Pay to Play in the NCAA: A Data Driven Playbook on How to Compensate Athletes
Author: Cameron Van, J.D.
Contributing Author:
Cameron Van, J.D.
University of California, Davis School of Law, Davis CA
400 Mrak Hall Drive, Davis, CA 95616
Email: Cevan@Ucdavis.edu
Phone Number: (650) 740-2235
Cameron Van is a recent UC Davis School of Law Graduate with a focus on the intersection of business and the law.
ABSTRACT
This article offers the NCAA a reputable, repeatable, and reasonable formula for a student-athlete revenue scheme that will ensure its competitive edge in an ever-encroaching market. The NCAA uses amateurism to restrict artificially the compensation of student athletes’ compensation to “cost of tuition,” at best. It is precisely this reason that more athletes are finding alternative ways to capitalize on their talents. As a result, this amateurism scheme is not Pareto Efficient. Pareto efficiency is reached when a situation cannot be modified in a way that would have one party better off without making another party worse off. Notably, Pareto efficiency does not imply equality, equity, or fairness, rather simply that there could be no economic changes that would better off the overall system. Here, this article explores a rare occurrence where the system can be made both more efficient and equal by increasing the supply of revenue generators – the athletes. This article will build upon Stocz formula for deriving a student-athlete’s salary, as well as give examples of what such a salary would look like for said athletes.
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