Sports Management – Page 52 – The Sport Journal

A History of Women in Sport Prior to Title IX

Submitted by: Richard C. Bell, Ed.D., J.D.

Abstract:

Women’s opportunities for competitive physical activity were limited in America until Federal Legislation, commonly referred to as Title IX, became law. It required American society to recognize a woman’s right to participate in sports on a plane equal to that of men. Prior to 1870, activities for women were recreational rather than sport-specific in nature. They were noncompetitive, informal, rule-less; they emphasized physical activity rather than competition. In the late 1800’s and early 1900’s, women began to form clubs that were athletic in nature. Efforts to limit women’s sport activity continued as they became more involved in competitive sports. This paper will present a history of women’s involvement in sport prior to the federal legislation enacted to eliminate sexual discrimination in education and sport.

Early Women’s Sports

Certainly, women engaged in sport three millennia ago. Homer, c 800 B.C., relates the story of Princess Nausicaa playing ball with her handmaidens next to a riverbank on the island of Scheria. “When she and her handmaids were satisfied with their delightful food, each set aside the veil she wore: the young girls now played ball; and as they tossed the ball…” (Homer, lines 98-102). Odysseus was awakened by the shouts of the girls engaged in their sport. Thousands of years later, the shouts of girls playing ball finally awoke the United States to the need for sport-specific opportunities for women.

Prior to 1870, sports for women existed in the form of play activities that were recreational rather than competitive and, being informal and without rules, emphasized physical activity (Gerber, Felshin, Berlin, & Wyrick, 1974). A dominant belief in the 1800s was that each human had a fixed amount of energy. If this energy were used for physical and intellectual tasks at the same time, it could be hazardous (Park & Hult, 1993). Horseback riding for pleasure, showboating, and swimming became fashionable, but women were not encouraged to exert themselves. Such physical activity for a woman was thought to be especially hazardous because during menstruation she was “periodically weakened” (Clarke, 1874, p. 100). In 1874, as women were beginning to gain access to higher education, Dr. Edward Clarke published Sex in Education; or, A Fair Chance for Girls, which sparked a tenacious and acrimonious debate about the capacity of women for physical activity. He stated that, “both muscular and brain labor must be reduced at the onset of menstruation” ( p. 102). Manipulating science to reinforce established dogma prevailed for many years in spite of repeated examples of women who were perfectly capable of performing physical feats and intellectual tasks. Many early opportunities for women to engage in physical activity were thwarted as a result of this dogma (Park & Hult).

As more women sought to become involved in physical activity, they became more competitive. In the late 1800s and early 1900s, women began to form informal athletic clubs. Tennis, croquet, bowling, and archery were popular in clubs from New York to New Orleans. Many men’s clubs allowed women to become associates and to participate in separate activities, though without according them full status. Parallel clubs in colleges began to appear during this time, but a major difference between the social metropolitan clubs and the college clubs was that the latter frequently sponsored coed competition as occasions for social gatherings (Gerber, et al., 1974).

College Sports for Women Prior to Title IX

Early college sports for women have been largely unrecognized by historians because competition was within college between students (intramural) rather than between the institutions (extramural). Competitions included intramural, club, and sorority matches, in addition to ‘play days’. These were special dates when women competed in sports and activities against students and teams from their schools. By 1936, 70% of colleges surveyed used this as a predominant form of sport participation for women (Hult, 1994).

Women’s physical educators were aware of the problems and criticism surrounding men’s intercollegiate athletics. They were determined to keep athletics in an educational environment for women. In the early 1900s, the Committee on Women’s Athletics (CWA) and the American Physical Education Association (APEA) endorsed programs of broad participation for women (Park & Hult, 1993). This occurred just as the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching produced its 1929 report, American College Athletics, reporting that amateurism was being eliminated or modified from athletics at the college level as colleges turned athletics into big business. The report argued that there should be a way to give “athletics back to the boys” (Thelin, 1994). These views were uppermost in the minds of many women’s physical educators as they met to organize a governing organization for women’s sports. In the 1920s, the Women’s Division-National Amateur Athletic Federation (NAAF) was formed to organize intercollegiate competition among women (Park & Hult).

Women were not active in intercollegiate sport until basketball was introduced at Smith College in 1892 (Gerber, et al., 1974). Basketball quickly spread to other colleges, and students began to clamor for intercollegiate play. Women’s physical educators opposed such competition because they were not ready to lose control over their programs (as they perceived the men had) (Gerber, et al.). The first intercollegiate competition among women was a scheduled tennis tournament between Bryn Mawr and Vassar. It was canceled because the Vassar faculty did not allow their women’s athletes to participate in competition between colleges (Hult, 1994). The honor of being the first teams to compete in women’s intercollegiate athletics belongs to the basketball teams of the University of California, Berkeley vs. Stanford and the University of Washington vs. Ellensburg Normal School; they played in 1896 (Gerber, et al.).

Competitive events for college women increased in the early 1900s. The nature of varsity competition was in conflict with the philosophy of women’s physical educators in the 1920s and 1930s, so these events were still uncommon. This philosophical conflict contributed to a lack of support for women’s varsity athletics. The NAAF provided a forum for women’s physical educators and leaders of women’s sports to formalize their beliefs regarding competition for girls and women by issuing a policy statement of the organizations goals for women. The goals were established to “play for play’s sake,” limit awards and travel, protect the participant from exploitation, discourage “sensational” publicity, and place qualified women in immediate charge of athletics and other physical activities (Gerber, et al., 1974). The motto was “every girl in a sport and a sport for every girl.” This position was interpreted by many as negative to competition and, as a consequence, virtually all forms of competitive sport for college women decreased in the early 1900s (Gerber, et al.).

The women’s suffrage movement in the late nineteenth and twentieth century resulted in the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920. The right to vote for women renewed emphasis on women’s freedoms. The first feminist movement resulted in modest gains for women in sports and intercollegiate competition, but these gains were negated by the depression in the 1930s. They would remain dormant for almost fifty years (Gelb & Palley, 1987). The depression left millions of Americans out of work, and the resulting campaign to keep women home and out of the work force left the women’s movement for broadened equal rights stagnating. The expectations of society were that a woman’s place was ‘in the home,’ which pushed aside the idea that there were psychological and physiological benefits to be gained from involvement in sport. This view remained largely unchanged until the events of the 1940s (Lucas & Smith, 1982).

The 1940s brought war to the United States and millions of men entered the military. Many women joined the military service or left their positions as homemakers to fill the void left in the work force, earning the moniker, “Rosie the Riveter.” They demonstrated that they were equal to the task. The self-esteem and self-confidence gained by women during these critical times propelled the movement for women’s equal rights. Many women believed that if they could compete successfully in the work force, then they could certainly compete on the athletic fields (Chafe, 1972). World War II also saw the advent of the first woman’s professional athletic team. The All-American Girls Baseball League was started in 1943 as an attempt to replace Major League Baseball, which had been canceled due to the war. When World War II ended, organizations for women in sport began to increase as sport became more competitive and intercollegiate and interscholastic competition spread (Gerber, et al., 1974).

In the 1950s and 1960s, the social conscience of America was changing. The push for Civil Rights, which culminated in the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, helped increase the status of women and minorities. A wave of feminist activism was born (Gelb & Palley, 1996). Feminist activism propelled the movement for women’s rights forward. The United States became embroiled in the debate for an Equal Rights Amendment. This debate raised the consciousness of those involved in women’s sport. Collegiate women seeking greater athletic opportunities moved closer to their goals in 1957, when the long-entrenched official position statement of the Division for Girls and Women in Sport (DGWS) was amended to state that intercollegiate programs “may” exist. In 1963, the DGWS view of women in sport evolved further to state that it was “desirable” that intercollegiate programs for women exist (Gerber, et al., 1974).

In 1966, the DGWS appointed a Commission on Intercollegiate Sports for Women (CISW) to assist in conducting intercollegiate competitions. In 1967, it was renamed the Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics for Women (CIAW). The women’s movement in sport was rapidly moving toward a status more in line with men’s athletics. In 1969, a schedule of national championships for women’s sports was announced that included gymnastics and track and field. Swimming, badminton, and volleyball followed in 1970 and in 1972, basketball was added. Women wanted an institutional membership organization similar to the NCAA. The CIAW was replaced by the Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women (AIAW) in 1971. This set the stage for the struggle to control women’s athletics in the 1970s between the AIAW and the NCAA (Gerber, et al., 1974).

The increasingly positive attitude toward women in sport carried over into the 1970s (Hult, 1994). The AIAW began the 1971-1972 academic year with 278 charter institutions. By 1981, their membership exceeded 800. Their mission was to “lead and conduct” programs at the collegiate level that were competitive for women (Hulstrand, 1993). The AIWA focused on the female student-athlete’s education, not on athletic performance, and thus rejected the ‘win or die’ attitude of the NCAA. Instead, the AIAW emphasized participation in sport as the most important aspect and de-emphasized winning (Sperber, 1990).

The Evolution of Title IX

The new wave of feminism within the larger social reforms sought by the Civil Rights movement moved women closer to legislative action for greater equal treatment in athletics. The concept that federal legislation was to eliminate sexual discrimination was the main focus of women’s groups in the late 1960s and early 1970s. At their first national conference in 1967, the National Organization for Women (NOW) adopted a platform that read in part “…the right of women to be educated to their full potential equally with men be secured by Federal and State legislation” (Boles, 1989, p.643).

Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 was paid little attention in the early legislative efforts to codify these rights. Court-ordered busing in the other Titles of the Omnibus Education Amendments took the spotlight (Palley & Preston, 1978). It was only after Title IX was passed, when the question surrounding implementation arose, that opposition to Title IX took place (Gelb & Palley, 1987). After the passage of Title IX, Congress built in a six-year period for secondary and post-secondary schools to achieve compliance. The date for compliance by colleges and universities was 1978. Interpretation and enforcement were vested in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (Carpenter, 1993).

The critical element lacking after the passage of Title IX was the implementation legislation that would specify how it was to be applied and to whom. Passage of the implementation legislation was not easy; many self-interest groups sought to erode the legislation. In 1974, approximately sixty women’s and feminist groups formed a coalition called the Education Task Force (which would later becme the National Coalition for Women and Girls in Education) (Gelb & Palley). It was largely as a result of their persistent and dedicated efforts through lobbying that Title IX was successful.

The NCAA became concerned by what it perceived to be the potential weakening of its position as the dominant and controlling body of intercollegiate athletics. If Title IX was to apply to intercollegiate sports at all levels and women were to be elevated to a status equal to the men, its financial assets and political power were threatened. The first approach of the NCAA, when faced with the threat of equality in intercollegiate athletics, was to attempt to limit Title IX’s application. The NCAA tried to offer its interpretation of Title IX (Acosta & Carpenter, 1985). It encouraged a narrow interpretation of the law, excluding athletic departments from the scope of Title IX. The NCAA argued that because athletic departments did not receive federal funds, they should be excluded from compliance. Nonetheless, when the NCAA sought to limit the application of Title IX, it began to address the issue of control of women’s athletics in earnest.

The NCAA observed the growth of women’s athletics and looked to the increased financial base and political power to be gained from exerting control over women’s intercollegiate athletics. It set out to force the AIAW out of control (Hult, 1994). The strategy was to absorb the AIAW into its current structure while offering women’s championships outside the AIAW to effectively link schools to the NCAA. Because there was no alternative mechanism for determining college-level champions, this strategy could have been successful (Stern, 1979). The NCAA decided to form its own NCAA Women’s Committee and exclude the AIAW (Carpenter, 1993). The NCAA had never shown an interest in women’s athletics before Title IX because there was nothing that required female participation at a national level. Thus, it chose not to pursue women’s athletics. “The formation of this committee was politically significant because prior to this time the NCAA had demonstrated no interest whatever in taking responsibility for women’s sports” (Carpenter, 1993, p. 83).

In the fall of 1974, the NCAA agreed to a meeting with the AIAW. The NCAA wanted the AIAW to affiliate itself with the NCAA; the AIAW hoped to form a joint committee to draw up rules. The NCAA did not consider the AIAW its equal and it would not agree to a 50-50 joint union and equal representation at all policy-making levels (Festle, 1996).

At its 1973 convention, the NCAA waived the regulation barring women from men’s events, thinking that the compromise of allowing a token female to compete in the NCAA championships would help avoid charges of sex discrimination and help avoid offending the AIAW while avoiding any real commitment to women’s athletics (Festle, 1996). The NCAA continued to be concerned about the loss of power and control over intercollegiate athletics as it began to sense that the idea of equal opportunity for women in intercollegiate athletics was the direct aim of the Federal Government. The NCAA needed to implement an acceptable policy without delay (Festle).

The NCAA was a powerful adversary for the AIAW because of its wealth, political influence, and long history. The NCAA decided to introduce women’s championships for intercollegiate sports by offering the institutions sponsoring women’s sports a proposition that ultimately led to the demise of the AIAW. The NCAA offered to: (a) pay all expenses for teams competing in a national championship, (b) charge no additional membership fees for schools to add women’s programs, (c) create financial aid, recruitment, and eligibility rules that were the same for women as for men, and finally, (d) guarantee women more television coverage. The NCAA had earmarked three million dollars to support women’s championships. The AIAW could not compete with the NCAA inducements and the loss of membership, income, championship sponsorship, and media rights forced the AIAW to cease operations on June 30, 1982 (Festle, 1996). The AIAW sued the NCAA for allegedly violating the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, but was unsuccessful when the courts ruled that the market for women’s athletics was open for competition, therefore no anti-trust laws had been violated (Schubert, Schubert, & Schubert-Madsen, 1991).

Subsequent to Title IX, women and girls have become much more involved in sports. College women’s athletic participation has increased from 15% in 1972 to 43% in 2001. High school girl’s athletic participation increased from 295,000 in 1971 to 2.8 million in 2002-2003, an increase of over 840%. In 2004, the average number of teams offered for females per college/university was 8.32, up from 2.50 per school in 1972 (Carpenter & Acosta, 2005). In 1981-82, women’s championships became a part of the NCAA program. Today, the NCAA sponsors forty women’s championships, thirty-eight men’s championships, and three combined championships in all three of its divisions (NCAA, 2005).

It can be seen that women’s involvement in sport was slow to develop. Opportunities for participation and recognition were almost non-existent for centuries. It was not until the advent of the equal rights movements and Title IX that women truly found a place as participants in the world of sport and in the public arena.

References

Acosta, R.V. & Carpenter, L.J. (1985). Women in sport. In Donald Chu, Jeffrey O. Segrave & Beverly J. Becker (Eds.), Sport and Higher Education (pp.313-325). Champaign, IL. Human Kinetics.

Boles, J.K. (1989). A policy of our own: Local feminist networks and social services for women and children. Policy Studies Review, 8(3), 638-647.

Carpenter, L.J. (1993). Letters home: My life with Title IX. In G.L. Cohen (Ed). Women in Sport: Issues and Controversies. (pp 133-155), Newberry Park, CA.: Sage Publishing.

Carpenter, L.J. & Acosta, R.V. (2005). Title IX. Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics.

Chafe, W.H. (1972). The American woman: Her changing social, economic and political roles, 1920-1970. New York: Oxford University Press.

Clarke, E. H. (1874). Sex in education; or, a fair chance for girls. Boston: James R. Osgood and Company.

Festle, M.J. (1996). Playing nice: Politics and apologies in women’s sports. New York: Columbia University Press.

Gelb, J., & Palley, M.L. (1996). Title IX: The politics of sex discrimination. Women and Public Policies: reassessing gender politics. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.

Gerber, E.W., Felshin, J., Berlin, P., & Wyrick, W. (Eds.). (1974). The American woman in sport. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Homer, The Odyssey of Homer (Allen Mandelbaum, trans.) Berkeley, CA: University of California Press (1990).

Hult, J.S. (1994). The story of women’s athletics: Manipulating a dream 1890-1985. In D.M. Costa & S.R. Guthrie (Eds.), Women and sport: Interdisciplinary perspectives. (pp. 83-107), Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics.

Hultstrand, B.J. (1993). The growth of collegiate women’s sports: The 1960s. The Journal of Physical Education, Recreation, and Dance, 64(3), 41-43.

Lucas, J.A., & Smith, R.A. (1982). Women’s sport: A trial of equality. In R. Howell (Ed.), Her Story in Sport: A Historical Anthology of Women in Sports (pp. 239-265). West Point, NY: Leisure Press.

NCAA Championships (2005).http://www.ncaa.org/about/champs.html

Palley, M.L., & Preston, M.B. (1978). Symposium on race, sex and policy studies. Policy Studies Journal, 7, 188.

Park, R.J., & Hult, J.S. (1993). Women as leaders in physical education and school-based sports, 1865 to the 1930s. The Journal of Physical Education, Recreation & Dance, 64(3), 35-40.

Schubert, A.F., Schubert, G.W., & Schubert-Madsen, D.L. (1991). Changes influenced by litigation in women’s intercollegiate athletics. Seton Hall Journal of Sport Law, 1, 237-268.

Sperber, M. (1990). College sports inc.: The athletic department vs. the university. New York, John Hopkins Press.

Stern, R.N. (1979, June). The development of an inter-organizational control network: the case of intercollegiate athletics. Administrative Science Quarterly, 24, 242-266.

Thelin, J. (1994). Games colleges play: Scandal and reform in intercollegiate athletics. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press.

U.S. Sports Academy2016-10-12T14:50:53-05:00March 14th, 2008|Sports Management, Women and Sports|Comments Off

Non-Economic Societal Impacts of Intercollegiate Athletics

Submitted by: David Larimore, Ph.D & George Chitiyo, Ph.D

Abstract:

Intercollegiate athletics impact society in numerous positive ways. A number of studies have been done seeking to establish the effects of these sports programs on athletes, their institutions, and society at large. This paper is a synthesis of the literature concerning the non-economic impacts of sports. The findings largely support the notion that athletics are beneficial, not only to athletes, but to society in general. Many important lessons and virtues are derived from athletics. Among the many benefits to higher education institutions are the concepts of attracting more admissions applications and enhancing institutional name recognition and visibility.

Introduction:

Athletics provide entertainment, physical development, social interaction, and business (Cigliano, 2006). They create platforms for individual recognition and institutional visibility. There are many positive externalities associated with athletic activities. Attaching monetary value to these effects is difficult, as the value is based on societal satisfaction measures that are hard to measure.

Athletics Mould Virtues

Athletics help shape the social character of participants (Rudd and Stoll, 2004). A sample of 595 students from several universities was used in a causal-comparative study in which athletes and non athletes were compared concerning social and moral character. There were significant differences between athletes and non athletes. The main conclusion was that sport helps build character in terms of teamwork, loyalty, and self-sacrifice. There is no evidence to support the idea that athletics help build moral character, though neither is it proven that they do not do so.

Yiannakis, Douvis, and Murdy (2003) studied the perceived economic and non-economic impacts of sports. The findings are based on a survey of 702 residents and students of Connecticut attending two universities. They measured the perceived impacts of sports in terms of job creation, infrastructure, image promotion, economic impacts, environmental impacts, crime, and deviancy, among others. The authors conjectured that conflicts, issues, ideologies, pain, success, and tragedy are all blended in sports. People identify with these and are able to better handle the challenges of life as they see teams fighting on the field of play.

Athletes learn the principles of self discipline, teamwork, winning and losing, hard work, and self confidence. They have their self esteem boosted (National Federation of High Schools, 2003). One athletics director at a community college within the Tennessee Board of Regents (TBR) said, “Athletics fulfill major commitments of our mission statement to educate the whole person, to develop teamwork and leaders, and to contribute to the personal health and well-being of our students” (Cigliano, 2006, p45).

Yiannakis et al. (2003) established that the perceptions of people regarding the positive impacts of sport differed based on whether one was a fan or not. Non fans tend to regard sports as a nuisance that causes traffic jams and pollution. Enthusiasts savor the joy brought by the victories of their teams. A relationship may exist between the degree of interest and the extent to which sports are perceived to be beneficial.

Cigliano’s (2006) qualitative study was done at two community colleges in the TBR to examine the economic, institutional, and human impacts of athletic programs. The participants from each college included the president, the athletics director, two coaches, and four student-athletes. Coaches from the colleges said they viewed athletics as vehicles that help some students stay in school. The discipline and structure in athletic programs help motivate student-athletes to take advantage of educational opportunities. The coaches spoke of employing discipline, monitoring class and study hall attendance, and using encouragement to motivate student-athletes to achieve academic goals and become academically successful. Indirectly, the study addressed the apparent conflict of goals between academic interests and athletics. As long as there is a good relationship between the sports departments and academics, goal conflict exists only as an abstract concept.

Student-athletes participating in Cigliano’s (2006) study stated the following as virtues they received: recognition, patience, becoming better persons, self-discipline, maturity, motivation, teamwork, knowing people better, working hard, perseverance, working together, self-confidence, and leadership. The presidents, athletic directors, and coaches identified leadership development, a sense of civic responsibility, loyalty, punctuality, team work, cooperation, winning and losing with class and dignity, being competitive, developing individual strengths and skills, getting along with people, obedience, discipline, learning to make independent decisions, adjusting to being on their own, and maturity as virtues learned from athletics.

In the words of one athlete:

As much as we have to be physically in shape…we definitely also need an attitude which enhances our performance. This…(is)…an inner attitude of confidence in your ability, determination to see what you can do, and delight in what may be possible. The positive vibes that surround a person with an attitude like this can spread (Depew¹ , 1999).

The NFHS (2003) reported that sport promotes citizenship and sportsmanship by instilling a sense of pride in community, teaching lessons of teamwork and self-discipline, and facilitating the physical and emotional development of participants.

Bailey, Moulton, and Moulton (1999) compared athletes and non-athletes concerning levels of self-esteem and approval motivation. A sample of 492 university undergraduates participated in this study; ninety-four were athletes. The study used a multivariate analysis of variance to determine whether there was a significant difference between athletes and non-athletes on the variables of self-esteem and approval motivation. Athletes had significantly higher levels of self-esteem than non-athletes. There was also a statistically significant difference on approval motivation. Thus, athletes are “more likely to view themselves positively…and are less likely to engage in approval seeking behavior than non-athletes” (Bailey, Moulton, & Moulton, 1999).

The ability of physical exercise to eliminate anxiety in university youth was investigated by Akandere and Tekin (2002). The sample was comprised of 311 students from Konya Selcuk University of Turkey who had never been involved in physical exercise. A sub-sample of sixty students who had the highest anxiety scores was split in half, so that thirty became the experimental group (which participated in organized physical activity) and the other thirty became the control group. Participation in physical exercise and physical activities decreased the anxiety level of both sexes.

Basking in Reflected Glory

Athletic activities relax the mind and “function as psychological and spiritual havens where disorder and moral ambiguities are resolved and managed through communal sport ritual practices and traditions” (Yiannakis et al., 2003, p.5). One of the perceived impacts lies in a concept called ‘Basking in Reflected Glory’ (BIRG). In Yiannakis et al.’s study, a majority of the respondents reported feeling ‘really good’ when their teams won and feeling ‘really bad’ when their teams lost. However, the relationship between sport-induced mood states, social identity, empowerment, and pro-social behavior is not fully understood and may require further inquiry.

One of the most popular studies on ‘BIRG’ was done by Cialdini et al. (1976)². College students were found to be more likely to use the pronoun ‘we’ and to wear clothing that identified with their schools after a successful athletic weekend than during times when they had drawn or lost. Cialdini posited that people had a predisposition to associate with positive outcomes and make them their own. When one is ‘BIRG’, the person on the receiving end would not have done anything to bring the team’s success. Theirs is just to bask in unearned grandeur. When one’s team does well, it results in feelings of happiness, well-being, and collective euphoria. It has also been suggested that ‘BIRG’ improves mood in both individuals and communities.

On the flip side of the concept of ‘BIRG’ is ‘Cutting-Off Reflected Failure’ (CORF). The main ‘CORF’ strategy is to minimize the association between oneself and the losing team via several means, including by refusing to attend the teams’ matches’ and using terms such as ‘they’ rather than ‘we’. ‘CORF’ can be said to have somewhat positive results. The pessimism that precedes crucial matches can have the positive impact of uniting fans in the face of the possibility that it can all go wrong. Such an acceptance of a possible negative outcome can have the effect of protecting fans against disappointment as a result of failure. Having a shared moan can be a way of bonding³.

Reputation and Institutional Image

The reputation of an academic institution is closely tied to its sports programs (Cigliano, 2006; Pulsinelli et al, 1989). Thrilling performances by teams score points for the institution. High ranking sporting colleges are also ranked high in the academic arena.

The majority of respondents from Cigliano’s (2006) study mentioned a variety of values of publicity that athletic programs brought to the colleges, including a sense of excitement, activity, focus, free advertising, media coverage, service area communication, recruitment enhancement, and identity for local support to the institutions. The institutional image generated was said to be very positive. Good coverage amounted to free advertising. One of the presidents commented that:

Whether it is right or wrong, many people out in the community do not see anything in your college other than athletics. I mean, you have a certain constituent group out there that will even evaluate your college on how your athletic program is and people read about athletics in the paper. (Cigliano, p62).

In the study, athletic directors noted that visibility of their colleges was due more to athletics than any other department. They pointed out that institutional recognition is a function of the athletics program.

In a 2004 study, Frank mentioned the effect that spending on big time sports has on a university’s name recognition. Because these institutions are constantly making headlines in the public media, their names become more familiar to prospective students than those which are not publicized. This is likely to influence them in the college decision-making process. In such instances, “a big-time athletic program serves much like a national advertising campaign” (Frank, p15).

While athletes are students, they are also considered role models by their fans. People identify with role models on the sports field (Yiannakis et al., 2003). James Sheridan, a cross country athlete at Kenyon College, said, “athletes represent (their institutions) across the country and the type of attitude (they) project reflects on (the) entire learning institution” (Depew, 1999).

Enrollment

Athletics have a positive effect on enrollment. Pulsinelli, Borland, & Goff (1989) postulated that in order for sporting teams to be self financing, athletic teams would have to ‘attract’ a certain number of non-athletic students to the university. Enrollment data for the years 1960 to 1988 were analyzed with winning percentages for football and basketball. Overall, high sporting performance was associated with increased enrollment. This study alluded to the fact that recruiting high profile athletes might increase enrollment because of the indirect ‘attracting influence’ exerted on non-athlete aspiring students. When choosing among schools that offer athletic programs, non athletes prefer schools that have winning records to those that do not.

An impact study of Nichols State University (NSU) by Coats and Cox (2004), found that athletics have an effect on enrollment apart from the economic impact. Nicholls State’s athletic programs directly supported 239 student athletes. It was estimated that these student athletes drew an additional forty-three friends or relatives to NSU. Furthermore, of the 105 members of the marching band, approximately a third would have enrolled elsewhere were it not for the existence of the athletics program. Thus, the NSU athletics and associated programs were directly responsible for attracting 322 students to NSU. These students, in turn, supported approximately fourteen faculty positions.

Toma and Cross (1996) examined undergraduate admissions applications for institutions that won the NCAA Division I-A national football championship and those that won the NCAA men’s basketball tournament for the years 1979 through 1992. Increases were recorded in undergraduate admissions applications in years following a championship season. Fourteen out of sixteen schools that won or shared championships in football recorded increases in the number of applications. In basketball, ten out of thirteen schools recorded increases in applications following the NCAA Tournament championship.

Frank (2004) analyzed the effects of successful athletic programs on soliciting additional applications and donations by alumni and others. He postulated that universities continue to expand expenditures when they may fail to cover direct costs because the athletic programs may generate indirect benefits in other domains of sufficient value to make up the shortfall. The study stated that, “If students are indeed more likely to apply to an institution with a successful athletic program…such schools will be more selective than others on…the average SAT scores of entering freshmen.” McCormick and Tinsley (1987) validated this by asserting that freshmen entering a school would have an average SAT score about thirty-three points higher than it would if it did not have a big-time athletic program. They estimated a multiple regression in which the average SAT score was dependent on several variables, including whether the school had a thriving athletics program. Their data came from about 150 schools for the year 1971, sixty-three of which had big time athletic programs.

The opportunity to participate in athletics is a primary consideration for students (Cigliano, 2006). One community college president stated that the athletic program attracted between eighty to one-hundred students who would not be attending college if the athletic program were not available for them. Another said that sports had a significant impact on enrollment because of the influence athletes had in attracting girlfriends, friends, and peers.

Academic Performance

Student athletes in Colorado were shown to have ‘significantly higher’ grade-point averages than their non-sporting counterparts (NHFS, 2003). Those in Jefferson County high schools were also shown to have higher grade-point averages than their non-sporting peers. The latter school district has matched the academic success of its students with success on the playing field (NHFS, 2003).

Schildnecht (2002) quoted studies by the North Carolina High School Athletic Association, the Colorado Department of Education, and the American College testing services to show that students who participated in sports performed better academically. Student athletes were also found to be more likely to graduate than their non-athletic counterparts.

In one study, which goes against the idea of athletics having a positive relationship with graduation rates, Mangold, Bean, and Adams (2003) explored the impact that athletic programs have on institutional graduation rates. Data on graduation rates for ninety-seven universities competing in NCAA Division IA basketball and football were regressed on several predictors. The results of the study did not support the hypothesis that colleges with successful sports programs would have higher graduation rates for students in general. On smaller campuses, involvement in a successful sports program was suggested to conflict with academic goals. This study provides an example of the post hoc fallacy. There’s probably some third variable that explains this negative relationship.

Lucas and Lovaglia (2002) found that non athletic scholars anticipated higher benefits from academic success than athletes. Their study, for which the sample was 135 students (of which thirty-three were athletes), sought to measure the perceptions of student athletes and non athletes regarding cost, benefit, and motivation towards academic success. They reported that student athletes had a lower motivation to perform academically than non athletes. This does not, however, necessarily support the notion that athletes struggle academically as compared to non athletes, as the authors suggested.

A study was done by Meier, Robinson, Polinard, and Wrinkle (2000) to see if pursuit of athletic goals had a negative impact on academic interests of universities as reflected by scores on the SAT and ACT. The data for the analysis came from Texas school districts for the years 1997-1998. Athletic budgets were found to have no relationship with school attendance. However, the study concluded that athletic budgets had a significant negative relationship with academic performance, although the statistical significance of the variables is unknown. The study acknowledges that there are positive benefits at the individual level. Whatever these impacts may be, it is tempting to suggest that these individual benefits, across the district, could collectively override the negative results of athletics across academic institutions.

Donations

Having reviewed literature pertaining to alumni donations, Frank (2004) concluded that there is evidence that links athletic success to alumni giving. Rhoads and Gerking (2000) also analyzed the role of success in intercollegiate football and basketball in attracting donations to universities from alumni and other sources. Results from regression analysis of panel data from eighty-seven universities showed that, year to year, changes in athletic success had a positive impact on alumni giving. Other donors were not as responsive. Longstanding athletic traditions were shown to attract charitable donations.

Clotfelter cited participation in extracurricular activities and athletics as one of the factors that affected alumni giving (2001). The study utilized a data set of graduates from fourteen private institutions and sought to establish factors associated with alumni donations. The data covered cohorts of individuals who entered the institutions in the fall of 1951, 1976, and 1989. The findings showed that over half of all donations were given by only 1% of all alumni, most of whom contribute annually.

In a 2000 study of 2,822 Vanderbilt University graduates, Dugan, Mullin, and Siegfried investigated alumni giving behavior during the eight years following their graduation. A probit model and a regression were run on the data of givers and non givers. Participation in athletics was found to generate a stronger sense of attachment to the university through group membership, a factor which would have a positive effect on giving. In addition, former athletes receive solicitations from special clubs of former athletes apart from the usual appeal for alumni contributions. For that reason, they are expected to contribute more than other graduates. Students who were members of athletic teams responded more favorably to requests for donations after graduation.

A Chance to Continue in Sport and Education

The awarding of scholarships to athletes affords the chance to further academic interests (Schildnecht, 2002). Athletic directors in Cigliano’s (2006) study expressed that athletics, “provides education for a group of people who might not be able to have an education.” Dropping athletic programs from state universities and community colleges would have the undesirable effect of removing opportunities for many student-athletes to follow their career goals and obtain an education while pursuing future success in athletics. For most, this will be the peak time of their sporting careers. Few venture into professional sports after college.

Negative Effects

A few issues can be raised concerning the negative effects of participation in college sports. Athletics consume time. Often, the athlete has to cope with the stress of attending to sporting obligations while fulfilling academic requirements. They have to submit assignments at the same time as every other student. For those who are not on scholarship, their families have to bear the increased burden of giving them pocket money, since they cannot manage jobs to supplement their incomes.

Stieber (1991) mentions the presence of a black market for athletes. In this situation, a supply and demand for cheaters exists coordinated by national sports bodies. The student athlete is generally discriminated against. The market for athletes is not a free market. It is, in reality, a monopoly. The buying cartel “exploits by eliminating the bidding process among its membership” (Stieber, 1991, p446). The resulting wage is lower for the athlete than what would be obtained in an uncontrolled market. The authors of this paper believe that Stieber’s argument would only hold for the very top tier of institutions, which have major revenue streams associated with football and basketball. For the other non-football and basketball athletes in those institutions and for the athletes in the rest of higher education, a full or partial scholarship may be more than the free market would generate.

Colleges have difficulty recruiting students who are good athletes and academically talented. Cigliano (2006) mentioned an apparent lack of preparation for college work for some of the student-athletes. However, this applied for the rest of the student body as well. Thus, it is not specific to student athletes.

Yiannakis et al. (2003) stated that sports were perceived to increase pollution by 62% of the respondents. Also, crime, gambling, alcohol abuse, and other illegal activities were viewed as increasing by up to 45%. Vandalism, assaults, and drug abuse were also feared to be increasing. There is a need, however, to establish the extent to which particular sports programs have a negative impact on a particular environmental setting.

Conclusions:

Athletics are beneficial to student athletes, to universities, and to society at large. Research points almost incontrovertibly towards the advantages associated with intercollegiate sports. National bodies responsible for sports are generally pleased with the results that athletics yield and would not support plans to reduce support for sports. However, athletes have to work under stressful conditions because of tight schedules and the demanding nature of their work. In some cases, student athletes are exploited by unscrupulous individuals and sports organizations. Ultimately, though, the benefits of athletics outweigh the disadvantages, albeit they are difficult to quantify.

Footnotes:

¹ Gelsey Lynn, a cross country runner, as quoted by Depew, R (1999).

² As cited by Posten, M. (1998).

³ The Mental Health Foundation: Football and Mental Health (n.d)

References:

Akandere, M. and Tekin A. (2002). The effect of physical exercise on anxiety: The Sport Journal Volume 5, Number 2.

Athletic policy manual of Duke University (2003). Retrieved May 18, 2006 from

Click to access Athletic%20Policy%20Manual.pdf

Bailey, K., Moulton, M., & Moulton, P. (1999). Athletics as a predictor of
self-esteem and approval motivation: The Sport Journal Volume 2, Number 2.

Chapin (2002). Identifying the real costs and benefits of sports facilities. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Working Paper.

Cigliano, L. M. (2006). A perceptual study of the impact of athletic programs in selected community colleges in the State of Tennessee: PhD Dissertation, East Tennessee State University.

Clotfelter, C. T. (1999). Who are the alumni donors? Giving by two generations of alumni from selective colleges. Nonprofit Management and Leadership. Vol 12(2). Pages 119-138

Coats, R. M., and Cox, K. C., (April 14, 2004). Economic impact of NSU athletics Retrieved May 29, 2006 from http://www.slec.org/uploads/EconomicImpact.pdf

Depew, R. (1999). Kenyon athletes define “Role Models” in their own words. Vol. 1(2). Retrieved June 12, 2006 from http://www2.kenyon.edu/orgs/Ksai/features/features11992.htm#sheridan

Dugan, K. Mullin, C. H. & Siegfried J. J. (2000). Undergraduate financial aid and subsequent giving behavior: Williams Project on the Economics of Higher Education. Discussion Paper No. 57. Retrieved June 15, 2006 from
http://opus.zbw-kiel.de/volltexte/2005/3672/pdf/DP-57.pdf

The Mental Health Foundation: Football and mental health (n.d) Retrieved June 23, 2006 from http://www.mentalhealth.org.uk/page.cfm?pageurl=football.cfm

Frank, R. H. (2004). Challenging the myth: A review of the links among college athletic success, student quality, and donations: Prepared for the Knight Foundation Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics.

Gerking, S., & Rhoads, T. A. (2000). Educational contributions, academic quality, and athletic success. Contemporary Economic Policy, 18, 248-254.

Lucas, J. W. and Lovaglia, M. J. (2002). Athletes’ expectations for success in athletics compared to academic competition: The Sport Journal Volume 5, Number 2.

McCormick, R., & Tinsley, M. (1987). Athletics versus academics? Evidence from SAT scores: Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 95: 1103-1116.

Mangold, William D. (2003). The impact of intercollegiate athletics on graduation rates among major NCAA Division I universities: Implications for college persistence theory and practice. The Journal of Higher Education Vol.74( 5), pp. 540-562. The Ohio State University Press.

Meier, K. J., Robinson, S., Polinard, J. L., & Wrinkle R. D. (2000). A question of priorities: Athletic budgets and academic performance. The Texas Educational Excellence Project.

National Federation of High Schools Association (NFHS), (2003). Survey resources: The case for high school activities. Retrieved September 3, 2005 from http://www.nfhs.org/scriptcontent/Va_custom/vimdisplays/contentpagedisplay.cfm?content_ID=163

Posten, M. (1998). Basking in glory and cutting off failure. Retrieved March 14, 2006 from http://www.units.muohio.edu/psybersite/fans/bc.shtml

Pulsinelli, R.W., Borland, M. V., & Goff, B. L., (1989). Western Kentucky University’s athletic program: Financial burden or boon? Department of Economics, Western Kentucky University.

Rudd, A. & Stoll, S. (2004). What type of character do athletes possess? An empirical examination of college athletes versus college non athletes with the RSBH Value Judgment Inventory: The Sport Journal Volume 7, Number 2.

Schildknecht, J. (2002). Benefits of interscholarstic athletics: schooling in American society. Retrieved September 23, 2005, from
http://filebox.vt.edu/users/jschildk/portfolio/documents/Benefits%20of%20Interscholastic%20Athletics.doc

Stieber, J. (1991). The behavior of the NCAA: a question of ethics. Journal of Business Ethics. Retrieved June 13, 2006 from http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=5&did=572547&SrchMode=1&sid=1&Fmt=6&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1130169395&clientId=28564

Toma, J. D. & Cross, M. (1996). Intercollegiate athletics and student college choice: understanding the impact of championship seasons on the quantity and quality of undergraduate applicants. ASHE Annual Meeting Paper. http://www.edrs.com

University of North Carolina at Charlotte. Institutional plan 2004 – 2009. Retrieved May 18, 2006 from http://www.provost.uncc.edu/planning/lrp/institutional.pdf

Yiannakis, A., Douvis, J., & Murdy, J. (2003). Perceived impacts of sport: measuring the impacts of sport: Methodological and policy considerations V6. 174.

U.S. Sports Academy2017-05-31T13:19:14-05:00March 14th, 2008|Contemporary Sports Issues, Sports Facilities, Sports Management, Sports Studies and Sports Psychology|Comments Off

Introducing a Risk Assessment Model for Sport Venues

Submitted by: Stacey Hall, Lou Marciani, Walter E. Cooper & Robert Rolen

Abstract:

With the ‘unknown certainty’ of terrorist actions and fan behavior, it is impossible to ensure a risk-free environment at America’s sporting venues. Incidents will happen and emergencies will arise. It is a matter of how one prepares, responds, and recovers to mitigate the consequences of emergencies at a sporting venue. Sport venue managers need to be aware of risk assessment methodologies to detect threats, identify vulnerabilities, and reduce consequences. Information gathered through this process is extremely valuable for enhancing security measures. This article discusses risk assessment and analysis, addresses the need for risk assessments at sporting venues, and describes the sport-specific risk assessment model developed while conducting research through a Homeland Security grant.

Introduction:

Sport lost its innocence on September 5, 1972, at the Olympic Games in Munich, Germany (CNN.com, 2002). A Palestinian group known as Black September crept into the Olympic Village and took nine members of the Israeli team hostage. The captors demanded a safe exit out of Germany and the release of Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli jails (2002). Unfortunately, a failed rescue attempt led to the death of all nine Israeli hostages, five terrorists, and one German policeman (2002). “For the first time, world sport had become a victim of terrorism, bringing with it a brutal reminder of the world’s harsher realities” (2). Terrorism struck again in 1996. A ‘domestic terrorist’ was responsible for the Centennial Olympic Park bombing at the Atlanta Games. This incident killed one person and injured more than 100 (CNN.com, 1996). Regardless of the motives for these attacks, terrorists chose to act on a world stage that offered global exposure for their cause. The incident in which an Oklahoma student prematurely detonated a bomb strapped to his body outside a football stadium packed with 84,000 in October 2005 (Hagmann, 2005), and the most recent threat of a dirty bomb attack on several NFL stadiums in October 2006 (CNN.com, 2006), emphasize the fact that sport venues are an attractive target for potentially catastrophic consequences. Besides terrorism, sport venue managers must plan for other incidents or unexpected disasters, such as fan/player violence or natural hazards.

One problem that sports venue manager’s face is determining the potential threat level, “causing leagues, teams and venues to prepare for a range of possible incidents at their facilities and to maintain close contact with federal, state and local law enforcement representatives regarding possible threats” (Hurst, Zoubek, Pratsinakis, n.d., p. 4). The risk assessment process is a way to determine risk and threat levels and identify vulnerabilities. “A good risk management approach includes three primary elements: a threat assessment, a vulnerability assessment, and a criticality assessment.” (Decker, 2001, p. 1). These assessments provide vital information for the protection of critical assets against terrorist attacks and other threats. Sport venue managers are able to identify vulnerabilities and thus harden the facility and improve physical protection systems. This may include implementing access controls, using CCTV security cameras, adding lighting, encouraging background checks, credentialing, checking backpacks, enhancing communication networks, and developing or updating emergency response and evacuation plans.

Understanding Risk

“Risk is the possibility of loss resulting from a threat, security incident, or event” (General Security Risk Assessment Guideline, 2003, p. 5). Risk is inherent in almost all aspects of life. Sport venue managers must continually attempt to minimize risk at their facilities. Risk cannot be totally eliminated from the environment, but with careful planning it can be managed. “Risk management is a systematic and analytical process to consider the likelihood that a threat will endanger an asset, individual, or function and to identify actions to reduce the risk and mitigate the consequences of an attack” (Decker, 2001, p. 1).

Risk is best understood as the product of the consequence of an event and the probability of the event occurring: Risk = Consequence x Probability (“Risk 101”, n.d). Risk increases as the consequences and probability of occurrence increases (n.d.). “In order to manage risk, it must first be identified, measured, and evaluated” (4). The Vulnerability Methodologies Report (2003) issued by the Office for Domestic Preparedness, Department of Homeland Security, identified three types of risk: mission or function risks, asset risks, and security risks. Mission risks prevent an organization from accomplishing a mission. Asset risks may harm an organization’s physical assets. Security risks have the potential to cripple actual data and people (2003).

Sport facility managers identify risks through various means. They can conduct surveys of attendees, conduct inspections of the facility, interview present employees, or ask experts in the field (Ammon, Southall, & Blair, 2004). Sport facility managers must address primary and secondary factors in order to reduce risk (2004). Primary factors are identified in the standard operating procedures. Facility staff is included among these factors (2004). An unsupervised or improperly trained ticket taker, usher, or cashier can become a risk for the facility manager (2004). “A well-trained staff, educated about proper risk management procedures, can help the risk manager to identify potential risks” (p. 108). Secondary factors of risk faced by most sport facilities include weather, type of event, patron demographics, and facility location (2004).

The essence of risk is dependent on the potential of threats. “A threat is a product of intention and capability of an adversary, both manmade and natural, to undertake an action which would be detrimental to an asset” (Vulnerability Assessment Report, 2003, p. 11). Vulnerabilities expose the asset to a threat and eventual loss. The General Security Risk Assessment Guideline (2003) defines vulnerability as “an exploitable capability; an exploitable security weakness or deficiency at a facility, entity, venue, or of a person” (p. 5). A risk analysis evaluating the potential of loss from a threat will determine whether risk should be reduced, re-assigned, transferred, or accepted (Vulnerability Assessment Report, 2003). “An acceptable risk is the risk level that an individual or group considers reasonable for the perceived benefit of an activity” (“Risk 101”, n.d., Acceptable Risk 1). An acceptable level of risk is usually determined by the asset manager or owner (2003). Severe risks that cause a high degree of loss and occur frequently should be avoided (Ammon, Southall, & Blair, 2004). Average frequency and moderate severity risks can be transferred to someone who’s willing to assume the risk. The facility manager may decide to pay an insurance company to cover physical and financial damages (2004). Some facility mangers may decide to keep or retain the risk. In so doing, they become financially responsible (2004). Facility managers can reduce risk through staff training, preventative maintenance, and development of a risk management plan to be included in the standard operating procedure (SOP) (2004). “The SOP is a set of instructions giving detailed directions and appropriate courses of action for given situations. SOP’s should be developed for all risks,” (Farmer, Mulrooney, & Ammon, 1996, p. 81).

In order to determine threats and vulnerabilities, an organization must undergo a risk assessment. The Department of Homeland Security issued a ten-step risk assessment methodology criterion (Vulnerability Assessment Report, 2003):

Clearly identify the infrastructure sector being assessed.
Specify the type of security discipline addressed, e.g. physical, information, operations.
Collect specific data pertaining to each asset.
Identify critical/key assets to be protected.
Determine the mission impact of the loss or damage of that asset.
Conduct a threat analysis and perform assessment for specific assets.
Perform a vulnerability analysis and assessment to specific threats.
Conduct analytical risk assessment and determine priorities for each asset.
Be relatively low cost to train and conduct.
Make specific, concrete recommendations concerning countermeasures.

This is general in nature and may be adapted to meet the needs of a specific organization. Several other risk assessment models exist today. For example, Sandia National Laboratories developed the RAM-Chemical to assess chemical facilities in the United States. Sports facilities in the U.S. must embrace risk management processes. Identifying the greatest threats and eliminating or reducing vulnerabilities will help minimize risk at sports events. “A sports arena is always critical as a high value terrorist target because of the potentially high casualty rate” (Durling, Price, & Spero, 2005, p. 8). Whether facing a terrorist attack, natural disaster, or unruly fan behavior, sport venue managers must pursue an effective risk management approach to protect the facility and human lives.

The Sports Event Security Assessment Model (SESAM)

In May, 2005, the Department of Homeland Security, in conjunction with the Mississippi Emergency Management agency, awarded the University of Southern Mississippi a $568,000 research grant to create a research-based model for the security management of university sport venues. Several risk assessment methodologies were reviewed and the DHS risk assessment criterion was customized for the assessment of sport venues. The Sport Event Security Assessment Model (SESAM) was developed through the collaboration of academic and security professionals in a six-hour brainstorming session. Academic professionals with experience in the sport event security area and training in DHS threat/risk assessment participated. Security professionals included former employees of the FBI, CIA, and Secret Service with extensive background in risk assessment methods and vulnerability assessment experience in the security and sport security field. This collaborative group supported the development and field testing of the model. A seven step procedure was created to evaluate sport security operations. An overview of the SESAM is presented in figure 1.

A risk assessment was conducted of the sport operations at seven public universities in Mississippi between May 2005 and February 2006. The following highlights the critical points during each stage of the seven-step process:

1. Step 1 of the process involves the identification of a SESAT team, including all key personnel responsible for game day security. These may include the athletic facility manager, campus police chief, emergency management director, local sheriff, and/or campus physical plant facility manager. Once the SESAT is established, meetings and interviews are scheduled to provide assessment objectives and define the assessed area based on a one mile radius of the sport venue.

2. Characterization of assets and target identification are achieved through in-depth surveys and interviews at each sport facility. Campus and community assets are identified and prioritized. Critical infrastructure and existing physical protection countermeasures are also identified. The target attractiveness is finally evaluated.

3. The threat assessment focuses on potential threat elements on campus and in the surrounding community. Specific factors are taken into consideration, including the existence of a group/individual operating close to the venue, history or past activity of the group/individual, intentions of the potential threat to act, their capability to act, and the ultimate targeting of the sport venue. A threat level is assigned to each critical asset, which is identified during step 2 of the risk assessment process.

Figure 1: Sport Event Security Assessment Model (SESAM). Adapted by Robert Rolen, Walter Cooper, Lou Marciani, and Stacey Hall. The Center for Spectator Sports Security Management.

4. The vulnerability assessment is a key component of the risk assessment model involving the analysis of several key factors about the venue, including:

Level of Visibility: assess the awareness of existence and visibility of the sport venue to the general public.
Criticality of Sport Venue to the Jurisdiction: assess the usefulness of the sport venue to the local population, economy, or government.
Potential Sport Venue Population Capacity: assess the maximum number of people at a site at any given time.
Potential for Collateral Mass Casualties: assess potential mass casualties within a one-mile radius of the sport venue.
Impact Outside of the Venue: assess the loss outside of the sport venue.
Existence of CBRNE Elements: assess the presence of a legal WMD on the site.
Potential Threat Element Access to Sport Venue: assess the availability of the sport venue for ingress and egress by a PTE.

5. The consequence evaluation component analyzes the number of potentially injured people at the sport venue who might require transportation/hospitalization. It also assesses the loss of life, loss of infrastructure, economic and environmental impact, and the potential social trauma.

6. The overall risk level of a sport venue is calculated during this step. The risk assessment evaluates the threat potential (produced during step 3), likelihood of adversary success (produced during step 4), and severity of the consequences of an attack (produced during step 5). A final risk level is determined for the sport venue based on a scale of 0 to 5, with 0 being low and 5 being the greatest. It is the sport manager’s responsibility to determine what level is acceptable for the venue.

7. The final step involves the proposal of

consequence reduction

measures. These recommendations will help sport managers develop and/or enhance security policies and procedures, emergency response capabilities, and physical protection systems and capabilities at the venue. Also, suggestions for appropriate training in security awareness for staff and the sporting public are recommended.

The SESAM is a cyclical model, as assessments must be continuously completed to ensure that adequate plans and security measures are in place and maintained over a period of time. A sport venue’s threat or vulnerability level may change regarding circumstances in the country or even in the surrounding community. Evaluations of potential threats and existing vulnerabilities “are not only used to determine what dangers to prepare for and how to meet them, but also to prioritize preparedness efforts.” (Sauter & Carafano, 2005, p. 338). By determining which threats are the most dangerous, managers are able to decide where they should invest their time and effort in preparing to deal with the consequences of a potential incident (2005). The risk assessment process is also considered by most specialists “to be the most vital task establishing an effective business continuity/disaster recovery plan” (p. 338). Contingency planning will aid sport businesses in recovery efforts and continuation of operations during incidents.

Conclusion:

“On September 11^th, it became abundantly clear that stadium and arena operators needed to incorporate security safeguards at America’s sporting venues.” (Pantera et. al, 2003, 1). It is critical that all sport organizations complete a risk assessment of their sport venues in order to identify vulnerabilities and improve security measures. The sport organization should not become complacent or content with their current security practices. Sport programs in America are faced with an ongoing battle to stay alert and be prepared for the ‘unthinkable.’

References:

Ammon, R., Southall, R. & Blair, D. (2004). Sport facility management: Organizing events and mitigating risks. Morgantown, WV: Fitness Information Technology, Inc.

CNN.com. (1996, July 27). Sources: arrest in Olympic bombing could occur within days. Retrieved September 15, 2005, from http://www.cnn.com/US/9607/27/blast.am/index.html

CNN.com. (2002, September 5). When sport lost its innocence. Retrieved September 26, 2005, from http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/09/05/munich.72/

CNN.com (2006, October 18). Threats against NFL stadiums not credible. Retrieved October 18, 2006, from http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/10/18/football.threats/index.html

Decker, R.J. (2001). Key elements of a risk management approach. United States General Accounting Office. [On-line]. Available: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02150t.pdf

Durling, R.L., Price, D.E., & Spero, K.K. (2005). Vulnerability and risk assessment using the Homeland-Defense operational planning system (HOPS). Retrieved October 4, 2005, from http://www.llnl.gov/tid/lof/documents/pdf/315115.pdf

Farmer, P.J., Mulrooney, A.L., & Ammon, R. (1996). Sport facility planning and management. Morgantown, WV: Fitness Information Technology, Inc.

General Security Risk Assessment Guideline. (2003). ASIS International. [On-line]. Available: http://www.asisonline.org/guidelines/guidelinesgsra.pdf

Hagmann, D.J. (2005, October 30). Black hole in America’s heartland. Northeast Intelligence Network. Retrieved July 20, 2006, from http://www.homelandsecurityus.com/site/modules/news/article.php?storyid=16

Hurst, R., Zoubek, P., & Pratsinakis, C. (n.d.). American sports as a target of terrorism: The duty of care after September 11^th. [On-Line]. Available: www.mmwr.com/_uploads/UploadDocs/publications/American%20Sports%20As%20A%20Target%20Of%20Terrorism.pdf

Pantera, M.J., et. al. (2003). Best practices for game day security at athletic & sport venues. The Sport Journal, 6 (4). [On-Line]. Available: http://www.thesportjournal.org/2003Journal/Vol6-No4/security.asp

Risk 101. (n.d.). U.S. Coast Guard. Retrieved October 4, 2005, from http://www.uscg.mil/hq/gm/risk/background.htm

Sauter, M. A. & Carafano, J.J. (2005). Homeland Security: A complete guide to understanding, preventing, and surviving terrorism. New York, NY: McGraw Hill.

Vulnerability Assessment Report. (July, 2003). Office of Domestic Preparedness, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Retrieved May 31, 2005, from http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/vamreport.pdf

U.S. Sports Academy2016-10-12T14:50:00-05:00March 14th, 2008|Contemporary Sports Issues, Sports Facilities, Sports Management|Comments Off

African-Americans in College Baseball

Submitted by: Frank B. Butts, Laura M. Hatfield & Lance C. Hatfield

Abstract:

The under-representation of African-Americans in college baseball is evident. African-American athletes make up only 4.5% of all National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) baseball players. They are a shrinking percentage of Major League Baseball players. A focus group was established to identify specific sociological issues which were perceived to influence the under-representation of African-Americans in collegiate baseball. Additionally, information from the observation of SEC baseball games during the 2006 season was used to quantify the social pattern. Data from the “traditionally black” Southwestern Athletic Conference (SWAC) and the Mid-Eastern Athletic Conference (MEAC) were also collected during the 2006 season. For the Southeastern Conference (SEC), fan attendance was less than 1% African-American and the player participation rate was 1.91 per team during the 2006 season. Additionally, none of the SEC head or assistant baseball coaches were African-American. The focus group determined that the reasons for the decline in numbers were related to (1) lifestyle factors, (2) competition from other sports and social opportunities, and (3) the absence of African-American role models in baseball. The authors propose that Title IX legislation and the influence of sports media were primary factors in the change.

African-Americans in College Baseball

The under-representation of African-Americans in college baseball is an obvious yet perplexing picture in athletics today. African-American athletes are more than equitably represented among many of the most popular collegiate spectator sports; however, their near absence in college baseball appears to be more than coincidental. Questions arise as to whether the educational system, the social system of athletics, and/or federal legislation have been responsible for the reduction in the number of African-American baseball players in America.

Only 4.5% of all National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) baseball players were African-American during the 2004 season. This includes all divisions, in addition to the historically African-American colleges and universities. On the contrary, 42.0% and 32.3% of NCAA basketball and football players, respectively, were African-American in the 2003-2004 academic year (Bray, 2005).

When specifically examining one of the perennial collegiate conference baseball powers, the Southeastern Conference (SEC), only 4.2% of 2006 roster players were African-American, as noted in Table 1. The twelve universities that make up the SEC represent states with an average African-American population of 20.8%.

Ironically, when examining the historically black Mid-Eastern Athletic Conference (MEAC) and the Southwest Athletic Conference (SWAC), findings surface which again support the difficulty of finding African-Americans in collegiate baseball. African-Americans are the minority on many of the rosters of these teams, as seen in Table 1.

Table 1: African-American Participation and Attendance at SEC Baseball Games

University	Number of African American Players	State Population (African American)	Number of African American Fans	Average Attendance	Number of African American Coaches
Alabama	1	26.0%	15	4172	0
Auburn	3	26.0%	7	3021	0
Arkansas	1	15.7%	0	7156	0
Florida	3	14.6%	8	2607	0
Georgia	1	28.7%	10	1958	0
Kentucky	1	7.3%	6	1250	0
Louisiana State	3	32.5%	8	7508	0
Mississippi	0	36.3%	2	4363	0
Mississippi St.	0	36.3%	3	6160	0
South Carolina	3	29.5%	22	3424	0
Tennessee	4	16.4%	5	1378	0
Vanderbilt	3	16.4%	3	1484	0
Alabama	1	26.0%	15	4172	0
Source: Attendance statistics from SEC member schools 2006. All observations of fan counts were from weekend games in spring 2005 and spring 2006. State African-American percentages were obtained from the United States Census Bureau.

With approximately 12.8% of the United States population reported to be African-American (United States Census Bureau, 2006), it would appear that African-American collegiate baseball players are under-represented. This is the case in both college and professional baseball.

Ken Williams of the Chicago White Sox, Major League Baseball’s (MLB) only African-American general manager, blamed the small number of collegiate scholarships designated for baseball on the small number of African-American players (Nightengale, 2006). Logan White, the Los Angeles Dodger’s amateur scouting director, noted that in his trips to colleges across the United States, he rarely encounters an African-American baseball player. Not only is the absence of the African-American player obvious at the collegiate level, the population has gone from 27% of Major League Baseball (MLB) players in 1975 to 8% today (Nightengale, 2006). Sociologists have recognized this trend and have proposed several theories to explain it.

Theories

A possible explanation for the diminishment of African-Americans in collegiate and professional baseball could be explained by Giddens’ (1979) “structuration” theory. This theory assumes that certain behaviors are shaped by an array of interconnected structures. These interconnected structures can include norms, accessibility, and facilitators. Norms are the expected behaviors that govern a culture. Facilitators can be individuals or events that increase the likelihood of engaging in a behavior. (The behavior in this case would be baseball.) Accessibility refers to the degree of availability a population has to baseball.

The Negro Leagues of the early part of the 20th century, in particular, provided African-Americans with access to a culture aligned with baseball. Prior to the integration of African-Americans into Major League Baseball (MLB) in 1947 (“African Americans in Sports,” n.d.), an estimated 2,300 African-Americans participated in professional baseball through the Negro Leagues (Lynn, 2006). In the 1920’s, even small African-American communities, such as the town of Buxton, Iowa, touted semiprofessional teams like the Wonders (Beran, 1990). African-American fans often traveled to surrounding states to watch the Wonders play. These games became a routine part of daily life for this community. Beran (1990) further noted that the games served as a gathering place for members of the community. As a result, the Wonders became a major part of the cultural identity of Buxton. Since the retirement of former Negro-League stars who went on to stellar careers in MLB, such as Henry Aaron, the number of both African-American baseball players and spectators has steadily declined in MLB (Early, 2000; Flanagan 1999).

Research by Odgen (2003a) suggested that television images may perpetuate the stereotype that African-Americans are not welcome in baseball venues. This is the basis for Odgen’s ‘Welcome Theory’, which states that certain groups feel a sense of belonging in some leisure activities, but not in others. Odgen found that African-Americans felt most welcome playing basketball and least welcome at country clubs. Feeling unwelcome in some leisure activities is not restricted to the African-American race. All races share a common attitude that activities are suited to some ethnicities more than others (Philipp, 1999). For example, of the 137 crowd shots at a particular televised baseball game, only one of them displayed a group of African-Americans (Odgen, 2003a). Furthermore, Ogden reported that only 3% of the attendance at a game dubbed “African-American Heritage Night” consisted of African Americans.

The Welcome Theory may be partially created by the extensive mass media edification of professional African-American basketball players (Hall, 2002). African-American youth are frequently shown that basketball is the most efficient route to fame and fortune. As a result, almost 80% of basketball players in the National Basketball Association (NBA) are African-American (Boyd, 1997).

Another factor that might explain the absence of African-Americans from baseball is a lack of social support for the game. A primary reason that children select extracurricular activity is for interaction with peers (Watson and Collis, 1982). Children naturally gravitate towards activities endorsed by peers within their social groups. The peers of African-American youth frequently endorse basketball instead of baseball by donning the apparel of their favorite NBA stars (Philipp, 1998; Wilson & Sparks, 1996).

Gravitation towards participation in sports other than baseball may begin at the youth level. Of the 2,000 youth players in select tournaments from 1998-2000, only 3% were African American (Odgen, 2001). Select leagues, also known as traveling teams, are the highest level of play in age-group baseball. These teams may be compiled from competitive tryouts and/or selecting players from other “all star” teams. Select team baseball is characterized by long and arduous seasons that may contain as many as 150 games for youth players (Odgen, 2003b). These teams often play games all across the country, which requires considerable travel expenses. This external demand may validate limited access as an explanation, if one assumes that African-Americans have less access to baseball leagues, select-travel teams, and fields. Baseball diamonds are documented more frequently in the suburbs than in the urban core, where the population of African-Americans is more heavily populated, further supporting the theory of a reduced access that African-American youth have to baseball (Odgen 2003b).

Efforts to Curb Disparity

Recently, several MLB celebrities and players have attempted to curb the lack of interest of African-Americans in the sport of baseball. Initiatives such as Reviving Baseball in Inner Cities (RBI), founded by John Young, a former major league player, have received funding from Major League Baseball (“Major League Baseball,” n.d.). RBI was created to enable inner city youth with reduced accessibility and funds to enjoy baseball. Since its inception in 1989, the RBI program has provided opportunities for youth baseball in more than 200 cities. Major League Baseball also sponsors a program known as the Urban Youth Baseball Academy (“Major League Baseball,” n.d.). Some former participants in this program have remained in baseball and are now professional baseball players. Another project, known as the Urban Initiative for Little League Baseball, plans to expand existing facilities and baseball programs in the inner cities (“Little League Online,” n.d. ). Professional players, such as Torii Hunter, have even spearheaded efforts to raise funds for the creation and maintenance of baseball facilities in low income areas (“The Torii Hunter Project,” n.d.).

After an examination of the literature, it appears that those who are associated with and who study baseball have taken note of the declining African-American population in the sport. The authors of this study attempted to quantify the number of African-Americans playing college baseball in several of the most visible collegiate conferences in America in an attempt to measure the magnitude of the social change.

Methods:

A focus group was established to assist in identifying specific sociological issues perceived to influence the under-representation of African-Americans in collegiate baseball. The focus group consisted of twelve college age, African-American males who were either currently on a NCAA Division II baseball roster or who had played baseball in high school but were no longer playing in college. The group met during the fall of 2006 in three, one-hour sessions over a one month period. The first meeting consisted of an introduction to the topic, followed by the distribution of the outline of this study. This was followed by a period of general brainstorming. The group was asked to investigate the literature related to this study topic before the next meeting. In the second meeting, the group continued brainstorming. Members were allowed to present findings from the previous week of research and to begin extrapolating reasons for the social change in baseball. Common themes among the focus group were identified. In meeting three, the focus group began the process of assembling and ranking its theories for the reduction of African-Americans in collegiate baseball.

In addition to the qualitative, focus group study, the authors gathered data from NCAA data bases and from observation of SEC baseball games during the 2006 season. The authors personally attended and collected SEC baseball attendance data by conducting visual counts of African-American fans and players at select SEC games during the 2006 season.

For point of interest purposes, data from the Southwestern Athletic Conference (SWAC) and the Mid-Eastern Athletic Conference (MEAC) were collected by examining the media publications of each member institution’s athletic website for the 2006 season. The schools in these two conferences are known as historical black colleges and universities (HBCU) with predominantly African-American populations. The authors attempted to secure the numbers of African-American baseball players and coaches from these conferences.

Results:

Examinations of the findings in Table 2 depict an SEC baseball fan attendance base that was 0.2% African-American during the 2006 season. There was an average of seven African-American fans at each weekend SEC baseball game in 2006, out of the average crowd of 3,707. In all cases, the African-American fan count was less than 1% of the attendance.

Table 2: African-American Participation in the Mid-Eastern Atlantic Conference (MEAC) and the Southwest Atlantic Conference (SWAC)

<tr”>MEAC% of African American PlayersSWAC% of African American Players

Bethune-Cook	21	Alabama A&M	90
Coppin State	30	Alabama State	84
Delaware State	no baseball	Alcorn State	50
FAMU	39	Arkansas PB	no data
Hampton	no baseball	Grambling	80
Howard	no baseball	Jackson State	72
Maryland Eastern	16	Miss Valley St	100
Morgan State	no baseball	Prairie View	84
Norfolk	25	Southern	no data
N.C. A&T	60
Average among those reporting	31		68
Sources, http://www.meacsports.com/, http://www.swac.org

Additionally, none of the SEC head or assistant baseball coaches were African-American during the 2006 season. The average SEC team had 1.91 African-American players on the forty-man roster with the range from one to four players. The two SEC schools representing states with the highest African-American population, Mississippi State and Mississippi, from a state with a 36.3% African-American population, had zero African-American players.

As presented in Table 3, the focus group identified four categorical areas as reasons for the limited number of African-Americans in college baseball. The reasons noted by the focus group, in order of their perceived importance, were: (1) lifestyle factors, (2) competition for the African-American athlete from other sports and social opportunities, (3) the absence of African-American role models (either active players or coaches), and (4) a limitation resulting from the perception that the African-American athlete is more difficult to coach.

Table 3: Focus Group Conclusions for the Scarcity of African-American Baseball Players

Themes	Description
Lifestyle Factors	African Americans are more interested in fast-paced sports.
Competition	College baseball is out-recruited by more visible sports.
	The popularity of AAU basketball draws interest.
	College baseball has less recruiting money.
	Minority scholarships take away opportunities for African-Americans in historically black colleges and universities.
Role Models	There is a small number of African-American baseball icons.
	There are not many visible African-American GMs and Managers.
Limitations	The African-American athlete is viewed as less able to be coached and is, therefore, less likely to be recruited.

Discussion:

There have been many theories presented as to why African-Americans are rapidly disappearing from college baseball. One possible explanation could be the relationship between the onset of Title IX, which led to many NCAA I schools reducing the number of baseball scholarships to 11.7 and to 10.0 in NCAA Division II, which may have contributed to the loss of interest in a college sport where full-scholarships are rare. In both NCAA Division I and II, partial scholarships are the rule, not the exception. There is the possibility that baseball has been socially architected out of the mainstream of African-American culture by means of well-intended legislation, such as Title IX. Results of this legislation have been to reduce access for the less affluent to college baseball and to influence athletes with the ability to play multiple sports to select a sport that can lead to a full scholarship.

Well-documented theories, such as Gidden’s structuration theory (1979), Ogden’s Welcome Theory, and limited access proposals (2003) may have credibility; however, they are difficult to prove quantitatively. It is likely that more than one specific theory or variable has been key in this social shift in baseball.

Several questions must be addressed. Have high-school and college baseball priced themselves out of the African-American athlete’s market by requiring participation in select teams for high schools or by limiting scholarship money for the college bound? Has the eagerness of the Central-American baseball player to sign for small bonuses become more appealing to MLB than going after the African-American player? Has the fact that MLB is now an international game influenced the reluctance of the high-school athlete to pursue baseball in college because other sports appear to be less competitive in the athlete’s quest for stardom? Is baseball too slow for the fast-paced lifestyle of the inner-city African-American youth? Are white athletes replacing African-Americans in baseball or is the international growth of the game naturally reducing the influence of any one racial group?

Perhaps the most perplexing rationale for the reduction in participation rates among African-Americans arises from the focus group in this study, which stated that the perceived slower pace of baseball has become a deterrent to participation among African-Americans. Baseball has many strategic games within it that are, in reality, constantly changing and fast paced. Therefore, the pace issue may have evolved out of a false perception which has been capitalized upon by those marketing other sports. People may not understand or see these elements of baseball. This issue itself merits further study.

No doubt, the evolution of sport participation is well documented. However, much study is needed before the theories behind the change can be scientifically proven. This author believes the change is primarily the result of a combination of the ramifications of Title IX legislation and the mass media marketing of the perception that other sports are faster paced and more entertaining.

References:

African Americans in Sports (n.d.). Retrieved September 15, 2006, from http://www.jimcrowhistory.org/scripts/jimcrow/sports.cgi?sport=Baseball

Beran, J. (1990). Diamonds in Iowa: Blacks, Buxton, and baseball. Journal of Negro History, 75(3-4), 81-95.

Boyd, T. (1997). “The day the Niggaz took over: Basketball, Commodity, Culture, and Black Masculinity in Out of Bounds: Sports, Media, and the Politics of Identity, ed. Aaron Baker and Todd Boyd. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, p. 140.

Bray, Corey. (2005). 1999-2000-2003-2004 Student-Athlete ethnicity report. The National Collegiate Athletic Association. January 2005, Retrieved September 1, 2006, from http://www.ncaa.org/library/research/ethnicity_report/2003-04/2003-04_ethnicity_report.pdf

Early, G. (2000). Why baseball was the Black national pastime. In T. Boyd & K.L. Shropshire (Eds.), Basketball Jones (pp.27-50). New York: New York University Press.

Flanagan, J. (1999, June 29). Baseball continues to ponder how to attract black fans. Kansas City Star, p. C2.

Giddens, A. (1979). Central Problems in Social Theory. Berkeley: University of California.

Hall, R. (2002). The bell curve: Implications for the performance of black/white athletes. Social Science Journal, 39(1), 113-118.

Little League Online. (n.d.). Retrieved September 22, 2006, from http://www.littleleague.org/programs/urban.asp

Lynn, A. (2006, February 21). Research on minority stars for Baseball Hall of Fame a revelatory process. Illinois News Bureau. Retrieved September 15, 2006, from http://www.news.uiuc.edu/news/06/0221hallfame.html

Major League Baseball: Community: Reviving Baseball in Inner Cities (RBI). (n.d.). Retrieved September 22, 2006, from http://mlb.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/mlb/official_info/community/rbi

Nightengale, B. (2006, June 2). Where are black ballplayers? USA Today, pp. 1C-2C.

Odgen, D. (2001). African Americans and pick-up ball: A loss of diversity and recreational diversion in midwest youth baseball. NINE: A Journal of Baseball History & Culture 9: pp. 200-207.

Odgen, D. (2003a, April 12). Baseball Crowd Shots and the Social Construction of Spectators: An Exploratory Analysis. Paper presented at the Central State Communication Association meeting.

Odgen, D. (2003b, March 20-23). The Welcome Theory: An approach to studying African American Youth Interest and Involvement in Baseball. Paper presented at the Tenth Annual NINE Spring Training Conference. Retrieved September 1, 2006 from http://muse.jhu.edu, from the Project Muse Database.

Philipp, S. (1998). Race and gender differences in adolescent peer group approval of leisure activities. Journal of Leisure Research, 30(2), 214-232.

Philipp, S. (1999). Are we welcome? African American racial acceptance in leisure activities and the importance given to children’s leisure. Journal of Leisure Research 31: pp.385-403.

The Torii Hunter Project. (n.d.). Retrieved September 22, 2006, from http://www.toriihunter48.com/

United States Census Bureau. (Revised 2006, June 23). USA QuickFacts from the U.S. Census Bureau. Retrieved September 1, 2006, from http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html

Watson, G. & Collis, R. (1982). Adolescent values in sport: A case of conflicting interests. International Review of Sport Sociology 17 (1982): pp. 73-90.

Wilson, B. & Sparks, R. (1996). It’s gotta be the shoes: Youth, race, and sneaker commercials. Sociology of Sport Journal, 13(4), 398-427.

U.S. Sports Academy2020-06-02T13:16:22-05:00March 14th, 2008|Contemporary Sports Issues, Sports Facilities, Sports Management|Comments Off

Competitive Balance and Conference Realignment: The Case of Big 12 Football

Submitted by: Martin M. Perline, Ph.D. & G. Clayton Stoldt, Ed.D.

Abstract:

Past research has indicated that an effort to achieve greater competitive balance has been one factor in conference realignments within college athletics. The purpose of this study was to determine if greater levels of competitive balance in football were realized after the Big 8 conference merged with four members of the Southwest Conference. Specifically, comparisons were made between competitive balance levels for the last ten years of the Big 8 with the first ten years of the Big 12. Three measures of competitive balance were employed; in general, the findings indicated that competitive balance in football has improved in the ten years after the merger.

Introduction:

In the area of competitive sports, it is mandatory that the outcome of any game or match contain some degree of uncertainty. If this was not the case, it is believed fans would lose interest (Depken & Wilson, 2006; El Hodiri & Quirk, 1971; Kesenne, 2006; Quirk & Fort, 1992; Sanderson & Siegfried, 2003) and thus there would be significantly lower revenues for the organizations involved, particularly media revenue. Stated somewhat differently, it is of vital importance that for any sports league or conference, there needs to be some degree of competitive balance among the various teams.

Competitive imbalance is often linked to disparate revenues among competing organizations (Kaplan, 2004; Sanderson, 2002). At the professional level, these disparities are commonly linked to variables such as the size of a particular team’s media market or home facility. Organizations serving larger markets and/or having newer facilities may be able to generate more revenue than competitors, and thus secure the most talented teams. Likewise, at the collegiate level institutions may enjoy competitive advantages as a result of revenues generated from larger fan bases and better facilities. While those monies may not be passed to student-athletes in the form of salaries, high-revenue programs arguably enjoy significant recruiting advantages because they can invest in new or improved facilities and other program enhancements.

At the professional level, a variety of tactics are commonly employed to enhance competitive balance (Sanderson & Siegfried, 2003). They include salary caps, luxury taxes, revenue sharing, and draft orders favoring those teams that enjoyed the least success the previous season. At the college level, measures such as scholarship limits and prohibitions against extra benefits for student-athletes have attempted to promote competitive balance (Rhoads, 2004). These regulations are commonly enforced by a national governing body (e.g., NCAA, NAIA). However, college athletic conferences also play roles in promoting competitive balance. In particular, Rhoads (2004) has argued the conference realignments are at least partially driven by competitive disparity among institutions. Because of the large gate and television revenues that are often at stake, particularly in football and men’s basketball, efforts to maintain a certain degree of competitive balance in these sports would serve as an incentive to bring about churning within, and mergers between, conferences (Rhoads, 2004).

The purpose of this paper is to attempt to measure the change in competitive balance as a conference changes its membership. Does this bring about the desired increase in competitive balance? In order to shed light on this question, we surveyed the changes in competitive balance as the Big 8 Conference merged with four members of the Southwest Conference to become the Big 12.

Since previous research has suggested no increase in competitive balance in men’s basketball as conferences have gone through change (Rhoads, 2004; Perline & Stoldt, in press), we have chosen to test the hypothesis that attempts to increase competitive balance in football are major reasons for conference realignment (Rhoads, 2004; Fort & Quirk, 1999; Quirk, 2004). More specifically, we compared levels of competitive balance in football in the ten years before the merger with the ten years after. Although the Big 12 separated football into two divisions, we chose to use the overall conference standings for our analysis. This seemed most appropriate, since the Big 8 was not so divided, and teams in each division of the Big 12 played three of their eight conference games with teams in the opposite division.

The Big 12 Conference

The Big 12 is a NCAA Division I-A level conference founded in 1995 (Big 12, 2006). Its membership includes Baylor University, the University of Colorado, Iowa State University, the University of Kansas, Kansas State University, the University of Missouri, the University of Nebraska, the University of Oklahoma, Oklahoma State University, the University of Texas, Texas A&M University, and Texas Tech University.

Each institution in the conference was formerly a member of either the now-defunct Big 8 or Southwest conferences. Changing dynamics in the collegiate athletics marketplace, such as other conferences churning members and new agreements for television coverage, provided an impetus for the formation of the Big 12 (Michaelis, 1996; Thompson, 2000). The new conference included each member of the Big 8 and four institutions from the Southwest Conference. Texas and Texas A&M were, arguably, the flagship programs in the Southwest Conference, so their selection was not surprising. The decision to include Baylor and Texas
Tech was more controversial because those institutions were from smaller markets than the four other members of the Southwest Conference that were not selected. However, both institutions had alumni in key offices within the Texas state government at the time of the merger, and the political influence of those state officials impacted Baylor’s and Texas Tech’s selection (Thompson, 2000; Waldman, 1995). The resultant geographic market of the new conference includes 42 million people and 18 million households with television — roughly 16% of the nation’s total (Big 12, 2006; Michaelis, 1996; Thompson, 2000; Waldman, 1995).

The conference is separated into two divisions for football. The North Division features Colorado, Iowa State, Kansas, Kansas State, Missouri, and Nebraska. The South Division is comprised of Baylor, Oklahoma, Oklahoma State, Texas, Texas A&M, and Texas Tech. Each year, each school plays one game against its divisional opponents and three games against teams from the other division. A rotation system is used to select which three “other division” opponents a team will face in a given system. Over four years, each team will play every team from the other division twice — once at home, once away. All conference games count toward the division standings, and the two division winners meet in a conference championship game each year. The winner of that championship game receives an automatic bid to participate in the Bowl Championship Series (BCS).

Big 12 football teams have enjoyed considerable success at the national level. The conference has placed a team in the BCS national championship game five times, more than any other conference (Big 12, 2006). Further, three teams have won national championships since the conference was founded: Nebraska in 1997, Oklahoma in 2000, and Texas in 2005.

Measuring Competitive Balance:

Several methods have commonly been used to measure competitive balance. The most appropriate of these methods often depends on what the researcher is attempting to measure. Methods most appropriate for measuring competitive balance within a given season may be different from those used to measure competitive balance between seasons (Leeds & VonAllmen, 2005). Since different concepts are being measured, there is no reason to assume the various methods will reach the same conclusions about degree of competitive balance. Indeed, if it is argued that competitive balance is necessary to keep fans interested and thus revenues maximized, it could be argued that no particular method can address theoretical optimal balance, i.e., what the fans who buy tickets and watch television believe is most appropriate. One could even argue that overall conference revenue could be maximized if the teams in the largest markets, with the largest fan base, won most often. Given these caveats, efforts have been made to measure competitive balance. In addressing our task, we rely on such methods.

Three of the most commonly employed measures are:

the standard deviations of winning percentages of the various teams in the conference or league
the Hirfindahl-Hirschman Index to measure the number of teams that achieve championship status over a given period of time
the range of winning percentages

Standard Deviation of Winning Percentages

The method probably used most often to measure competitive balance within a conference in a given season is the standard deviation of winning percentages. Since there will, outside of a tie, always be one winner and one loser for each game, the average winning percentage for the conference will always be .500.

In order to gain insight into competitive balance, we need to measure the dispersion of winning percentages around this average. To do this, we can measure the standard deviation. This statistic measures the average distance that observations lie from the mean of the observations in the data set. The formula for the standard deviation is:

σ = (√(Σ(WPCT – .500)²)) / N

The larger the standard deviation, the greater the dispersion of winning percentages around the mean, thus the less the competitive balance. (If all teams have winning percentages of .500, there would be a standard deviation of zero and there would be perfect competitive balance.)

Using the actual standard deviation in our case presents a potential problem. This occurs because, all things being equal, there is a likelihood that the larger the number of conference games played, the more likely there will be less deviation of winning percentages, since various lucky breaks, injuries, etc. will, over time, even out. Since the number of league games played in the Big 8 was seven and the number of league games played in the Big 12 was eight, there is a need to adjust for these differences. This adjustment entails finding the ideal competitive balance in which each team has a 50% chance of winning each game. This ideal can be measured as:

σ = 0.5 /√ N

where .5 indicates the .5 probability of winning, and n is the number of games played by each team in the season.

In the Big 8, the ideal standard deviation ratio would be 0.5 / √ 7 = 0.1890 and for the Big 12 would be 0.5 / √ 8 = 0.1768.

To measure the competitive balance within a given season, we find the ratio of the actual standard deviation to the ideal standard deviation.

R = σA / σI

The closer the measure is to one, the more competitive balance there is.

Championship Imbalance

While using the standard deviation as a measure of competitive balance provides a good picture of the variation within a given season, it does not indicate whether the same teams win every season, or if there is considerable turnover among the winners i.e., whether there is between-season variation.

Therefore, another method economists have used to measure imbalance is the Hirfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which was originally used to measure concentration among firms within an industry (Leeds & von Allmen, 2005). Whereas the standard deviation was used to measure percentage winning imbalance, the HHI is used to measure championship imbalance — how the championship is spread amongst the various teams. Using this method, the greater the number of teams which achieve championship status over a specific time period, the greater the competitive balance. The HHI can be calculated by measuring the number of times each team won the championship, squaring that number, adding the numbers together, and dividing by the number of years under consideration. Using this measure, it can be concluded that the lower the HHI, the more competitive balance among the teams.

Range of Winning Percentage Imbalance

Although the standard deviation of winning percentages can tell us about variation around the mean, it does not specifically reveal if the same teams win or lose from season to season. Likewise, whereas the HHI gives us some perspective on the number of teams who win the championship over a period of time, it does not tell us what is happening to the other teams in the conference. It is quite possible that a few teams could always finish first, but that the other teams could be moving up or down in the standings from one year to another.

One way of gaining insight into the movement in the standings of all teams over time is to get the mean percentage wins for each team over a specific period. The closer each team is to .500, the greater the competitive balance over this period. If several teams had very high winning percentages and others had very low winning percentages, it would suggest that there was not strong competitive balance over time, because the same teams would be winning losing, year after year.

Results:

We employed each of the three measures of competitive balance in our analysis of football results for the Big 8 and Big 12 Conferences. Findings are offered in the following sections.

Standard Deviation of Winning Percentages

Source: Information provided by Big 12 Conference office.

**Table 1: Winning Percentages at the Big 8 Conference**
Year	MO	KU	OU	KSU	NU	ISU	OSU	CU
1986	.286	.000	1.000	.143	.714	.428	.571	.857
1987	.428	.071	1.000	.071	.857	.286	.714	.571
1988	.286	.143	.857	.000	1.000	.428	.714	.571
1989	.143	.286	.714	.000	.857	.571	.428	1.000
1990	.286	.357	.714	.286	.714	.357	.286	1.000
1991	.143	.428	.714	.571	.928	.214	.071	.928
1992	.286	.571	.571	.286	.857	.286	.357	.786
1993	.286	.428	.571	.643	1.000	.286	.000	.786
1994	.286	.428	.571	.714	1.000	.071	.071	.857
1995	.143	.714	.286	.714	1.000	.143	.286	.714

Mean	.257	.343	.700	.343	.893	.307	.350	.807	.500

Source: 2005 Big 12 Football Media Guide contained data for 1996-2004. Big 12 Website contained data for 2005.

**Table 2: Winning Percentages at the Big 12 Conference**
Year	KU	CU	UT	ISU	TTU	OU	NU	OSU	BU	MU	TAMU	KSU
1996	.250	.875	.750	.125	.625	.375	1.000	.250	.125	.375	.500	.750
1997	.375	.375	.250	.125	.625	.250	1.000	.625	.125	.625	.750	.875
1998	.125	.500	.750	.125	.500	.375	.625	.375	.125	.625	.875	1.000
1999	.375	.625	.750	.125	.625	.625	.875	.375	.000	.125	.625	.875
2000	.250	.375	.875	.625	.375	1.000	.750	.125	.000	.250	.625	.750
2001	.125	.875	.875	.500	.500	.750	.875	.250	.000	.375	.500	.375
2002	.000	.875	.750	.500	.625	.750	.375	.625	.125	.250	.375	.750
2003	.375	.375	.875	.000	.500	1.000	.625	.625	.125	.500	.250	.750
2004	.250	.500	.875	.500	.625	1.000	.375	.500	.125	.375	.625	.250
2005	.375	.625	1.000	.500	.750	.750	.500	.125	.250	.500	.375	.250

Mean	.250	.600	.775	.313	.575	.688	.700	.388	.100	.400	.550	.663	.500

Tables 1 and 2 display the annual winning percentages for the football teams in the Big 8 and Big 12 Conferences, respectively. Tables 3 and 4 display the annual standard deviations, the standard deviation ratios, and the means for the ten years of data in the Big 8 and Big 12 conferences.

Source: Authors’ calculations according to formulas in text from data in Table 1.

**Table 3: Standard Deviations and Standard Deviation Ratios of Winning Percentage Imbalance in Big 8 Conference**
Year	Standard Deviation	Standard Deviation Ratio
1986	.3498	1.851
1987	.3498	1.851
1988	.3498	1.851
1989	.3498	1.851
1990	.2725	1.442
1991	.3415	1.807
1992	.2321	1.228
1993	.3171	1.678
1994	.3479	1.841
1995	.3238	1.731

Mean	.3234	1.711

Source: Authors’ calculations according to formulas in text from data in Table 2.

**Table 4: Standard Deviations and Standard Deviation Ratios of Winning Percentage Imbalance in Big 12 Conference**
Year	Standard Deviation	Standard Deviation Ratio
1996	.2968	1.679
1997	.2919	1.651
1998	.2919	1.651
1999	.2968	1.679
2000	.3153	1.783
2001	.2968	1.679
2002	.2770	1.567
2003	.2968	1.679
2004	.2556	1.446
2005	.2500	1.414

Mean	.2869	1.623

The data indicate that overall competitive balance increased with the merger of the Big 8 into the Big 12. After adjusting, the mean of the standard deviation ratio was 1.711 for the Big 8 (see Table 3 – mean standard deviation ratio) and 1.623 (see Table 4 – mean standard deviation ratio) for the Big 12. This was a difference of 5.4%.

If we eliminate the lowest standard deviation ratio for the Big 8 – 1.228 – which would appear to be an outlier as it was well below the mean, the mean for the Big 8 would rise to 1.767, which would raise the percentage differential between the Big 8 and Big 12 to 8.9%.

Championship Imbalance

Using the HHI to measure competitive balance in the Big 8, we find that over the ten-year period, three teams achieved a first place finish: Nebraska 6, Oklahoma 2, and Colorado 2. If we give one point for each first place finish squared, we find:

HHI= 62 + 22 + 22 = 44/10= 4.4

Since the Big 12 is divided into two divisions, the first place finishers in each division play each other to determine the championship. We find that over the ten-year period, six different teams won the championship: Oklahoma 3, Texas 2, Nebraska 2, Colorado 1, Texas A&M 1, and Kansas State 1. Applying the HHI to this data, we find:

HHI= 32 + 22 + 22 + 12 + 12 + 12 = 20/10= 2

Here, the numbers are particularly revealing. We see twice as many institutions won the championship in the first ten years of the Big 12 than had won in the previous ten years with the Big 8. These results, though, need be mitigated by the fact that one would expect there to be more difference in teams achieving the championship with twelve competitors than with eight. Nevertheless, in the case of the Big 8, three teams out of a possible eight (37.5%) won the championship, whereas in the case of the Big 12, six out of a possible twelve teams won the championship (50%). While this does lessen the difference, the Big 12 still remains considerably more competitively balanced.

Range of Winning Percentage Imbalance

If we arbitrarily set .500 plus or minus .100 as a range, which would suggest a high degree of competitive balance over the ten-year period, we find significantly more competitive balance in the Big 12 than in the Big 8.

The mean winning percentages displayed for each team in Table 1 (Big 8) suggest that when using such an approach, no teams fell within this .400-.600 range. There were obvious winners and losers, but not many in the middle. (Nebraska, Colorado, and Oklahoma were the winners, and the remaining five institutions were the losers.)

On the other hand, the mean winning percentages displayed for each team in Table 2 (Big 12) indicates that four institutions (33% of the league total) – Colorado, Missouri, Texas A&M, and Texas Tech – fell within the specified range. Texas, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Kansas State exceeded the range. Oklahoma State, Iowa State, Kansas, and Baylor fell below the range, with the latter two institutions never having a winning season.

When looking at the range between the top and bottom winning percentages, we find that in the Big 8 the range is .636 (Nebraska .893 and Missouri .257), whereas it is actually larger for the Big 12 at .675 (Texas .775 and Baylor .100). Baylor has not had a winning season since joining the Big 12, and only once in the ten-year period has it won as many as two conference games. Therefore, if we were to exclude Baylor at an outlier, we find the range drops to .525 (Texas .775, and Kansas .250). This would make the range approximately 20% lower in the Big 12 than in the Big 8.

Conclusions:

Previous research had suggested that one reason for conference realignment was to achieve greater competitive balance in sports among the various member institutions (Rhoads, 2004). This appeared to be particularly true in football, one of the very high revenue sports in major athletic conferences. With this in mind, we investigated whether there was an increase in competitive balance in the sport of football after the Big 8 Conference merged with four members of the Southwest Conference to form the Big 12 Conference. The data for this study came from the conference standings in football for the Big 8 for the ten years prior to the merger and the standings for the Big 12 ten years subsequent to the merger.

Using the standard deviation to measure the winning percentage imbalance, and the Hirfindahl-Hirschman Index to measure championship imbalance, we concluded that each of the above measures indicated an increase in competitive balance after the merger. In the case of the range of winning percentages, the results suggested a slightly greater competitive balance for the Big 8, although once the least successful team in the Big 12 was dropped as an outlier, there was considerably more competitive balance in the Big 12. Given the fact that conferences often realign in an attempt to achieve greater competitive balance (Rhoads, 2004), these findings would support the decision to realign.

Achieving greater levels of competitive balance in a single sport is not the only justification for conference realignment. There are numerous ways in which the Big 8-Southwest Conference merger has impacted its member institutions and the overall landscape of college athletics. However, since competitive balance is recognized as being generally appealing to consumers and football is among the conference’s most marketable sports, the implications of these findings must be deemed important if not surprising.

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