrorist target because of the potentially high casualty rate” (Durling, Price, & Spero, 2005, p. 8). Whether facing a terrorist attack, natural disaster, or unruly fan behavior, sport venue managers must pursue an effective risk management approach to protect the facility and human lives.

The Sports Event Security Assessment Model (SESAM)

In May, 2005, the Department of Homeland Security, in conjunction with the Mississippi Emergency Management agency, awarded the University of Southern Mississippi a $568,000 research grant to create a research-based model for the security management of university sport venues. Several risk assessment methodologies were reviewed and the DHS risk assessment criterion was customized for the assessment of sport venues. The Sport Event Security Assessment Model (SESAM) was developed through the collaboration of academic and security professionals in a six-hour brainstorming session. Academic professionals with experience in the sport event security area and training in DHS threat/risk assessment participated. Security professionals included former employees of the FBI, CIA, and Secret Service with extensive background in risk assessment methods and vulnerability assessment experience in the security and sport security field. This collaborative group supported the development and field testing of the model. A seven step procedure was created to evaluate sport security operations. An overview of the SESAM is presented in figure 1.

A risk assessment was conducted of the sport operations at seven public universities in Mississippi between May 2005 and February 2006. The following highlights the critical points during each stage of the seven-step process:

1. Step 1 of the process involves the identification of a SESAT team, including all key personnel responsible for game day security. These may include the athletic facility manager, campus police chief, emergency management director, local sheriff, and/or campus physical plant facility manager. Once the SESAT is established, meetings and interviews are scheduled to provide assessment objectives and define the assessed area based on a one mile radius of the sport venue.

2. Characterization of assets and target identification are achieved through in-depth surveys and interviews at each sport facility. Campus and community assets are identified and prioritized. Critical infrastructure and existing physical protection countermeasures are also identified. The target attractiveness is finally evaluated.

3. The threat assessment focuses on potential threat elements on campus and in the surrounding community. Specific factors are taken into consideration, including the existence of a group/individual operating close to the venue, history or past activity of the group/individual, intentions of the potential threat to act, their capability to act, and the ultimate targeting of the sport venue. A threat level is assigned to each critical asset, which is identified during step 2 of the risk assessment process.

Figure 1: Sport Event Security Assessment Model (SESAM). Adapted by Robert Rolen, Walter Cooper, Lou Marciani, and Stacey Hall. The Center for Spectator Sports Security Management.

4. The vulnerability assessment is a key component of the risk assessment model involving the analysis of several key factors about the venue, including:

  1. Level of Visibility: assess the awareness of existence and visibility of the sport venue to the general public.
  2. Criticality of Sport Venue to the Jurisdiction: assess the usefulness of the sport venue to the local population, economy, or government.
  3. Potential Sport Venue Population Capacity: assess the maximum number of people at a site at any given time.
  4. Potential for Collateral Mass Casualties: assess potential mass casualties within a one-mile radius of the sport venue.
  5. Impact Outside of the Venue: assess the loss outside of the sport venue.
  6. Existence of CBRNE Elements: assess the presence of a legal WMD on the site.
  7. Potential Threat Element Access to Sport Venue: assess the availability of the sport venue for ingress and egress by a PTE.

5. The consequence evaluation component analyzes the number of potentially injured people at the sport venue who might require transportation/hospitalization. It also assesses the loss of life, loss of infrastructure, economic and environmental impact, and the potential social trauma.

6. The overall risk level of a sport venue is calculated during this step. The risk assessment evaluates the threat potential (produced during step 3), likelihood of adversary success (produced during step 4), and severity of the consequences of an attack (produced during step 5). A final risk level is determined for the sport venue based on a scale of 0 to 5, with 0 being low and 5 being the greatest. It is the sport manager’s responsibility to determine what level is acceptable for the venue.

7. The final step involves the proposal of

consequence reduction

measures. These recommendations will help sport managers develop and/or enhance security policies and procedures, emergency response capabilities, and physical protection systems and capabilities at the venue. Also, suggestions for appropriate training in security awareness for staff and the sporting public are recommended.

The SESAM is a cyclical model, as assessments must be continuously completed to ensure that adequate plans and security measures are in place and maintained over a period of time. A sport venue’s threat or vulnerability level may change regarding circumstances in the country or even in the surrounding community. Evaluations of potential threats and existing vulnerabilities “are not only used to determine what dangers to prepare for and how to meet them, but also to prioritize preparedness efforts.” (Sauter & Carafano, 2005, p. 338). By determining which threats are the most dangerous, managers are able to decide where they should invest their time and effort in preparing to deal with the consequences of a potential incident (2005). The risk assessment process is also considered by most specialists “to be the most vital task establishing an effective business continuity/disaster recovery plan” (p. 338). Contingency planning will aid sport businesses in recovery efforts and continuation of operations during incidents.

Conclusion:

“On September 11th, it became abundantly clear that stadium and arena operators needed to incorporate security safeguards at America’s sporting venues.” (Pantera et. al, 2003, 1). It is critical that all sport organizations complete a risk assessment of their sport venues in order to identify vulnerabilities and improve security measures. The sport organization should not become complacent or content with their current security practices. Sport programs in America are faced with an ongoing battle to stay alert and be prepared for the ‘unthinkable.’

References:

Ammon, R., Southall, R. & Blair, D. (2004). Sport facility management: Organizing events and mitigating risks. Morgantown, WV: Fitness Information Technology, Inc.

CNN.com. (1996, July 27). Sources: arrest in Olympic bombing could occur within days. Retrieved September 15, 2005, from http://www.cnn.com/US/9607/27/blast.am/index.html

CNN.com. (2002, September 5). When sport lost its innocence. Retrieved September 26, 2005, from http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/09/05/munich.72/

CNN.com (2006, October 18). Threats against NFL stadiums not credible. Retrieved October 18, 2006, from http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/10/18/football.threats/index.html

Decker, R.J. (2001). Key elements of a risk management approach. United States General Accounting Office. [On-line]. Available: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02150t.pdf

Durling, R.L., Price, D.E., & Spero, K.K. (2005). Vulnerability and risk assessment using the Homeland-Defense operational planning system (HOPS). Retrieved October 4, 2005, from http://www.llnl.gov/tid/lof/documents/pdf/315115.pdf

Farmer, P.J., Mulrooney, A.L., & Ammon, R. (1996). Sport facility planning and management. Morgantown, WV: Fitness Information Technology, Inc.

General Security Risk Assessment Guideline. (2003). ASIS International. [On-line]. Available: http://www.asisonline.org/guidelines/guidelinesgsra.pdf

Hagmann, D.J. (2005, October 30). Black hole in America’s heartland. Northeast Intelligence Network. Retrieved July 20, 2006, from http://www.homelandsecurityus.com/site/modules/news/article.php?storyid=16

Hurst, R., Zoubek, P., & Pratsinakis, C. (n.d.). American sports as a target of terrorism: The duty of care after September 11th. [On-Line]. Available: www.mmwr.com/_uploads/UploadDocs/publications/American%20Sports%20As%20A%20Target%20Of%20Terrorism.pdf

Pantera, M.J., et. al. (2003). Best practices for game day security at athletic & sport venues. The Sport Journal, 6 (4). [On-Line]. Available: https://thesportjournal.org/2003Journal/Vol6-No4/security.asp

Risk 101. (n.d.). U.S. Coast Guard. Retrieved October 4, 2005, from http://www.uscg.mil/hq/gm/risk/background.htm

Sauter, M. A. & Carafano, J.J. (2005). Homeland Security: A complete guide to understanding, preventing, and surviving terrorism. New York, NY: McGraw Hill.

Vulnerability Assessment Report. (July, 2003). Office of Domestic Preparedness, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Retrieved May 31, 2005, from http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/vamreport.pdf

2016-10-12T14:50:00-05:00March 14th, 2008|Contemporary Sports Issues, Sports Facilities, Sports Management|Comments Off on Introducing a Risk Assessment Model for Sport Venues
Read More

The Sport Journal uses Accessibility Checker to monitor our website's accessibility.

Go to Top