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The Effect of a Plyometrics Program Intervention on Skating Speed in Junior Hockey Players

U.S. Sports Academy2016-10-24T11:45:30-05:00March 3rd, 2008|Contemporary Sports Issues, Sports Coaching, Sports Exercise Science, Sports Studies and Sports Psychology|

Abstract

Few studies have been conducted to examine the effects of plyometrics on skating speed in junior hockey players. The present study was designed to look at the effects of a 4-week, eight session, plyometric training program intervention on skating speed. Six male subjects (18.8 ± .98 years) that engaged in the training program completed pre and post 40 meter on-ice sprinting tests. The training group showed significant time improvements (p<.05) in the 40 meter skating distance. The results suggested that plyometric training has a positive effect on skating speed in junior hockey players such that a reduction in on-ice sprinting times is evident.

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Determinants of Success Among Amateur Golfers: An Examination of NCAA Division I Male Golfers

U.S. Sports Academy2015-10-30T13:26:19-05:00March 3rd, 2008|Contemporary Sports Issues, Sports Coaching, Sports Studies and Sports Psychology|

Abstract

An extensive body of research examines the importance of a golfer’s
shot-making skills to the player’s overall performance, where performance
is measured as either tournament money winnings or average score per round
of golf. Independent of the performance measure, existing studies find
that a player’s shot-making skills contribute significantly to explaining
the variability in a golfer’s performance. To date, this research
has focused exclusively on the professional golfer. This study attempts
to extend the findings in the literature by examining the performance
determinants of amateur golfers. Using a sample of NCAA Division I male
golfers, various shot-making skills are analyzed and correlated with average
score per round of golf. Overall, the findings validate those dealing
with professional golfers. In particular, the results suggest that, like
professional golfers, amateurs must possess a variety of shot-making skills
to be successful. Moreover, relative to driving ability, putting skills
and reaching greens in regulation contribute more to explaining the variability
in a player’s success.

Introduction

Davidson and Templin (1986) present one of the first statistical investigations
of the major determinants of a professional golfer’s success. Using
U.S. Professional Golf Association (PGA) data, these researchers find
that a player’s shot-making skills explain approximately 86 percent
of the variability in a player’s average score and about 59 percent
of the variance in a player’s earnings. Based on these results,
Davidson and Templin conclude that a professional golfer must possess
a variety of shot-making skills to be successful as a tournament player.
They further offer strong empirical support that hitting greens in regulation
and putting were the two most important factors in explaining scoring
average variability across players, with driving ability showing up as
a distant third.

Following Davidson and Templin (1986), a number of researchers have
continued to investigate the determinants of a professional golfer’s
overall performance. Examples include Jones (1990), Shmanske (1992), Belkin,
Gansneder, Pickens, Rotella, and Striegel (1994), Wiseman, Chatterjee,
Wiseman, and Chatterjee (1994), Engelhardt (1995, 1997), Moy and Liaw
(1998), and more recently Nero (2001), Dorsel and Rotunda (2001), and
Engelhardt (2002). Overall, these studies support the major conclusion
presented by Davidson and Templin (1986), which is that a professional
golfer must exhibit a variety of shot-making skills to be successful as
a touring professional. While the relative importance of these skills
to player performance is not uniform across these studies, there is a
developing consensus that shot-making skills like putting and hitting
greens in regulation are more important to a player’s success than
driving distance.

Interestingly, while there is an accumulating literature investigating
professional golfers, no analogous studies have examined the amateur player,
despite the fact that Davidson and Templin (1986) explicitly state that
this avenue of investigation would be a useful direction for future research.
More recently, Belkin, et al. (1994) specifically raise this point, suggesting
that:

“It would also be intriguing to examine whether the same
skills which differentiate successful professionals also contribute
in the same manner to the fortunes of amateurs of differing capabilities.”
(p. 1280).

By way of response, this study fills that particular void in the literature
by empirically estimating the relationship between an amateur golfer’s
overall performance and various shot-making skills. To facilitate direct
comparisons to the existing literature on the determinants of professional
golfers’ performance, we employ the basic approach used by Davidson
and Templin (1986) and Belkin, et al. (1994), among others.

Method

Sample

The sample used for this analysis is a subset of NCAA Division I male
golfers who participated in at least one tournament during the 2002–2003
season. Table 1 presents a listing of the colleges and universities represented
in the study and the number of players from each institution. The specific
data on these collegiate golfers are obtained from Golfstat, Inc. (2003)
(accessible on the Internet at www.golfstat.com), and/or from the respective
colleges and universities directly. The colleges and universities included
in the analysis are a subset of the college teams participating in National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) Division I Men’s Golf. While
it would be preferable to examine all Division I teams, the individual
player statistics needed to perform the analysis are not available. However,
since it is reasonable to assume that the schools listed in Table 1 are
a representative sample of all Division I men’s teams, the data
sample is appropriate for this study.

TABLE 1
Sample of Schools Included in the Study

Sources: Golfstat, Inc. (2003) “Customized Team Pages-Men.”
www.golfstat.com/2003-2004/men/mstop10.htm, (accessed June 16, 2003),
various teams; Golfweek. (2003) “Golfweek/Sagarin Performance Index –
Men’s Team Ratings.” www.golfweek.com/college/mens1/teamrankings.asp,
(accessed July 1, 2003).

Measures

For the schools represented in this study, Golfstat, Inc. collects and
reports individual player statistics necessary to complete a performance
analysis. For this study we used statistics for the 2002 – 2003
NCAA Division I tournament season. Among the available data are the average
score per round (AS) for each amateur player in the sample. This statistic
provides the performance measure needed for the dependent variable in
this study, since earnings are not relevant to amateurs. Specifically,
according to the United States Golf Association (2003, p. 1) and the Royal
and Ancient Golf Club of St. Andrews (2003, p.1), an amateur golfer is
defined as:

“…one who plays the game as a non-remunerative and
non-profit-making sport and who does not receive remuneration for teaching
golf or for other activities because of golf skill or reputation, except
as provided in the Rules.”

Although studies of professional golfers examine scoring average and/or
earnings as performance measures, Wiseman et al. (1994) argue that correlation
results are stronger when scoring average is used. Hence, the use of scoring
average for this study of amateurs is soundly supported by the literature
examining professional golfers.

Statistics for the primary shot-making skills typically used in the
literature are collected and reported by Golfstat, Inc. and by some colleges
and universities. These include measures of driving accuracy, greens in
regulation, putting average, sand saves, and short game.

To capture amateurs’ long game skills, we use one of the classic
measures, which is driving accuracy. Specifically, we use the variable
Fairways Hit, which is defined as the percentage of fairways hit on par
4 and par 5 holes during a round of golf. Data on driving distance for
the amateur sample are not available. However, Dorsel and Rotunda (2001)
present evidence suggesting that the number of eagles (i.e., two strokes
under par on any hole) a player makes is positively correlated with the
player’s average driving distance. Hence, we use the variable Eagles,
the total number of eagles a player makes during the season, to control
for each player’s average driving distance. Following the literature,
we also include the variable Greens in Regulation (GIR) to measure the
percentage of greens a player reaches in regulation for the season. This
is defined as one stroke for a par three, two strokes or less for a par
four, and three strokes or less for a par five. As discussed in Belkin
et al. (1994), this GIR variable captures a player’s iron play and
their success at reading a green within the regulation number of strokes.

With regard to the short game, several variables are used in the analysis.
In keeping with the literature, we use two measures of putting skill –
Putts per Round, defined as the average number of putts per round, and
GIR Putts, which is the average number of putts measured only on greens
reached in regulation. Belkin, et al. (1994) is one study that uses the
former measure, while Dorsel and Rotunda (2001) is an example of a study
using the latter. Interestingly, Shmanske (1992) argues that the latter
statistic, GIR Putts, is superior because it correctly accounts for the
longer putting distances associated with a player who achieves a higher
number of greens in regulation. By including one of these measures in
different regression models, we can assess the validity of that argument.
We also include the variable Sand Saves (SS), which measures the percentage
of time a golfer makes par or better when hitting from a sand bunker.
In certain specifications of our regression analysis, we experiment with
the variable Short Game as an alternative measure to Sand Saves. Short
Game measures the percentage of time a player makes par or better when
not reaching the green in the regulation number of strokes.

In addition to a player’s shot-making skills, Belkin, et al. (1994)
and others note the importance of experience in determining a player’s
success. To control for this factor, two experience measures are used.
First, we define the variable Rounds as the number of tournament rounds
completed by each player during the 2002–2003 season. In a sense,
this measure captures a player’s short-term experience, in that
it measures how each additional round played in a season increases the
experience that a player can call upon in subsequent rounds. Second, to
control for longer-term cumulative experience, we construct a set of dummy
variables to reflect the player’s academic age, (i.e., Freshman,
Sophomore, Junior, or Senior). It is hypothesized that the higher a player’s
academic age, the more collegiate golfing experience has been gained,
and therefore the lower the expected average score.

Finally, since golf at the collegiate level is a team sport, it is important
to capture any associated team effects. That is, a player’s performance
might be affected by the team with which they are associated. At least
two plausible explanations for this team effect are viable – one
relating to the team’s coach and the other relating to the courses
played. With regard to the former, each team’s coach is expected
to uniquely affect the success of each team member through mentoring,
leadership, instruction, and overall direction. In fact, Dirks (2000)
and Giacobbi, Roper, Whitney, and Butryn (2002) present evidence supporting
the importance of a coach’s influence on the performance of a collegiate
athlete. Primarily, the coach acts as the team leader and instructor.
As a leader, the coach is responsible for the overall team strategy and
for ultimately determining a player’s tournament participation.
As an instructor, the more experienced coach may be better able to teach
players and to motivate them to improve their play.

As for courses played, we expect a player’s scoring average to
be affected by the specific golf courses played, which in turn are not
consistent across collegiate teams. Indeed, it is highly plausible that
some teams might, for example, play easier courses throughout a given
tournament season, which may lower a team member’s score. To account
for these team effects, dummy variables are constructed, whereby each
dummy variable identifies the team to which each player belongs.

Procedure

Following the literature, multiple regression analysis is used to estimate
the relationship between an amateur golfer’s average score and various
shot-making skills. In addition, each regression model is specified to
control for player experience and team factors. Ordinary least squares
(OLS) is used to derive the regression estimates for four different models.
These models are distinguished by the selection of shot-making skill statistics
used for certain variables. Specifically, each model is distinguished
by its use of Sand Saves (SS) versus Short Game and Putts per Round versus
GIR putts. We also generate simple Pearson correlation coefficients between
the measure of player performance and each of the independent variables
in the study.

Results and Discussion

Basic descriptive statistics for the sample of 93 golfers are presented
in Table 2. At the collegiate level, most tournaments consist of three
rounds of golf, and, like the professionals, each round comprises eighteen
holes. The average NCAA Division I male golfer in the sample participated
in approximately nine tournaments, played slightly less than 26 rounds
of golf, and had an average score per round of approximately 75 strokes
during the 2002 – 2003 season.

TABLE 2
Basic Descriptive Statistics

With regard to specific shot-making skills, the average amateur hits
approximately 68 percent of the fairways and reaches the green in the
regulation number of strokes 60 percent of the time. Of the greens reached
in regulation, the average player needs 1.88 putts to finish a hole, and
over the course of a round, each needs to take slightly more than 31 putts.
On average, an amateur golfer makes par or better when hitting from a
sand bunker 42 percent of the time and makes par or better when not on
a green in regulation 51 percent of the time. Over the course of the 2002
– 2003 season, the average player made 1.5 eagles.

Table 3 presents the results of the correlation analysis among an amateur’s
average score (AS) and various shot-making skills, experience, and team
effects. Notice that all shot-making skills are significantly correlated
with a player’s average score. Somewhat predictably, GIR is the
variable that is most highly correlated with an amateur golfer’s
average score. This finding is analogous to what has been found for professional
golfers by Davidson and Templin (1986) and others. We also find that the
Short Game variable and GIR Putts rank second and third respectively in
terms of the strength of correlation among shot-making skills. Notice
that across the two putting measures – GIR Putts and Putts per Round,
the correlation for GIR Putts is higher, which may support Shmanske’s
(1992) assertion that this is a more accurate measure of putting skill.
We also find that both the short-term and long-term experience measures
are statistically correlated with a player’s performance. With regard
to the Rounds variable, the correlation shows a significant negative relationship
with a player’s average score, which follows our expectations. Also,
as anticipated, the dummy variable for academic age is positively correlated
with the player’s average score for freshmen and negatively correlated
for seniors. Lastly, for certain colleges and universities, there is a
significant correlation between a team effect and a player’s average
score.

TABLE 3
Pearson Correlation Coefficients

* significant at the 0.10 level
** significant at the 0.05 level
*** significant at the 0.01 level

In Table 4, we present the multiple regression results for four alternative
models. As previously noted, these models vary by which putting statistic
is used and by whether Short Game or Sand Saves is used in the estimation.
Model 1 uses Putts per Round and Sand Saves (SS), Model 2 uses Putts per
Round and Short Game, Model 3 uses GIR Putts and Sand Saves (SS), and
Model 4 uses GIR Putts and Short Game.

TABLE 4
Regression Analysis (Standardized Beta Coefficients in parentheses)

* significant at the 0.10 level, assuming a one-tailed
test of hypothesis
** significant at the 0.05 level, assuming a one-tailed test of hypothesis
*** significant at the 0.01 level, assuming a one-tailed test of hypothesis

Overall, we observe that shot-making skills, player experience, and
team effects collectively explain a large proportion of the variability
in an amateur’s scoring average independent of the model specified.
Specifically, the adjusted R2 statistics across the four models range
from 0.81 to 0.90, values that are similar to those reported in Davidson
and Templin (1986) and Belkin, et al. (1994).

Of the specific shot-making skills, GIR and putting (either Putts per
Round or GIR Putts), are the most consistent predictors of an amateur’s
average score across the four models. In each case, GIR is significant
at the 1 percent level, as are both putting variables. However, the standardized
beta coefficients show that GIR is the most important predictor, as was
the case for the models estimated by Davidson and Templin (1986) and Belkin,
et al. (1994). Both putting variables also are significant at the 1 percent
level, though the standardized beta coefficients suggest that Putts per
Round might be a superior measure of amateur putting, which runs counter
to Shmanske’s (1992) view of these variable definitions, as noted
previously.

Interestingly, Short Game is a significant predictor of average score,
but only when the variable GIR Putts is included in the model, which is
Model 4 specifically. With regard to Sand Saves (SS), we find that it
is not a significant factor in predicting a player’s performance
in either Model 1 or Model 3. Davidson and Templin (1986) and, more recently,
Moy and Liaw (1998) find analogous results for their respective samples
of professional golfers. One explanation put forth by Moy and Liaw is
that all golfers have similar abilities in this skill category. Another
more likely justification is one presented by Dorsal and Rotunda (2001),
which is that bunker play is less frequent and, as a result, has a negligible
effect on a player’s overall performance.

To the extent that the number of eagles over the season captures driving
distance, the results indicate that driving distance is not a major factor
in determining a player’s performance. In general, this conclusion
agrees with the findings of Davidson and Templin (1986), Belkin, et al.
(1994), and Dorsel and Rotunda (2001). Hence, this finding seems to be
independent of whether the golfer is an NCAA amateur or a professional
player. However, such an assertion has to be made with caution, since
no direct measure of driving distance was available to include in this
amateur study.

In addition to a player’s shot-making skills, experience and team
effects appear to have an influence on an NCAA golfer’s performance.
With regard to the experience measures, the total number of rounds played
in the 2002-2003 season improves a player’s overall performance.
This assertion is based on the consistently negative coefficient on Rounds
across models, though the result is statistically significant only in
Model 3. As for longer-term experience, sophomore players consistently
achieve a lower average score than their freshman counterparts, and this
effect is statistically significant across the four models. Juniors and
seniors are found to enjoy the same performance effect linked to experience,
but the influence is found to be statistically significant only in Models
1 and 2.

As for individual team effects, the results suggest that a statistically
significant influence exists for certain collegiate programs. For example,
holding all else constant, all four models indicate that players on the
University of Kentucky team have higher and statistically significant
average scores relative to players on the Clemson team (the suppressed
dummy variable), who are the 2002-2003 NCAA Division I Champions. Conversely,
players at Georgia State University achieve lower average scores than
players at Clemson, independent of individual shot-making skills or experience,
and three of the four models show this finding to be statistically significant.
The absence of statistical significance for the other teams might be attributable
to limited variability of team effects within a single NCAA division.

Finally, an F-test comparing the full model to a reduced version was
conducted across each model specification, where the reduced model assumes
that the academic age and team effects are jointly zero. As noted in Table
4, the null hypothesis was rejected across all four models, indicating
that these two experience variables collectively help to explain the variability
of an amateur player’s performance. This outcome validates the belief
of other researchers, including Belkin et al. (1994) and Shmanske (1992).

Conclusions

The importance of shot-making skills to a professional golfer’s
success has been well documented in the literature. In general, research
studies point to the fact that a variety of shot-making skills are important
to a player’s overall performance. More specifically, four shot-making
skills – GIR, putting, driving accuracy, and driving distance –
are responsible for the majority of variation in a professional golfer’s
scoring performance. Of these four, GIR and putting have consistently
been found to be the more important factors. On occasion, driving accuracy
and driving distance have been found to statistically impact a professional
golfer’s average score, but typically the influence is weaker than
for GIR and putting skills.

Despite an accumulating literature seeking to validate or refine these
results, we know of no study that has extended this analysis beyond the
realm of professional golfers. To that end, we attempt to fill this void
in the literature by empirically identifying performance determinants
for amateur golfers. Using a sample of NCAA Division I male golfers, we
hypothesize that a variety of shot-making skills along with player experience
and team membership are expected to influence an amateur golfer’s
performance measured as average score per round. Using multiple regression
analysis, our results indicate that all these factors collectively explain
a large percentage of the variability in an NCAA golfer’s average
score. This is evidenced by R-squared values ranging from 0.81 to 0.90
across four different models distinguished by varying variable definitions.

We further find that the amateur golfer’s shot-making skills measured
through GIR and putting are the most important factors to explaining average
score per round. These findings offer an important contribution to the
growing literature on professional golfer performance in that they validate
and extend much of what has been shown in existing studies. Future research
should attempt to further extend these findings to other amateur data,
as they become available.

References

1. Belkin, D.S., Gansneder, B., Pickens, M., Rotella, R.J., & Striegel,
   D. (1994) “Predictability and Stability of Professional Golf Association
   Tour Statistics.” Perceptual and Motor Skills, 78, 1275-1280.
2. Davidson, J. D. & Templin, T. J. (1986) “Determinants of
   Success Among Professional Golfers.” Research Quarterly for Exercise
   and Sport, 57, 60-67.
3. Dirks, K. T. (2000) “Trust in Leadership and Team Performance:
   Evidence from NCAA Basketball.” Journal of Applied Psychology,
   85, 1004-1012.
4. Dorsel, T. N. & Rotunda, R. J. (2001) “Low Scores, Top 10
   Finishes, and Big Money: An Analysis of Professional Golf Association
   Tour Statistics and How These Relate to Overall Performance.”
   Perceptual and Motor Skills, 92, 575-585.
5. Engelhardt, G. M. (1995) “‘It’s Not How You Drive,
   It’s How You Arrive’: The Myth.” Perceptual and Motor
   Skills, 80, 1135-1138.
6. Engelhardt, G. M. (1997) “Differences in Shot-Making Skills
   among High and Low Money Winners on the PGA Tour.” Perceptual
   and Motor Skills, 84, 1314.
7. Engelhardt, G. M. (2002) “Driving Distance and Driving Accuracy
   Equals Total Driving: Reply to Dorsel and Rotunda.” Perceptual
   and Motor Skills, 95, 423-424.
8. Giacobbi, P.R., Roper, E., Whitney, J. and Butryn, T. (2002) “College
   Coaches’ Views About the Development of Successful Athletes: A
   Descriptive Exploratory Investigation.” Journal of Sport Behavior,
   25, 164-180.
9. Golfstat, Inc. (2003) “Customized Team Pages-Men.” www.golfstat.com/2003-2004/men/mstop10.htm
   (accessed June 16, 2003), various teams.
10. Golfweek. (2003) “Golfweek/Sagarin Performance Index- Men’s
    Team Ratings” www.golfweek.com/college/mens1/teamrankings.asp,
    (accessed July 1, 2003).
11. Jones, R.E. (1990) “A Correlation Analysis of the Professional
    Golf Association (PGA) Statistical Ranking for 1988.” In A.J.
    Cochran (Ed.), Science and Golf: Proceedings of the First World Scientific
    Conference of Golf. London: E & FN Spon. 165-167.
12. Moy, R. L. and Liaw, T. (1998) “Determinants of Professional
    Golf Tournament Earnings.” The American Economist, 42, 65-70.
13. Nero, P. (2001) “Relative Salary Efficiency of PGA Tour Golfers.”
    The American Economist, 45, 51-56.
14. National Collegiate Athletic Association (2003) “Sports Sponsorship
    Summary.”
15. www1.ncaa.org/membership/membership_svcs/sponssummary, (accessed
    July 1, 2003).
16. Royal and Ancient Golf Club of St. Andrews (2003) “Amateur Status.”
    www.randa.org/index.cfm?cfid=1066700&cftoken=78999628&action=rules.amateur.home,
    (accessed August 16, 2003)
17. Shmanske, S. (1992) “Human Capital Formation in Professional
    Sports: Evidence from the PGA Tour.” Atlantic Economic Journal,
    20, 66-80.
18. United States Golf Association. (2003) “Rules of Amateur Status
    and the Decisions on the Rules of Amateur Status.” www.usga.org/rules/am_status/,
    (accessed August 16, 2003).
19. Wiseman, F., Chatterjee, S. Wiseman, D. and Chatterjee, N. (1994)
    “An Analysis of 1992 Performance Statistics for Players on the
    U.S. PGA, Senior PGA, and LPGA Tours.” In A. J. Cochran and M.
    R. Farrally (Eds.), Science and Golf: II. Proceedings of the World Scientific
    Congress of Golf. London: E & FN Spon. 199-204.

Sport in Turkey: the Post-Islamic Republican Period

U.S. Sports Academy2013-11-26T20:19:26-06:00March 3rd, 2008|Contemporary Sports Issues, Sports Management|

A Brief Evaluation of Development of Turkish Sport from 1839 to 1923

Although the modern Turkish Republic was officially established in 1923,
the liberalization, secularization and the democratization process of
the Republic was initiated in 1839. All of these three phases occurred
in conjunction with the Tanzimat reforms, which granted partial constitutional
rights to the Turkish people.

After the Tanzimat, the Turkish people reorganized their lives and established
organizations on voluntary and constitutional principles. The formation
of such organizations also provided leadership for sports activities within
the country. Eventually, the sport movement gained momentum. According
to Fisek, “Despite the discouragement of government, the popularity
and enthusiasm for sports were manifested” (p. 270). However, Turkish
sport had not yet set national objectives nor defined goals.

Prior to the Republican Period, between the 1650’s and the 1920’s, the
Ottoman Empire was constantly at war with one or more of her enemies,
weakening the economic and political strength of the nation. During this
period of crisis, it was only natural that the issue of sport escaped
the attention of officials. Nevertheless, it was also “…handed
over to the protection of a few rich individuals called Agas, and of sport
Tekkes (an ancient form of sport clubs) which provided shelter and management
for sport” (Fisek, 251). According to Fisek, “The largest of
all tekkes was in Istanbul and sheltered approximately 300 athletes, mostly
wrestlers” (p. 257). In some instances, services for the sports were
also provided by the Sultan’s Palace.

In the history of Turkish sport this period is remembered as the “Period
of Protectionism” (Fisek, 250). Furthermore, under the protectionist
system, entire services enhanced the athletic performance of Turkish athletes,
yet no effort was advanced for the development of the institution of sport
per se. According to Hicyilmaz, “…there was not any attempt or
any suitable approach to the problems connected with the issues of sport”
(P. 55).

Specific issues regarding sport in Turkiye gained some attention only
around the beginning of the twentieth century when some European-educated
Turkish sportsmen returned with a Western view of sports. With the help
and the experience of these sportsmen “…the system of sport began
to organize and a few national objectives” were stated (Atabeyoglu,
11).

Around the turn of the century, the Ottoman Empire had been suffering
from severe economic and political conditions and was on the verge of
collapse. Finally, soon after WWI, the Empire was invaded and occupied
by the Allied nations of Europe. During this period of invasion, several
“Anglo-Saxon” sports entered into Turkiye.

According to Fisek, “In the cities of Izmir and Istanbul, by using
their diplomatic immunity, the staff of Embassies of England
and France were organizing athletic competitions: cricket, rugby, hockey
and soccer” (p. 249). Ertug reported that, “In 1913, in Istanbul,
the staff of the British Embassy organized a soccer tournament for the
honor of the British commander General Harrington” (p. 8). Moreover,
according to Hicyilmaz, “…by using their diplomatic privileges,
the British merchants and the staff of the British Embassy not only organized
sports competitions but also formed several sports clubs and societies”
(p. 29). It is very important to point out that prior to this period the
occurrence of such events would have been immediately banned by the government.
However, due to prevailing conditions of the occupation, the Ottoman government
was forced to remove the restrictions that blocked the formation of athletic
clubs or associations in the country. According to Howard, “Under
the terms of the Istanbul treaty, during the invasion, the Allied nations
were taking no orders from the Ottoman government” (pp. 136-137).
Taking advantage of the Ottoman government’s vulnerability, a significant
number of athletic clubs were formed, especially by the British. We cannot
interpret England’s initiative as a favor to the Turks, however, England
was not ever concerned with the physical health of the Turkish youth.
Rather, it was a very common British policy that had been used successfully,
in India and in some African nations, to develop sports facilities in
order to restrict nationalism and curb political activity. In fact, in
the early years of the occupation, the British established two soccer
clubs., “The Strugglers” and the “The Progress.” Although
there is no clear evidence, the meanings of the names of the clubs exactly
coincided with the political conditions of both England, which was “progressive,”
and the Ottoman Empire, which was “struggling” at the time.
According to Fisek, “The purpose of the formation and the orchestration
of sport clubs in Turkiye by England were entirely imperialistic”
(p. 268).

It is relevant to stress how external factors influenced the internal
creativity in every area of life in the country. In this regard, the condition
and the subsequent development of sport was not different-from, and were
heavily influenced by, the existing cultural systems in Western Europe
and America. For instance, programs in physical education were modeled
after the calisthenics of Germany and the Scandinavian countries and resembled
the sports and games from England and America. The military and civil
colleges also promoted other gymnastics programs. The first sport clubs
and societies to be organized in Turkiye, however, were those overseen
by the British in soccer and rugby.

British influence on Turkish sport was noticeable, specifically in soccer.
According to Ertug, “The first soccer and rugby club (Moda Futbol
ve Ragby Kulubu) was formed in Moda, Istanbul in 1896′ (p. 6). Although
the British introduced the majority of modern sports such as soccer, rugby,
and hockey, the Americans introduced the game of basketball. During the
occupation “…several nationalist groups were seeking an American
Mandate to protect the country from an English occupation” (Hicyilmaz,
9). According to Fisek, “In 1919, with the financial and technical
assistance of the American government via the Chester Project in Istanbul,
a branch of the YMCA was opened and basketball was introduced to the Turkish
youth” (p. 249).

In the 1890’s Turks were not permitted to participate in modern sport
events against the newly formed British sports clubs, yet some Turks hoped
to have their own sport clubs and club memberships. At the turn of the
century, the Turks’ persistence paid off and they organized their own
athletic clubs. The first clubs to be organized were “The Black Stockings
in 1899, Besiktas in 1903, Galatasaray in 1905 and Fenerbahce in 1907”
(Fisek 256). Despite the fact that the sports clubs were formed back to
back, however, their actual organized athletics were not begun until after
the declaration of the second Mesrutiyet (adoption of constitution) in
1908, which granted more personal freedoms to citizens.

For a while, however, participation in sport activities evolved rather
slowly because, “Most of the societies and clubs were initially concerned
with merely the game of soccer. Sports such as athletics or track and
field, wrestling and basketball, that attracted more attention from the
public, were added only later” (Haluk San, 12).

In the first quarter of the twentieth century, participation in sport
activities increased overwhelmingly, “…and at one point there were
so many sports clubs that for the first time the Turkish sport felt the
need for federation” (Aksin, 316). From 1903 to 1914 patterned along
the British style, a few soccer leagues such as Istanbul Futbol Birligi
(IFB) and Istanbul Futbol-Kulupleri Ligi (IFKL) were organized. Under
the British authority and with the participation of such clubs as the
Moda, Union Club, Elips and the Imogene Club, the IFB was formed in 1903.

After a series of problems the IFB dissolved in 1910 however; but In
the same year by adding a couple of Turkish clubs the former members
of the IFB reformed the IFB and established the IFKL which was dissolved
in 1914 (Fisek 284).

The objectives of the IFB and the IFKL were: scheduling and officiating
the league games according to the British system.

Since 1839, after the declaration of Tanzimat, strong nationalistic sentiments
were evoked, and Turks aspired toward increased participation in political,
cultural and educational fields. Unfortunately, such developments, including
participation in sports, were frequently discouraged and suppressed by
the Ottoman Sultans. During the reign of A. Hamit II (1876-1906) “…most
of the cultural and intellectual organizations were shut down” (Eliot,
124). According to San, Unsi and Var, “The Black Stockings club was
closed because the club organized a soccer tournament which gathered an
unexpected number of spectators” (p. 67).

Despite the fact that the Sultan A. Hamit II was determined to dismantle
the functions of most of the social, cultural and intellectual societies
or clubs, “There were a few privileged athletic clubs that functioned
regularly and freely with the help of their members who were either high-ranked
military generals or rich friends of the Sultan” (San, et. all, 30).
The Besiktas Gymnastic Club (Besiktas Jimnastik Kulubu) was one of these
privileged clubs that was formed by the special decree of the Sultan in
1903.

The Turkish sport system was never completely able to free itself from
the outmoded, pan-Islamic political views of the Ottoman Sultans. It is
important to remember that during the pre-Republican period, most people
were barred from joining sport clubs or any other type of social and intellectual
organizations. Fortunately, with the support of the nationalistic movements,
and by the turn of the twentieth century, the sport movement gradually
gained momentum and became the main source of recreation and pastime for
the Turkish youth. The enthusiasm for sports was especially manifested
by outdoor events such as soccer, grease-wrestling and running, and by
indoor calisthenics. According to Apak, “Whereas the game of soccer
was practiced during the weekends, running and wrestling competitions
were conducted at public gatherings and at festivals” (p. 352).

Such recreationally innocent gatherings actually played a decisive role
in the rise and development of Turkish nationalism in the 1910’s. Initially,
sport crowds gathered solely for the sporting event, but such gatherings
soon became a symbolic protest against the Sultanate. Sporting events
contributed to the politization of many people, and eventually the sporting
events served as a political arena.

The Connection of Sports with Physical Education

Turkiye’s sporting and physical education heritage owes a great deal
to the reformists of Tanzimat who “…adopted and applied the general
principles of the French revolution in Turkiye” (Fisek, 262). Modern
sports were completely unknown in Turkiye prior to 1860, but by 1863 school
gymnastics were an esteemed component of urban high school student life.
In almost all of these educational institutions, the “French system
of physical education and sport was practiced and instructed” (Okan,6).
According to Fisek, “The first recorded reference to a person teaching
track and field was a French gymnastics teacher, Curel, at Istanbul’s
Mekteb-i Sultani High School in 1870” (p. 262).

The birth of nationally oriented school sports was a natural result of
the introduction of western physical educational systems in Turkiye. In
addition, Turkiye’s first taste of contemporary sports was made possible
by the practice of French calisthenics on school campuses. According to
Somali, “The first high school to practice calisthenics was Istanbul’s
Kuleli Idadisi in 1863” (p. 10). At that time, the French gymnastics
program was a combination of “fencing, free-style or floor gymnastics
and shot put (Okan, 6). According to San, “By 1869 there were several
schools interested in physical education programs in their curriculum”
(p. 12). Those schools were “Kuleli Idadisi, Mekteb-i Sultani or
Galatasaray Lisesi, Mektebi Bahriye and Mektebi Harbiye’ (San, 12), the
last two of which were military academies.

The physical education classes were not designed to enhance or improve
the physical well-being of students. Rather the PE classes were designed
with such difficult program figures that allowed only the students who
had skills to perform. Therefore) most of the students were discouraged
and did not participate In physical education classes any more (P. 263).

Around the turn of the twentieth century, physical education was not
designed to teach the basic fundamentals of physical and mental health.
Even though sports in Turkish schools were electives, the more prestigious
schools gained much status by offering them, since sports instruction
was not available elsewhere, and its “Western” nature was fashionable,
generating new excitement among the students. It is not surprising that,
from the beginning, the formation and development of modern sports clubs
were initiated on the high school campuses.

Concurrently, there was a growth of in-service teaching in physical education
and coaching from Europe. “Sports and gymnastics became expensive
yet popular” (Okan, 10). Athletic clubs and associations sprung up
all over campuses with a subsequent increase in journalistic coverage
of sports, fired by readers interest at a time when sports events made
even headlines news. Fisek indicates that, “For over forty years
from 1860 to 1903 the development of Turkish sport was affected negatively
by various economic and political conditions” (p. 262). Despite the
fact that most of the modern sports in Turkiye are over a century-old,
very few of them fully developed and reached the level of their European
counterparts, nor were the standards of physical education for students
satisfactory. Basically an elitist system, it remained geared for the
physically gifted.

Development of Sport in Turkiye since 1923

After the war of independence in 1923, through the restoration of full
national and political independence and under the leadership of Ataturk,
the founder of the Republic of Turkiye, the Turks eagerly decided to liberate
themselves from any form of out-moded, pan-Islamic Ottomanist concepts.
Ataturk introduced several reforms ranging from education to religion.
The fundamental aim of these reforms was to break the centuries-old traditions,
to modernize and to elevate Turkiye to the level of Western nations. Ataturk’s
liberal and far-reaching reforms also created expanding opportunities
for the young and mostly European-educated sportsmen to revolutionize
and revive Turkish sport.

After 1923, opportunities for sports participation were broadened through
leadership provided by the formation of numerous non-government sponsored
sports clubs and associations such as the TICI, (the United Sport Clubs
Association), making possible mass participation. According to Caglar,
“There was a gradual increase in the numbers of people involved in
various sports clubs and organizations on both the competitive and the
recreational level” (p. 3).

Prior to the Republican period, there were no stated national objectives
for Turkish sport. Most of the organized sports activities, even if not
forbidden, were realistically out of the common citizen’s reach. In this
respect, the status quo of Turkish sport greatly differed from sport as
it was overtly focused in the industrialized world. During the Ottoman
Empire, sport was basically a form of amusement for the Sultan’s palace.
However, with the establishment of the new, democratic and politically
more stable Republic of Turkiye, a new organizational framework for sport
was formulated. With its theoretical premises geared toward mass participation,
the envisioned programs promised renewed popular interest and vitality.
This situation, along with the prospects of a revolutionary and improved
way of life, prompted a number of sportsmen to emphasize now aspects of
sport.

Modern Turkiye’s sporting legacy owes a great deal to those European
educated sportsmen: Selim Sirri Tarcan, Ali Sami Yen, Burhanettin Felek,
Nasuhi Baydar and Yusuf Ziya Onis who are considered the “…pioneers
of modern Turkish sport” (Sumer, 26). With their help, “Sport
and physical activity has undergone continuous expansion throughout this
half of the century’ (San, et al, 69-70). The establishment of numerous
athletic clubs, the formation of sport leagues such as ‘Cuma Ligi’, and
the development of voluntary sport associations like the United Sports
Clubs Association were all efforts of these far-sighted men.

A number of trends were occurring simultaneously in Turkish sport during
the early years of the Republic. On one hand, while most of the major,
modern sports were spreading throughout the nation, major national sports
federations were continuously expanding the number and the type of sporting
events held, including long range goals for energizing efforts and further
plans. There was also a growing awareness of the political importance
of sport so that sport started to be used to foster national pride.

On the other hand, and, “…due to the lack of sufficient finances,
there was great difficulty in improving the existing conditions of sport”
(Fisek, 310). Moreover, and perhaps most importantly of all, the traditional,
indigenous Turkish sports such as Cirit, Grease-Wrestling, Archery and
other activities were declining and becoming part of “history.’ These
traditional Turkish sports declined for several reasons; cirit, for example,
were expensive to maintain. But a more significant fact was that they
were seen as old-fashioned and not progressive, partly due to specific
British propaganda that presented Western sports to the younger Turks.

As the modern Turkish Republic was developing rapidly, the traditional
life styles of the Turkish people were also changing. According to Ceki,
“Many young people were

looking around for things to do and to replace traditional ways of living”
(p. 9). It was during this transition that modern sports received the
most ardent attention.

The young generations spent their free time playing various ball games
such as basketball; volleyball and soccer, and running or doing calisthenics.
The noblemen and the townspeople had other sporting activities such
as chess; backgammon, and various card games (Lewis, 89).

The “Halk Evleri” (folk or public houses) were formed and financed
by the government in order to fulfill the great hunger for sports and
to gratify the general public’s desire for intramural sports.

Development of Institutional Sport (1922-1992)

The organizational and administrative development of Turkish sport in
the Republican period can be divided into four periods.

I- Turkiye Idman Cemiyetleri Ittifak 1922-1936
II-Turk Spor Kurumu 1936-1936
III-Beden Terbiyesi Genel Mudurlugu 1938-1992
IV-Genclik ve Spor Bakanligi 1969-1992

I- (Turkiye Idman Cemiyetleri Ittifaki)

After the war of independence a national central organization of sport,
the TICI (Turkiye Idman Cemiyetleri Ittifaki) was formed in 1922 in order
to improve the chaotic, unsatisfactory state of Turkish sport and the
poor performance of Turkish athletes. By the joint efforts of “Selim
Sirri Tarcan, Ali Sami Yen, Burhanettin Felek and Yusuf Ziya Onis, the
major figures of Turkish sport movement, the first congress of TICI took
place” (Fisek, 255 and Sumer, 25). The TICI was the very first independently
organized, volunteer, multi-sports association, which represented Turkish
sport both nationally and internationally. The basic principles of TICI
were adopted from the Swiss sport model, the “Reglements Sportifs
de l’Union Suisse’ (Sumer, 30). The purposes of TICI were:

to direct, coordinate and advance the activities of all sport organizations;
to represent Turkish sport In international events; to Identify and
stabilize the principles of amateur and professional sport; to organize
sport competitions on a national scale; to canalize the free time of
youth for sport and to discover the new athletes, coaches and officials;
to Identify and direct the qualifications for the Olympic Games in accordance
with the National Olympic Committee; to establish and register the national
sport federations to the International sport federations, to make sport
publications (Fisek, 354-365).

For sixteen years, the Turkish sport movement was directed and controlled
by this truly democratic sport institution. Because of its populist status,
the TICI was able to develop and grow at a very fast pace. Sport clubs,
federations and societies were assembled within the various individual
national sport federations that became forming members of TICI Individual
sport federations assembled under TICI. Examples are:

• Track & Field Federation 1922
• Soccer Federation 1922
• Bicycle Federation 1923
• Fencing Federation 1923
• Weight Lifting Federation 1923
• Swimming & Water Sports Federation 1924
• Skiing & Winter Sports Federation 1924
• Horse Riding and Trap & Shooting Federation 1926
• Basketball Federation 1934
• Volleyball Federation 1934

Prior to the TICI, no sport organization was completely independent
and almost all of them had some political or religious linkage. With the
development of TICI, the issue of sport was temporarily freed from the
touch of politics and religion. In TIOX every form of ethnic and religious
discrimination, divisive politics and religious activities were strictly
prohibited. TICI became the sole representative and defender of Turkish
sport at every level of athletics. TICI was also “…an official
office for the National Olympic Committee [NOCI” (Ertug, 68). Fisek
reported that, “When Selim Sirri Tarcan officially established the
NOC in 1924, he was also an executive member of the TICI’ (pp. 361-362).
In fact, “In the 1924 Paris Olympic Games, the national teams were
financed and represented by TICI” (San, 6).

The 1930’s were a period of reforms, opportunities, freedom, and national
development. During this renaissance it was possible to introduce innovations,
now ideas and various experiments. On the other hand, it was also a period
of economic difficulties left over from the Great Depression. This situation
negatively affected the financial status of TICI.

During the mid-1930’s, there was a general scarcity of financial support
for TICI. Due to this lack of finances, there was great difficulty in
improving the existing conditions of Turkish sport. In 1936, in a congressional
meeting of TICI, the members and the administrative leaders of the association
voted that “The total movement of sport and physical culture should
be government supported, and made a state program” (Fisek, 266-269).
It followed that, “…the Turkish government was pushed to involve
(itself) in the issues of Turkish sport more actively” (Hicyilmaz,
22).

The aim of this decision was to prepare for life both the athletes in
clubs and the students in classrooms. Clearly this could not have been
accomplished without the permanent financial support of the government.
During those years of financial concerns, the TICI was also suffering
politically and there were several disputes among the members of the TICI
that practically forced the organization to seek government support. “In
1936 at its eighth and final congress, the TICI first changed its name
and status and then dissolved itself forever” (Sumer, 28). With this
decision, the semi-government controlled organ of sport, known as Department
of Sport (Turk Spor Kurumu [TSK] was officially established in 1936.

2- (Turk Spor Kurumu) 1936-1938)

Due to the general economic situation, during the era of TICI, the efforts
to improve the overall status of sport and the general fitness of the
population in Turkiye met with limited success because of the lack of
sufficient resources, such as inadequate sport and recreational facilities
and expertise. Hence, in addition to the lack of resources, “The
main objectives of TICI’s member clubs were beyond the development of
mass athletics” (Fisek, 374).

Apak reports that, “‘The sport authorities of ‘TICI were making
a visible effort to maintain a certain balance between competitive sports
and mass participation” (p. 229). However, the former was frequently
sacrificed for the latter. Pressure to obtain and improve the success
level of Turkish sport in international arenas, especially in soccer where
the national team suffered heavy defeats, was one of the key factors in
placing the competitive sports ahead of mass sports. In the 1930’s, this
situation surfaced as a riveting concern for proponents of the nation’s
only political party of Republican Populist Party (RPP). A close relationship
was temporarily established between sport and party leaders. According
to Fisek, “The politicians promised to rescue Turkish sport from
its present conditions, by offering the invaluable goods and services
of RPP’ (p. 373).

Such promises created a working relationship between sport leaders and
the leaders of the RPP. Eventually, in order to alleviate the existing
conditions of sport, in 1936 in the eighth and last general congress of
TICI, the delegates voted convincingly and overwhelmingly, to abolish
itself and to establish the TSK [Turk Spor Kurumu (National Sport Association)].
In this transaction, a system parallel to the Soviet organization of sport
was created. The TSK was registered under the jurisdiction and the office
of the General Secretary of the (RPP). Sumer writes that, “With the
establishment of TSK the Turkish government began to directly and officially
involve itself in the matters of Turkish sport” (p. 29).

The TSK was presented as a hope and as a long awaited cure for the ills
of Turkish sport. According to Fisek, “It was this hope and the assurances
from the media and sport analysts that made the TICI close its doors and
hand over the association and sports to the control of the government
(p. 376).

This was the beginning of an autocratic, centrally administrated, government
controlled sport management period in Turkish sport. There were living
examples of this model in Stalin’s Soviet Union and in Hitler’s Germany,
both of which were working successfully. In fact, “The government
hired a German sport planner and organizer to help Turkish sport develop”
(Fisek, 377). For a time, this arrangement appeared to be successful.
For instance, the TSK was able to use and benefit from the various resources
of RPP such as the youth clubs, camps, folk houses, dormitories, hostels,
etc.

However, soon it was understood that the TSK was very far from being
a cure for Turkish sport. In fact, with the TSK, Turkish sport lost its
most important heritage, its legacy from the TICI as an independent, democratic
volunteer sport organization whose officers, unlike the TSK, “…were
not appointed by a higher authority but were elected’ (Sumer, 29). The
TSK could not guard the independent democratic sporting heritage of TICI,
and the further development of modern competitive sport program in Turkiye
was unsuccessfully cultivated.

Despite the slow progress under TICI, there had been indications of
growing interest among the Turkish leaders concerning the possible significance
of physical activities and sport within the context of national development.
Yet during the TSK, this essential concern was vanquished by political
ambitions of the TSK leaders. With power politics of key interest, sport
and physical education were regarded as highly valuable tools for underlining
both national health and national defense programs. Despite the fact that
these uses of sport were praiseworthy, and possibly because of politization,
Turkish sports stagnated. According to Sumer, “The battle for leadership
was the most important factor that paralyzed the functioning capacity
of the system of sport in the nation” (p. 33). Therefore, the period
of TSK “…was no more than a period of transition of sport from
an independent volunteer system to a completely controlled and centralized
system of sport administration” (Fisek, 373). The primary goal of
TSK was: “To enhance the mental and the physical health of the citizens
through organizing and developing sports and physical activities in revolutionary
and nationalistic directions” (Records of BTGM, p. 657).

3-(Beden Terbiyesi Genel Mudurlugu 1938-1992)

The attempts of TSK to centralize sport were unsuccessful. In 1938 a
special law (3530) the “Beden Terbiyesi Kanunu,” was established
in order to “…assist and promote culture and national development
in Turkiye by creating a militant youth with a nationalistic spirit to
defend Turkiye’s national sovereignty” (Fisek, 367-386). With this
law, the centralization of Turkish sport was accomplished.

Sport and physical education were considered by the government as capable
of supporting the political struggle through disciplined training of the
masses. They were further regarded as vehicles through which national
unity and national integration and national defense might be strengthened.
It was this idea that led to the establishment of the The National General
Directorate of Sport (Beden Terbiyesi Genel Mudurlugu) (BTGM) in 1936.
The directorate subsidized the hiring of coaches, the formation of sport
federations, the building and equipping of sport facilities, and the opening
of regional administration offices in the major cities. Fostering the
development of sport in general the BTGM has both major and minor departments
for all areas of athletic endeavor, as well as departments which “…plan,
conduct and supervise the training of specialists in the building of sport
facilities, international sport relations, sport politics, budgeting,
Sport Lottery’ (TBMM Zabit Ceridesi, in Fisek, pp 2-3).

The BTGM was originally signed under the authority of the Prime Ministry
but, as the governments were changed, the responsibilities and the official
administrative location of the BTGM were changed and registered under
the authority of various sport ministries. For instance, in 1969, when
the Ministry of Youth and Sport was established, the BTGM was automatically
located under this ministry:

When sport became an Issue of education, the BTGM was located under
the authority of Ministry of Education. When It became an issue of youth
then the BTGM was located under the administration of Ministry of Youth
and Sport, and when sport became a national issue then the office of
the BTGM was registered under the authority of the Prime Ministry (Fisek,
418).

BTGM was under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education, Youth and
Sport.

The BTGM was responsible for the development of sport in Turkiye and
“…worked in close co-operation with the various sport federations
and practically supervised their work” (Beden Terbiyesi Kanunu, madde
14, in Fisek, 367).

Since 1936 the Turkish system of sport has been a highly centralized
and controlled bureaucracy that is administrated by the supervision and
guidance of BTGM which currently uses the title or the name Genclik Spor
Genel Mudurlugu (GSGM) or the Directorate of Youth and Sport. The objectives
of the GSGM are:

to develop a bodily and mentally fit, united) revolutionist, nationalist
youth; to fertilize and spread out the sport and physical education
nation- wide; to free the citizens of Turkiye from habits of drinking
alcohol, smoking, and gambling; to develop strong and able-bodied citizens
and national soldiers for the national defense; to open new horizons
for the national youth, to organize, administer and prepare sport competitions
and represent the Turkish sport Internationally; to create opportunities
for both amateur and professional athletes to go abroad and compete
and represent the Turkish Republic In International arenas (Fisek, 386).

The underlying, nationalistic principles of sport policy of GSGM have
been centered in the principle of a sound mind in a sound body (“Saglam
Kafa Saglam Vucutta Olur”), a slogan adopted by Ataturk. A holistic
physical, mental and social development of the individual is emphasized
to prepare people for personal well-being and for potential defense of
the nation. The strengthening of the masses is considered to be of central
importance for the regime. From its inception, the most important concern
of the GSGM has been to use sport for the demonstration of national pride.
The achievements of Turkish athletes in international competitions have
provided an impetus for the rise of Turkish sport and to bring international
recognition to the nation.

4-(Genclik Spor Bakanlinligi)

The Ministry of Youth and Sport (Genclik ve Spor Bakanligi) was established
in 1969, during the government of the late Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel,
in order to bring the state and Turkish sport closer together and to give
the governing body of sport more political authority. The GSB was an attempt
to reshape Turkish sport and reemphasize its role in national development
by fostering and equipping children and youth organizations, by contributing
both to physical fitness and sport-for-all programs and by contributing
to competitive sports. The duties of GSB were to “…direct sport
in the country, to work out a legislative policy, put sport programs into
effect, and to coordinate the practical and theoretical connections or
works of federations and different physical cultural organizations”
(Fisek 413).

However, several critics reported that the objectives of GSB were part
of the objectives and the duties of several other ministries such as the
ministry of education, ministry of health and social services, ministry
of labor, ministry of village affairs, ministry of tourism and the ministry
of culture. But there was little co-operation among these various ministries
for sharing authority and responsibility. Although the GSB was granted
official responsibility, this ministry gained very little respect governmental
role in sport.

For instance, starting in 1963 Turkiye entered into the period of a five-year
development plan. According to Sumer, “In the first five-year development
plan (1963-1968) the topic of sport was not taken up” (p.106). In
the second five-year plan, sport was mentioned in but a single line, the
“Sport-for-all program should be encouraged” (Sumer, 106-107).

Moreover, during the GSB no effort was generated to close the gap between
the opportunities for city and rural youth in sport. Contrary to the objectives
and the expectations of both GSGM and GSB, sport and physical education
had been considered to be of little value in national and economic development.
Consequently, the expectations and the objectives of both the GSB and
the GSGM have not been accomplished.

As a final forfeiture, the dissolution of the GSB cost Turkish sport
a drastic budget reduction from the government. Turkish sport was left
with a low priority and sought “…technical assistance and aid from
the private sectors.” Another blow, along with the dissolution of
GSB, was the loss of the country’s best sport science and education institutions
such as the sport academies.

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Best Practices For Game Day Security At Athletic & Sport

U.S. Sports Academy2016-10-12T11:55:38-05:00March 3rd, 2008|Contemporary Sports Issues, Sports Facilities, Sports Management|

Introduction

On September 11th, it became abundantly clear that stadium and arena operators needed to incorporate security safeguards at America’s sporting venues. Increased foresight and precautions have become an integral part of standing orders at athletic venues not only for protecting existing facilities, but also in the defense of future sites. The authors of this article formed a team of researchers who conducted a nationwide investigation on the current game day security operations at Division I college football and basketball sporting venues. This research highlighted a number of security precautions that should be taken into consideration during all phases of facility operation: from initial design through post-event debriefing. The authors realize that every venue is different and therefore each site presents unique challenges that stadium, athletic directors and arena managers will need to overcome. For that reason alone, the checklist was constructed by relying on an extensive review of literature along with personal contacts with prominent security professionals across America. An initial instrument was pilot tested for content validation to a select group of Division I institutions along with a small number of professional experts including the Vice Presidents of Security for all four major professional sports leagues. This work resulted in the creation of the “Game Day Security Operations Checklist” that consists of 38 items vital to security preparations at stadiums and arenas.

After designing the instrument, it was sent in a survey packet to all Division I athletic directors and university directors of public safety. The athletic directors chosen to participate in the study were identified through the 2002-2003 National Directory of College Athletics (Collegiate Directories Inc., 2002). The remainders of the study’s participants were identified through a combination of Internet research and personal phone calls to individual institutions. In addition to the Game Day Security Operations Checklist, the survey packet included a cover letter that informed the participants that all information gained from completed surveys would be used by the researchers solely for statistical purposes and would be held to strict confidentiality and anonymity for security purposes.

The participants were asked to rate the frequency with which they implement each of the 38 security measures on a 5-point Likert-type scale. The scale was set as follows: 1 indicating no emphasis (this is not part of our game day operations), 2 indicating moderate emphasis (we feature this at 50% of our athletic events), 3 indicating priority (we feature this at 75% of our athletic events), 4 indicating we feature this (this is part of our standard operating procedure), and 0 indicating no opinion.

One hundred and twenty-one different schools responded to the survey and that is representative of 38% of the Division I colleges and universities in America. Completed surveys were received from all 31 polled conferences.

How Does Your University Match Up Against The Best Prepared Football Stadiums

Figure 1. presents 21 concepts along with the mean score for the most secure stadiums versus stadiums operating at a lower level of security. At the request of numerous athletic directors and a reporter at AP News, the research team also categorized the costs of implementing each precautionary measure. Individual prices are not listed since the costs for each of theses measures varied according to geographic regions. Three levels of cost classifications were utilized and they included: Prohibitive, Moderate, and Low. The authors have included the actual Game Day Security Checklist as a separate addendum for those colleges and universities that did not participate in this research and who might wish to fill out the checklist prior to reading the results listed below.

Figure 1. Differentiating Concepts for Football Stadiums

How Does Your University Match Up Against The Best Prepared Basketball Arenas

21 concepts were identified as being those security measures that separated the highest scoring basketball institutions from the lowest scores in the study. Figure 2. presents these concepts along with the score connected with the top 25% most secure arenas verses the lowest quartile of arenas operating at a lower level of security.

Figure 2. Differentiating Concepts for Basketball Arenas

The Best Prepared Football & Basketball Conferences
Football fans anxiously anticipate the release of the preseason top 25 Coaches Poll just as basketball fans burn the midnight oil creating their March Madness brackets looking forward to the Final Four. Just as there can only be a certain number of dominant teams on the gridiron or hardwood, so there are a handful of superior athletic conferences when it comes to Game Day Security Operations. The researchers have discovered the following elite conferences that indicated compliance with the proposed security concepts 75% of the time or more along with their total score, out of a highest possible Game Day Security Operations Checklist total score of 152.

Figure 3. The Best Prepared Conferences

Figure 3. indicates a number of important results. First, a total of eight conferences participating in Division-I football complied with the proposed security measures at 75% of events while only six basketball-playing conferences achieved the same level of compliance. The researchers believe there are a number of reasons for this discrepancy. First, Division-I football stadiums resemble professional venues to a greater degree than basketball arenas. While this is a generalization, many football stadiums are used almost exclusively for the football games while being located off campus and shut-off from the normal flow of students, faculty, etc. In contrast, basketball arenas are often considered just another on-campus facility. These facilities are often used for classroom space, intramurals, and other daily events. The nature of football stadiums as being isolated from the routine college campus traffic and usage while also being more catered to corporate clients may allow for more stringent security procedures. This is one possible explanation for the discrepancy between the numbers of elite football conferences complying with the proposed security measures as compared to the number of basketball venues reaching the same level of compliance. Another possible explanation is that the number of events scheduled for indoor venues far exceeds the total number of events held in outdoor football stadiums. As usage of a facility increases, so does the cost of securing that venue. With daily usage of basketball arenas, stringent security may tax the university’s capacity to implement the majority of the security measures as part of its standard operating procedure.While a few of the suggested security concepts are admittedly cost prohibitive, such as the deployment of antiterrorism squads and the utilization of biological detection equipment that might be used at the Super Bowl or NCAA finals, in a similar manner that the daily implementation of even the moderate cost items may stress the average athletic department budget, there are methods by which a university may ameliorate this financial burden. For instance, Mr. Bernie Tolbert, Vice President of Security for the National Basketball Association, has suggested rotating the utilization of security concepts from event to event. This will prevent potential security threats from establishing a pattern to a venue’s security measures. Milt Ahlerich, Vice President for NFL Security identified the installation of jersey barriers or other concrete bollards as one of the most important factors. Fifty-six percent of the respondents for football and eighty-one percent of the respondents for basketball have not installed concrete bollards at their venues. While somewhat cost prohibitive, this one time investment coupled with several of the low to moderate cost items like prohibiting re-entry, no carry-ins, and the prohibition of deliveries 90 minutes prior to the event go a long way in securing these sporting venues.

Lessons Learned

The cornerstone of all good research centers on the transformation of theoretical concepts into improved practice. Similarly, just as teamwork is the cornerstone of all successful athletic programs, so communication is the foundation of all safe sport venues. If the unique atmosphere of collegiate athletics is to be preserved, and the excitement of Rivalry Week, Midnight Madness, New Year’s Day bowl games, and the Final Four is to be enjoyed by future generations of fans, then athletic directors and directors of public safety at college campuses need to scrutinize their game plans well in advance of the kickoff and tip-off of each season. Furthermore, coordinated communication must be a priority from pre-event training through post event debriefing. Several NFL teams including the Buffalo Bills and the Jacksonville Jaguars have planned and practiced coordinated responses to a variety of disaster scenarios. Stadium and arena managers with the support of their college and university presidents should develop and practice coordinated responses to a variety of disaster scenarios with their local, state, and federal first responders. Just as all players on a team need to have intimate knowledge of where they are supposed to be on the field or court and the responsibilities that accompany that position, so all athletic directors and support staff must be familiar with their particular roles and responsibilities. Simple knowledge of individual responsibility, however, is not sufficient. This is why constant communication both in the air and on the ground from within the hot zone and outside the hot zone is vital to the protection of collegiate athletic events should an attack take place. The head coach serves as the hub of all team communication and game plans just as the central command of a stadium or arena directs all communication efforts and coordinates the formal planning, from risk management to evacuation, that is necessary to securing the safety of players, coaches, the media, and the fanatical supporters in the stands.

Final Thoughts

The Springfield College faculty and students that comprised the Game Day Security Checklist Research Team for stadium designers and operators are hopeful that this easy reference checklist will be useful as the security and operation experts on the front lines develop their strategies to safeguard their athletic and sport venues. The Research team would also like to thank experts Martin Boryszak, Kathy Larue, and John Pantera for their counter-terrorism consultations. A special word of thanks is extended to Larry Perkins, General Manager of the RBC Center in North Carolina, and to the Vice Presidents of Security for each of the four professional leagues, most especially Milton Ahlerich, Vice President Security NFL, and Bernie Tolbert, Vice President Security NBA and Distinguished Weckwerth Lecturer, Springfield College Sport Management & Recreation Department 2003.

Inherent Conflicts of Interest in the National Football League Management Structure May Render the Rooney Rule Meaningless

U.S. Sports Academy2020-10-06T08:28:12-05:00March 3rd, 2008|Contemporary Sports Issues, Sports Facilities, Sports Management|

Introduction

Recently, the National Football League (NFL) has come under attack for its minority hiring practices at the upper echelon management positions. Lawyers Johnnie L. Cochran, Jr. and Cyrus Mehri have notified the NFL that they will sue unless substantial progress is made by the NFL in the hiring of African-Americans for head coaching positions. The NFL’s response was to enact the Rooney Rule, a league policy requiring each team to interview at least one minority candidate when seeking to fill a head coaching vacancy.

Although the NFL continues to face external opposition to the Rooney Rule which many opponents state is not aggressive enough, its most formidable opposition may be internal, occasioned by the inherent conflicts of interest in the NFL’s own management structure. This article will explore the conflicts of interest inherent in the league’s structure, including the respective roles of the NFL Commissioner and league owners.

Background

The 2003-2004 National Football League season marks the league’s 83rd year since its inception in 1920. While, currently, nearly 70% of all NFL players are African American, only 3 of 32 head coaches are African-American(Simmons, 2003). In fact, the NFL’s track record in the hiring of black coaches throughout its existence has not been much better. When considering the over 400 head coaches hired all-time by the NFL, only 7 have been African-American revealing a grossly inadequate percentage of 1.75%.(Cochran & Mehri, 2002)

As illustrated in the following table, there have only been 6 African-American head coaches in the modern NFL, commencing with Art Shell in 1989. Prior to Shell, the NFL had not hired an African American head coach in sixty-four years.(Cochran & Mehri, 2002)

Table 1

African-American Head Coaches in the NFL

In response to a September 2002 study by Janice Madden, Ph.D., commissioned by attorneys Johnnie L. Cochran, Jr. and Cyrus Mehri titled “Black Coaches in the National Football League: Superior Performance, Inferior Opportunities” and a threatened lawsuit against the NFL for its unfair hiring practices by the two noted attorneys, the NFL’s owners agreed, in principle, in December 2002 to implement a league policy requiring that any team seeking to hire a head coach would have to interview at least one minority candidate.(Farrell, 2003) This new rule became known as the “Rooney Rule”, named after the Pittsburgh Steelers owner Dan Rooney, who serves as chairman of the NFL’s workplace diversity committee.(Lions’ Millen fined $200K for not interviewing minority candidate, 2003). Despite the NFL’s proactive attempt to address its own minority hiring practice problems, the Rooney Rule may never have a meaningful impact due to the inherent conflicts of interest posed by the NFL’s management structure. A “conflict of interest” is defined as a situation when an individual has a conflict between competing duties or between private interests and professional responsibilities. How does an NFL owner who sits on the league’s diversity committee and believes in the Rooney Rule in theory not in practice enforcement of the rule against other owners and himself? How does the NFL Commissioner who is hired by the owners and is accountable to the owners enforce the Rooney Rule against those very same owners?

The NFL Commissioner

In March 1941 the NFL named Elmer Layden its first commissioner. In broad terms, a commissioner’s role is to exercise broad administrative or judicial authority. More specifically, the NFL Commissioner manages the business affairs of the league and is its most visible representative.

The management structure of the NFL reveals the inherent conflicts of interest when considering the juxtaposition of the commissioner and the league’s owners in the context of such structure. While the commissioner is an employee of the owners, he also, in many ways, directs, oversees and otherwise polices the owners in the due course of his role in running the day-to-day operations of the NFL. For example, the commissioner may discipline an owner for violating a standing NFL regulation under the guise of maintaining the sanctity and integrity of the sport. However, this power is anything but unbridled as the owners hire the commissioner, and possess mechanisms to fire him when his decisions are adverse to their interests (Wong, 2002). If a commissioner’s paramount concern is his very own job security, how does he simultaneously do what is in the best interest of the sport in the face of the owners’ divergent interests?

Another glaring conflict of interest which compromises the commissioner’s ability to fairly carry out the duties of his office are the politics involved in pleasing the owners as a collective group. As a result of the varying and sometimes conflicting interests of the owners, in order to be effective, the commissioner must be diplomatic and political in his approach if he wishes to have a successful and lengthy tenure in office (Wong, 2002). How does the commissioner simultaneously, for instance, weigh the interests of owners of big market teams vs. the interests of owners of small market teams? Does he simply side with the more influential owners in name of his own job security, notwithstanding a potentially detrimental impact on the sport?

The commissioner also manages issues involving players. When the players and owners have opposing positions on a particular issue the commissioner’s conflict of interest is pronounced. Fortunately for players, the commissioner’s power over the players is regulated by three main documents: the league’s Basic Agreement, the Uniform Player Contract, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement (Wong, 2002).

Despite the adoption of the three main documents, professional athletes in the big four sports leagues (i.e., NFL, NHL, NBA and MLB) recognized the inherent conflicts of interest in the commissioner acting as arbitrator between players and owners in grievance proceedings. “First, players asserted that the commissioner would not be able to remain impartial if the grievance was against a decision he himself had made. Second, the players claimed that the commissioner of a professional sports league is hired and fired by the owners of that league, and therefore is not an impartial entity but may have a bias toward the owners.”(Wong, 2002) As result, players demanded and were granted a system whereby an independent party would act as final arbitrator.

The Owners

In 1900 William C. Temple took over the team payments for the Duquesne Country and Athletic Club, becoming the first known individual club owner.(NFL.com) Owners in the modern NFL are still individual or private franchise owners. As mentioned previously, the owners hire a commissioner who is charged with operating the league on a day-to-day basis and generally hire an individual they believe will advocate for their own best interest. It is not surprising then, that the current NFL commissioner, Paul Tagliabue, served as the NFL’s principal outside counsel prior to becoming commissioner. (Sportsencyclopedia.com)

The owners establish league policies through a committee structure. Through membership on the various committees (e.g., finance, rules, diversity, etc.), owner’s set policy which, in theory, promotes the sport’s long-term viability, maintains its integrity, sanctity, commercial appeal, etc. Policies approved by the various committees are implemented and enforced by the commissioner. Finally, the owners operate their individual teams all of whom must abide by the policies set by the various committees and enforced by the commissioner.

The NFL’s management structure pertaining to owners as outlined above, also reveals inherent conflicts of interest. The owners hire the commissioner and author policies as committee members that the commissioner must, in turn, enforce against them as individual franchise owners. The owners as a collective group must also be able to place the best interests of the league ahead of their individual interests as franchise owners. How does an owner simultaneously consider conflicts of interest posed by weighing their individual goals against that of the league’s and the sport’s goals as whole?

Conclusion

Due to the NFL’s management structure, which is fraught with inherent conflicts of interest, the commissioner, who is beholden to the owners, is reduced to figure head status when it comes to the enforcement of league policies such as the Rooney Rule. Sure, the commissioner is empowered to levy penalties (e.g., monetary fines, etc.) against teams that violate league policy, but such disciplinary action is discretionary with the interpretation of the letter and spirit of the rule left to the devices of the commissioner on a case-by-case basis.

The conflicts of interest in the NFL’s management structure were, by design, created by the owners to benefit the owners. Therefore, in order for the Rooney Rule or any other policy to have a meaningful impact the owners must embrace it, not only in theory, but also in practice. The commissioner may attempt to cajole the owners into complying with a policy, but it is the owners who must actually take action. Owners must embrace a policy to the point that it becomes embedded as the normal and accepted way that business is conducted, notwithstanding conflicts of interest in management structure. This is the only way a league policy, fair hiring or otherwise, will have a meaningful effect.

Simmons, C. R. (2003, August 11). Cochran and Mehri Take Aim at the NFL. Blackenterprise.com. Retrieved August 11, 2003, from the World Wide Web:
http://www.blackenterprise.com/ExclusivesOpen.asp? Source=Articles/11142002CS.html

Cochran, J. L., & Mehri, C. (2002). Black Coaches in the National Football League: Superior Performance, Inferior Opportunities. Retrieved August 11, 2003, from the World Wide Web:
http://www.findjustice.com/ms/nfl/indextop.html

Farrell, W. C. (2003, August 3). Walsh Network Produces Diversity as Well as Success. The New York Times, Section 8-11

 Lions’ Millen fined $200K for not interviewing minority candidates. (2003, July 25). CBS SportsLine.com. Retrieved July 29, 2003, from the World Wide Web:
http://cbs.sportsline.com/nfl/story/6498949

Wong, G. M. (2002). Essentials of Sports Law (3rd ed.). Connecticut: Praeger, p. 13

NFL History — Chronology 1869-1910. NFL.com. Retrieved August 12, 2003, from the World Wide Web: http://ww2.nfl.com/history/chronology/1869-1910.html

Paul Tagliabue (1989-Present). (2002, August 26). Sportsecyclopedia.com. Retrieved August 13, 2003, from the World Wide Web:
http://www.sportsecyclopedia.com/nfl/comish/tagliabue.html

Author’s Note:

Corey M. Turner, J.D./M.S.W. is an Adjunct Professor of Sports Law and Ethics in the Graduate School of Business at the Metropolitan College of New York and Instructor of Business Law / Corporations at the New York Paralegal School. He is also Principal in The Turner Law Firm, P.C., a New York City Corporate, Entertainment and Securities firm.