Abstract:

With the ‘unknown certainty’ of terrorist actions and fan behavior, it is impossible to ensure a risk-free environment at America’s sporting venues. Incidents will happen and emergencies will arise. It is a matter of how one prepares, responds, and recovers to mitigate the consequences of emergencies at a sporting venue. Sport venue managers need to be aware of risk assessment methodologies to detect threats, identify vulnerabilities, and reduce consequences. Information gathered through this process is extremely valuable for enhancing security measures. This article discusses risk assessment and analysis, addresses the need for risk assessments at sporting venues, and describes the sport-specific risk assessment model developed while conducting research through a Homeland Security grant.

Introduction:

Sport lost its innocence on September 5, 1972, at the Olympic Games in Munich, Germany (CNN.com, 2002). A Palestinian group known as Black September crept into the Olympic Village and took nine members of the Israeli team hostage. The captors demanded a safe exit out of Germany and the release of Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli jails (2002). Unfortunately, a failed rescue attempt led to the death of all nine Israeli hostages, five terrorists, and one German policeman (2002). “For the first time, world sport had become a victim of terrorism, bringing with it a brutal reminder of the world’s harsher realities” (2). Terrorism struck again in 1996. A ‘domestic terrorist’ was responsible for the Centennial Olympic Park bombing at the Atlanta Games. This incident killed one person and injured more than 100 (CNN.com, 1996). Regardless of the motives for these attacks, terrorists chose to act on a world stage that offered global exposure for their cause. The incident in which an Oklahoma student prematurely detonated a bomb strapped to his body outside a football stadium packed with 84,000 in October 2005 (Hagmann, 2005), and the most recent threat of a dirty bomb attack on several NFL stadiums in October 2006 (CNN.com, 2006), emphasize the fact that sport venues are an attractive target for potentially catastrophic consequences. Besides terrorism, sport venue managers must plan for other incidents or unexpected disasters, such as fan/player violence or natural hazards.

One problem that sports venue manager’s face is determining the potential threat level, “causing leagues, teams and venues to prepare for a range of possible incidents at their facilities and to maintain close contact with federal, state and local law enforcement representatives regarding possible threats” (Hurst, Zoubek, Pratsinakis, n.d., p. 4). The risk assessment process is a way to determine risk and threat levels and identify vulnerabilities. “A good risk management approach includes three primary elements: a threat assessment, a vulnerability assessment, and a criticality assessment.” (Decker, 2001, p. 1). These assessments provide vital information for the protection of critical assets against terrorist attacks and other threats. Sport venue managers are able to identify vulnerabilities and thus harden the facility and improve physical protection systems. This may include implementing access controls, using CCTV security cameras, adding lighting, encouraging background checks, credentialing, checking backpacks, enhancing communication networks, and developing or updating emergency response and evacuation plans.

Understanding Risk

“Risk is the possibility of loss resulting from a threat, security incident, or event” (General Security Risk Assessment Guideline, 2003, p. 5). Risk is inherent in almost all aspects of life. Sport venue managers must continually attempt to minimize risk at their facilities. Risk cannot be totally eliminated from the environment, but with careful planning it can be managed. “Risk management is a systematic and analytical process to consider the likelihood that a threat will endanger an asset, individual, or function and to identify actions to reduce the risk and mitigate the consequences of an attack” (Decker, 2001, p. 1).

Risk is best understood as the product of the consequence of an event and the probability of the event occurring: Risk = Consequence x Probability (“Risk 101”, n.d). Risk increases as the consequences and probability of occurrence increases (n.d.). “In order to manage risk, it must first be identified, measured, and evaluated” (4). The Vulnerability Methodologies Report (2003) issued by the Office for Domestic Preparedness, Department of Homeland Security, identified three types of risk: mission or function risks, asset risks, and security risks. Mission risks prevent an organization from accomplishing a mission. Asset risks may harm an organization’s physical assets. Security risks have the potential to cripple actual data and people (2003).

Sport facility managers identify risks through various means. They can conduct surveys of attendees, conduct inspections of the facility, interview present employees, or ask experts in the field (Ammon, Southall, & Blair, 2004). Sport facility managers must address primary and secondary factors in order to reduce risk (2004). Primary factors are identified in the standard operating procedures. Facility staff is included among these factors (2004). An unsupervised or improperly trained ticket taker, usher, or cashier can become a risk for the facility manager (2004). “A well-trained staff, educated about proper risk management procedures, can help the risk manager to identify potential risks” (p. 108). Secondary factors of risk faced by most sport facilities include weather, type of event, patron demographics, and facility location (2004).

The essence of risk is dependent on the potential of threats. “A threat is a product of intention and capability of an adversary, both manmade and natural, to undertake an action which would be detrimental to an asset” (Vulnerability Assessment Report, 2003, p. 11). Vulnerabilities expose the asset to a threat and eventual loss. The General Security Risk Assessment Guideline (2003) defines vulnerability as “an exploitable capability; an exploitable security weakness or deficiency at a facility, entity, venue, or of a person” (p. 5). A risk analysis evaluating the potential of loss from a threat will determine whether risk should be reduced, re-assigned, transferred, or accepted (Vulnerability Assessment Report, 2003). “An acceptable risk is the risk level that an individual or group considers reasonable for the perceived benefit of an activity” (“Risk 101”, n.d., Acceptable Risk 1). An acceptable level of risk is usually determined by the asset manager or owner (2003). Severe risks that cause a high degree of loss and occur frequently should be avoided (Ammon, Southall, & Blair, 2004). Average frequency and moderate severity risks can be transferred to someone who’s willing to assume the risk. The facility manager may decide to pay an insurance company to cover physical and financial damages (2004). Some facility mangers may decide to keep or retain the risk. In so doing, they become financially responsible (2004). Facility managers can reduce risk through staff training, preventative maintenance, and development of a risk management plan to be included in the standard operating procedure (SOP) (2004). “The SOP is a set of instructions giving detailed directions and appropriate courses of action for given situations. SOP’s should be developed for all risks,” (Farmer, Mulrooney, & Ammon, 1996, p. 81).

In order to determine threats and vulnerabilities, an organization must undergo a risk assessment. The Department of Homeland Security issued a ten-step risk assessment methodology criterion (Vulnerability Assessment Report, 2003):

• Clearly identify the infrastructure sector being assessed.
• Specify the type of security discipline addressed, e.g. physical, information, operations.
• Collect specific data pertaining to each asset.
• Identify critical/key assets to be protected.
• Determine the mission impact of the loss or damage of that asset.
• Conduct a threat analysis and perform assessment for specific assets.
• Perform a vulnerability analysis and assessment to specific threats.
• Conduct analytical risk assessment and determine priorities for each asset.
• Be relatively low cost to train and conduct.
• Make specific, concrete recommendations concerning countermeasures.

This is general in nature and may be adapted to meet the needs of a specific organization. Several other risk assessment models exist today. For example, Sandia National Laboratories developed the RAM-Chemical to assess chemical facilities in the United States. Sports facilities in the U.S. must embrace risk management processes. Identifying the greatest threats and eliminating or reducing vulnerabilities will help minimize risk at sports events. “A sports arena is always critical as a high value terrorist target because of the potentially high casualty rate” (Durling, Price, & Spero, 2005, p. 8). Whether facing a terrorist attack, natural disaster, or unruly fan behavior, sport venue managers must pursue an effective risk management approach to protect the facility and human lives.

The Sports Event Security Assessment Model (SESAM)

In May, 2005, the Department of Homeland Security, in conjunction with the Mississippi Emergency Management agency, awarded the University of Southern Mississippi a $568,000 research grant to create a research-based model for the security management of university sport venues. Several risk assessment methodologies were reviewed and the DHS risk assessment criterion was customized for the assessment of sport venues. The Sport Event Security Assessment Model (SESAM) was developed through the collaboration of academic and security professionals in a six-hour brainstorming session. Academic professionals with experience in the sport event security area and training in DHS threat/risk assessment participated. Security professionals included former employees of the FBI, CIA, and Secret Service with extensive background in risk assessment methods and vulnerability assessment experience in the security and sport security field. This collaborative group supported the development and field testing of the model. A seven step procedure was created to evaluate sport security operations. An overview of the SESAM is presented in figure 1.

A risk assessment was conducted of the sport operations at seven public universities in Mississippi between May 2005 and February 2006. The following highlights the critical points during each stage of the seven-step process:

1. Step 1 of the process involves the identification of a SESAT team, including all key personnel responsible for game day security. These may include the athletic facility manager, campus police chief, emergency management director, local sheriff, and/or campus physical plant facility manager. Once the SESAT is established, meetings and interviews are scheduled to provide assessment objectives and define the assessed area based on a one mile radius of the sport venue.

2. Characterization of assets and target identification are achieved through in-depth surveys and interviews at each sport facility. Campus and community assets are identified and prioritized. Critical infrastructure and existing physical protection countermeasures are also identified. The target attractiveness is finally evaluated.

3. The threat assessment focuses on potential threat elements on campus and in the surrounding community. Specific factors are taken into consideration, including the existence of a group/individual operating close to the venue, history or past activity of the group/individual, intentions of the potential threat to act, their capability to act, and the ultimate targeting of the sport venue. A threat level is assigned to each critical asset, which is identified during step 2 of the risk assessment process.

Figure 1: Sport Event Security Assessment Model (SESAM). Adapted by Robert Rolen, Walter Cooper, Lou Marciani, and Stacey Hall. The Center for Spectator Sports Security Management.

4. The vulnerability assessment is a key component of the risk assessment model involving the analysis of several key factors about the venue, including:

1. Level of Visibility: assess the awareness of existence and visibility of the sport venue to the general public.
2. Criticality of Sport Venue to the Jurisdiction: assess the usefulness of the sport venue to the local population, economy, or government.
3. Potential Sport Venue Population Capacity: assess the maximum number of people at a site at any given time.
4. Potential for Collateral Mass Casualties: assess potential mass casualties within a one-mile radius of the sport venue.
5. Impact Outside of the Venue: assess the loss outside of the sport venue.
6. Existence of CBRNE Elements: assess the presence of a legal WMD on the site.
7. Potential Threat Element Access to Sport Venue: assess the availability of the sport venue for ingress and egress by a PTE.

5. The consequence evaluation component analyzes the number of potentially injured people at the sport venue who might require transportation/hospitalization. It also assesses the loss of life, loss of infrastructure, economic and environmental impact, and the potential social trauma.

6. The overall risk level of a sport venue is calculated during this step. The risk assessment evaluates the threat potential (produced during step 3), likelihood of adversary success (produced during step 4), and severity of the consequences of an attack (produced during step 5). A final risk level is determined for the sport venue based on a scale of 0 to 5, with 0 being low and 5 being the greatest. It is the sport manager’s responsibility to determine what level is acceptable for the venue.

7. The final step involves the proposal of

consequence reduction

measures. These recommendations will help sport managers develop and/or enhance security policies and procedures, emergency response capabilities, and physical protection systems and capabilities at the venue. Also, suggestions for appropriate training in security awareness for staff and the sporting public are recommended.

The SESAM is a cyclical model, as assessments must be continuously completed to ensure that adequate plans and security measures are in place and maintained over a period of time. A sport venue’s threat or vulnerability level may change regarding circumstances in the country or even in the surrounding community. Evaluations of potential threats and existing vulnerabilities “are not only used to determine what dangers to prepare for and how to meet them, but also to prioritize preparedness efforts.” (Sauter & Carafano, 2005, p. 338). By determining which threats are the most dangerous, managers are able to decide where they should invest their time and effort in preparing to deal with the consequences of a potential incident (2005). The risk assessment process is also considered by most specialists “to be the most vital task establishing an effective business continuity/disaster recovery plan” (p. 338). Contingency planning will aid sport businesses in recovery efforts and continuation of operations during incidents.

Conclusion:

“On September 11^th, it became abundantly clear that stadium and arena operators needed to incorporate security safeguards at America’s sporting venues.” (Pantera et. al, 2003, 1). It is critical that all sport organizations complete a risk assessment of their sport venues in order to identify vulnerabilities and improve security measures. The sport organization should not become complacent or content with their current security practices. Sport programs in America are faced with an ongoing battle to stay alert and be prepared for the ‘unthinkable.’

References:

Ammon, R., Southall, R. & Blair, D. (2004). Sport facility management: Organizing events and mitigating risks. Morgantown, WV: Fitness Information Technology, Inc.

CNN.com. (1996, July 27). Sources: arrest in Olympic bombing could occur within days. Retrieved September 15, 2005, from http://www.cnn.com/US/9607/27/blast.am/index.html

CNN.com. (2002, September 5). When sport lost its innocence. Retrieved September 26, 2005, from http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/09/05/munich.72/

CNN.com (2006, October 18). Threats against NFL stadiums not credible. Retrieved October 18, 2006, from http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/10/18/football.threats/index.html

Decker, R.J. (2001). Key elements of a risk management approach. United States General Accounting Office. [On-line]. Available: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02150t.pdf

Durling, R.L., Price, D.E., & Spero, K.K. (2005). Vulnerability and risk assessment using the Homeland-Defense operational planning system (HOPS). Retrieved October 4, 2005, from http://www.llnl.gov/tid/lof/documents/pdf/315115.pdf

Farmer, P.J., Mulrooney, A.L., & Ammon, R. (1996). Sport facility planning and management. Morgantown, WV: Fitness Information Technology, Inc.

General Security Risk Assessment Guideline. (2003). ASIS International. [On-line]. Available: http://www.asisonline.org/guidelines/guidelinesgsra.pdf

Hagmann, D.J. (2005, October 30). Black hole in America’s heartland. Northeast Intelligence Network. Retrieved July 20, 2006, from http://www.homelandsecurityus.com/site/modules/news/article.php?storyid=16

Hurst, R., Zoubek, P., & Pratsinakis, C. (n.d.). American sports as a target of terrorism: The duty of care after September 11^th. [On-Line]. Available: www.mmwr.com/_uploads/UploadDocs/publications/American%20Sports%20As%20A%20Target%20Of%20Terrorism.pdf

Pantera, M.J., et. al. (2003). Best practices for game day security at athletic & sport venues. The Sport Journal, 6 (4). [On-Line]. Available: http://www.thesportjournal.org/2003Journal/Vol6-No4/security.asp

Risk 101. (n.d.). U.S. Coast Guard. Retrieved October 4, 2005, from http://www.uscg.mil/hq/gm/risk/background.htm

Sauter, M. A. & Carafano, J.J. (2005). Homeland Security: A complete guide to understanding, preventing, and surviving terrorism. New York, NY: McGraw Hill.

Vulnerability Assessment Report. (July, 2003). Office of Domestic Preparedness, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Retrieved May 31, 2005, from http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/vamreport.pdf

Abstract:

The under-representation of African-Americans in college baseball is evident. African-American athletes make up only 4.5% of all National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) baseball players. They are a shrinking percentage of Major League Baseball players. A focus group was established to identify specific sociological issues which were perceived to influence the under-representation of African-Americans in collegiate baseball. Additionally, information from the observation of SEC baseball games during the 2006 season was used to quantify the social pattern. Data from the “traditionally black” Southwestern Athletic Conference (SWAC) and the Mid-Eastern Athletic Conference (MEAC) were also collected during the 2006 season. For the Southeastern Conference (SEC), fan attendance was less than 1% African-American and the player participation rate was 1.91 per team during the 2006 season. Additionally, none of the SEC head or assistant baseball coaches were African-American. The focus group determined that the reasons for the decline in numbers were related to (1) lifestyle factors, (2) competition from other sports and social opportunities, and (3) the absence of African-American role models in baseball. The authors propose that Title IX legislation and the influence of sports media were primary factors in the change.

African-Americans in College Baseball

The under-representation of African-Americans in college baseball is an obvious yet perplexing picture in athletics today. African-American athletes are more than equitably represented among many of the most popular collegiate spectator sports; however, their near absence in college baseball appears to be more than coincidental. Questions arise as to whether the educational system, the social system of athletics, and/or federal legislation have been responsible for the reduction in the number of African-American baseball players in America.

Only 4.5% of all National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) baseball players were African-American during the 2004 season. This includes all divisions, in addition to the historically African-American colleges and universities. On the contrary, 42.0% and 32.3% of NCAA basketball and football players, respectively, were African-American in the 2003-2004 academic year (Bray, 2005).

When specifically examining one of the perennial collegiate conference baseball powers, the Southeastern Conference (SEC), only 4.2% of 2006 roster players were African-American, as noted in Table 1. The twelve universities that make up the SEC represent states with an average African-American population of 20.8%.

Ironically, when examining the historically black Mid-Eastern Athletic Conference (MEAC) and the Southwest Athletic Conference (SWAC), findings surface which again support the difficulty of finding African-Americans in collegiate baseball. African-Americans are the minority on many of the rosters of these teams, as seen in Table 1.

Table 1: African-American Participation and Attendance at SEC Baseball Games

With approximately 12.8% of the United States population reported to be African-American (United States Census Bureau, 2006), it would appear that African-American collegiate baseball players are under-represented. This is the case in both college and professional baseball.

Ken Williams of the Chicago White Sox, Major League Baseball’s (MLB) only African-American general manager, blamed the small number of collegiate scholarships designated for baseball on the small number of African-American players (Nightengale, 2006). Logan White, the Los Angeles Dodger’s amateur scouting director, noted that in his trips to colleges across the United States, he rarely encounters an African-American baseball player. Not only is the absence of the African-American player obvious at the collegiate level, the population has gone from 27% of Major League Baseball (MLB) players in 1975 to 8% today (Nightengale, 2006). Sociologists have recognized this trend and have proposed several theories to explain it.

Theories

A possible explanation for the diminishment of African-Americans in collegiate and professional baseball could be explained by Giddens’ (1979) “structuration” theory. This theory assumes that certain behaviors are shaped by an array of interconnected structures. These interconnected structures can include norms, accessibility, and facilitators. Norms are the expected behaviors that govern a culture. Facilitators can be individuals or events that increase the likelihood of engaging in a behavior. (The behavior in this case would be baseball.) Accessibility refers to the degree of availability a population has to baseball.

The Negro Leagues of the early part of the 20th century, in particular, provided African-Americans with access to a culture aligned with baseball. Prior to the integration of African-Americans into Major League Baseball (MLB) in 1947 (“African Americans in Sports,” n.d.), an estimated 2,300 African-Americans participated in professional baseball through the Negro Leagues (Lynn, 2006). In the 1920’s, even small African-American communities, such as the town of Buxton, Iowa, touted semiprofessional teams like the Wonders (Beran, 1990). African-American fans often traveled to surrounding states to watch the Wonders play. These games became a routine part of daily life for this community. Beran (1990) further noted that the games served as a gathering place for members of the community. As a result, the Wonders became a major part of the cultural identity of Buxton. Since the retirement of former Negro-League stars who went on to stellar careers in MLB, such as Henry Aaron, the number of both African-American baseball players and spectators has steadily declined in MLB (Early, 2000; Flanagan 1999).

Research by Odgen (2003a) suggested that television images may perpetuate the stereotype that African-Americans are not welcome in baseball venues. This is the basis for Odgen’s ‘Welcome Theory’, which states that certain groups feel a sense of belonging in some leisure activities, but not in others. Odgen found that African-Americans felt most welcome playing basketball and least welcome at country clubs. Feeling unwelcome in some leisure activities is not restricted to the African-American race. All races share a common attitude that activities are suited to some ethnicities more than others (Philipp, 1999). For example, of the 137 crowd shots at a particular televised baseball game, only one of them displayed a group of African-Americans (Odgen, 2003a). Furthermore, Ogden reported that only 3% of the attendance at a game dubbed “African-American Heritage Night” consisted of African Americans.

The Welcome Theory may be partially created by the extensive mass media edification of professional African-American basketball players (Hall, 2002). African-American youth are frequently shown that basketball is the most efficient route to fame and fortune. As a result, almost 80% of basketball players in the National Basketball Association (NBA) are African-American (Boyd, 1997).

Another factor that might explain the absence of African-Americans from baseball is a lack of social support for the game. A primary reason that children select extracurricular activity is for interaction with peers (Watson and Collis, 1982). Children naturally gravitate towards activities endorsed by peers within their social groups. The peers of African-American youth frequently endorse basketball instead of baseball by donning the apparel of their favorite NBA stars (Philipp, 1998; Wilson & Sparks, 1996).

Gravitation towards participation in sports other than baseball may begin at the youth level. Of the 2,000 youth players in select tournaments from 1998-2000, only 3% were African American (Odgen, 2001). Select leagues, also known as traveling teams, are the highest level of play in age-group baseball. These teams may be compiled from competitive tryouts and/or selecting players from other “all star” teams. Select team baseball is characterized by long and arduous seasons that may contain as many as 150 games for youth players (Odgen, 2003b). These teams often play games all across the country, which requires considerable travel expenses. This external demand may validate limited access as an explanation, if one assumes that African-Americans have less access to baseball leagues, select-travel teams, and fields. Baseball diamonds are documented more frequently in the suburbs than in the urban core, where the population of African-Americans is more heavily populated, further supporting the theory of a reduced access that African-American youth have to baseball (Odgen 2003b).

Efforts to Curb Disparity

Recently, several MLB celebrities and players have attempted to curb the lack of interest of African-Americans in the sport of baseball. Initiatives such as Reviving Baseball in Inner Cities (RBI), founded by John Young, a former major league player, have received funding from Major League Baseball (“Major League Baseball,” n.d.). RBI was created to enable inner city youth with reduced accessibility and funds to enjoy baseball. Since its inception in 1989, the RBI program has provided opportunities for youth baseball in more than 200 cities. Major League Baseball also sponsors a program known as the Urban Youth Baseball Academy (“Major League Baseball,” n.d.). Some former participants in this program have remained in baseball and are now professional baseball players. Another project, known as the Urban Initiative for Little League Baseball, plans to expand existing facilities and baseball programs in the inner cities (“Little League Online,” n.d. ). Professional players, such as Torii Hunter, have even spearheaded efforts to raise funds for the creation and maintenance of baseball facilities in low income areas (“The Torii Hunter Project,” n.d.).

After an examination of the literature, it appears that those who are associated with and who study baseball have taken note of the declining African-American population in the sport. The authors of this study attempted to quantify the number of African-Americans playing college baseball in several of the most visible collegiate conferences in America in an attempt to measure the magnitude of the social change.

Methods:

A focus group was established to assist in identifying specific sociological issues perceived to influence the under-representation of African-Americans in collegiate baseball. The focus group consisted of twelve college age, African-American males who were either currently on a NCAA Division II baseball roster or who had played baseball in high school but were no longer playing in college. The group met during the fall of 2006 in three, one-hour sessions over a one month period. The first meeting consisted of an introduction to the topic, followed by the distribution of the outline of this study. This was followed by a period of general brainstorming. The group was asked to investigate the literature related to this study topic before the next meeting. In the second meeting, the group continued brainstorming. Members were allowed to present findings from the previous week of research and to begin extrapolating reasons for the social change in baseball. Common themes among the focus group were identified. In meeting three, the focus group began the process of assembling and ranking its theories for the reduction of African-Americans in collegiate baseball.

In addition to the qualitative, focus group study, the authors gathered data from NCAA data bases and from observation of SEC baseball games during the 2006 season. The authors personally attended and collected SEC baseball attendance data by conducting visual counts of African-American fans and players at select SEC games during the 2006 season.

For point of interest purposes, data from the Southwestern Athletic Conference (SWAC) and the Mid-Eastern Athletic Conference (MEAC) were collected by examining the media publications of each member institution’s athletic website for the 2006 season. The schools in these two conferences are known as historical black colleges and universities (HBCU) with predominantly African-American populations. The authors attempted to secure the numbers of African-American baseball players and coaches from these conferences.

Results:

Examinations of the findings in Table 2 depict an SEC baseball fan attendance base that was 0.2% African-American during the 2006 season. There was an average of seven African-American fans at each weekend SEC baseball game in 2006, out of the average crowd of 3,707. In all cases, the African-American fan count was less than 1% of the attendance.

Table 2: African-American Participation in the Mid-Eastern Atlantic Conference (MEAC) and the Southwest Atlantic Conference (SWAC)

<tr”>MEAC% of African American PlayersSWAC% of African American Players

Additionally, none of the SEC head or assistant baseball coaches were African-American during the 2006 season. The average SEC team had 1.91 African-American players on the forty-man roster with the range from one to four players. The two SEC schools representing states with the highest African-American population, Mississippi State and Mississippi, from a state with a 36.3% African-American population, had zero African-American players.

As presented in Table 3, the focus group identified four categorical areas as reasons for the limited number of African-Americans in college baseball. The reasons noted by the focus group, in order of their perceived importance, were: (1) lifestyle factors, (2) competition for the African-American athlete from other sports and social opportunities, (3) the absence of African-American role models (either active players or coaches), and (4) a limitation resulting from the perception that the African-American athlete is more difficult to coach.

Table 3: Focus Group Conclusions for the Scarcity of African-American Baseball Players

Discussion:

There have been many theories presented as to why African-Americans are rapidly disappearing from college baseball. One possible explanation could be the relationship between the onset of Title IX, which led to many NCAA I schools reducing the number of baseball scholarships to 11.7 and to 10.0 in NCAA Division II, which may have contributed to the loss of interest in a college sport where full-scholarships are rare. In both NCAA Division I and II, partial scholarships are the rule, not the exception. There is the possibility that baseball has been socially architected out of the mainstream of African-American culture by means of well-intended legislation, such as Title IX. Results of this legislation have been to reduce access for the less affluent to college baseball and to influence athletes with the ability to play multiple sports to select a sport that can lead to a full scholarship.

Well-documented theories, such as Gidden’s structuration theory (1979), Ogden’s Welcome Theory, and limited access proposals (2003) may have credibility; however, they are difficult to prove quantitatively. It is likely that more than one specific theory or variable has been key in this social shift in baseball.

Several questions must be addressed. Have high-school and college baseball priced themselves out of the African-American athlete’s market by requiring participation in select teams for high schools or by limiting scholarship money for the college bound? Has the eagerness of the Central-American baseball player to sign for small bonuses become more appealing to MLB than going after the African-American player? Has the fact that MLB is now an international game influenced the reluctance of the high-school athlete to pursue baseball in college because other sports appear to be less competitive in the athlete’s quest for stardom? Is baseball too slow for the fast-paced lifestyle of the inner-city African-American youth? Are white athletes replacing African-Americans in baseball or is the international growth of the game naturally reducing the influence of any one racial group?

Perhaps the most perplexing rationale for the reduction in participation rates among African-Americans arises from the focus group in this study, which stated that the perceived slower pace of baseball has become a deterrent to participation among African-Americans. Baseball has many strategic games within it that are, in reality, constantly changing and fast paced. Therefore, the pace issue may have evolved out of a false perception which has been capitalized upon by those marketing other sports. People may not understand or see these elements of baseball. This issue itself merits further study.

No doubt, the evolution of sport participation is well documented. However, much study is needed before the theories behind the change can be scientifically proven. This author believes the change is primarily the result of a combination of the ramifications of Title IX legislation and the mass media marketing of the perception that other sports are faster paced and more entertaining.

References:

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Boyd, T. (1997). “The day the Niggaz took over: Basketball, Commodity, Culture, and Black Masculinity in Out of Bounds: Sports, Media, and the Politics of Identity, ed. Aaron Baker and Todd Boyd. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, p. 140.

Bray, Corey. (2005). 1999-2000-2003-2004 Student-Athlete ethnicity report. The National Collegiate Athletic Association. January 2005, Retrieved September 1, 2006, from http://www.ncaa.org/library/research/ethnicity_report/2003-04/2003-04_ethnicity_report.pdf

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Odgen, D. (2001). African Americans and pick-up ball: A loss of diversity and recreational diversion in midwest youth baseball. NINE: A Journal of Baseball History & Culture 9: pp. 200-207.

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Odgen, D. (2003b, March 20-23). The Welcome Theory: An approach to studying African American Youth Interest and Involvement in Baseball. Paper presented at the Tenth Annual NINE Spring Training Conference. Retrieved September 1, 2006 from http://muse.jhu.edu, from the Project Muse Database.

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