Black Coaches Trying to Make It in a White-Dominated Industry: College Football and the Racial Divide

ABSTRACT

Sport participation among Black student-athletes has steadily increased throughout the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) over the last two decades. The number of Black head coaches in Division I Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) College Football, however, has remained stagnant and in many years declined (18). Research has stated that the presence of a defined glass ceiling, discrepancies among Blacks and Whites with regard to social capital (social mobility), and factors of intent and interest in becoming coaches have been integral in preventing many Black coaches from pursuing positions as head coaches in college football. Through the use of narrative, this research contributed to the scholarship in this area by providing anecdotal evidence that hurdles still exist for Black coaches, but changes are also occurring that statistics may not reflect. The story of Charlie Friemont, a graduate assistant aspiring to become a college head coach, demonstrates how the aforementioned factors impact his career choices. Many of his experiences align with the previous literature and have impacted him both negatively and positively in his career pursuits. In addition, Charlie’s story introduces a new factor that may impact the trends of this issue in college football.

INTRODUCTION

Charlie Friemont entered the football offices at State University (SU) with strong, brisk strides wearing neatly pleated dress pants, a well pressed polo shirt tucked into his slacks, and a leather-bound notebook under his arm. He shook hands with a firm grip and sat cross-legged across a small table in the running backs’ office. As he sat back in his chair, he smiled and gestured that he was ready to begin the interview. Charlie was an enthusiastic and confident graduate assistant with the SU’s football team. In the spring of 2011, he was in the midst of his first season of spring practices at SU, working with the offense and special teams. During the busy in-season period, 16 to 18 hour workdays were routine. In addition to his football responsibilities, Charlie juggled the rigors of a demanding master’s program that was a requirement of his position. Charlie, a former student-athlete, was one of 6,178 Black student-athletes competing in football at an National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) Division I Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) school in the fall of 2003 (29). That same season there were only four Black head football coaches in all of the FBS, accounting for 3.3% of the population (18). Charlie, admittedly, was pursuing a career in an industry that has been dominated by White males (28).

After finishing an undergraduate degree in Media Arts, Charlie accepted a position at a large sports television broadcasting company in the northeast. It was his exposure to certain media practices, specifically a diverted attention to players’ personas rather than their on-field accomplishments, which inspired him to consider an alternative vocational option. “It was getting away from what the guy was doing on the field to more personalizing the athlete,” Charlie explained. “It was always who’s getting in trouble? Who’s making mistakes off the field? Who’s making a fool of themselves on the field?” Inspired to help student-athletes, Charlie left media to begin a career in college football coaching.

Like other Black coaches before him, Charlie immediately faced stereotypes that would impede his progress toward his ultimate goal of becoming an offensive coordinator. According to Lapchick (19), of the 266 possible offensive or defensive coordinator positions in the FBS, only 30 were held by Black coaches. Ironically, one year prior to Charlie embarking on his high school playing career in the spring of 1993, Anderson (1) published a study that would, unbeknownst to Charlie, forecast his college playing career and eventually his coaching aspirations. The study found that Black athletes were often moved to subordinate, or non-central, positions like running back or wide receiver in favor of their White counterparts who were cast in leadership roles such as quarterback and offensive line (1). At his undergraduate institution, Charlie’s coach noticed “he runs around a lot, so he has great feet” and moved him from quarterback, the position he played throughout high school, to running back, a position he had never played before. Anderson (1) further noted that former quarterbacks and offensive linemen were more likely to obtain assistant coaching jobs at those same positions upon entering the profession, which was viewed as a “pipeline” to a coordinator position. Over a decade and a half afterwards, Finch, McDowell, and Sagas (10) asserted a similar position. As Charlie came onto campus as an aspiring coach years later, he was approached about what position he preferred to coach and was told, “You want to be a coach? What position did you play? ‘Well, I played running back because I didn’tget a chance to play quarterback.’ Now you’re the running backs coach.” Once again, Charlie was pigeonholed.

This examination proposed that a glass ceiling, perpetuated by hiring practices influenced by tradition and racial discrimination, has inhibited increased diversity among coaching staffs within the FBS. Specifically, this article demonstrated the impact stereotypes have had in shaping the perceptions and experiences of an aspiring Black coach who was pursuing a position in the coaching industry. The purpose of this study was to analyze those perceptions and apply the findings to a better understanding of obstacles similar aspirant Black collegiate football coaches face.

LITERATURE REVIEW

According to the NCAA Student-Athlete Ethnicity Report (29), Black participation percentages in all divisions of the NCAA increased from 1999-00 to 2008-09. It is within the revenue-generating sports of football and men’s basketball where Black student-athlete representation is highest and has helped drive the increase in overall percentages. In 2008, 47% (6,644) of the participants in FBS football were Black, which was more than two percent more than their White counterparts (44.8%) (29). Although a higher percentage of Black participants existed, the total number of Black head coaches at FBS schools at the end of 2008 was seven (20). At the end of the 2010 football season, 16 Black (2 additional minority) head coaches held the head coach position at FBS schools, which was a historical high-water mark for the NCAA,but was still only 15% (19).

Much of the literature determined racial stereotyping and discriminatory hiring practices as the determinant to the distinct discrepancy in the percentage of Black participants to the percentage of Black head coaches in the NCAA (1, 5, 7, 10, 22, 24). Among the stereotypes presented by scholars, intellectual inferiority, athletic superiority, professional ineptitude, and temperament pervaded as Black coaches continued to struggle to obtain central coaching positions (26).

Glass Ceiling

The concept of a glass ceiling, as it pertains to this topic, refers to artificial barriers that preclude persons without power (i.e., minorities, women) from advancing into managerial positions (5). Treatment discrimination is a functional effect of the glass ceiling and has contributed to job dissatisfaction among subgroups (24). Essentially, inferior parties, in this case Black coaches, become disenchanted with the profession because of sustained mistreatment and a defined cap on hierarchal success. In some scenarios participants would no longer view the activity as enjoyable and the resulting loss of interest would be termed “burnout” (3). Literature suggested that the perception of a glass ceiling and subsequent job discontent created greater turnover, which negatively impacted organizational loyalty and job involvement (5). A comparatively smaller frequency of achievement subsequently hindered the foundation of strong Black networks that was already present among White coaches.

As central decision-makers, head coaches in intercollegiate athletics, specifically football, normally made hiring decisions for assistant coaching vacancies on their staff (6). It was those same assistant coaches that eventually provided a viable pool of candidates for open head coaching positions at other institutions or at the current school (1, 10, 25). The inference can then be made that if Black coaches are not being hired in leadership positions, they do not have the opportunity to hire other minority assistant coaches, thus creating a glass ceiling due to institutional racism (24).

Some scholars believed that institutional racism was a derivative of homologous reproduction, which is stated as the propensity of members of a leadership group to hire and promote within similar social and physical characteristics of themselves (15). Kanter (15), Knoppers (16), and later Mullane and Whisenant (22) tested homologous reproduction as it related to race and gender in the workplace. Cunningham and Sagas (6) argued that this theory contributed to racial inequity in intercollegiate athletics. In all of the studies except for Mullane and Whisenant (22), homologous reproduction was found to have significant influence on hiring practices (6, 15, 16). Cunningham and Sagas (6) stated the hypotheses that White head coaches hired predominantly White assistant coaches and Black head coaches, accordingly, hired primarily Black assistant coaches was statistically relevant. It could then be inferred that those that hold leadership positions, and subsequently make hiring decisions, influence the demographical makeup of a coaching staff.

Fink, Pastore, and Riemer (11) described the majority leadership network in intercollegiate athletics as “white, Protestant, able-bodied, heterosexual males” (p. 13). Employees that did not possess similar characteristics were a much smaller subgroup and often experienced negative work experience (5, 11). This dynamic allowed the authoritative group, in this case White males, to assert control. In the case of Black coaches, the glass ceiling acted as an inhibitor in career ascension due to the lack of upward mobility in the coaching ranks and the cyclical affect perpetuating the phenomenon. Ultimately the glass ceiling has profoundly impacted the coaching landscape in college football.

Social Mobility

Sartore and Cunningham (26) stated, “membership does indeed have its privileges, individuals not belonging to this network will not reap many associated benefits like information exchange, challenging work tasks, promotion, etc” (p. 72). The above stated referred to social mobility, which is described as an alteration in social standing that involves amendments to social environment and life conditions (27). Sport participation has facilitated this movement among select Black student-athletes, creating an upward mobility for a concentrated group of participants in revenue-generating sports (27). The reality is, however, that Blacks faced sport segregation through the 1950s, which inhibited high participation percentages in many sports (3). Coakley (3) further noted that Blacks participated in a small range of sports, but because those sports were notable in the United States, the under representation of minorities went unnoticed. In essence, the lack of an established administrative network has prevented Black coaches from obtaining leadership positions based on race. The challenge that was once related to participation has, in part, subsided, but has remained for Black coaches and administrators.

A contributing concept to social mobility is social capital theory, which Day and McDonald (9) defined as “resources embedded in networks” (p. 138). The authors argued that Black coaches received greater benefit than White coaches in utilizing social capital, provided they extended their network to include other White coaches and administrators (9). However, some scholars determined that Black coaches did not share the same benefit of social capital as White coaches (25). One causative factor to this has been the prevalence of “stacking”, which is stated as the migration of Black participants into non-central positions, while White participants occupy the majority of leadership positions (12). Elements of stacking, such as discriminatory hiring practices and racial stereotyping, were found to be some of the determining factors that impeded career ascension for minorities (25, 26). Stacking, as a practice, has contributed to this issue due to the collection of networking opportunities allowed to student-athletes participating in central positions. Social capital is accumulated through, not only participation, but participation in integral positions (8). Though social capital was a principle cause to career immobility among Black coaches (25), discrimination and furthered adherence to stereotypes created a prominent limitation for mobility among Black coaches (5, 13-14). In effect, Black coaches have struggled to infiltrate the White dominated field of coaching, which has prevented them from founding a social network that ultimately assists in job placement and ascension.

Intent and Interest

Cunningham, Sagas, and Ashley (7) examined the effects of affective commitment, dealing with the function of wanting to do a task as it related to occupational commitment. Coaches that have high affective commitment in coaching subsequently have less intention of leaving the profession (7). Cunningham (5) noted that only 1/3 (N = 93) of the Black student-athletes he examined in 2003 had interest in becoming a college coach. However, intent and interest are certainly related but they are not the same (5). Brown and Lent’s (2) examination of social cognitive framework delineated interest as an affinity toward an area. Conversely, Cunningham (5) noted that intent was a purposeful pursuit of, in this case, an occupation in coaching. The difference was seen in the number of Black student-athletes that pursued careers in coaching. Those student-athletes that entered the industry had high intent and interest in coaching. However, those who stated they were interested in becoming a coach but chose a different profession may have had high interest, but ultimately had low intent (5).

The examination of intent and interest is vital for two primary reasons. First, it brings to light the possibility that Black student-athletes are discouraged from entering the profession due to the prior knowledge of discriminatory hiring practices. Secondly, demonstrating intent validates interest as student-athletes consider possible career choices post-participation, which is especially important when measuring perception. According to Cunningham (5), Black student-athletes were aware of the differences in racial percentages among coaches and those disparities negatively impacted the intent and interest of these student-athletes in pursuing coaching positions.

Conceptual Framework

Finch, McDowell, and Sagas (10) expanded on Anderson’s (1) delineation of the dynamics of coaches progressing through the hierarchy of the industry. They noted that assistant coaches provided the most viable pool of head coaching candidates and, more specifically, particular coaching positions present expedited ascension to higher coaching jobs. For example, a quarterback or linebacker coach would receive preference for a vacant offensive or defensive coordinator position over another position coach like running backs or defensive backs coach. Offensive and defensive coordinators are then generally viewed as the prerequisite positions to becoming a head coach. Black coaches have been traditionally underrepresented in these secondary roles, which has limited their ability to ascend through the ranks. This concept is referred to as institutionalized racial discrimination (1, 10).

Expounding upon these assertions, this study incorporated Sagas and Cunningham’s (25) conceptual framework, which expanded on Anderson’s (1) initial findings to outline career success, human and social capital, and discrimination based explanations for the lack of minority representation among football coaches. The concept of career success is best viewed for the purposes of this study as hierarchal, extrinsic, and intrinsic success within the coaching profession. Black coaches were essentially failing to achieve success reaching a desired level of coaching or were not benefiting from their participation intrinsically or extrinsically, so they left the profession. Human capital theory refers to the educational, experiential, and opportunity based resources available to coaches. The social capital theory details the accessible network built on personal relationships. Both theories are derivatives of opportunity, or lack thereof, that coaches utilize to attain better jobs. Lastly, discriminatory explanations simply provide examples of practices that have contributed to racial inequity. The application of these ideologies influenced the understanding of the elements involved in discriminatory hiring, but also gave weight to the perceptions of an aspiring coach that was in the midst of the process.

METHODOLOGY

The narrative of Charlie Friemont is a glimpse into the social reality of college football coaching, which through story inform us of a greater meaning (18). This method was chosen to allow the reader to put Charlie’s experiences with coaching into historical context. Narrative gave the researcher the opportunity to explore the axiomatic discourse of this culture and shed light on an individual’s perception of this ongoing issue (23). Previous inquiry on this topic has been predominantly quantitative (1, 10, 25-26) and scholars that have extensively examined race in coaching suggested more qualitative exploration in this area (25). Narrative was chosen as the most appropriate method to capture the individual experiences of a person heavily invested in this topic (4), in this case Charlie Friemont. This study should be viewed as an individual’s confrontation with inequality and a starting point for furthered understanding about how it has shaped the coaching industry. As Merriam (21) suggested, “Stories are how we make sense of our experiences, how we communicate with others, and through which we understand the world around us” (p. 32).

Participant

State University (SU) is a perennial top 25 program in the country and has produced numerous professional athletes, both White and Black. The football team is a member of a highly competitive conference in the Southeastern United States. Charlie is in his first season as a graduate assistant with SU’s football team. He is a Black male that previously played the sport at another FBS school. He acknowledged that coaching is his career goal and has been involved in the profession at the graduate assistant level at multiple institutions. At the time of this inquiry, Charlie was the only Black graduate assistant working with the football staff. His experience participating in college football, as well as pursuing a full-time coaching position rendered his opinions of the current landscape of Black coaches in the FBS relevant.

Data Collection

Data was collected during four individual interviews conducted by the researcher over a two week period in the spring. Additionally, one field observation was made at State University spring football practice and another at a team scrimmage. The first two interviews were one-hour in length. Two additional 45-minute interviews were conducted during the football team’s spring practice. Each of the interviews was conducted in Charlie’s office. Observations of Charlie’s interactions with coaches and student-athletes were conducted over the course of a half hour each. Field notes were taken and recorded onto a Microsoft Word file. The interviews were recorded with an audio recording device and were also transcribed onto a Microsoft Word file.

Data Analysis

The transcribed interviews and field notes were coded and analyzed by method of meaning condensation. Meaning condensation requires “an abridgement of the meanings expressed by the interviewee into shorter formulations” (17, p. 205). The transcripts of the interviews were preliminarily reviewed by the researcher allowing for initial assignment of themes. Passages were then drawn from the data and given more abbreviated categorical designations related to the aforementioned themes. Finally, the researcher reviewed the entirety of the data and aligned meanings to the concepts.

Trustworthiness

Several steps were taken to ensure reliability in the data. An extensive review of the literature pertaining to the topic was performed prior to data collection. Multiple interviews were conducted with Charlie, which established both a working rapport and a detailed view of his professional setting. Detailed field notes and observations were also assembled by the researcher to further triangulate the data. Extensive efforts were made to thoroughly document and appropriately handle the data collection process. A precise audit trail was used to maintain the integrity of the research. Names and implicating information were omitted to make certain participant confidentiality was maintained. Member checking was also performed as Charlie reviewed the manuscript before it was submitted for publication.

FINDINGS

During this investigation with Charlie, State University (SU) hired a Black head coach for its basketball program. Basketball, the only other revenue-generating sport in the NCAA, has similarly lacked diversity among its head coaches. Charlie, sharing his reaction to the news of the new coach, gave a guarded response. “I think it speaks volumes to saying that we’re giving [Basketball Coach] an opportunity, but he doesn’t even know what the opportunity is, much less do we.” Charlie sits back in his chair, folding his arms and a wry smile comes across his face as he adds, “I think it would be probably unheard of to have a 33 year old African-American head [football] coach at [State University].” There is undoubtedly an understanding of the challenges he faces in pursuing his goals ofbecoming an offensive coordinator. The obstacles, he acknowledges, are no different than those of other aspiring coaches, except the consideration of the stereotypes associated with race. “The stereotypes just tend to keep showing up and there’s not a lot of progressive thinking going on.” Charlie’s insight into the factors deterring Black coaches from entering and sustaining positions within the coaching profession rendered three themes perceptions of racial discrimination, persistence of an elitist fraternity, and burnout. Additionally, a fourth theme emerged that may indicate a shift in the trends associated with the aforementioned factors. The theme is titled positivity and new success.

Perceptions of Racial Discrimination

During his college playing career, Charlie was persuaded to switch from quarterback, the position he played in high school, to wide receiver and eventually running back. “He should be an athlete that we can move to receiver or running back or safety,” he recalls of the general sentiment coaches had of him and other athletic, Black quarterbacks. He reveals that his perception of the stereotype of Black student-athletes was that Black players were often too versatile athletically. Their athleticism allowed coaches to decentralize these student-athletes and insert their White counterparts into those desired positions like quarterback. He went on to draw parallels within coaching as well. “A lot of the stereotypes go back to the same stereotypes that coaches get.” Charlie elaborates, “Exceptionally talented [Black] quarterbacks in high school that have to run the system that their high school coach teaches him. They don’t get the opportunity to learn, so he’s labeled as he can’t learn this.” Sitting back in his chair, Charlie continues to talk about the way Black coaches are labeled as unable to learn. Basically, they have never been exposed to certain systems or styles of play. If they are not privy to the knowledge, it is exceptionally challenging to try to learn from decentralized positions.

The position of quarterback is often deemed the face of the football program. His belief is that most institutions would prefer the traditional model of a statuesque White quarterback that aligned with societal ideals. Although Charlie concedes that size was the principal factor preventing him from playing quarterback, he notes that other Black student-athletes encountered additional barriers. “Young men culturally express themselves different by the way they look, their hair, the artwork on their bodies; the tattoos. Do you want that to be the face of your program?” In his opinion, cultural expressions often caused Black student-athletes to be exiled to positions outside of the public eye in concurrence with the institution’s preferred message.

Charlie’s move from quarterback to wide receiver and running back is evidence that the concept of stacking impacted his career. Admittedly though, he was skeptical about its impact on his particular situation. “It’s all a fraternity and it’s all about who you know and the opinions of who you know are going to come from people you trust. I think it’s about the product that you put on the field.” Some of Charlie’s objection to this theory involves the evolution of coaching and how Black coaches relate to Black student-athletes. As more coaches are able to move into leadership positions, the more difficult it is to state stacking is prevalent in college football. “Coaches have been conscious of not trying to stack because of the appearance of when you’re going torecruit,” Charlie says. “If you’re going to walk into a Black family’s house and they say ‘Hey, who’s on your staff? Where’s the Black coach down here to relate to my son?’ It would look a little odd.” Black student-athletes are aware of the makeup of the coaching staff and it is Charlie’s belief that if there was an unbalance it would be evident.

Throughout Charlie’s playing career he endured countless injuries that often kept him off of the field. The circumstances that led to him being unable to compete also allowed him to dedicate time to studying the game and assist with various aspects of coaching. It was during these occasions that Charlie discovered the dynamic of the student-athlete/coach relationship, which was regularly impacted by race. He found that student-athletes related to coaches differently. Certain student-athletes felt more comfortable with specific coaches and that connection, or in some cases disconnect, was generally motivated by race. “Different styles of coaches influence players in different ways,” explained Charlie. “There has been, for a long time, a cookie cutter image of a coach. Players look at it like, ‘ahcoach, man, he’s kind of weird, he’s not cool, he doesn’t relate to us.’” Black student-athletes could relate to Black coaches, but there was usually a detachment from the White coaches on staff, who predominantly held the head coaching or coordinator positions.

As Charlie sat and discussed the imbalance of Black head coaches that held positions in college football, he rhetorically assessed the current landscape of Black offensive coordinators or even quarterbacks coaches, at any level. The room deafening with silence, Charlie was sitting in his chair pondering the answer to his own question. He paused, shook his head and finally gave a response, “I can’t. I can’t even think of any.” Even Charlie, a current coach, could not name one Black offensive coordinator or quarterbacks coach in either the National Football League (NFL) or college football. “The stereotypes just tend to keep showing up and there’s not a lot of progressive thinking going on.” As a Black man that is aspiring to become an offensive coordinator, these are the challenges Charlie is faced with.

Fraternities

Charlie’s dad was his football coach in Little League, but nobody in Charlie’s family had ever coached in major college football prior to his attempts to break into the industry. In some respects, coaching is viewed as a family business and those fortunate to have relatives that have been successful in coaching, open doors for younger generations looking to get into the business. Charlie does not have that luxury, but has taken note of the landscape of the industry.

Head coaches become head coaches because they’re in an elite group. There’s an elite status with being a head coach. And I think to back it up a little bit further, to get into the game of coaching, it’s like any other type of fraternity, there’s ways that you can get in, but normally it’s seen as a grandfathered type of system. And with America and the way that it was built, of course it would be dominated by the White male.

Tradition, more specifically a practice of doing things a certain way because that is the way that it has always been done, has quietly manipulated the system. Key contributors to the perpetuity, Charlie believes, are institution’s sports boosters. Boosters, who are financial contributors to an institution’s athletic department, will safeguard their investments by exercising their influence on the program. Similar to the quarterback representing the face of the program, a head coach can and often will act in that same role on a larger scale. The universities and colleges, who are desperate for financial backing, will work diligently to accommodate the expectations of their wealthy supporters. “Your boosters are always going to have an influence. When you’re speaking about those people, they have their own elite fraternities and the familiar faces in those elite fraternities aren’t minorities.” Affluent boosters are predominantly older White males and, similar to the above mentioned student-athletes, relate to coaches with similar backgrounds.

Another concept that Charlie introduces to the fraternity establishment is what he refers to as the “tree concept.” Essentially, the tree concept is a coaching lineage that binds coaches with other coach’s successes or failures. In other words, if Charlie spends four seasons working under one head coach, he will then take on, in many respects, the reputation of that coach. For instance, if State University wins a national championship this year in football, Charlie will be seen as a commodity because he coached on a staff that experienced the highest level of success. Conversely, if the head coach is found to have violated several NCAA bylaws and has a reputation of attracting negative attention, Charlie will be stigmatized by the coach’s characterization.

What we’re dealing with now and the topic that we’re on is all about opportunity. It’s all association in this game and it’s who’ve you aligned yourself with and who you’ve had the opportunity to work with that somehow deems that you’ll be successful at some point. The perception from the periphery, the media, the fans and all that is basically going to say, were you with someone successful or were you not?

Charlie uses the “Bill Belichek tree” to reinforce this statement. As head coach of the New England Patriots, Belichek has produced a number of coaches that have gone on to take coaching jobs in the NCAA and elsewhere in the NFL. The perception is that these coaches have a certain pedigree for success and will bring that same success to their new organization. He then pauses and says, “We’re just starting to see it now with Tony Dungy and the slew of people that have come from him and where he’s come from.” Dungy was the first Black head coach to win a Super Bowl and has been given credit for starting his own coaching tree, which consists of other Black coaches such as Mike Tomlin (Pittsburgh Steelers), Lovie Smith (Chicago Bears), and Jim Caldwell (former head coach of the Indianapolis Colts). He admits that it is progress, but the Black coaching trees are still in their infancy.

Burnout

Coakley (3) defined burnout as the point that “stress becomes so high and fun declines so much that a person decides to withdraw from a role or activity” (p. 644). Scheduling a time to meet with Charlie was not an easy task during spring football practices. The only time the interviews could be conducted was during lunch time on Fridays. Each time Charlie arrived for an interview, he would be hustling out of a staff meeting eager to move onto the next thing in his day. “You would think, with the hours we work, we were actually curing cancer,” Charlie quipped. In the spring he worked 16 to 18 hour days, which he admitted could have been longer if it was not necessary for him to sleep. Unlike the rest of the coaches on the staff, except for the only other coaching graduate assistant, Charlie also has togo to school during the week. Part of the responsibilities of being a graduate assistant was working toward obtaining a master’s degree in exchange for tuition reimbursement and a position on the football coaching staff. Charlie confessed, “You can’t cheat the work by any means.” In both arenas, school and coaching, his production is readily exposed and he must be diligent in both to sustain his position.

In the spring of 2010, Charlie left his previous graduate assistant position to take the graduate assistantship at State University. Including his playing career, the coach at SU was his fourth head coach that he worked under and he willingly admitted that the turnover affected his production. He referred to the language of the game and the demand to master the language so that the entire staff could remain cohesive on the field. “Football has a language of its own and it changes on every different staff. So, breaking that barrier of language is just like the English language.” Charlie was working with the offense and he praised the efforts of his offensive coordinator for his diligence in bringing the entire staff along at the same pace. He also underscored the necessity of adapting to a new staff. He does,however, warn that at other schools, coordinators, and even head coaches can be guarded with assisting other coaches.

You’re limited in what you know because of what you’re exposed to. That’s the challenge. I think our offensive staff does a really good job of being vocal and everyone is exposed to what our quarterback sees. We talk a lot about throwing mechanics and things like that. Our coordinator does a really good job of that. I can’t really say that we promote pigeonholing knowledge to everyone on the staff here. You know, I think a lot of staffs do.

Working towards a master’s degree, learning his fourth “language”, trying to climb up the coaching ladder, and all the other salient responsibilities were part of Charlie’s everyday life. “There have been plenty of coaches that have jumped into coaching and are out of it in a year or two.” He continued, “A lot of it’s just accepting coaching football. It’s some intense, long hours and it’s not for everybody.”

Most student-athletes, once they have exhausted their eligibility, will have played the sport of football for nearly 18 years. Charlie started playing football when he was five years old. Early on in his life he made a conscious decision to dedicate a majority of his time to learning the game and maximizing his opportunities to participate in whatever capacity he could. “You have to think, you finish playing football at 22-23 years old, that’s 18 years that you’ve invested in a game.” Charlie’s enthusiasm for the game is evident in his passionate tones and his drive to be successful. However, participating as a coach is not the same as participating as a player, which is a struggle for some former student-athletes who are looking to become coaches. “If you were 18 years of investing in Nuclear Science, when you finish college, ‘hey what do you want to do? Go play football? No.’ You want to go into Nuclear Science.” In effect, these coaches have further pigeonholed themselves into this profession, which has been a factor in burnout.

Positivity/New Success

In the researcher’s findings, a notable fourth category emerged with Charlie that separates from the previous literature. As mentioned before, Charlie was relentlessly enthusiastic about anything that dealt with football and coaching. This final theme is attributed to the positivity, persistence, and hope for change engrossing Charlie that will, in his mind, revolutionize the coaching profession.

When Charlie left media to enter the coaching ranks, he did so because he saw a growing misrepresentation of student-athletes, especially Black student-athletes, in the media. He saw how television highlight shows and radio talk shows would primarily focus on the persona of an athlete rather than the accomplishments of the athlete on the field. He wanted to prevent student-athletes from providing media outlets with damaging material to broadcast from the ground level of coaching. In choosing to pursue this career, Charlie said he was aware that coaching was a White-dominated industry and that “he did his homework.” His secret to success has been, “I just try to stay positive through it and not let it weigh me down,” as his smile widened and he began to chuckle. “It’s not like I was the cause of it or something.” His optimism, he believed, can inspire change.

Charlie’s positivity has also fueled his persistence. He did not have an opportunity to play in the NFL after his college career, but that did not discourage him from remaining in the game. So when he was asked, why do you keep coming back to work every day? He simply responded, “I love it. I love football.” Of course that response was a simplistic version of the real answer, but he did eventually expand on that thought.

We’re trying to put our hands on people that are going to affect society at some point. I’m tired of hearing all of the negative and whatever I can do in my little part I want to. Then, you know I love football, so it’s two parts of one being around the game and one being around motivated people.

He believes that being around young people has kept him young in spirit as well. Charlie’s perception of the role of a coach went much deeper than the “X’s and O’s” of football. He viewed his role as a coach as someone that would instill the appropriate values in a student-athlete, which he needed to become a successful man, not just a successful athlete.

As Charlie stood on the sideline during an SU spring practice session, he attentively watched the first-team offense run a play. The running back who had just carried the ball came over to the sideline after the whistle had blown and the team reset for the next play. As the student-athlete came to the sideline, he removed his helmet and dropped to one knee with his head gear supporting his opposite side. Charlie turned and positioned himself directly in front of the student-athlete, bent over and with a hand on his shoulder pads spoke to him with intent. The conversation was one-sided with Charlie doing all of the talking. When he was done, the student-athlete stood, towering over the shorter Charlie, put his helmet back on and patted his coach on the back. The student-athlete had received ample coaching and Charlie turned to watch the next play. This exchange was one of many similar that was observed of Charlie during the scrimmage. In fact, at times it was extremely difficult to distinguish the difference between him and the other full-time coaches on staff.

As Charlie continues to work with his student-athletes in improving their character, he is also continuing his efforts to change opportunities for Black coaches. He understands the obstacles that lay before him and other minority coaches, but he believes that over time progress will be made. He attributes this belief to the impact research can have on the industry and the effect of, what he calls, “new success.” He says, “Believing in new success or believing that there can be new success, that’s huge. That’s huge believing that there can be new success and when there is, accepting it.” Charlie’s reference to new success is his belief that, as Black coaches accumulate greater accomplishments, there will be a higher propensity for diversity in the coaching profession.

DISCUSSION

After discussing the dynamics of the coaching profession with Charlie, it is clear that his perception is that most aspiring Black coaches are aware of the glass ceiling and that it has contributed to the determent of prospective coaches in the industry. Factors that have added to the racial inequity in college coaching include a failure to attain career success, a lack of human and social capital, and discriminatory actions against Black coaches (25). Charlie’s experiences with each of these factors is further evidence that Anderson’s (1) and Finch et al.’s (10) updated argument that Black coaches are limited in their ascension within coaching was accurate. It is the idea of new success that Charlie introduced that is most intriguing regarding this research.

Positivity and new success are elementary concepts, yet have not been applied to the coaching industry in this capacity. In a way, this theme is the antithesis of burnout, referring to the dissatisfaction of an aspiring coach. However, it is arguable that positivity and new success has to do with genetic makeup of the coach and his mindset toward the profession as a whole. Charlie entered the coaching profession because he noted a trend of players being misrepresented in the media. His purpose in his coaching pursuit was to make a difference in student-athletes’ lives. His positive predisposition allowed him to stay and flourish within his job, which may be a factor not present in coaches that previously participated in similar studies. The findings of this research indicate that attitude may heavily impact the success and perception of Black coaches in the industry.

Assistant football coaches have a regimented order in which they ascend up the coaching ranks (1, 10). As a graduate assistant, Charlie is in the first stage of this process. His challenge is making the leap from graduate assistant to running backs coach and eventually to quarterbacks coach, a position he aspires to hold in the short term. As Charlie came on to his undergraduate campus, he was a quarterback. After his coach moved him to wide receiver and eventually running back, he lost ties to the original position that he desired to play. Charlie’s coach moving him to a position with less leadership responsibility is common for Black student-athletes (26). That experience alone may have set Charlie back in his progression towards his goal. As he reemerged as a graduate assistant, he was pigeonholed again as a graduate assistant running backs coach and was working with that position at the time of this study.

Although Charlie did not feel that stacking was a current practice in college sport, there was evidence that he was subjected to the practice during both his playing and coaching careers. Essentially, stacking is moving Black participants, in this case student-athletes, into non-central or non-leadership positions (12). In addition, Day (8) argued that those groups that were susceptible to stacking would have noticeably lower social capital, a necessity in ascending in the coaching industry. Charlie was moved from a central position, quarterback, to non-central positions, wide receiver and running back. The same phenomenon is seen in the coaching landscape with the majority of Black coaches holding the non-central positions of wide receiver, running backs, and defensive backs coaches. White coaches, conversely, are in leadership positions such as offensive and defensive coordinator and head coach. The tension lies in the opportunities, or lack thereof afforded to Black coaches.

The concept of burnout is fascinating when applying it to coaching football. Charlie was not alone working those 16 to 18 hour days. Some of the coaches on staff were known to sleep in the office during busy times. Burnout can certainly impact any coach, regardless of race. However, it is interesting to compare burnout with White coaches as opposed to Black coaches. A White coach, who aspires to become a head coach, could potentially put in years of working 80-plus hour weeks. His regimen could include traveling all over the country, sleeping in hotel rooms, and separation from his family. The same could be said for a Black coach, except the White coach is more than five times more likely to achieve his goal of becoming a head coach (7). As Charlie demonstrated, he is aware that Black coaches are not given the opportunity to reach the pinnacle of coaching as often as White coaches are. For those who aspire to become a head coach, the realization that this goal is nearly impossible to attain underlies why coaches leave the profession. It is also an indication why former Black student-athletes do not enter the profession to begin with.

IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH

Charlie’s story is an example of many flaws in the system, as it relates to opportunity. The Black student-athlete as an “athlete” has their growth in leadership positions inhibited. Charlie had exceptional athletic ability and was persuaded to move to a different position to fill a void. Although he had the measurable attributes necessary to play quarterback in college, he also had elevated attributes in other areas that made him marketable at wide receiver and running back. Essentially, his versatility hindered his opportunities to play quarterback. Once he was moved to a different position, he was pigeonholed in that position moving forward through his playing career and into coaching, thus creating a cycle for the student-athlete that demonstrates exceptional athletic ability.

The effect of placing these student-athletes in a pigeonhole is that they are limited in attainable knowledge as they progress in their career. For example, a wide receiver will only learn the nuances of the passing game, while the quarterback necessitates a wider skill set of knowledge (1, 10). Once a former receiver or running back enters coaching they are assigned to a position they did not want to play, but the only one they have enough experience in to coach. Couple those factors with a lack of mentoring and guarded colleagues; there is a reasonable understanding as to why there is so few Black coordinators and head coaches.

A few limitations existed in this study. Charlie’s story, although supported by theory, was a singular example of these practices. His story is relevant to further understanding the perceptions of Black coaches, but is limited in its ability to generalize throughout FBS football. Also, the interviewer in this examination is White, while Charlie is Black. Though Charlie did not seem uncomfortable divulging in his experiences, he may have been more comfortable speaking to a researcher of the same race. Similarly, the interviews were conducted in Charlie’s office. He was forthcoming in his answers and did not seem to hesitate in addressing sensitive topics, but discussing this topic in that setting may have caused him use restraint in his responses.

Charlie, himself, calls for a need for additional inquiry on this topic. As the percentages of Black coaches increase, perceptions of the glass ceiling may change as well. In addition, there is a similar discrepancy in college basketball between Black participants and Black coaches. As the only other revenue-generating sport in the NCAA, basketball warrants further examination on this topic as well. While there is quantitative work in this area, there is a need for further qualitative research on this topic. Therefore, a case study involving a larger group of aspiring Black coaches would render more findings important in forwarding our understanding.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

For “Charlie” and him accomplishing his dreams.

REFERENCES

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2.Brown, S. D., & Lent, R. W. (1996). A social cognitive framework for career choice counseling. Career Development Quarterly, 44(4), 354-366.

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5.Cunningham, G. B. (2003). Already aware of the glass ceiling: Race-related effects of perceived opportunity on the career choices of college athletes. Journal of African American Studies, 7(1), 57-71.

6.Cunningham, G. B., & Sagas, M. (2005). Access discrimination in intercollegiate athletics. Journal of Sport & Social Issues, 29(2), 148-163.

7.Cunningham, G. B., Sagas, M., & Ashley, F. B. (2001). Occupational commitment and intent to leave the coaching profession: Differences according to race. International Review for the Sociology of Sport, 36(2), 131-148.

8.Day, J. C. (2011). The labor market context of social capital: Race and social networks in the occupational internal labor market of college football coaches. Sociation Today, 9(1).

9.Day, J. C., & McDonald, S. (2010). Not so fast, my friend: Social capital and the race disparity in promotions among college football coaches. Sociological Spectrum, 30(2), 138-158.

10.Finch, B., McDowell, J., & Sagas, M. (2010). An examination of racial diversity in college football: A 15-year update. Journal for the Study of Sports and Athletes in Education, 4(1), 47-58.

11.Fink, J. S., Pastore, D. L., & Riemer, H. A. (2001). Do differences make a difference? Managing diversity in Division IA intercollegiate athletics. Journal of Sport Management, 15, 10-50.

12.Hawkins, B. (2002). Is stacking dead? A case study of the stacking hypothesis at a Southeastern Conference (SEC) football program. International Sports Journal, 6(2), 146.

13.Hill, F. (2004). Shattering the glass ceiling: Blacks in coaching. Black Issues in Higher Education, 21(4), 36-37.

14.Holder, J. C., & Vaux, A. (1998). African American professionals: Coping with occupational stress in predominantly White work environments. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 53(3), 315-333.

15.Kanter, R. M. (1977). Men and women of the corporation. New York: Basic Books.

16.Knoppers, R. (1987). Gender and the coaching profession. Quest, 39, 3-32.

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20. Lapchick, R. E., Little, E., Lerner, C., & Mathew, R. (2009). The 2008 Racial and gender report card: College sport Executive Summary: Devos Sports Business Management. University of Central Florida.

21.Merriam, S. B. (2009). Qualitative research: A guide to design and implementation. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

22.Mullane, S., & Whisenant, W. (2007). Florida ADs and homologous reproduction. Public Organization Review, 7(3), 261-267.

23. Riessman, C. K. (2008). Narrative methods for the human sciences. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.

24.Sagas, M., & Cunningham, G. B. (2004). Treatment discrimination in college coaching: Its prevalence and impact on the career success of assistant basketball coaches. International Sports Journal, 8(1), 76-88.

25.Sagas, M., & Cunningham, G. B. (2005). Racial differences in the career success of assistant football coaches. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 35(4), 773-797.

26.Sartore, M. L., & Cunningham, G. B. (2006). Stereotypes, race, and coaching. Journal of African American Studies, 10(2), 69-83.

27.Spaaij, R. (2009). Sport as a vehicle for social mobility and regulation of disadvantaged urban youth: Lessons from Rotterdam. International Review for the Sociology of Sport, 44(2-3), 247-264.

28.Wolverton, B. (2005). Dearth of Black coaches could prompt lawsuits. Chronicle of Higher Education, 52(13), A42-A42.

29.Zgnoc, E. (2010). 1999-00 – 2008-09 NCAA student-athlete ethnicity report. Indianapolis, IN: National Collegiate Athletic Association.

2013-11-22T22:42:18-06:00November 21st, 2012|Contemporary Sports Issues, Sports Coaching, Sports Management, Sports Studies and Sports Psychology|Comments Off on Black Coaches Trying to Make It in a White-Dominated Industry: College Football and the Racial Divide

Female Representation within Intercollegiate Athletics Departments

ABSTRACT

The experiences of female employees have differed from males with regard to access to and ascension through a sport organization. Numerous structural and cultural factors could impact these experiences. The purpose of this study was to gain insight from females employed in intercollegiate athletics administration in order to identify factors that have impacted female representation within this field. Eleven females employed at three NCAA Division I institutions located in the Southern United States participated in this study. Data was collected through semi-structured interviews. The framework for this study was shaped by social role and role congruity theories. Participants attributed work-family conflict, gender ideologies, and informal social networks as factors that have influenced female representation within thisprofession.

 

INTRODUCTION

Sport has been labeled the “generic preserve of men” because many sport organizations have been male dominated, especially with regard to management of these organizations (30, 7). Most managerial positions have been occupied by a Caucasian, Protestant, able-bodied, heterosexual male (14, 28). On the other hand, female presence in managerial capacities within sport organizations has not been as widespread.

Explanations with regard to reasons why females have not held the majority of management positions in sport organizations have been offered. One explanation is that sport organizations are settings that often reflect societal attitudes and beliefs (2, 25, 17, 23). Society has traditionally characterized females as caring, good at organizing, and domestically oriented (6). They are also perceived to be empathetic communicators but are not aggressive nor are they “big picture” thinkers. Conversely, it has been argued that males hold managerial positions because society perceives men as natural leaders who have the ability to see the overall vision of an organization (28). Although females have held management positions in numerous sport organizations, the practice of placing them in roles thought of as“appropriate” to their gender has been argued to occur as a result of these attitudes (21, 26, 27). For example, appropriate positions have been described as those related to “housekeeping” roles of management. These roles have been described as those not requiring proficiency in leadership and decision-making but rather emphasizing caring and empathy (12, 11).

The influence of socially constructed meanings associated with gender and perceived congruity or incongruity between these meanings and role fulfillment could also be useful in explaining female representation within sport organizations. Aggressive, ambitious, dominant, forceful, independent, self-sufficient, and self-confident are characteristics attributed to masculinity. On the other hand, caring, kind, and sympathetic are characteristics attributed to femininity (11). Since males are expected to be dominant and aggressive, they would be assumed to be compatible with roles connected to directing others. Since females are expected to demonstrate kindness and sensitivity, they would be assumed to be compatible with roles that involve caring, nurturing, or giving support (9, 8). If an individual fulfills roles that alignwith socially constructed characteristics of masculinity and femininity, role congruity has been achieved (10). Conversely, incongruity would exist if the individual fulfilled a role that did not align with socially constructed masculine or feminine characteristics. As a result of these assumptions, individuals in decision-making capacities at sport organizations might hire and/or promote an individual based on perceptions of congruity between the individual and the role that must be fulfilled.

The field of intercollegiate athletics administration was selected for this study because little research has been devoted to an understanding of why women are underrepresented in key leadership positions in college athletics (24). Overall, females hold nearly 36% of the administrative positions within intercollegiate athletics departments in the United States (1). Although there is a presence of females in this profession, they are present in various roles and operating areas to a larger extent than others. With regard to the position of athletics director, females hold approximately 20% of athletics directors’ positions at NCAA Division I, II, and III institutions (1). Female representation in the athletics director position is lowest at NCAA Division I institutions. These institutions typically incur the highestoperating costs and generate the highest revenues from ticket sales, merchandise, and television contracts (7). Approximately 11% of athletics directors at such institutions are female.

Within this profession, there are certain operating units that are directed in large part by females and others that are directed in large part by males. For example, sports information and operations are areas where males have occupied the vast majority of leadership positions. Sport information directors are responsible for overseeing the maintenance and dissemination of statistical data compiled during athletics competition. Operations directors are primarily responsible for the coordination of maintaining athletics facilities. Approximately 88% of sports information directors and approximately 87% of facility/operations directors at NCAA Division I, II, and III institutions are male (19).

On the other hand, females are represented to a greater extent than males within other operating areas. Academic advising, compliance, and student success/life skills are areas in which the highest percentages of females serve in leadership capacities. Academic advisers and life skills coordinators assist student-athletes with creating their course schedules and help prepare them for life after graduation. Compliance directors ensure the athletics department is compliant with NCAA regulations. Nearly 62% of academic advising units within NCAA Division I, II and III athletics departments are lead by a female. Approximately 54% of all compliance coordinators are female. Lastly, nearly 72% of life skills coordinators are female (19).

In summation, females have a significant presence inside numerous operating areas within the profession of intercollegiate athletics administration but are largely absent from others. In order to gain further insight into possible reasons that have resulted in various levels of female representation in this setting, the perspectives of females employed in this environment were sought. Therefore, the purpose of this study was to gain insight from females employed in intercollegiate athletics administration in order to identify factors that have impacted female representation within this profession.

METHOD

Participants

Because the purpose of this study was to investigate female intercollegiate athletics department employees’ perceptions of factors affecting female representation within their profession, it was important to select participants who could help the investigators achieve this purpose. Purposeful criterion sampling was the first strategy utilized in order to acquire participants for this study. Within purposeful criterion sampling, all cases must meet some pre-determined criterion of importance (22). A second form of purposeful sampling, homogeneous sampling, was utilized. Homogeneous sampling includes selecting similar cases in order to describe some subgroup in depth (16). Female administrators who were employed at intercollegiate athletics departments fit the desired criteria and were selected for this study.

Eleven females employed at three NCAA Division I institutions located in the Southern United States participated in this study. The ages of the participants ranged from 25-53 years. One participant identified herself as African American. Ten identified themselves as Caucasian. Five worked at university “A,” three at university “B,” and three at university “C.” One athletics director, one associate athletics director, one assistant athletics director, and two coordinators from university “A” participated. One associate athletics director, one assistant athletics director, and one coordinator from university “B” participated. Lastly, one assistant athletics director and two coordinators from university “C” participated.

Several operating areas were represented within the participant pool. One of the associate athletics directors was in charge of financial operations. The other associate athletics director oversaw facility and event operations. Two of the assistant athletics directors were in charge of marketing/promotions and one of the assistant athletics directors managed development and fundraising initiatives. Three of the coordinators directed the compliance programs within their respective departments. Two coordinators managed student-athlete academic services.

The length of time each participant was employed within intercollegiate athletics varied. The athletics director served in this field for just over 30 years. The associate athletics directors’ length of service varied from 15 to 20 years. The assistant athletics directors reported lengths of service between six to 12 years. The coordinators were employed in this profession between three and seven years.

Data Collection

After receiving institutional review board approval, the process of acquiring participants began. Potential participants for this study were located through an initial search of each institution’s athletics department web site. Each female administrator in the department was invited to participate in the study via a written letter. The purpose of the study and time commitment associated with participation was provided. Recipients of this letter were asked to respond with their interest via e-mail and were informed that follow-up correspondence would occur via e-mail in the event a response was not received. Six recipients responded to the written letter. The follow-up e-mail was sent approximately two weeks after the initial letters were mailed. Five additional employees agreed to participate after the follow-upe-mail was sent. These eleven individuals were contacted a second time via e-mail in order to arrange an interview at a time and date convenient to them.

Data focusing upon participants’ perceptions of factors affecting female representation in this profession were collected through qualitative measures. This method of inquiry was utilized in order to obtain descriptive data that would allow for a better understanding of the factors participants perceived as significant with regard to position fulfillment in this profession. The data collection method in this study was a semi-structured interview. Interviews were audio taped and lasted between 45-60 minutes. Participants were interviewed individually. When possible, interviews were conducted in a face-to-face format. Several participants were not available to meet in person for their interview. In those cases, interviews were conducted over the telephone. Interviews were conducted in a conference-call style in a securelocation so that only the investigators could hear the participants’ responses. The interview began with a series of pre-formatted, closed-end questions. Examples of closed-end questions included: “How long have you been employed in the profession of intercollegiate athletics administration?” and “What operating areas have you worked in as an employee within this profession?”

As the interview progressed, the investigators encouraged the participant to elaborate on their experiences as well as share their perspectives. Throughout the interview, probing questions were asked in order to obtain further detail and elaboration from the participant. An example of a question that was designed to encourage further elaboration was “Why do you believe females are represented in various operating areas within intercollegiate athletics departments more so than others?” The goal associated with asking these questions was to gain insight into factors they perceived were significant with regard to employment trends and opportunities for females within this profession. Upon completion of the interview, participants were asked debriefing questions. In addition, they chose a pseudonym. All names usedin this study were pseudonyms selected by the participants.

Data Analysis

Interviews were transcribed verbatim. Analytic induction was the approach that was utilized in this study in order to analyze interview data. An inductive approach is utilized when some specific problem, question, or issue becomes the focus of research. When utilizing this approach, the researcher does not attempt to prove or disprove hypotheses held prior to entering the study (4). The primary focus of this research was not to prove or disprove a hypothesis but rather gain insight into female intercollegiate athletics administrators’ perceptions of factors that have affected female representation in their profession.

After the interviews were transcribed, open and axial coding was utilized in order to sort the interview data into categories. Coding is a method of sorting descriptive data that has been collected so that it may be more easily referenced and retrievable at a later time (4). Open coding was the first activity that was practiced in this process. Basic concepts and themes were identified and the data were broken down, examined, and compared. During the open coding process, the authors identified keywords and statements that reoccurred in the interviews.

Once these reoccurring keywords or statements from the interviews were located, the next step was to place this content from the interview data into various categories. Axial coding was utilized in order to reassemble the data that were broken down during the open coding process. Through axial coding, categories were established and then refined in order to further organize and form a precise representation of the participants’ perceptions with regard to factors that have affected female representation within intercollegiate athletics administration.

Upon completion of the open and axial coding processes, a constant comparative method was utilized. A constant comparative method of data analysis entails the simultaneous process of coding and analyzing in order to develop emerging themes (15, 29). As data were analyzed, it was constantly reviewed to ensure the emerging themes accurately reflected the participants’ responses.

An important component of qualitative inquiry includes establishing trustworthiness (16). This process entails utilizing various procedures in order to convince the reader that measures were taken to ensure the material s/he is reading is consistent with what the participants actually said and experienced (22). Trustworthiness can be accomplished through a number of techniques. The techniques of peer debriefing and member checking were utilized in this study.

Peer debriefing includes external reflection and input into the researcher’s work (16). Two colleagues experienced in qualitative inquiry examined the transcripts as well as the manuscript and subsequently provided feedback. These individuals confirmed the content in the manuscript was an accurate representation of the content in the interview transcripts.

The process of member checking allows participants to confirm their statements were reported accurately (16). Each participant was provided with a copy of the transcript and manuscript. Participants were requested to analyze the documents in order to ensure their statements were reported accurately. All of the participants responded to a request for feedback and indicated their statements in the transcript and manuscript were recorded accurately.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The purpose of this study was to gain insight from female athletics administration employees in order to identify factors that have impacted female representation within intercollegiate athletics departments. Three themes emerged from the participants’ responses. The themes were: (a) work-family conflict, (b) gender ideologies and the “natural” fit, and (c) male dominated social networks.

Work-family Conflict

Females often assume the majority of domestic responsibilities in the household. In order to be perceived as committed to an organization, however, employees are expected to manage their domestic responsibilities in such a fashion so that they do not interfere with work responsibilities (18). Maintaining domestic responsibilities while fulfilling occupational responsibilities could be especially difficult because the employee might be required to work evenings, weekends, and holidays as well as travel frequently (5).

Work-family incompatibilities were repeatedly stated as a reason why participants believed females hold few of the management positions within various operating areas. Several participants indicated that extended hours and travel are significant aspects of their jobs and mentioned that females who work in this profession oftentimes leave because the quantity of hours spent on occupational obligations prevents them from fulfilling their domestic responsibilities. In order to stay in the profession, many female employees have elected to not start families of their own. Keri was a compliance coordinator within her department. She discussed how senior administrators in her department who have been in the profession for a number of years are single. She attributed their longevity to the fact that they have minimal domesticresponsibilities. She said,

I think for a lot of women, where it becomes important is do you want a family or a career?

I think one of our senior administrators out of 4 or 5 is married. I had a female boss at

another school and she didn’t get married until she was 40. She’s a senior manager, but for

40 years of her life it was either have a family or have a career, which is ultimately what it

comes down to.

As mentioned earlier, females working in this profession are represented within several operating areas more so than others. Academic advising, compliance, and student services have the highest percentages of female representation (19). A reason that was given with regard to why females are employed in these operating areas results from the schedule associated with particular positions. Lisa, an assistant athletics director in charge of marketing activities, acknowledged that females with families of their own manage these operating areas more often than others because of the required work schedule. She said,

Positions such as academic advising that don’t require you to travel or work on weekends

may be more appealing to women who are also mothers. I would also say that women that

don’t have families are more likely to take positions that are not overly represented by

women.

The demands of the profession and potential work-family incompatibilities that could occur might not only cause many females to leave the profession but also prevent them from entering. Barbara was the athletics director in her department. She believed the occupational demands prevent many females from seeking employment in this field. She said,

The hours, the travel, the time doesn’t necessarily compute to a normal life. It is not a job

that is for everyone and it seems to me that the women we’re turning out in these sport

management programs, the students who get their degrees, they look at our jobs and very

few of them say ‘this is what I want to do.’

In summation, social role expectations are such that females are expected to assume domestic responsibilities to a greater extent than males (23). Many jobs within intercollegiate athletics administration make fulfilling domestic responsibilities difficult because an irregular schedule and frequent travel is often required (5). According to the participants, work-family incompatibilities prevent many females from entering into and/or remaining in the field. If they do, it is often in a position where the schedule better allows for the fulfillment of domestic responsibilities.

Gender Ideologies and the “Natural” Fit

Various assumptions with regard to gender and the fulfillment of employment roles exist within various sport organizations (28). It has been argued that certain positions are more appropriate for male employees whereas others are more appropriate for females (3). Within intercollegiate athletics departments, female representation is higher in some operating areas than others (19). For example, an area where female representation is high is academic advising for student-athletes. As a result of traditional gender ideologies and normative social roles, this position could be thought of as a natural fit for female employees. This is because females are assumed to be caring and nurturing and the advisor is often called upon to provide guidance or help nurture a student-athlete (26). Since congruency is perceived to exist betweenthe nature of the job and the nature of females, they might be thought of as better suited than males for this position.

Participants in this study were asked to provide their perspective as to why positions in certain areas are predominately held by females. Rebecca was the compliance coordinator within her department. She identified congruency between feminine attributes and the tasks associated with the position as a reason why females are more likely to be employed in areas such as academic advising. She said, “I think women are more caregivers and nurturers and they are naturally a better fit for some of those areas. You’re caring for student athletes and helping them develop. I think it fits with the nature of women.”

Elaine was the coordinator of academic services within her department. She also identified congruency between feminine attributes and required job tasks as a reason why females are present in such roles to a greater extent than males. She stated, “Academic advising is thought of as taking care of the kids, so to speak. Typically that type of thing lends itself towards getting a woman to do that.”

Rebecca and Elaine were two participants who did not view the possibility of gender ideologies influencing the fulfillment of certain positions within this profession as problematic. On the other hand, Maria expressed concern with this outcome at her institution. Maria was an associate athletics director in charge of facilities and event operations. She was concerned with the thought processes that result in the paucity of females within certain operating units and their abundance in others. She said,

My biggest concern is that there are tracks that they (females) are being hired for. You look

at a lot of schools and it seems that the top academic person is a woman and your top

compliance person is a woman if there are any women at all. I question if women are being

put into tracks that they think are female areas, taking care of kids so to speak. What I fear

is typecasting. You know, “this is a woman’s job.” Doing academic stuff. What I wish

would happen is that women are represented in every position across athletics programs.

Several other participants believed gender ideologies and position fulfillment have served to the detriment of female employees in this profession. Looking forward, however, participants perceived that gender ideologies influencing perceptions of natural fit as well as fulfillment of positions are disintegrating. Within this changing environment, participants felt that females are receiving stronger consideration for positions in operating areas where they have been previously underrepresented. Lori, the compliance coordinator within her department, stated,

I think it (the practice of hiring females for certain tracks) was sort of a reflection of society

where that was the case 20-25 years ago. I think it’s the same mentality that women are

teachers or nurses and that women should do academic support and some of the more care

and nurturing positions within an athletics department. I think that has to do with societal

perceptions about what women’s roles are but I don’t feel like that’s the case now. The

women I work with now are in the business office or the marketing or communications

office so I don’t feel like there’s a place now where they’re saying ‘that’s not an

appropriate place for a woman.’

In summation, gender ideologies were perceived as a factor that shaped female representation in this profession. The impact of gender ideologies upon position fulfillment in this profession resulted in higher levels of female representation in areas where caring and nurturing were perceived as significant job elements. Although gender ideologies were perceived to have affected female representation, participants perceived changing mindsets have resulted in increased female representation in operating areas that have been largely occupied by men.

Male Dominated Social Networks

Sport organizations such as intercollegiate athletics departments have traditionally been male dominated and have served the interests of men. Coakley (7) argued that females do not have strategic connections and networks to compete with male candidates for many upper level administrative positions. Informal networking could provide employees with valuable information and insight to aid in the advancement of their careers (20). Furthermore, membership within an informal network could help an individual access a position or promotion while lack of membership in such networks could prevent this access (24). Historically, white males have possessed those connections and held membership in the “old boys” network. As members of this network, they enjoyed preferential treatment in the hiring process or were givenpositions as a result of relationships they possessed with other members of this network (20).

The influence of informal networks upon female representation emerged from participants’ responses. Specifically, its effect upon the presence of females in upper level managerial positions (e.g., athletics director) was commented upon. Participants acknowledged that hiring practices benefitting members of the old boys network still exist; however, they perceived these practices occur with less frequency than before. As intercollegiate athletics programs have grown, they identified a shift from hiring someone based solely on a personal connection to someone who is qualified to run a department has occurred.

Sarah was an associate athletics director in charge of financial operations in her department. She has worked in this profession for just over 20 years and has seen changes in the way athletics departments fill vacancies. She acknowledged that the old boys network still exists but perceived that fewer vacancies are now filled through this network. She stated,

Rather than seeing where you used to have a good old boy network, picking their buddies

to fill various roles, now you’re seeing applicant pools and search committees utilizing

outside networks and resources for people to look for qualified candidates and that sort of

thing. I think it still exists to some extent and there are certain administrators that would be

very comfortable in hiring people they know. Do I think that’s the way the future of this

business is going? No. Everything I see is that people are taking more of a professional

approach to the business.

Barbara has worked in intercollegiate athletics administration for over 30 years. She also acknowledged the old boys network is still present but stated that hiring on the basis of a personal relationship has declined. The reason behind this was because the growth of athletics programs into multi-million dollar operations dictated the acquisition of personnel who could successfully run the department. She said,

I believe it’s still alive. I don’t know it’s alive and strong. I think it is decaying in some

ways because we don’t matriculate old coaches up any more. I think at one time you could

get a job if you knew the right people and it didn’t matter if you were qualified for the job.

I don’t believe that’s true anymore. Athletics today is not just looked at as being sport; it is

looked at as being a business. So now you’re bringing people along, whether they are male

or female, to execute the business at hand.

In summation, the presence of informal networks limited past opportunities for females in this profession. This was especially prevalent in the fulfillment of upper level positions such as athletics director. Participants perceived these networks have weakened and additional upper level administrative opportunities for females resulted. Although female representation is lower in the role of athletics director as opposed to various operating areas, participants were optimistic this position could see a greater level of female representation as objective measures are increasingly utilized in order to fill vacancies.

CONCLUSIONS

A number of factors were identified with regard to position fulfillment among females within intercollegiate athletics administration. First, incompatibility between occupational and domestic obligations was identified as a reason that has limited female representation within various operating areas. This was most evident in areas that require working irregular schedules and frequent travel.

Second, gender ideologies were identified as a reason why females are employed within various operating areas more so than others. Females have been assumed to be a better fit for positions where exercising feminine attributes are important (28). Participants perceived that females are more highly represented in areas such as academic advising and student services because the attributes needed to effectively fulfill the position in these areas are congruent with characteristics such as nurturing and empathy, which are commonly perceived as feminine.

Third, the presence of informal networks was perceived to affect female representation, especially in the athletics director position. Intercollegiate athletics programs have traditionally benefitted male applicants because of the presence of the old boys network. Although these networks have impacted position fulfillment in the past, participants perceived these networks are weakening as the process of filling vacancies has become more objective.

APPLICATIONS IN SPORT

Circumstances that affect opportunities for females in this profession should be critically examined on an ongoing basis. Fink (13) stated, “We must continue to examine the issues of gender and sex diversity in sport organizations in order to make these organizations accessible, comfortable, and beneficial to all” (p. 147). Shaw (26) also advocated for ongoing critical inquiry of these issues because of the impact they could have upon organizational effectiveness. Furthermore, Coakley (7) stated that sport organizations “must critically assess the impact of male dominated/identified/centered forms of social organization” (p. 254). Continued critical inquiry on this topic is needed because of the effect it could have upon an organization as well as the experience of the individual employee.

A potential limitation associated with this study is that single interviews were conducted with each participant. It is possible that participants’ perspectives will change over time. For example, participants who did not see certain trends as problematic at this time might feel differently if they were passed over for a promotion for which they felt qualified. A suggestion for future research is to conduct longitudinal studies. These could reveal changing perspectives over the course of a career.

Lastly, further examination of perspectives and experiences of current employees could be beneficial to those who are interested in pursuing a career in this profession. By learning from those who are already employed, individuals who possess an interest in entering this profession could be better prepared for the challenges and circumstances they might encounter. Ideological thinking will continue to exist and requirements inherent to particular jobs in this profession will remain. By conducting ongoing critical inquiry within these environments, however, it is hoped these efforts will be useful in uncovering thought processes and subsequent hiring practices that have affected female representation in this profession.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

None

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2013-11-22T22:43:10-06:00November 21st, 2012|Contemporary Sports Issues, Sports Coaching, Sports Management, Women and Sports|Comments Off on Female Representation within Intercollegiate Athletics Departments

Analysis of the Reasoning Behind the Firings of Mike Leach and Jim Leavitt

ABSTRACT

This paper is a thematic analysis of press coverage surrounding the firings of coaches Mike Leach and Jim Leavitt from the 2010. In an effort to understand
the rationale behind their dismissals, this quantitative research uses attribution theory as the basis of the analysis. While the schools stated the firings were
due to the way these two coaches questionably handled a player, the press coverage displayed other reasons. This paper contextualizes the rationale behind their
firings in an effort to explain the current high stakes of major college football.

INTRODUCTION

There are very few professionals with less job security than major college football coaches. Entering the 2010 season, there were 24 new coaches in the
Division I Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS). That turnover represented 20% of all FBS programs. Two of the 24 coaches who lost their jobs following the 2009
season generated national attention from their relatively regional programs. Both Mike Leach of Texas Tech and Jim Leavitt from South Florida lost their
jobs amid controversy and intensive media coverage centering on their off-field actions with some of their players. Prior to the firings, both coaches were
hailed as successful leaders. Issues surrounding their departures cast doubt upon the official reasons stated by the universities. When perceived reality
contradicts public discourse, there is a tremendous opportunity for public relations scholarship. This paper uses thematic analysis of news coverage to demonstrate
how the meanings the universities tried to construct for these firings were essentially refuted in the sports press.

Relevance of Research

The rationale behind the firings of these coaches, beyond what was publicly stated by their employers, is an important topic for researchers
to analyze for multiple reasons. First, as it relates to the growing field of sport communication, it provides content that focuses on the expansive growth
of the college football industry, the salaries provided to coaches, and the overall investment schools are willing to make to be successful on the football
field. Additionally, this research is an important topic as it relates to the fields of mass media, public relations, and journalism. College football is
at such a prominent level in terms of revenue, advertising, and marketing that it shares an escalating symbiotic relationship with the mass media. This media
coverage helps raise the financial stakes of those schools participating at the highest level of college football. The sport has always had this relationship
but since the inception of the Bowl Championship Series (BCS) in 1998, the monetary rewards have risen exponentially. The BCS is the system that selects 12 schools
that participate in the top six post-season bowl games. Those 12 slots are highly coveted since they bring the most money and media attention to the participating
schools (Dunnavant, 2004). The power of the BCS has escalated to a point where politicians are now questioning its possible violation of anti-trust laws (Staples,
2010). This past bowl season, the six conferences that received an automatic bid to a BCS game garnered $145.2 million in revenue from the BCS. That sum
is compared to the $24.7 million awarded to the five conferences that didn’t receive an automatic BCS bid (Murphy, 2011). The manner in which college football
has become such an integral part of the mass media landscape makes any controversy that occurs in the industry worthy of address by academic researchers (Oriard,
2009).

College Football and Higher Education

The rise in college sports, in terms of revenue and media prominence, creates a public relations conundrum. Under the traditional educational perspective,
still touted in their marketing materials, colleges and universities have the primary mission of educating young people and preparing them for adult life.
For the select few student-athletes competing in the high-visibility sports at the Division I level, athletics is still presented as just another outlet
that prepares them physically and mentally for adulthood. However, the financial investments schools are making in their sports programs put this traditional
model in jeopardy. Now, athletes are more than students; they are necessary participants in the school’s profit motives (Sperber, 2000).

The role of the coach is also different in the evolving collegiate sports model. With the amount of money major colleges invest in football and the turnover
rate for head coaches, it is difficult to argue that winning isn’t the coach’s first priority (Stein, 2004). Because the multi-year contracts top coaches command
typically do not permit termination just for losing, a pretext may be needed to fire a coach. While schools are often forced to fire losing coaches because
of disgruntled fan bases, it remains a difficult financial decision. For an academic institution, it would appear that firing a coach for breaking rules
should be an easy decision to make. However, there are a number of college coaches who blatantly violated university or NCAA rules but still kept their jobs. Having
a rule-breaking coach remain on staff appears to violate the principles of an institution of higher learning. Yet, on the football and basketball sidelines
there remain a number of coaches almost impervious to being fired. There must be an underlying reason some schools are willing to be more lenient with rule-breaking
coaches.

LITERATURE REVIEW

From a theoretical perspective, research into the rationale behind the firings of Leach and Leavitt relates to attribution theory. An expert in attribution
theory, Bernard Weiner (1985), often wrote about the human characteristic in which people have a driving need to search for the cause of events. This theory
relates to the persuasive messages used to explain how people account for the actions of others (Woodward & Denton, 2009). Attribution theory is storytelling
and the belief that a persuader tries to figure out how certain behaviors or messages will be perceived by others. The resulting story communicated by persuaders
best suits their needs and goals (Coombs, 2007). Attribution theory relates to public relations and crises communication since responses made by an organization
during the time of crisis will frame the public perception and impact its overall reputation (Heath, Toth & Waymer, 2009). After researching the influence
Word of Mouth Communication (WMOC) has on brand recognition, Laczniak; DeCarlo and Ramaswami (2001) concluded that poor WMOC significantly devalues the public’s
perception of the brand.

Even though there is a relationship between attribution theory and crisis communications, scholarly analysis connecting the theory to sports-related issues is almost
non-existent. In fact, there is almost no academic research into the broad topic of sports coaches being fired. Most of the literature deals with the impact,
in terms of wins and losses when a coach is dismissed during the season (Koning, 2003; Frick, Barros & Prinz 2010; White, Persad & Gee, 2007). One case
addressed by a scholar was the dismissal of basketball coach Jim Valvano by North Carolina State University in 1990. Michael Selvaggi (1993) used legal
analysis to examine the lawsuit filed by the university asserting that it had proper grounds to fire Valvano because of the poor academic progress of his
players. This research determined that this was the first time a school had fired a coach because of a stipulation in his contract regarding players’
academic progress.

Legal scholar Martin J. Greenberg (1991) noted that there is no other business in which contracts are broken more often than the sports industry. Since there
is so much at stake in terms of revenue and publicity, colleges and universities are in a precarious situation when administering punishment for coaches and
players who break rules. Keeping a coach or player out of action because of a violation could endanger a school’s chance of winning a game. That in
turn would lead to economic ramifications (Stangel, 2000).

Based on the cases of Leach and Leavitt and the possibility that they were both fired for other reasons than stated by their employers, this paper will
look to connect attribution theory to each controversy. Based on the research of Laczniak; DeCarlo and Ramaswami (2001), these controversial cases impacted
the overall brand value for both Texas Tech and South Florida. The following research questions will be used to better rationalize the firings of Leach and
Leavitt.

RQ1: Were there other reasons for the firings of Leach and Leavitt besides the rationale provided by their employers?

RQ2: How do the cases of Leach and Leavitt compare to other BCS coaches who kept their jobs after violating NCAA rules during the same time frame?

METHOD

This qualitative research paper is a case study of the firings of both Leach and Leavitt in an effort to better explain the reasoning behind their dismissals.
A case study is expected to “catch the complexity of a single case” by “coming to understand its activity within important circumstances”
(Patton, 2002, p. 297). By using thematic analysis of press accounts, this paper will argue that the universities reasons for the firings of Leach and Leavitt
were not entirely supported by the media reports.

Since college football is still predominantly a regional sport, as noted by Cave and Crandall (2001), this research paper relies heavily upon the relevant
local media outlets that cover Texas Tech and South Florida football in-depth. Those outlets include the Dallas Morning News, Lubbock Avalanche-Journal, and
Tampa Tribune. In order to present a national perspective to this analysis, stories from noted publications such as ESPN.com, USA Today, Sports Illustrated
and The New York Times were also used. These media outlets in particular cover college football in depth and often include critical coverage of off-the-field
issues. Also, these media outlets are highly regarded as the premier sources of national sports journalism.

The research obtained for this paper was a result of a thorough LexisNexis search using the terms Mike Leach, Jim Leavitt, Texas Tech football, and South
Florida football. Due to the fact that both coaches received little national media attention for their programs prior to the 2008 season, the search was
limited to the time frame from 2008 to early 2010. This allowed for the collection of press accounts that detailed the rise of both coaches and then the ensuing
fallout from their crises that occurred in early 2010.

The resulting press accounts served as the data for a thematic analysis of the crises surrounding Leach and Leavitt. This method of collecting data enables
researchers to combine and catalogue related patterns into sub-themes (Aronson, 1994). This method enables researchers to search through data to identify any
recurrent patterns. Themes are then linked together to find similar meetings and patterns. Anne Golden (2003) also utilized a thematic analysis of the sports
media when she examined the differences in the press coverage of the 2002 Winter Olympics and the 2002 Winter Paralympics. Relating to the method used for this
research, Mirca Madianou (2002) conducted a thematic analysis of television news coverage to investigate the coverage of how Greeks are identified in the
media.

To contextualize possible motives underlying the schools’ decision-making, this paper will also compare the cases of Leach and Leavitt to four other contemporary
coaches who broke rules (during the same time frame as the incidents surrounding Leach and Leavitt) established by their employers and the National Collegiate
Athletic Association (NCAA). The four coaches examined in this research: Pete Carroll, Jim Tressel, Urban Meyer, and Nick Saban are universally regarded by
the sports media as the top college coaches in the country. Through the use of media reports, this element of the thematic analysis will exhibit the reasons
that these other rule-breaking coaches were able to maintain their employment during the time frame of the study.

CASE STUDIES

Mike Leach

Mike Leach was the Texas Tech head football coach from 2000 to 2009. His Red Raiders went 84-34 with nine bowl game appearances (5-4) because of their pass-centric
offense that featured the 11 offensive players on the field lining up further apart from each other than what was commonly used by other coaches. Leach’s
success culminated with the 2008 campaign which brought the school its first ever 11-1 season that included a win over top-ranked Texas and a share of the
Big 12 Conference South division title. He was named Co-Coach of the Year in the Big 12, but the Red Raiders were left out of a BCS bowl berth because of
a little known tie-breaking rule. Texas and Oklahoma represented the Big 12 in the BCS while Texas Tech played in the lesser Cotton Bowl, where it lost
to Mississippi.

Oklahoma wound up losing the National Championship Bowl against Florida. Not making a BCS bowl game is a major issue since the Big 12, like the Big East
where South Florida resides, gives a bigger share of the game’s profit to the schools that appear in one of the top post-season games. Other conferences
divide BCS bowl money evenly among all members. This is not the case for the Big 12 and Big East. Therefore, there is a tremendous financial incentive to
be a conference representative in a BCS bowl game for a Big 12 and Big East squad (Warmbroad, 2004).

During his career in Lubbock, Leach’s name was often mentioned with coaching vacancies at other larger programs. Leach stayed with the Red Raiders as he
received a pair of contract extensions. In 2008, he signed a five-year extension worth $12.7 million. This contract gave Leach unprecedented clout at the school
(Leach, 2009).

Crisis: Leach places player in shed

Leach’s crisis began in late December 2009 when Texas Tech suspended him after allegations arose that earlier in the month he had an injured player
sent to an equipment shed as a form of punishment. The player, Adam James, the son of ESPN announcer and former NFL running back Craig James, had suffered
a concussion and was unable to practice. This unconventional move by Leach became a newsworthy topic both locally in Texas and nationally (Dodd, 2009). The ensuing
media hype continued to rise when Leach refused to apologize for his actions and James became the spotlight of local and national sports media (Lubbock Avalanche-Journal,
2009). In just a matter of one season, in the eyes of the national and local media, Texas Tech went from being the upstart program that played a compelling
wide-open offense to the school that employed a coach who humiliated an injured player. This forced the school into an on-going crisis communication phase.
Ultimately, the organization’s crisis communication management would use public relations techniques to attempt to protect the institution’s reputation.

Texas Tech officially fired Leach on December 30th. The firing came one day before Leach was due a substantial $800,000 bonus and a guaranteed $1.7 million
salary for the upcoming season (ESPN, 2009). The amount of money paid to Leach was far more than Texas Tech had spent on coaches in the past. However, it is
similar to the salaries of the major national coaches also in the Big 12. For example, Mack Brown of Texas received $5 million per year and Bob Stoops of
Oklahoma received $4.2 million per year (Rohode, 2010).

After Leach was fired he went on the media offensive criticizing the school and its athletic department. He claimed that the school “conspired”
to fire him because of the $800,000 bonus he was due. In court documents, his lawyers argued “TTU would obtain the benefits of Leach’s performance
but chisel him out of his compensation” (Associated Press, 2010). He also said the animosity between him and the school was a result of the contract negotiations
he went through the previous year (Evans and Thamel 2009). Since Texas Tech had such a productive 2008 season going 11-2, Leach’s name was constantly
attached to openings at large programs including Auburn and Washington. Subsequently, in an effort to keep Leach in Lubbock, Texas Tech was forced to renegotiate
the coach’s contract. Larger football schools must commonly increase incentives in order to keep a head coach if he wins. Texas Tech was essentially in an unfamiliar
situation from a financial perspective to be bidding against itself to keep Leach.

Leach said of his relationship with Texas Tech administrators, “It’s shocking to me that there’s people working together that were trying to
get me fired last year after an 11-1 regular season,” Leach said. He added: “I believe in everybody working together and that together we could all
accomplish great things together, but then I discover that’s not the case and that the very foundation is crumbling out from under me. Betrayal’s
really hard” (Evans and Thamel, 2010). Providing support to Leach’s claims that the school’s top administrators did not want him running the
program regardless of the James situation, the Dallas Morning News acquired internal emails from 2008 to 2010 between Tech administrators, primarily Chancellor
Kent Hance and athletic director Gerald Myers, and athletic booster Jim Sowell of Dallas during Leach’s contract negotiations. The emails display a general
lack of support for Leach even though the school was going to offer him a major pay raise. One message had Sowell recommending to Hance and Myers that Tech
should stand firm in its negotiations with the coach. “You should sign a contract that would not cost us too much to fire him,” Sowell wrote.
“He has to have a big buyout. He has shown no loyalty” (Dallas Morning News, 2010). Leach’s attorney also stated that reports show that Hance
informed an attorney investigating James’ claims against Leach that they were “too milk toast” and “too mild” (USA Today, 2010).

Leach also contended that the celebrity status awarded to James because of his father’s NFL career and status as an ESPN commentator accelerated
the firing process. (Evans and Thamel, 2010). Texas Tech officials denied these claims and fired Leach with cause because of his insubordination and lack of
assistance during the James situation and the resulting investigation (Carver, 2010). The back-and-forth claims eventually led Leach to sue the university
on a number of claims. A district judge ruled that Leach could sue on one count of breach of contract. To date both sides are still entangled in a legal battle
(Blaney, 2010).

Jim Leavitt

Leach and Texas Tech’s national rise almost paralleled that of Jim Leavitt and the University of South Florida. Leavitt was ostensibly the godfather of
Bulls football. He coached at the school from 1997 to 2009. Beginning in 1997, South Florida was a I-AA program that eventually joined I-A’s Conference
USA in 2003. After just two seasons in the conference, South Florida made another significant jump, this time to the Big East and its BCS conference status. Once
again Leavitt was at the helm as the USF program grew and won simultaneously. South Florida made five straight post-season games from 2005 to 2009.

The peak of Leavitt’s career and the height of South Florida football came in September 2007 when the program made its first-ever appearance in the
Top 25. As the Bulls kept winning that season, they made it to No.2 in the BCS rankings. Only Ohio State had a better position than the Bulls. South Florida
lasted in that spot only one week as it fell to conference rival Rutgers in a nationally televised contest. Two more losses came in ensuing games as Leavitt’s
squad eventually dropped out of the rankings. The Bulls finished the season 9-4 with a loss to Oregon in the Sun Bowl.

Even with the late season dry spell, Leavitt was rewarded with a contract extension that would pay him $12.6 million from 2008 to 2014 (USA Today, 2010). Much like
Leach, other major programs also courted Leavitt prior to his signing this contract extension. Schools such as Alabama, Arizona State, Kansas State, and Miami were
reportedly interested in Leavitt’s services (Donahue, 2006). Leavitt often cited his allegiance to the university as the main reason he stayed in Tampa.
His allegiance was rewarded with a new contract, an uncommon policy for the school that only a few years prior had become a Division I program.

Crisis: Leavitt has altercation with player

The Jim Leavitt case mirrors Leach in many ways. Leavitt coached USF from 1997 to 2009 to a 94-57 record. Like Texas Tech, USF never made a BCS bowl appearance
even though it came very close. To stay competitive in an extremely difficult market, USF gave Leavitt a raise to keep him as its football coach. This raise
came just before a controversial incident, as was the case with Leach. On November 21, 2009, during halftime of a game against Louisville, Leavitt apparently struck
one his players, sophomore Joel Miller, a claim that Leavitt denied to school officials. Fanhouse.com first reported the story of the halftime incident (McMurphy,
2010). Afterwards, Leavitt responded: “It’s absolutely not true. It’s so wrong. It’s so far out there. I’m very disappointed something like this would
be written” (Auman, 2009). Leavitt contended that he was trying to raise the spirits of an upset player.

When first contacted by the media following the breaking story, South Florida representatives neither supported nor criticized Leavitt. “The University
of South Florida is aware of the story and will review the matter promptly,” said Michael Hoad, USF vice president for communications. “We’re committed
to ensuring due process for everyone involved. To ensure fairness, the university doesn’t comment during a review” (Auman, 2009).

An investigation followed and it was concluded that Leavitt grabbed Miller by the throat, slapped him in the face and then lied about it (ESPN.com, 2010).
USF made the findings first known to the media through a press release. The investigation conducted by the school also revealed that Leavitt lied to investigators
and had encouraged players and coaches to do likewise. In the wake of the report, Leavitt said he did not hit the player or ask others to lie on his behalf. USF
President Judy Genshaft and athletic director Doug Woolard asked Leavitt to admit to the incident as a result of his momentary loss of control. The coach
refused to do so, saying he was “sticking to his guns.” Just hours after he refused to admit to his misbehavior as stated in the investigation
to the school’s top administrators, Leavitt was fired on January 8, 2010 (Peterson, 2010). In a press conference announcing the firing, “neither
Genshaft nor Woolard took questions and specifics about Leavitt were not discussed” (Fox Sports, 2010).

Financial considerations were also present in the Leavitt firing. ESPN.com reported in January 2010: “Leavitt just finished the second season of
a seven-year, $12.6 million contract extension that calls for a base salary of $800,000 in 2010. The terms of the contract stipulate that if fired with
cause Leavitt is entitled to one month’s base pay, in this case $66,667. If fired without cause, the university would owe him 75 percent of what he’s owed
for the remainder of the contract.”

RESULTS

Table 1. Themes of press coverage surrounding firings of Mike Leach and Jim
Leavitt

Themes of Press Coverage of Leach and Leavitt
1. Coaches are praised for putting their programs on the national stage.2. For the first time, Texas Tech and USF must keep renegotiating contracts
with coaches.
3. Texas Tech and USF get close to BCS game but fail to make it.
4. Focus on Leach and Leavitt immediately goes from praise to their scandals.
5. Firings become national stories as journalists look to explain the situations.

6. Both schools attribute the firings to just the incidents in question.

7. Both coaches were due raises but were fired before they were paid.
8. School administrators characterize both as difficult or odd – other motives
regarding firings emerge.
9. Coaches who get schools to BCS games can encounter multiple offenses
and not lose their jobs.

Even though both Texas Tech and USF in their press conferences and reports to the media stated that the firings were a result of the way the two coaches
handled the players in questions, other motives clearly emerged in the press. The amount of national media coverage regarding these two regionally based coaches
indicates journalists were in search of deeper meanings behind their dismissals. To answer RQ1, the other reasons appear to be financially motivated, along with
administrators from both schools growing discontented with the coaches’ behaviors.

In the Leach case, there is an email trail that clearly displays the displeasure Texas Tech administrators had with giving Leach so much money and prestige.
If Leach brought BCS riches, it’s likely the school would maintain its relationship with him despite its displeasure. Since Leach did not provide the
school with its ultimate goal of being in a BCS game, Texas Tech was unable to take the national criticism it received as a result of Leach’s actions
(Jonsson, 2009). Spencer Hall (2009) wrote” It makes sense in a world where Leach, an oddball among oddballs, finally reaches the limit of tolerance
both on his part and on the part of his bosses in the TTU administration. Leach’s contract negotiations were, to put it politely, contentious. His flirtations
with other jobs were brazen. The university’s patience with his high-profile antics was running low.” The idea that there was more to Leach’s
firing than just his behavior with James was further supported by Magary (2009), “Just last year, he was nearly dropped by the school in the wake of contentious
negotiations. Just as the James saga was likely the last straw for the school to keep Leach around.” Based on attribution theory, Texas Tech explained
Leach’s firing for just one reason, not for the multiple reasons as stated in the media.

This rationale also holds true for Leavitt, a coach without a BCS bowl game to his credit who got a big pay raise right before a controversial incident.
South Florida was unwilling to tolerate national criticism created by a high paid coach that did not deliver the school the coveted BCS prize. As deplorable
as it is for a coach to hit a player, conflicting stories about the incident, including statements by Miller, make Leavitt’s abrupt firing questionable
in its motives (Schad, 2009). Even though Leavitt listened to other job offers, it does not appear that the ill will between him and the school ran as deep
as it did between Texas Tech and Leach. Rather, Leavitt’s biggest mistake was not winning a conference championship prior to the incident with Miller.

		"If his team was coming off a Big East title he might be able to survive 
	  this (for right or wrong), but when his teams routinely fizzled over the second 
	  halves of seasons, and with the way his team was a disaster in the classroom 
	  (with one of the nation’s worst rankings according to the Academic Progress 
	  Report), this wasn’t that tough a call for the university” (College 
	  Football News, 2010)."

Richard Cirminello echoed these sentiments with

 
		"Leavitt had become a caricature in recent years, racing around the 
	field as if he was that team trainer with less than all of his faculties. While 
	it was a cute act when USF was climbing up the ladder in the early days, it 
	stopped being endearing when the program stopped improving. The Bulls peaked 
	in October of 2007, rising to No. 2 in the country. Since then, they’ve 
	gone just 16-14, slipping into the middle of the Big East pack. As a program 
	builder, Leavitt had an epic run. As a program elevator, he appeared increasingly 
	out of his league. The incident involving Miller may have been just the ideal 
	opening the administration needed in order to make a change” (College 
	Football News, 2010)."

This “ideal opening” correlates with attribution theory since it allowed USF to tell a particular persuasive story about Leavitt’s firing
that was in the best interest of its stakeholders.

Comparison of Leach and Leavitt with BCS winning coaches

Around the same time Leach and Leavitt faced intense scrutiny from their employers; several other major coaches were also found to have violated rules. The coaches
used for comparison to address RQ2 are Pete Carroll (USC), Jim Tressel (Ohio State), Urban Meyer (Florida), and Nick Saban (Alabama). The media coverage
of these four coaches demonstrates each repeatedly violated NCAA rules and regulations. However, unlike Leach and Leavitt, these four coaches had success in bringing
their schools to BCS games. Also, these coaches did not lose their jobs after breaking the rules. Based on the research, as it relates to RQ2, there appears
to be a double standard for college football coaches. Winning coaches can withstand a crisis or rules violation unlike those coaches without the same BCS success.

For example, Carroll, the former coach of USC, was able to maintain his job from 2001 to 2009 even though he presided over the program that committed a
number of major NCAA violations. So much so, that in June 2010 the NCAA put USC on a two-year post-season ban while also forcing the program to eliminate
30 scholarships and forfeit a number of wins from 2004 to 2006 (Klein and Wharton, 2010). Most of the illegality of Carroll’s program came during the recruitment
of Reggie Bush.

Noted Los Angeles Times sports columnist Bill Plaschke (2009) criticized Carroll’s tenure and his knowledge of the recruiting illegalities by writing “he
goes from saint to scallywag. Carroll says he didn’t know about the Bush violations. That now seems impossible… …he made $33 million from violations that will
cost his old school its reputation, and folks here will never look at him the same.” Carroll was able to keep his job during a period of time the NCAA
was “troubled” by “the campus environment” that he created at USC (Lev, 2010). The NCAA also criticized USC for disregarding Carroll’s
blatant use of allowing influential visitors access to his team by stating in a critical report of the school “”the institution’s failure to regulate
access to practices and facilities” (Gardner, 2010). Clearly, Carroll’s BCS accomplishments helped insulate him from the immediate and harsh punishment
given to Leach and Leavitt.

Ohio State’s Tressel guided his team to three BCS championships, winning one, during his 10 years in Columbus. Those impressive numbers included five
straight Big 10 conference titles. Because of this success, he was one of the top paid coaches in the country with an annual salary that eclipses $3.7 million
(Berkowitz, 2010). However, Tressel faced scandals several times during his Ohio State tenure. Longman (2007) wrote that both his career first at Youngstown
State and then OSU have been tarnished by a number of issues. “At both colleges, his top quarterback took money from boosters in violation of NCAA
rules. Maurice Clarett, the running back who played a vital role in Ohio State’s national championship in 2002, sits in prison after a sad descent. A number
of other Ohio State players have encountered legal or disciplinary problems since Tressel became head coach in 2001, and his academic record, while improving,
remains mixed.” Longman (2007) also wrote that Ohio State’s athletic director was a “staunch ally” of Tressel. As it relates to Leach,
he certainly was not an ally of top Texas Tech officials.

There was a similar relationship at Florida between Meyer and athletic director Jeremy Foley. Meyer was the recipient in 2005 of a seven-year contract worth
$14 million handed out by Foley (Low, 2009). This salary was a result of Meyer’s two national championships and the highest winning percentage in the BCS. However,
during this time in Gainesville, 27 of Meyer’s players were arrested. The charges varied from larceny, stalking, to assault. The arrests forced Meyer
to defend himself by saying “it’s not a dirty program” (Associated Press, 2010). Tressel was fired by OSU in 2011 and Meyer retired in late 2010.

Alabama’s Saban, a winner of three BCS games and a national championship, encountered scandal in the summer of 2010 when a number of his players were
involved with illegal dealing with agents (Mandel, 2010). Saban did his best to distance himself from the issue, but this followed another scandal where
a number of Alabama players were caught in unauthorized selling of their free textbooks as a result of their scholarships (Miasel and Schlabach, 2010). During
his time at Alabama, Saban has dealt with “text book scandals and felonies” (Brizendine, 2008). While Alabama was forced to vacate 21 wins and placed on
three years-probation, Saban’s job was not in jeopardy as a result (Hooper, 2009).

DISCUSSION

The one-dimensional storytelling via the media conducted by both Texas Tech and South Florida regarding the firings of Leach and Leavitt has a direct relationship
with attribution theory. Since these schools omitted other relevant and significant factors, such as disputes with administrators, uneasiness about renegotiating
contracts, general odd behavior, and poor academic performance by the players, their messages to the media suggest they were doing so to protect themselves
and their stakeholders. These other factors were well documented by journalists.

For Texas Tech and USF, this protection was a manifestation of attribution theory in action. The rationale behind the firings of Leach and Leavitt was
public relations and marketing driven. Texas Tech and South Florida did not want to expand publicly on these other issues and instead focused their messages
on the intolerant behaviors Leach and Leavitt displayed in an effort to perpetuate the image that the schools are institutions of higher learning, not just football
academies. Also, by crafting a public story focused just on the singular activities of Leach and Leavitt, it gave the schools the rationale of firing a coach for
just cause. Texas Tech and South Florida called upon the persuasion techniques of attribution theory to create a story that would have fans, and some journalists,
believe the outcomes of the events were solely a result of the singular actions of both Leach and Leavitt.

These two schools were able to employ their crisis communication techniques of creating a favorable story line because so many media outlets were willing
to carry their message in an effort to gain more content and programming. The addition of ESPN’s Craig James into the story generated even more media
attention. Most of the coverage about the other issues surrounding the firings came from the national outlets. This finding is noteworthy as it underscores
the symbiotic relationship the local Texas and Florida news outlets share with Texas Tech and South Florida. The local media outlets may have shown restraint
in creating critical coverage of these two universities. The exception was the Lubbock Avalanche- Journal that did run a number of pieces illustrating the
problems between Texas Tech administrators and Leach.

In the context of this research, there appears to be a double standard within the highest ranks of college football. Coaches with BCS wins apparently can
withstand a crisis and receive greater support from their employer than those coaches without BCS wins. Unfortunately for Leach and Leavitt, they didn’t
have the same success as the likes of Carroll, Tressel, Meyer and Saban. Relating to the concepts of the attribution theory, a school is unlikely to make public
statements that a coach was able to keep his job because he won BCS games. The school would instead provide other reasons that supported its status as an institution
of higher learning.

CONCLUSIONS

The media coverage surrounding Leach and Leavitt in wake of their scandals demonstrates that the worst action a college coach can do is simply not win
enough. Universities, using the application of attribution theory, are not likely to publicly state this as it would tarnish their overall reputation. However,
it can serve as the foundation for a firing based on another incident that otherwise might not seem related. This idea of using an alternative rationale brings relevance
to this paper’s topic and attribution theory. As part of a school’s crisis communication plan, it might tell a public story that best serves itself
and its stakeholders.

APPLICATIONS IN SPORT

This paper expanded the literature of sport communication to include attribution theory. As previously stated in this paper, attribution theory is not often
included in sports media literature. This paper is one of the few works to introduce attribution theory to sports public relations. A better understanding of this
theory as it relates to sports crisis communication will benefit both academic scholars and professional journalists looking to interpret and contextualize
the issues surrounding the firing of a major college coach. Since schools have so much money riding on the success of their teams, they will continue to dismiss
coaches who do not win enough games in efforts of finding someone who will. Such competition in the industry of higher education that is supposed to both
educate young people and profit from athletic investments will continue to create a constant flow of financial, ethical, and media issues worthy of deeper analysis.

Even though both Texas Tech and South Florida scaled back the amount of money invested in their football coaches, other schools are still pouring millions
of dollars into their programs in search of BCS riches. However, there only a select few games and only half the teams participating in those games can
prevail as the winner. So, there will continue to be more schools that fail in their BCS quest than win. This financial arms race and the adjoining media
coverage should continue to create worthy areas of academic exploration for future researchers. This paper could lead other researchers into examining the
rationale of how and why a football coach was fired by a college or university. As college basketball continues to expand in popularity, similar research could
evolve with that sport as well.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

David Dewberry, Yun Xia, Cheryl Moore, Eliot Emert

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2014-11-24T05:48:54-06:00November 16th, 2012|Contemporary Sports Issues, Sports Coaching, Sports Facilities, Sports Management|Comments Off on Analysis of the Reasoning Behind the Firings of Mike Leach and Jim Leavitt

Point/Counterpoint: Paying College Athletes

Abstract

The notion of paying college football players has been an ongoing debate since the early 1900’s. With current television revenue resulting from NCAA football bowl games and March Madness in basketball, there is now a clamoring for compensating both football and basketball players beyond that of an athletic scholarship. This article takes a point/counterpoint approach to the topic of paying athletes and may have potential implications/consequences for college administrators, athletes, and coaches. Dr. John Acquaviva defends the current system in which colleges provide an athletic scholarship that provides a “free college education” in return for playing on the university team. Dr. Dennis Johnson follows with a counterpoint making the case that athletes in these sports should receive compensation beyond that of a college scholarship and forwards five proposals to pay the athletes.

Key words: pay for play, athletic scholarships

Introduction: History of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)

The idea of paying college athletes to compete dates back to what is considered to be the first intercollegiate competition. In a regatta between Harvard and Yale Universities, Harvard used a coxswain who was not even a student enrolled at the Ivy League school (5). Much like today’s universities whose appetites for appearances in corporate-sponsored “big money” football bowl events; Harvard may have used the non-student to please regatta sponsor Elkins Railroad (23).

In the late 1800’s, football played by college teams was a brutal sport but enjoyed by many fans. However, from 1900 to 1905, there were 45 players who died playing the sport (22). This prompted President Theodore Roosevelt to summon the presidents of Harvard, Yale, and Princeton, and threaten them with a ban unless the sport was modified. As a result of that meeting, a group of 62 university presidents convened to form the Intercollegiate Athletic Association in 1906. This group evolved into the NCAA in 1910, but as a group it only possessed supervisory power (22).

College football became even more popular in the period of 1920-1940. This was a time when commercialism in the educational system was being questioned on a variety of levels. One such fundamental question was posed in 1929 by Howard Savage, a staff member of the Carnegie Foundation. He raised a question in an article entitled Athletics in American College (originally published in 1930 but reprinted in 1999) “whether an institution in the social order whose primary purpose is the development of the intellectual life can at the same time serve an agency to promote business, industry, journalism, and organized athletics on an extensive commercial basis? More importantly, the report asked “can it (the university) concentrate its attention on securing teams that win, without impairing the sincerity and vigor of its intellectual purpose” (9, p.495)? Savage also states that “alumni devices for recruiting winning teams constitutes the most disgraceful phase of recent intercollegiate athletics” (9, p. 495). In sum, the original 1929 report claimed that “big time” college sports were not educational, but were entirely financial and commercial.

Athletes during the early and mid-1900’s were routinely recruited and paid to play; and there were several instances where individuals representing the schools were not enrolled as students. For example, there is one report of a Midwestern university using seven members of its team that included the town blacksmith, a lawyer, a livery man, and four railroad employees (5). Other athletes at colleges were given high paying jobs for which they did little or no work. In 1948, the NCAA adopted a “Sanity Code” that limited financial aid for athletes to tuition and fees, and required that aid otherwise be given based on need (5). In the early 1950’s, with the threat of several southern schools bolting from the NCAA, the code was revised to allow athletic scholarships to cover tuition, fees, and a living stipend.

However, by the mid-1950’s many schools were still struggling with the issue of offering athletic scholarships. Some university presidents ultimately decided to maintain the principles of amateurism and further serve the mission of higher education. Those were presidents of universities that today make up the Ivy League. They concluded that it was not in the best interest of their universities to award athletic scholarships, and have remained steadfast even today.

After passing Title IX in the mid 1970’s, the NCAA absorbed the Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women (AIAW) and began to govern women’s sport at the collegiate level. Over the past 50 years, the NCAA has also expanded into three divisions with a multitude of championship events on a yearly basis (20). There are more than 1,300 member institutions that represent an estimated 400,000 student athletes who participate in sport (21). The result of this growth and development are enormous increases in revenue. NCAA President Mark Emmert reports the NCAA revenues for the 2010-11 fiscal year is projected at $757 million, of which $452.2 million will go to Division I members (14).

While seemingly operating in a purely capitalistic/professional atmosphere, the NCAA continues to endorse an amateurism concept in college athletics. These competing, and often contradictory, values lead some college athletes in big time football and basketball programs to question the status quo of the present system through their words and actions. For example, many athletes are still attempting to get their “piece of the pie,” albeit under the table. And so it leads to our point-counterpoint.

Point: College Athletes Should Not Be Paid

The intensity of the argument to pay college athletes has escalated in the past few years. Perhaps it’s because of the current economic climate and everyone, including amateur athletes is looking for ways to make money? Or maybe it’s because many higher learning institutions have given the public access to their annual budget and readers focus on the profit of select athletic programs? Or maybe it is due to the absurd coaches’ salaries and the money that colleges make from football bowl games and basketball tournaments? Regardless, this has magnified the fact that the athletes see none of these profits and thus begs the simple question: “Where’s my share?” Perhaps a fair question, but to understand this argument better, a healthy debate is needed. So, here are some points to consider.

Point #1: Education is Money

Colleges and universities provide an invaluable and vital service to our communities: education. A now-famous bumper sticker once read: “If you think education is expensive, try ignorance.” To address that very slogan, the U.S. census bureau, as reported by Cheesman-Day and Newberger (7), expressed this best when they reported that the lifetime earnings for those with a college degree are over $1 million dollars more than non-graduates. Despite such a statistic, essays and op-ed columns continue to pour in from those who favor paying student-athletes while simultaneously refusing to acknowledge or accept the value of a college education. Is a college education priceless or not?

A sports-journalist in a recent national radio interview proposed that any argument against paying college athletes based on the sole reason that education is the prize is “antiquated”. But what seems antiquated and even shortsighted is the belief that paying a college athlete some (or even a lot of) money will solve all or even some of student’s long-term issues. The fear of the NCAA, as it should be, is that the mere notion of paying college athletes undermines the university’s primary purpose – education, something far more valuable than a modest annual stipend proposed by many. If it currently appears that the universities “don’t really care” about the athlete, paying them would intensify that belief, not dissolve it.

The irony in this dispute is that student-athletes do cost the university a substantial amount of money each year. For example, a full scholarship over four years can range between $30,000 and $200,000 depending if the institution is public or private (29). But let’s address this main point head on: There is an obvious lack of appreciation of a college degree from those in favor of paying athletes, and until a genuine gratitude for this concept develops, this argument will probably continue to linger.

Point #2: There Are Problems with Payment

Despite the well-documented scandals and corruption in college athletics (30), many would probably agree that paying athletes would exponentially increase the need for intense NCAA oversight – an enormous task by all accounts. Plus, there are the practical issues to consider. For example, how much should the athletes get paid and will payments be based on performance? What if the athlete gets hurt? What if the athlete is a bust and despite remaining on the team, doesn’t start or even play at all? – Issues that seem to raise far more questions than answers. But perhaps most important – What will happen to the non-revenue sports at the colleges who lose money from all of their sports programs – including football and basketball? It has been shown that only a fraction of Division I football and men’s basketball programs turn a profit (24, 20). The other Division I football and basketball programs as well as sports such as baseball, softball, golf, hockey, women’s basketball (minus a couple of notable programs), and just about all Division II sports not only fail to make money, but actually drain their athletic budgets. The outcome here would be inevitable: Forcing athletic departments to pay its football and basketball players would result in the eventual elimination of most, if not all, of the non-revenue sports. Is that what we want?

We cannot afford to be myopic on this issue. That is, there are only a limited number of programs that make big money, but yet there are hundreds of schools who absorb big losses at the cost of providing athletes a place to compete and earn a degree. The purpose of the NCAA, along with Amateur Athletic Union (AAU), Little League, and dozens of other organized forms of amateur sport is to provide a venue to play these sports – something we should not take for granted. The problem is that some have shifted in thinking that playing an organized sport is a right, whereas it still stands as a privilege.

Point #3: The University Offers More Than an Education

Concerts, lecture series by prominent people, on-stage productions, movies, intramural sports, fitness facilities, and a variety of clubs are all part of the typical university experience. Most students agree that colleges are self-contained acres of learning and socializing, all which takes place in a safe environment. It’s common for schools to subsidize the above-mentioned on-campus activities by adding fees to the tuition – which means that it’s free to a full-scholarship athlete. Other benefits to the athlete include the regular use of pristine gyms, well-manicured fields, athlete-only (and often team-only) workout facilities, sports medicine care, the opportunity to travel via away games, specialized meal plans and free foot gear and athletic attire. In addition, athletes are improving their trade from the best coaching minds in the sport; not to mention having access to some of the best nutrition and strength/conditioning personnel. And perhaps the most overlooked benefits are that the school provides the player with high-profile name recognition, a dedicated fan base, media exposure, and a competitive atmosphere with proven rivals, all of which took decades, effort and money for each institution to establish.

Point #4: The Athletic Department Has Its Role

Keep in mind that student-athletes are not employees of the university, rather they are students first and athletes second. The university can indeed make money from the sports programs; however, for those that do, the money simply goes back into the athletic program to fund the non-revenue sports (24). In fact, every year the NCAA sponsors over 80 national championships in three divisions, demonstrating the range and depth of their organization (20). While it is true that the champion in football and men’s basketball (and most other sports for that matter) seem to come from a relatively small pool of universities, it might be safe to assume that paying athletes would create an even bigger disparity since so few universities actually make money. Let’s face it, we are an underdog-loving country, and paying athletes would all but ensure that teams like Butler University, who made it to the Final Four in consecutive tournaments (2010 and 2011), will never do it again.

Point #5: Athletes Know the Deal

From the moment the full-scholarship papers are signed, each participant’s role is very clear: Schools accept the responsibility of the student’s tuition, meal plan, and boarding, while the athlete is provided with the opportunity to earn a degree, engage in college life and play their favorite sport in a well-organized, and often high profile fashion. The document signed by each student-athlete describes this agreement in an unmistakable manner. Although wordy and at times complex – a necessity due to the nature of the agreement – there’s no vagueness in the general arrangement or a hidden agenda from either party (10). A failure to honor the basic premise of any such contract would cause all forms of business – big or small – to crumble. If for some reason the university could be held liable for entrapment or some other form of dishonesty, then their athlete’s argument would stand on firmer ground. But frankly, the details of this agreement are well known by all involved, and rather strangely, no one seems to mind when signing them.

In conclusion, it should be noted that any NCAA improprieties or blatant corruption may have a carry-over effect into empathizing with the position given here. While corruption and other related-concerns are legitimate and need investigation, paying college athletes still remains a separate debate. It is vital to this process to view each NCAA issue independently and avoid making judgments on them as a whole. The position here is that, like many organizations, the NCAA should not be dismissed or discredited on one issue due to the mishandling of others. Further, if the contention is that many student athletes enter college unprepared or that athletics takes up too much time to excel (or even earn a degree), those are separate, but much needed arguments, and are not related to the issue of paying athletes.

Now more than ever, we live in an era of entitlement. At one time our country viewed the chance at higher education as a priceless commodity. However, it now seems that a college education is not held in the same esteem and worse yet, some see it as simply an opportunity to earn money. Although it is now evident that there has been a failure to convince much of the public of the true value of an education, keeping college athletes as pure amateurs remains the right thing to do.

Counter Point: Athletes in “Big-Time” Sports Should Be Paid

Introduction

The argument that a college athletic scholarship is an equal quid pro quo for a college education has been utilized since athletic scholarships were approved by the NCAA in 1950’s. My colleague makes one point that is totally accurate – a college graduate can in fact make a great deal more money over a lifetime when compared to non-graduates. However, the remainder of the author’s points are half-truths and in reality just plain falsehoods. For instance, a “full athletic scholarships” do not provide a “free” education (as it does not cover all costs incurred from matriculation to graduation. In many cases, the university does not live up to its end of the bargain of providing an education; as evidenced by the dismal number in the graduation rates, especially among African Americans. Furthermore, the athletic scholarship is only a one-year (renewable) agreement that can be terminated by the coach or university in any given year for any reason.

In debating the pay-for-play issue in college athletics, the history of the governing body (i.e., currently the NCAA), their mission and view of amateurism, the past history of college athletes benefitting financially, and the degree to which athletes benefit from the university experience must all be examined. The counter point section of this paper addresses each point made by my colleague. Using the Eitzen (12) analogy comparing the NCAA and big-time athletic programs to the old southern plantation system will be the underpinning wellspring for the subject of athlete exploitation and the financial benefits enjoyed by the university derived from that plantation-like exploitation. An economic viewpoint will be presented to demonstrate the cartel-like atmosphere held by the NCAA while maintaining the illusion of amateurism.

Finally, five proposals that outline means to promote pay-for-play in NCAA Division I football and men’s basketball will be presented. The arguments that follow are specifically tailored for those two sports at schools who receive bonus money from the NCAA, as those universities and their coaches enjoy considerable revenue from TV contracts and sponsorships generated by bowl games and “March Madness” appearances.

Point #1: Athletic Scholarships Provide a “Free Education” is not correct

As mentioned, in the 1950’s the NCAA approved adding living stipends to athletic scholarships that previously included only tuition and fees. Today, the “full ride” scholarship can only include tuition, fees, room, board, and books. And as mentioned in the previous section, in some cases, depending on the school attended, that scholarship can be worth anywhere from $30,000 to $200,000, although the figures $20,000 to $100,000 over a four year period might be more accurate. In any case, that still does not cover the full cost of attending college.

The Collegiate Athletes Coalition (CAC) estimates that NCAA scholarships are worth about $2000 less than the cost of attending a university, as it does not account for expenses such as travel and sundries. Former Nebraska head football coach and United States Congressman, Tom Osborne (R-NE), calculates the gap between scholarship funding and the actual cost of attendance to be closer to $3,000. Even former NCAA President, Myles Brand, indicated that he favored increasing scholarship limits: “Ideally, the value of an athletically related scholarship would be increased to cover the full-cost of attendance, calculated at between $2,000 to $3000 more per year than is currently provided, I favor this approach of providing the full cost of attendance” (23, p.232).

So yes, the scholarship can be seen as pay for play, or at the very least, a quid pro quo for services rendered during a four year period. However, even with a full scholarship, an athlete will have to pay somewhere between $8,000 and $12,000 out of pocket to bridge the cost-of-living gap. Therefore, the full athletic scholarship does not provide a “free” education. Thus question remains: is the full scholarship a fair and equitable deal for the athlete?

Athlete Exploitation-The Plantation System

Eitzen (12) among others (27) makes the analogy that the NCAA operates like the “plantation system” of the old south. The coaches are the overseers who get work from the laborers (players) who provide riches for the masters (universities) while receiving little for their efforts. Perhaps slightly over-stated (obviously the athlete is not a slave, but maybe an indentured servant), the student–athlete is dominated, managed, and controlled, and they don’t receive a wage commensurate to their contribution as expressed in dollars earned by the university. Eitzen notes that athletes are sometimes mistreated physically and mentally and are often denied the rights and freedoms of other citizens. Ultimately, they have no real democratic recourse in an unjust system.

There are other similarities to the plantation analogy. Slaves were not free to leave the plantation much like an athlete cannot get out of a letter of intent (without penalty) and/or transfer without the penalty of sitting out a year. Much like the slaves who had no right to privacy, athletes are subject to mandatory drug testing (even though their coaches/masters are not tested), room checks, and limits on where they can and cannot go in the community. The athletes can be prohibited from political protests and the right to assemble. And finally, they can be subjected to mental cruelty and physical abuse (e.g., early morning torture sessions), all in order to create obedient slaves; student athletes.

Furthermore, collegiate athletics is often the only game in town for many of these athletes. For instance, football players must be in their third year of college or over the age of 21 to enter the National Football League (NFL). Basketball players, on the other hand, must attend college for one year or ultimately sit out a year before they can enter the National Basketball Association (NBA). Thus, the college game has become a “feeder system” similar to a minor professional league and it is in reality, “the only game in town.”

Point #2: Athletes Don’t Know the “Real” Deal

My colleague is partially correct in that most student athletes know that they are getting a scholarship that will allow them to go to school and play a sport. However, many don’t know the “real deal” as they generally have very little understanding they are about to enter a “plantation-like” system in which their scholarship in not guaranteed (i.e., renewable yearly) and can be terminated at any time. Student-athletes are also a led to believe that they will play and receive a college degree while possibly picking up a few fringe benefits along the way.

Take, for example, the recent stories regarding players like Reggie Bush, Cam Newton, or the players at Ohio State who received money and/or other benefits as a result of playing football. Even though student athletes know they will not get directly paid for playing, many desire and even expect some form of compensation. Slack (25) surveyed 3,500 current and retired football players in 1989 only to find that 31% had received under the table money during their college careers and 48% knew of others who had received payments. This seems to imply that while many recruits may indeed know “the deal”, they display their discontent by accepting payments or other benefits not currently allowed by the NCAA.

In reality, the statement “athletes know the deal” with regard to academic achievement and degree completion seems to lack substance. Dr. Nathan Tublitz, co-chair of the Coalition on Intercollegiate Athletes, an organization of 51 faculty senates whose purpose is to remind college presidents, athletic directors, and coaches that student athletes are students first. He points out that:

“…schools aren’t doing these kids any favors by admitting them when it’s unlikely that they will succeed academically. We bring 17 year-old kids, some of them from the inner city and we wine and dine them. They have female chaperones. We put them up in fancy hotels. They come here and see an incredibly fancy locker room with individual TV screens, air conditioning and videogames. They go in and see the new football stadium and the new $200 million basketball arena. They see a medical training facility that is stunningly beautiful with waterfalls, treadmill pools, and the sate-of-the-art medical and dental equipment. They come here and are treated like royalty. Until they break a leg or get put on the second string and they get set aside. Many don’t earn a degree. They don’t have the training or the skills to be independent after they leave the university. They’re lost (28, p.D10).”

When the scholarship is signed, the athlete and his family have reasonable expectations which include efforts by the coaching staff and university administration to meet all obligations of the contract. Additionally, my colleague notes, “that failure to honor the basic premise of any such contract would cause all forms of business – big or small – to crumble.” If the NCAA and athletic departments in higher education are a business, why are they allowed to act in a cartel-like fashion? And finally, do student athletes really know the “deal” when they penned their name on national signing day? It appears they don’t.

Point #3: The University Offers More than Education-It’s Possible-But Not Probable

Academic Detachment. My colleague also makes the claim that the university offers more than an education (e.g., concerts, lectures, intramurals, and clubs) in settings that enrich the college experience. Due to the plantation effect, however, many athletes are not able to take advantage of those events. For instance, few if any of the scholarship athletes would be allowed to play in an intramural contest for the coach’s fear of injury. Student athletes are also over-scheduled with study halls, practices, weight training sessions, film study, individual workouts, more practice, travel, and competition; all in an attempt to help athletes maintain focus on their sport.

Adler and Adler (1) spent five years recording systematic information regarding the athletes’ lives in a big-time college basketball program. After observing, interviewing, and traveling with them, they concluded that big-time basketball and being seriously engaged in academics were not compatible. They also found that freshmen had a period of optimism regarding academics when they first arrived on campus, but after about two semesters they found that the social isolation combined with the fatigue of training kept them from becoming involved in academic life.

Positive feedback these basketball players earned was always athletic-related and not academic. They soon learned what they had to do to stay eligible. Coaches made sure they scheduled classes that did not interfere with practices. Ultimately, the researchers realized that academic detachment was encouraged by the peer culture, and because of their social status (e.g., big man on campus), it became difficult for them to focus on academics.

Coakley (8) reported that not all of the athletes in the Adler & Adler (1) study experienced academic detachment. Those who entered college well-prepared with appropriate high school courses, strong parental support and an ability to develop relationships outside of sport were able to succeed in the classroom. It’s important to note that too many minority athletes from low socioeconomic environments struggle in academics – an issue that is often perpetuated by the coaches. For instance, Robert Smith, former running back for Minnesota Vikings and pre-med student while at Ohio State, needed two afternoon labs in the same semester. Since the labs conflicted with practice, coaches suggested that he drop them because of the commitment he made to play football. Against the wishes of the coaching staff, Smith took the classes but was forced to sit out the season as red shirt athlete; a further example of the plantation effect.

Benson (3) noted that one perspective was missing from the literature included a full expression from the black athletes point of view. Benson conducted a qualitative interview study of 12 African American students at a DI football program where the graduation rate was 31-40% for black football players compared to 60-70% of white football players. The results in this instance cannot be generalized due to the small sample size (N=12), but it does provide a snapshot of the thoughts regarding education and athletics of this group. Further, they reflect the results obtained by Adler & Adler (1).

Another major finding of the Benson (3) study was that the marginal academic performance was created by a series of interrelated practices engaged in by all significant members of the academic setting, including peers, coaches, advisors, teachers, and the student athletes themselves. It began in the recruitment, and continued through the first year. Black student athletes received the message that school was not important, and that as time passed, they had no real control over their destiny in the classroom. It was simply a matter of survival to keep the grade point average (GPA) to a point to be eligible. They all felt like the coaches did not “walk the talk” in terms of academics. They would just talk the academic game in public but then in reality they would have “fits” if classes ever interfered with the program. Simply put, student athletes learned it was a matter of survival and a basic expectation to maintain a GPA just high enough to remain eligible to compete (3).

“The Black Dumb Jock”. Harry Edwards (13) discussed the creation of the “black dumb jock” image prior to studies completed by Alder and Alder (1), Benson (3), and Coakley (8). He (i.e., Edwards) theorized that they were not born, but rather systematically created. The previous mentioned studies serve as evidence to support his statement (1, 3, 8). The exploitation of athletes is not solely an NCAA issue but a societal one. For example, Fred Butler was passed on through elementary, middle, and high school because he was a good football player. He graduated from high school reading at a second grade level and went to El Camino Junior College. There he took a number of physical activity classes while hoping to be drafted into the NFL. When no offer came, he played at California State University-Los Angeles for a year and a half. When again no offer came and his eligibility expired, he failed out of school within months with no degree, no offers to play pro ball, and no skills to use for employment. And he still could not read! (18). Similarly, Former NFL player Dexter Manley testified before a Senate Committee that he played four years at Oklahoma State University, only to leave the school illiterate. And the sad feature is that academic detachment from the university athletic department perspective doesn’t seem to be an issue because there are always more impoverished (and usually minority) kids waiting to come in and play.

Thus, student athletes in many cases cannot take advantage of the many extras offered by a college education. Why do athletes accept a diluted academic experience or the corruption of doctored transcripts, phantom courses, surrogate test takers, and tutors writing papers? Perhaps it is because they are disenfranchised under the current system, and will lose scholarships, starting roles, and eligibility if they complain. George Will argued that “College football and basketball are, for many players, vocations, not avocations, and academics are unsubstantiated rumors” (12, p.5). So do full scholarship athletes get a chance to take advantage of all the extras of the university experience? More than likely it is not the case especially when they can’t even hope for a meaningful degree.

NCAA as a Cartel. Kahn (16) examined the operation of the college football and basketball systems of the NCAA and offers lessons about the determinants and effects of supply and demand. Specifically he utilizes economic principles to calculate the value of college football player to a university. He notes that total ticket revenues for football and men’s basketball were $757 million in 1999, total value that exceeded the total ticket sales for all of professional baseball, football, and hockey that year. A figure indicating that the NCAA is a very successful business entity engaged in capitalism.

According to the cartel theory, the NCAA has “enforced collusive restrictions on payments for factors of production, including player compensation, recruiting expenses, and assistant coaches salaries; it has restricted output; and it has defeated potential rival groups (16, p. 211).” He notes, along with others (11, 15, 16, 30), that the NCAA can impose sanctions that range from scholarship reductions, elimination from post-season play to program death penalties (e.g., Southern Methodist football); and possibly even threaten a school’s academic accreditation. However, restriction of pay to players is the main way in which the organization acts to restrict competition.

Economists who have studied the NCAA “view it as a cartel that attempts to produce rents, both by limiting payments for inputs such as player compensation and by limiting output” (16, p.210). When looking at the rent values based on college football or men’s basketball players’ performances, they are paid below a competitive level of compensation based on estimates of marginal revenue product produced of these players (6). Their analysis considered the total revenue for a school and the number of players that were eventually drafted by a major professional league. Utilizing this framework they concluded that in 2005 dollars a draft-ready football player returned $495,000 to the university, while a draft-ready basketball player was worth $1.422 million for men’s basketball. And all of this compared to the approximately $40,000 paid in scholarship worth. This indicates that the NCAA does indeed use cartel power to pay top athletes less than the athlete’s market value.

Based on a workload of 1000 hours per year and an average scholarship value, economist Richard Sheehan (16) calculated the basic hourly wage of a college basketball player at $6.82 and a football player at $7.69. Coaches’ hourly wages, on the other hand, ranged from $250-$647 per hour (depending on salary). Again, using the Eitzen metaphor, the masters accumulate wealth at the slave’s expense, even though the athlete/slave’s health is jeopardized by participation (12).

Parent (23) notes the hypocrisy of the amateurism construct when looking at these capitalism issues. He notes that the former president of the University of Washington, William Gerberding, said, “As one contemplates the obvious fact that so many of the most gifted athletes are economically and educationally disadvantaged blacks, this becomes less and less defensible. I have become increasingly uncomfortable about having a largely white establishment maintaining an elaborate system of rules that deprives student-athletes, many of whom are non-white, of adequate financial support in the name of the ideals of amateurism” (p.236).

So, why do athletes tolerate this system? They do mainly because they are disenfranchised and fear losing their scholarships and eligibility if they complain. In essence, this pay-for-play discussion revolves around amateurism, as advertised by the NCAA, and its competing capitalistic drive for income. According to Tulsa Law School professor Ray Yasser, the best option for athletes to change the system for their benefit is to unite and “file an antitrust suit…against the NCAA and their universities, with the claim being that the NCAA and their universities are colluding to create a monopoly over the athlete’s ability to share in the profits generated from college athletics” (23, p.236).

While the points for maintaining the status quo were stated previously, there has been sufficient evidence presented in this section to stimulate discussion of paying players. The “play for a diploma” agreement is not happening in many cases, as the athlete failure rate indicates. Another example is national champion Connecticut men’s basketball program losing two scholarships for the upcoming season as a result of a poor Academic Performance Rating (APR) from the NCAA (11). Thus, the following pay for play proposals are being submitted for consideration.

Pay Proposals

It would appear that NCAA should get out of the commercial business of football and basketball and follow the Ivy League example of providing an environment that is truly amateur where student athletes actually are students first. That move would certainly place the student first in the student athlete term. However, it doesn’t seem pragmatic that either the NCAA or any of the major universities are in any hurry to turn away millions of dollars per year in profits. Therefore, it is time to consider some pay-for-pay proposals. California and Nebraska have already passed state legislation that would enable colleges to compensate athletes; however they are blocked by the NCAA from doing so (23). Therefore, I submit five proposals that could possibly be implemented:

    1. Big Ten Plan and/or Work Study Proposal: At the very least, the NCAA should follow former NCAA President Miles Brand’s suggestion and allocate athletes include a $2,000-$3,000 cost of living increase to full scholarships. Since athletes are supposedly only allowed to spend 20 hours per week involved with sport-related activities, this might actually be paid as 20 hours of work study or as a monthly living stipend. This would provide the athletes with the needed income for clothes, laundry, sundries, travel, and other small item expenses.
      Officials from the Big Ten are currently discussing a similar proposal that would help their athletes meet expenses not covered in an athletic scholarship. Big Ten commissioner Jim Delany reports league athletic directors and university officials have seriously discussed using some of their growing TV revenue to pay athletes more. This proposal which would give athletes a $2,000-$5,000 per year living stipend also has the support of current NCAA president Mark Emmert (2).

 

    1. SEC Game Pay Proposal: The Southeastern Conference, another of the big time football conferences recently entered into the pay for play discussion. University of South Carolina coach Steve Spurrier put forth a proposal at the recent conference meetings to pay players $300 per game. The proposal was supported by several other coaches.
      This type of a proposal could pay athletes anywhere from $300-$1000 per game based on time played per game. Since most players do not play more than 30 minutes a game, a player could be paid on a per-minute of competition basis. At a rate of $20 per minute a player could net $600 for a game and approximately $6000-$7,000 per season.

 

    1. Professional League Proposal: Ron Woods (27) puts forth a proposal submitted by Peter Plagensa, visiting professor at Middlebury College, regarding the pay-for-play issue. He appears to agree with the likes of Stanley Eitzen that the current practice of colleges and the NCAA do in fact “amount to a little more than a plantation system” (27, p. 67). He suggests that the big time college football and basketball maintain the million-dollar industry by making them an age 23 and under professional league. This proposal would allow universities to hire players as college staff (much like the cafeteria or groundskeepers) at moderate salaries plus room and board. Universities could also grant the athletes free academic classes until they earn a degree (even after playing days are over).

 

    1. Revenue Sharing Proposal from TV/NCAA Proceeds:

      “College basketball players watch the coach roaming the sidelines in his $1,500 custom-make suit. They read about his $500.000 salary and $250,000 perk from a sneaker deal. They watch the schools sell jerseys (and T-shirts) with the player’s numbers on them. They see the athletic director and NCAA officials getting rich and you wonder why they might ask; hey where’s my share? What am I, a pack mule” (17, p.46)

      Tim Tebow related on the Daily Show (26) that he joked with his college coach prior to a national championship game about getting a cut of his bonus money to ensure a victory. This brings another revenue sharing possibility to the surface: coaches sharing their bonuses and other performance incentives with the players.
      Most coaches in big time programs are paid huge bonuses based on team record and ranking, all a result of player performance. For instance, according to 2009 IRS income tax reports, Mike Krzyewski received $2,222,543 in bonuses and incentives (4). Coaches under this proposal would be required to share 25-50% of their bonuses with the players. Isn’t it reasonable to expect the athletes to get a cut of the bonus money? After all, they (i.e., the players) are the ones who put the coaches in a position to earn those bonuses.

 

My colleague has argued in point #2 that paying athletes raise a myriad of other issues, such as how much should they receive, what happens if an athlete gets hurt, and so on. That is a discussion for another time. First, we must agree that it is fair to compensate NCAA Division I football and basketball athletes beyond that of an athletic scholarship; then and only then may payout details be chronicled. Note: a reminder that we are only discussing compensation for the NCAA Division I-A football and basketball players; not the athletes in the AAU, Little League or other truly amateur venues of organized sport.

Summary

Throughout the history of the NCAA, college athletes have routinely received compensation beyond that of a full college scholarship (e.g., room and board, tuition, books). While such compensation is illegal, athletes like Reggie Bush and others receive under-the-table benefits as evidenced in the Slack survey (25).

Additionally, many athletes in “big time” programs do not receive a degree for their efforts in the athletic arena. Universities routinely admit students based on their athletic skills that are academically ill-prepared for success. As seen in the research (1, 3), many athletes that aspire to be academically successful soon lose hope with the over-scheduling and pressures of sport preparation. As a result, many college athletes, a majority of which are minorities, fail out of school once coaches have utilized their eligibility.

The NCAA functions like a cartel, keeping cost down while increasing profits. Rents for a draft-ready athlete earn the university somewhere between $500,000 for football and $1.422 million for men’s basketball (16), leading to a pseudo-plantation system where the coaches oversee the athletes demanding work and controlling their schedules on and off the field. This unbalanced system allows athletes to earn the equivalent of $6.80-$7.69 an hour (12) while coaches like Nick Saban of Alabama or Mack Brown of Texas earn over five million dollars a year (4).

If the NCAA continues as a corporate entity and acting in a cartel-like fashion making millions of dollars a year, implementing a plan to pay student athletes for playing must be considered. Otherwise, America’s institutions of higher learning should follow the Ivy League schools’ example and eliminate athletic scholarships, get out of the big time sport business, and get on with providing students with a complete educational experience.

Applications in Sport

Few discussions within sport are more common or controversial than the debate to pay college athletes. Some arguments are well thought and articulated, while others lack insight and are simply driven by passion. The purpose of this article is to provide the reader with a new perspective and some historical insight – all supported by the literature – regardless of their stance on this issue. Moreover, readers who may actually be heard by the NCAA may offer a position that has yet to be considered. The concession here is that despite any decision by the NCAA in the near future, we can be assured that college administrators, coaches, and athletes will continue this debate. However, their arguments may now be seen as relevant and more reasoned.

POSTSCRIPT: According to Michelle B. Hosick at the NCAA.org, the NCAA board of directors has moved on two issues discussed in this article since its submission. In April (2012), the board moved to implement a $2,000 allowance to an athlete’s full scholarship. They also voted to grant multi-year scholarships. However, both measures have been put on hold with the threat of an override vote by member institutions. On January 14, 2012 at the NCAA convention the board delayed implementation of the $2,000 supplement and sent it back to committee for revision at its April meeting. The multi-year scholarship issue will continue to be implemented on a conference-by-conference basis. And so the pay-for-play discussion continues.

References

  1. Adler, P. A., & Adler, P. (1999). College athletes in high-profile media sports: The consequences of glory. In Inside sports (pp. 162–70), edited by J. Coakley and P. Donnelly. London: Routledge.
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2015-01-31T01:14:13-06:00June 15th, 2012|Contemporary Sports Issues, Sports Coaching, Sports Facilities, Sports Management|Comments Off on Point/Counterpoint: Paying College Athletes

Risk Management Plans: Existence and Enforcement at NIAAA Member High School Athletic Departments

Abstract

The purpose of this study was to explore the current scenario of interscholastic athletics in terms of the existence and enforcement of risk management plans within high school athletic departments. Another purpose was to identify the common practices related to risk management currently utilized. The present study had a response rate of 16.7%. The results showed that 76.2 % of the respondents (N=816) conduct interscholastic activities with the support of risk management plans, but there are still 23.8% of those interscholastic athletic departments where risk management plans are nonexistent. In addition, from those who indicated having a risk management plan, 28% do not enforce it. A majority of respondents seem to be employing risk management best practices consistently, but there is an indication of a less than desired level of adoption of some practices (i.e., informed consent forms, pre-season sport specific meetings, ADA compliance, coach evaluation and written criteria, safety training, accessibility of AED’s, and warning signs). The results of our study showed a statistically significant relationship between the athletic directors’ years of experience and the adoption of certain risk management practices (i.e. coach evaluation, evaluation criteria, risk management enforcement, and hazard abatement), but (surprisingly) not to the adoption of other similarly important practices. This study provides high school athletic administrators and principals with relevant information that can be used to support their decision to adopt and enforce risk management plans for interscholastic athletic activities.

Key words: Risk Management Practices, Risk Management Plan, Interscholastic Athletics, Athletic Directors.

Introduction

In college athletics, risk management plans exist in order to reduce medical costs, prevent liability and to help schools afford insurance (Anderson, 2006). What about high school? Today, suing the schools, their coaches and officials for any reason is very common. Thus, high schools have to be prepared to defend themselves against legal claims, especially those related to interscholastic sports. Millions of teenagers participate in organized school-sponsored interscholastic sports programs each year. Competitive sports are an integral part of the lives of high school students and have the potential to offer them many benefits. Increased participation and rapid body changes make the risk of injuries for high school students engaging in interscholastic athletics a real threat (Ballard, 1996). In addition to the well-known mental, physical, economic, and spectator benefits provided by high school sports, the possible costs or hazards of interscholastic athletic participation are always present (Lipsey, 2006). Supporting that idea, an epidemiologic study commissioned by the Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System showed that 55.5% of American high school students participated on at least one sports team, and 21.9% of those students reported seeking medical treatment as a result of their activities (Eaton, Kann, Kinchen, et al., 2007). These data justify the need for increased efforts in developing and implementing strategies to identify and treat potential risks related to interscholastic participation. With that in mind, it is important for interscholastic athletic administrators to become familiar with commonly utilized best practices related to risk management in high school sports.

Gray (1995) studied risk management at physical education and athletic programs at the high school level in the state of Iowa. He investigated high school principals’ perceptions of a 20 item list of best practices related to risk management and principals’ supervision of programs. The author found that these administrators perform most of the risk management behaviors within the survey in a consistent basis. He also found that the size of the school had little influence on the behavior among the surveyed principals.

A similar study conducted by Bezdicek (2009), examined 463 high school athletic directors in Minnesota. The study was conducted to determine to what extent do athletic directors develop, implement, and manage a risk management plan for their athletic department, and the levels of familiarity that athletic directors have with risk management standards. The study revealed that the majority (56%) of athletic directors in Minnesota did not have a written risk management plan. In addition, the reasons for not having a risk management plan, as expressed by the respondents, were: lack of time (26.3%), lack of expertise (20.8%), and no need for a plan (19.7%).

Mulrooney and Green (1997) determined that the following characteristics must be present for a risk management plan to be considered bonafide and functioning: (1) a staff member is the risk manager, (2) a written risk management plan should outline policies and procedures in detail (including audit checklists), (3) periodic risk audits are conducted by staff, (4) periodic staff training programs related to risk management should be in place, and (5) the risk management plan is created with legal counsel.

Doleschal (2006) points out that: “ongoing risk management programs, the preparation of written material to be disseminated to coaches, participants, and parents or guardians, signed informed consent forms, inspection of equipment, etc., are examples of proactive steps that can be taken by school districts and their athletic programs” (p.295). He argues that unfortunately “many schools either do not have/use a risk management plan or do not follow good risk management practices” (p. 295). To assist interscholastic athletic departments in developing efficient risk management plans, Doleschal (2006) recommends 14 duties of care (proper planning, proper supervision, eligibility assessment, safe playing conditions, equipment maintenance, proper instruction, proper matching of athletes, proper conditioning, risk warning, proper insurance, emergency care and response plan, safe transportation, and proper selection, training and supervision of coaches) which schools should incorporate in their plans as preventive steps to minimize possible liability for the school or coaches.

Due to the nature of interscholastic athletic activities, coaches and schools constantly deal with the risk of litigation. Thus, it is important that they understand following the steps laid out in a risk management plan is instrumental to minimizing risks and reducing loss. The choice of either not having or not enforcing a risk management plan puts schools and their staff at risk of experiencing the anguish and pain involved in the time consuming process of defending a lawsuit (Doleschal, 2006). A good risk management plan is not an absolute guarantee that litigation will be avoided. However, good risk management practices can be effective aids in developing not only safer programs, but also act as an effective defense, should litigation occur (Doleschal, 2006).

With a good risk management plan in place, the identification and treatment of risks becomes much more effective. According to Stier et al. (2008), “risk management implies the assessment of risks associated with one or more activities or events and planning for the worst-case scenario”. (p. 32). Cotton (1993) points out that there are four essential elements to any risk management plan: identification of real and potential risks, assessment of the identified risks in terms of their causes, determination of appropriate courses of action to take in dealing with these risks if they occur, and establishment of effective and efficient risk prevention measures.

Finally, it is important to emphasize the athletic administrators’ role in the implementation and management of a risk management plan. A significant number of lawsuits are negligence claims taking place after the accident and the initial injury of an individual. Thus, the administrators’ ultimate goals must be to provide the safest environment possible for everyone involved, and to be prepared to deal with accidents and injuries if and when they do occur (Stier et al, 2008). Despite the fact that “no plan can be completely effective in preventing all injuries or accidents” (p.32), administrators are still responsible for enforcing and maintaining a meaningful risk management plan (Stier et al, 2008).

For high school athletic administrators, the challenge becomes providing sport programs which take safety seriously. In other words, the task is to effectively manage the many risks to which students-athletes are exposed. To do so, schools should rely on risk management plans and best practices to ensure that all school employees involved with athletics are fully prepared to prevent losses and to deal with losses when they occur (Appenzeller, 2005). However, is that really the case? Do high schools across the country actually have a risk management plan and truly enforce it? What are the most common practices related to risk management currently utilized by athletic departments at the high school level?

The purpose of this study was to explore the current scenario of interscholastic athletics in terms of the existence and enforcement of risk management plans within high school athletic departments. Another purpose was to identify the common practices related to risk management currently utilized. This study provides high school athletic administrators and principals with relevant information that can be used to support their decision to adopt and enforce risk management plans applied to interscholastic athletic activities.

To achieve such purposes, the following questions must be answered:

  1. How frequently high schools have and enforce risk management plans which are tailored to their athletic programs?
  2. What are the best practices used by high school athletic departments to address the inherent risks to the athletic activities they provide?
  3. Is there any relationship between athletic directors’ years of experience and existence/enforcement of specific risk management plan practices?

Methods

An online survey instrument was developed and distributed to high school athletic administrators for the purposes of examining risk management practices for high school athletics.

Subjects

The subjects were high school athletic directors belonging to the National Interscholastic Athletic Administrators Association (NIAAA). The NIAAA granted permission to the researchers to conduct the study. At the time of the survey, the NIAAA membership totaled 5,758 (while there were few email delivery failures, the amount was negligible). The first page of the online survey presented the participants information about the study and an informed consent form. Continuing to take the survey served as the respondents’ consent. The survey was available to the participants for six consecutive weeks, starting late Fall 2010.

Instrument

The survey instrument consisted of twenty-four questions related to risk management policy and practices as well as eight demographic questions. Questions were broken down into three categories: policy and procedure, supervision and personnel evaluation, and safety. The policy and procedure category consisted of questions related to Title IX, athletic association rules, insurance, informed consent, preseason meetings and ADA compliance. The supervision and personnel evaluation category consisted of questions related to coach certification and evaluation, supervision of events, and policy enforcement. Lastly, the safety category focused on emergency training, equipment and procedures, hazard inspection, game equipment, venue signage, and security and team transportation. The questions were a combination of Likert-type and open-ended. Directions for the survey were imbedded within the survey itself. Directions were placed for each section and coincided with any question format changes. Content for the questions was developed using previous literature related to risk management policies and procedures. Content validity was established using a panel of individuals chosen for their expertise and experience in risk management policy and procedures. The instrument was also tested for issues of readability using student focus groups.

Data Collection and Analysis

Using a modified Dillman (2007) method, the final version of the survey was sent to the NIAAA membership which totaled 5,758 at the time of the survey. The instrument was sent by email with a letter explaining the purpose of the study and informing them that participation was voluntary. Participants were assured of their anonymity as respondents, and also were given electronically generated respondent ID numbers by the survey program. There were 5,758 surveys sent out with 962 surveys returned for a 16 .7% response rate. Of the 962 surveys returned there were 816 fully completed and useable surveys. The researchers agree that 16% response rate seems low. However, it is important to point out that this is an exploratory study reaching out to a very large population. The group of respondents represents diverse geographic regions and a variety of school sizes. In addition, the complex and high-demand nature of the job performed by those athletic directors is a very reasonable justification for their low response rate.

Descriptive analysis was used to explore demographic information related to the administrators, and the frequency of legal action related to injuries and adoption of risk management best practices. Chi-square tests were performed to investigate the existence of relationships between the risk management practices and administrators experience.

Results

The athletic administrators surveyed represented schools ranging in size from 41 students to over 8,000. The mean enrollment of schools represented in the survey was 1,182. These schools fielded an average of 18 different athletic programs.

The administrators themselves were a majority male (83.9%). From all responding administrators, 2.6% held a doctorate, 74.6% held a master’s degree, 18.2 % held a bachelor degree, and 2 % represented other levels of education (associate or high school degree). These administrators had an average of 11.7 years of total experience with an average of 8.0 years being employed at their current school.

Policy Provision and Injury

In terms of injuries and risk, these schools have seen very little legal action related to injury (less than 1%), with (on average) three catastrophic injuries over the last five years requiring hospitalization. In light of this finding it is important to note that during this time, approximately one quarter of the sample either did not have a risk management policy (17.3%) or didn’t know if one existed at their school (6.5%). Of the schools possessing a risk management policy, 28 % said the policies were not enforced.

Risk Management Practices

To examine risk management practices, a series of questions were asked related to standard practices involving risk minimization for athletic program participation. In all categories (policy and procedure, supervision and personnel evaluation, and safety) 78% or more of respondents answered that they engaged in the practice often or always, with the exception of the item inquiring about the presence of visible risk warning signs at venues (46.9%) (Table 1). In the policy and procedure category, 10.5% of the respondents rarely, if ever, required consent forms for athletic participation. Also, only 86.4% conducted sport-specific pre-season meetings for athletes and parents. Lastly, 11.3% indicated that ADA guidelines were seldom met.

Within the supervision and personnel evaluation category, the results showed that less than 83% of the respondents evaluate their coaches on a regular basis. To compound this issue, only 85% had written criteria with which to evaluate those coaches. In addition, only 81.9% respondents indicated that their athletic department had someone responsible for enforcing the risk management plan.

The safety category results presented the largest concerns: 20.6% of the respondents indicated that emergency safety training is not provided to coaches and staff on a regular basis, and only 78.6% have AEDs within easy access at athletic activities. Having proper signage at sport venues with visible risk warning signs was also lacking, with less than half (46.9%) of administrators indicating adequate signage.

Risk Management Practices and Administrators’ Experience

A series of chi-square tests were performed to look at relationships between the risk management practices and administrators’ experience (Table 2). For the purposes of this analysis, administrators were categorized into two groups: those with fewer than eleven years of experience and those with eleven or more years. Significant associations were found between experience and the risk management practice variables of coach evaluation, evaluation criteria, risk management enforcement, and hazard abatement.

There was a significant (χ2 (1) = 12.75, p<.001) albeit weak (Phi = .126, p<.001) association between the level of administrator experience and whether the coaches were evaluated on a regular basis. Based on the odds ratio, the odds of administrators with 11 or more years of experience evaluating coaches on a regular basis was twice that of administrators with ten years or less experience.

The association between level of administrator experience and written evaluation criteria was also significant (χ2 (1) = 5.37, p<.05) and weak (Phi = .08, p<.05). The calculation of the odds ratio indicated the odds of administrators with 11 or more years of experience having written evaluation criteria were 1.6 times that of administrators with ten years or less experience.

Administrator experience and whether the athletic department had someone responsible for enforcing a risk management plan showed a significant (χ2 (1) = 5.30, p<.05) and weak (Phi = .08, p<.05) association. The odds ratio indicated the odds of administrators with 11 or more years of experience having a dedicated person responsible for risk management plan enforcement was 1.5 that of administrators with ten years or less experience.

Lastly, there was a significant (χ2 (1) = 5.15, p<.05) and weak (Phi = .08, p<.05) association between the level of administrator experience and whether identified hazards were repaired correctly and timely. Based on the odds ratio, the odds of administrators with 11 or more years of experience repairing hazards timely and correctly was twice that of administrators with ten years or less experience.

Discussion

The first goal of this study was to determine the frequency with which high schools in America have and enforce risk management plans applied to their athletic programs. Regarding the existence of a risk management plan, the results showed that 23.8% of the respondents either did not have a risk management policy or didn’t know if one existed at their school. In addition, among the schools possessing a risk management plan, 28 % said the plan policies were not enforced.

These figures are unexpected and very concerning. The concern is based on interscholastic athletic stakeholders’ expectation that schools and programs to be fully committed to the safety of athletes and fans, through the presence and enforcement of a solid risk management plan as the utmost symbol of that commitment. As such, it would be only reasonable to expect a much higher percentage of existence and enforcement of risk management plans. However, despite the increase in participation and the litigious character of our society, it seems that a significant number of interscholastic athletic administrators (or, in some cases, the local school board) choose to put their students and their schools at constant risk of major loss and liability (Bezdicek, 2009; Eaton et al., 2007; Gray, 1995; Lipsey, 2006; Stier et al, 2008). It is also surprising that, despite so many interscholastic athletic departments reporting absence of either a risk management plan or the enforcement of one, less than 1% of the respondents had legal action related to injury requiring hospitalization over the last five years. Perhaps, this could be a possible explanation for the less than desired level of adoption and enforcement of risk management plans among the respondents.

The administrators who have and enforce risk management plans will continue to reap the benefits of loss prevention and reduction (Bezdicek, 2009; Eaton et al., 2007; Gray, 1995; Lipsey, 2006; Stier et al, 2008). The same cannot be said for to the administrators who either do not have or do not enforce risk management plans. One can only hope that, by becoming acquainted with the information provided here, they may adopt practices that will certainly lead them to risk and liability reduction (Appenzeller, 2005; Bezdicek; Cotton & Wolohan, 2007; Eaton et al.; Gray; Lipsey; Stier et al).

The second goal of this study was to identify the best and most frequently used practices to address the inherent risks to interscholastic athletic activities. As expected, the survey results showed that most administrators followed these standards of risk management the vast majority of the time. However, the results presented a few points of concern, which could be another possible explanation for the low percentage of schools with risk management plans.

Initially, the fact that 10.5% of the respondents rarely required informed consent forms may place these schools in a defenseless position if facing negligence claims related to injuries occurring during participation in schools’ interscholastic activities (Appenzeller, 2005; Cotton, 1993; Doleschal, 2006). Dealing with the same liability category, 13.6% do not conduct sport specific pre-season meetings for athletes and parents. According to Doleschal (2006), “parents/guardians and athletes have a right to information regarding the possibility of injury, paralysis, and death that is inherent in all sports” (p.318).The provision of such information is a duty the institutions legally owe to the families. The lack of signed informed consent and sport specific pre-season meetings prevent participants (and their families) from being fully educated on the risks involved in the specific sport in which they desire to participate, and make the defense against a negligence claim very difficult (Appenzeller; Cotton & Wolohan, 2007; Doleschal).

ADA compliance at interscholastic venues is also an issue. 11.3% of the respondents indicated that ADA guidelines were seldom met. This lack of compliance not only prevents the access and participation of people with disabilities at those venues, but also provides strong legal claims to those affected by such lack of compliance to the law (Appenzeller, 2005; Cotton & Wolohan, 2007). One can only hope that such lack of compliance is due to the fact that those venues were built before ADA legislation was enacted (Appenzeller, 2005; Cotton & Wolohan, 2007). Despite being able to receive tax breaks for making the necessary corrections to be compliant with the law (Appenzeller; Cotton & Wolohan, 2007), it appears that the schools choose to hide behind the age of their venues rather than to take action and become compliant with the law.

Other concerning issues identified were the lack of written criteria with which to evaluate coaches (17.2%) and actual evaluation of those educators (15%). Combined, these two issues expose high schools to potential negligence and contract liability (Appenzeller, 2005; Cotton & Wolohan, 2007; Doleschal, 2006). On one hand, coaches’ various negligent actions may cause major injury and loss to all stakeholders. Such losses can be prevented if coaches’ evaluation and training are truly executed and based on written criteria (Doleschal, 2006). On another hand, the lack of written coaches’ evaluation criteria and an evaluation process following such standards may also place schools in violation of contract laws, specifically when coaches’ have to be disciplined or terminated (Appenzeller, 2005; Cotton & Wolohan, 2007; Doleschal, 2006).

Safety training, AED accessibility, and warning signs were also identified as concerning issues. Lack of safety training for coaches and staff on a regular basis (20.6% of the respondents) may expose students and spectators to a wide range of risks of injury and loss (ranging from failure to warn and equipment malfunction, to poor response to catastrophic injuries) that could be easily prevented with appropriate training (Doleschal, 2006). The absence of easily accessible AED equipment (reported by 21.4% of the respondents) adds to the major liability claims that certainly will come as a consequence of poor response to catastrophic injuries (Appenzeller, 2005). Lack of proper signage (reported by more than 50% of the respondents) may also expose students and fans to unnecessary risks and generate costly lawsuits against the schools. It is the schools’ duty to warn spectators and participants of potential risks involved in the activity through all means possible (i.e., verbal warnings, signage, and public announcement system) (Blumenthal, 2009; Girvan & Girvan, 1993; Lee, Farley & Kwon, 2010). Under any of these circumstances above, schools may be held liable.

The third goal of this study was to identify if there is any relationship between athletic directors’ experience and existence/enforcement of risk management plan practices. No significant relationship was found between experience and the existence of risk management plans. Such a result was expected, considering that the existence of a risk management is too important in preventing injury and loss at any institution to depend on the athletic director’s experience (Appenzeller, 2005; Cotton & Wolohan, 2007; Doleschal, 2006). However, significant associations were found between experience and the adoption of risk management practice variables. More experienced administrators (11 or more years) had higher odds of conducting coach evaluations, having evaluation criteria, risk management enforcement, and hazard abatement among their adopted risk management practices than administrators with less experience. The existence of such associations is not surprising. It is reasonable to expect that the experiences acquired through years on the job would lead administrators to the adoption of these best practices.

The use of written evaluation criteria and coaches’ evaluations may be a result of years of experience dealing with (either by themselves or by learning from others’ struggles) injuries, property loss, and financial loss suffered due to the lack of written evaluation criteria, and coaches’ evaluations. The existence of an enforced risk management plan and timely hazard abatement seem to be related to experience as well. By assigning the enforcement of the plan to a staff member, the administrator not only promotes injury and loss reduction, but also ensures that the plan is updated as venues and policies related to the athletic department change (Appenzeller, 2005). Regarding hazard abatement, experienced administrators know their facilities very well, including their maintenance history. Such knowledge should allow those administrators to treat hazards even before they appear, contingent to budget availability (Appenzeller, 2005).

As mentioned above, the fact that significant associations were found between experience and four of the risk management practice variables (coach evaluation, evaluation criteria, risk management enforcement, and hazard abatement) is not surprising. Intriguing is the fact that the other risk management practices did not present a similar relationship. One possible explanation is perhaps experience is less of a factor in adopting the practices that did not show a significant relationship. Another possible explanation is less experienced administrators may feel either uncomfortable or unprepared to conduct coaches’ evaluations, develop evaluation criteria, enforce a risk management, and/or deal with hazard abatement.

Recommendations for Future Research

The results of this study revealed that a significant percentage of high school athletic departments surveyed either do not have or do not enforce a risk management plan. It would be interesting to conduct a qualitative study among various state high school associations to learn their perspective on the situation and their perceived reasons for such lack of risk management plan existence and enforcement. To complement the study, athletic directors could be surveyed on their perceptions of the reasons suggested by the state high school associations’ leadership. After comparing the results from both groups, a list of potential actions to help increase risk management development, implementation and enforcement could be composed.

Conclusions

The present study demonstrated that interscholastic activities could be conducted with the support of risk management plans in a larger number of high schools. There is a significant amount of interscholastic athletic departments where risk management plans are either nonexistent or unenforced. A large majority of respondents seem to be employing risk management best practices consistently, but there is an indication of a less than desired level of adoption of some practices (i.e., informed consent forms, pre-season sport specific meetings, ADA compliance, coach evaluation and written criteria, safety training, AED’s accessibility, and warning signs). It also appears that the athletic directors’ years of experience plays a role in the adoption of certain risk management practices (coach evaluation, evaluation criteria, risk management enforcement, and hazard abatement), but (surprisingly) not to the adoption of other similarly important practices. It is the researchers’ hope that the evidence presented here opens the athletic directors’ minds to the importance of the adoption of a risk management plan as possibly the only reliable way to minimize loss to athletes, spectators, and institutions.

Applications in Sport

The results presented in this study are valuable to those in leadership positions at any high school in the United States. High school principals and athletic directors armed with this information would be able to (1) adopt and enforce a risk management plan, if they do not have/enforce one; and (2) review their policies and practices related to risk management and adjust them to industry standards. Other benefits to institutional leaders include the ability to provide athletes and spectators with a safer experience, and to reduce the risk of athletes’ injuries. These benefits will consequently help minimizing legal claims against high schools and their officials.

Tables with Captions

Table 1

Percent of Administrators Engaging in Risk Management Practices on a Regular Basis

Category Practice Percentage
Policy and Procedure Title IX Requirements are met 95.70%
State HS Athletic Assoc. rules are followed 99.00%
Athletic Activities are fully covered 93.30%
Participants sign sport-specific consents 89.50%
ADA requirements are met at venues 88.70%
Pre-season sport-specific meetings with parents 86.40%
Supervision and Evaluation Evaluate coaches on regular basis 82.80%
Written evaluation criteria to evaluate coaches 85.00%
AD attends home athletic contests 96.80%
Coaches are certified/qualified in sport they coach 91.10%
Dedicated person responsible for risk plan enforcement 81.90%
Safety Medical emergency procedures exist 97.50%
Emergency safety training provided to coaches and staff 79.60%
AEDs are easily accessible at athletic events 78.60%
Identified hazards are repaired properly and timely 93.80%
Adequate equipment is provided for athletic activities 98.60%
Venues and equipment are inspected regularly 93.50%
Adequate game security is provided 93.90%
Safe transportation is provided for away contests 97.00%
Venues have visible risk warning signs 46.90%

Table 2

Chi-square analysis of Administrator Experience (>11 years vs. 11 or more years) and Risk Management Practices

Category Practice χ2 value p value
Policy and Procedure Title IX Requirements are met .199 .726
State HS Athletic Assoc. rules are followed 2.905 .088
Athletic Activities are fully covered 1.008 .315
Participants sign sport-specific consents 2.216 .137
ADA requirements are met at venues .956 .328
Pre-season sport-specific meetings with parents 2.733 .098
Supervision and Evaluation Evaluate coaches on regular basis 12.75 <.001*
Written evaluation criteria to evaluate coaches 5.37 <.05*
AD attends home athletic contests .139 .710
Athletic activities are supervised .034 .854
Coaches are certified/qualified in sport they coach .001 .970
Dedicated person responsible for plan enforcement 5.30 <.05*
Safety Medical emergency procedures exist 3.116 .078
Emergency safety training provided 2.430 .119
AEDs are easily accessible at athletic events .011 .916
Identified hazards are repaired properly and timely 5.15 <.05*
Adequate equipment is provided for activities 1.619 .203
Venues and equipment are inspected regularly 2.261 .133
Adequate game security is provided 1.908 .167
Safe transportation is provided for away contests .485 .133
Venues have visible risk warning signs .203 .652

* Significant relationship

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Corresponding Author

Mauro Palmero Ph.D.
Sport Management Graduate Coordinator
East Tennessee State University
Department of Kinesiology Leisure and Sport Sciences
P.O. Box 70654
Johnson City, TN 37614
palmero@etsu.edu
423-439-4382

2017-08-03T10:47:34-05:00June 14th, 2012|Contemporary Sports Issues, Sports Coaching, Sports Facilities, Sports Management|Comments Off on Risk Management Plans: Existence and Enforcement at NIAAA Member High School Athletic Departments
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