Abstract:

This article presented an empirical analysis of the relationship between the portion of the “Entering Player Pool” (Rookie Cap) for each of the 32 National Football League franchises and that franchise’s draft selections. Although the formula for determining each franchise’s Rookie Cap is closely guarded by the NFL, the author hypothesized that it should be possible to model the deterministic structure used to calculate franchise spending for each rookie’s contract. The OLS-estimated models revealed statistically significant relationships between groups segmented by draft selection order and each franchise’s Rookie Cap. The model was verified in an out-of-sample test using the Rookie Cap values for the 2007 NFL season. It was found to have a mean absolute percentage error of 2.1%. The implications of these findings were contrary to language in the NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement, as the majority of rookie contracts are implicitly determined by each franchise’s Rookie Cap. The published estimates of each selection’s NFL determined cap value will provide useful bargaining information for rookie contracts.

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Abstract:

The National Football League has experienced both expansion and relocation of its franchises in the past decade. It is a dynamic market; the relocation of a NFL franchise is an annual possibility. This study looked at the demographic and economic factors that determine the current locations of NFL teams. The top 50 metropolitan areas were empirically examined to explain why some cities have an NFL team and others do not. These factors included population, per capita income, the number of other sports franchises, and the number of Fortune 500 companies, geographic factors, and television ratings for “Monday Night Football.” This model can identify cities for possible expansion and those that would serve as relocation sites in the future. Special attention was paid to the Los Angeles and New Orleans markets.

Introduction:

The National Football League has experienced a dynamic period of expansion and relocation in the past decade; the league seeks to position itself with the optimal configuration for long-term growth of the professional football market. Although expansion is not a current short-term goal for the NFL, the relocation of weak teams remains an annual possibility.

Moving an existing sports franchise is not new. After the 1995 season, Los Angeles lost both of its football teams. The Rams moved from the old Rose Bowl in Pasadena to the brand-new TWA Dome in downtown St. Louis. The Raiders moved from the Los Angeles Coliseum to the newly renovated Oakland Coliseum. In 1996, the Cleveland Browns moved into a new stadium in Baltimore and became the Ravens. Most recently, the Houston Oilers moved to Tennessee and became the Titans in 1999.

The city of Los Angeles, which lost its chance to gain an expansion team in 2002 to Houston because it was unable to approve financing for a new stadium, remains without a team. Although this leaves the second largest television market without its own team, it also offers a credible relocation threat for existing team owners in their new stadium negotiations with local authorities.¹

Expansion and relocation of franchises in professional sports leagues have been studied for baseball and basketball; however, as far as the researchers know, a location model had never been created for the National Football League. Bruggink and Zamparelli (1999) produced a location model for Major League Baseball. The top 50 metropolitan areas were chosen for the sample. The explanatory variables for the regression model are population, population growth, and per capita income, in addition to the number of other professional sports teams in the area, the number of headquarters for Fortune 500 companies in the area, and the distance to the closest city with a baseball team. As one would expect, all variables had positive coefficients in the regression model. A more recent sports model by Rascher and Rascher (2005) estimated the probability that a particular city will have a National Basketball Association team by using the same core set of variables and adding factors such as the average NBA Nielsen television ratings for each city.

One interesting application of our model was applied to the New Orleans Saints football team. Even before the Hurricane Katrina damage to the Superdome, the owners of the Saints hinted that a move to a new location was in the offing.² Of course, this is the typical ploy to gain public subsidies for a new or improved stadium, but the closure of the Superdome for the 2005 season made this relocation potential very real. The re-scheduled 2005 games found the Saints playing in the welcoming city of San Antonio with capacity attendance at the Alamodome. Although the Saints played the 2006 season in a repaired Superdome, they are in position to pursue one of two options after 2006: 1) stay in New Orleans with a long term city commitment to help build a new or improved stadium, or 2) move to a new location in Los Angeles (Maske and Shapiro, 2005) or San Antonio (Orsborn 2006). Our location model used estimates of New Orleans depopulation to give a perspective on the potential consequences for the city’s viability as a home to a NFL franchise.

Location Model

There are a number of factors that influence the selection of cities for NFL relocation or expansion. Based on demographic and economic factors in the largest 50 metropolitan areas, the researchers constructed a logit model to determine the relationship of these factors (X₁, X₂, X₃, X₄, X₅, X₆, X₇) to the expected conditional probability (P_i) that each city (represented as i) would have one or more NFL teams:

P_i = E (Y_i = 1| X_1i,X_2i, X_3i, X_4i, X_5i, X_6i, X_7i)

where

Y = 1 if metropolitan area has one or more NFL teams; 0 otherwise

X₁ = POP2000 = population in metropolitan area i (millions)

X₂ = POPGROWTH = % population growth of a city the decade before the current team
located in city i (if the city does not have a team, the current
decade of growth is used)

X₃ = INC = income per capita in metropolitan area i ($1000)

X₄ = DISTANCE = distance to closest football franchise city (miles) from city i

X₅ = F500 = the number of Fortune 500 company headquarters in metropolitan area i

X₆ = OTHER/POP2000 = the number of other professional sports teams per million
population in city i (men’s basketball, hockey, and baseball)

X₇ = NIELSEN = “Monday Night Football” Nielsen ratings in metropolitan area i using
the 2002-3 season

The NFL wants to expand or relocate to a metropolitan area with a large and growing population in order to maximize stadium revenues from attendance, concessions, and parking fees. The researchers expected positive coefficients for the population and population growth. In addition to market size, standard microeconomic demand theory suggests that per capita income will be a positive influence. According to a 2003 survey, football fans had the highest median salary in all sports at $55,115 (USA Today, 2003).

The distance to the closest NFL franchise city is a major aspect for the location of a franchise. The NFL does not want all of its teams in one part of the country because there will be interest only in that part of the country, not the whole United States. This is especially important for a sport driven by national television revenues. Furthermore, locating a new franchise close to an existing franchise (generally up to 75 miles) would financially hurt the owner of the latter. The league does not approve of these territorial infringements.

The number of other professional sports teams (baseball, basketball, and hockey) in the metropolitan area can have an impact on the demand for football games. The other sports could be considered substitute goods, or, on the other hand, a measure of fan interest for sports in general (a complement good). Rascher and Rascher (2005) found a negative and significant relationship between the number of other teams and the probability that a city had a professional basketball team. However, Bruggink and Zamparelli (1999) found just the opposite for baseball, supporting the fan intensity argument. The difference could be in overlapping the season with other sports. Basketball overlaps the most, competing with hockey, football, and the beginning of baseball. Baseball and football face less severe overlaps, and at times have the season to themselves.

Another location factor is the number of headquarters for Fortune 500 corporations in the metro area (F500). NFL owners are allowed to keep all the stadium revenue from luxury box receipts (i.e., no revenue sharing), and corporations are the largest patrons of these seating sections (which are also called corporate sky boxes). This is one of the reasons that owners desire new stadiums, because it affords them an opportunity to maximize the number of luxury box seats.

The last location factor is the number of households in the metro area watching football on television. In this study, the average Nielsen ratings³ for the 2002-3 “Monday Night Football” games are used for the 50 metropolitan areas. “Monday Night Football” games were selected because the same game is watched by the entire nation, whether a city has a NFL team or not. Nielsen ratings are particularly important for the National Football League because there are no local television contracts, only a national contract divided equally among the 32 teams, and it is the single largest source of income.

Empirical Results and Simulation:

The preliminary estimation of the model included the top 50 metropolitan areas (those with populations of approximately one million or more). About half had one or more teams. However, with Los Angeles in the data set the estimated coefficient of the population variable is negative instead of positive. This preliminary model showed how sensitive the population factor is to the inclusion of Los Angeles (by far, the largest metro area in the sample that has no team). As discussed earlier, league owners receive value from having a viable city without a team because it poses a credible threat for a team to relocate, allowing them to negotiate with local government for sports subsidies. In this sense, the no-team status of Los Angeles is not a market outcome but a strategic ploy. When Los Angeles was excluded, the researchers actually had a sample of cities that was more representative of market conditions. The estimated model without Los Angeles had a positive coefficient for population and a better overall fit. This sensitivity is the reason the researchers relied on this as the final model for the predictions.

In this study, the researchers: 1) examined the statistical results, 2) tested the within-sample predictions for each city, 3) determined a list of viable cities for the NFL expansion or relocation, and 4) ran a simulation on the effect of New Orleans’ recent depopulation on its viability of retaining its football team.

Table 1 shows all the statistical results for the fitted model using the logistic function shown below. The logistic function is the natural log of the odds ratio in favor of a metropolitan area having a team (P = 1 if the metro area has a team, P = 0 if it does not). There are three advantages to using the logistic curve rather than an ordinary least squares regression: (1) the predicted probabilities for a city having a team are constrained to lie between 0 and 1 for the logistic curve, whereas for a linear regression model the predicted probabilities could exceed 1 or fall short of zero, both of which are impossible values, (2) the slope coefficients in the logit model are more realistic than ordinary least square because they vary in magnitude, depending on the size of the corresponding explanatory variable, and (3) the variance is more constant in the logit model than with ordinary least squares, which makes the t-tests more valid.

Table 1: Location Model

All the coefficients but one have the correct sign. Four of the seven are statistically significant at a 10% level or better in a one-tailed test. The statistically significant coefficients are for the following variables: the distance from the nearest NFL city, the number of other sports teams in the city per million population, the “Monday Night Football” television ratings, and the number of Fortune 500 headquarters in the city. The income variable missed being significant at only a 10% level. The only high correlation among the independent variables is between F500 and POP2000. This may explain why the coefficient of POP2000 does not appear statistically significant.

Table 2 shows the standardized coefficients in the logit model. Standardized coefficients scale the coefficients in the model using the standard deviations of the each independent variable and the dependent variable. By this method, the Fortune 500 and population variables have the most effect on whether a city has a team or not. Each have more the twice the size and therefore twice the impact than the other standardized coefficients. Distance and the presence of other professional teams rank next in importance followed by Nielsen ratings and income.

Table 2: Standardized Coefficients

Table 3 shows the results of the in-sample forecasts. The logit model correctly predicted the current NFL franchise status in 45 out of the 50 metropolitan areas. The missed predictions included Los Angeles (this outcome is made using an out-of-sample prediction), San Antonio, Salt Lake City, Buffalo, and Jacksonville. For the first three misses, the model predicted the cities would have teams but they do not (for our purposes, any probability greater than 0.50 means the city should have a team). Buffalo and Jacksonville have teams but the model predicted that they do not.

Table 3: Predictions* All predictions are within-sample, except for the out-of-sample forecast for Los Angeles.

Table 4 shows the top five candidate cities to have teams either through expansion or relocation. The logit model predicted that Los Angeles would have a team with a probability of 1.0, which is not surprising given that it once had two teams. However, if NFL owners continue to use the city as a credible threat, and if a new stadium is not in the package for the Los Angeles team, then the other cities in this list deserve consideration. Next is San Antonio, where the Saints have already tested the waters with great success. The logit model estimated that San Antonio had a probability of 0.56 in obtaining an NFL franchise either through relocation or expansion. Salt Lake City is a more marginal candidate at 0.51, and the model suggests that both Sacramento and Columbus are not viable candidates (their predicted probabilities are less than 0.5).

Table 4: Predicted Probabilities for Candidate Cities from the Sample

League expansion and the open Los Angeles market have been discussed in the NFL by both the outgoing Commissioner Paul Tagliabue (NFL.com, 2004) and the new Commissioner Roger Goodell (Farmer, 2007), but there is no short term timetable for expanding to a 33^rd team or moving a troubled franchise there. Nonetheless, the league has been working with investor groups representing sites at the Los Angeles Coliseum and the Rose Bowl in Pasadena (NFL.com 2004). Besides New Orleans, Buffalo and Jacksonville are mentioned as cities that might lose their franchises (The Sports Economist, 2006).

Do the Saints Go Marching Back In?

Under pre-Katrina conditions, New Orleans had a probability of 0.85 for its in-sample prediction for having a team (see Table 3). But this changes when the potential depopulation of New Orleans is considered. The extensive damage to the city of New Orleans was not only to the industrial and commercial structures. Whole residential sections of the city were destroyed and depopulated.

The model prediction included depopulation in two parts. First, the New Orleans metropolitan area population was reduced by 10, 20, 25, and 30%.⁴ Second, the Nielsen television ratings were correspondingly reduced. No adjustment was made to the Fortune 500 headquarters because New Orleans has only one such company, Entergy Corporation, and it will remain in the area.

Table 5 shows the simulation results for different assumptions about permanent depopulation for New Orleans. The most recent population estimate from the Census Bureau dates from July 1, 2006. At this time, a 400,000 loss was announced (Whoriskey, 2006). This 30% decline would put the predicted probability for New Orleans at approximately 0.43. Only Buffalo and Jacksonville have teams with lower probabilities than this. But this worse case scenario is outdated. A portion of the 400,000 have returned to the metro area since June 2006⁵, but how many will ultimately return? At this time, there is no planned Census Bureau update for the New Orleans metropolitan population.⁶ Should half of the displaced 400,000 return, the model would put place a probability of 0.59 that New Orleans will have (in this case keep) a team. The most optimistic non-official estimate (as of December 20, 2006) put the metro area at 1.2 million (Savidge, 2006). This is less than 10% depopulation, and the model provided a more comfortable 0.74 probability of having (retaining) a football team.

Table 5: Predicted Probability of a Team in New Orleans with Depopulation

Conclusion:

Expansion and relocation of franchises in the National Football League remains an active topic when one considers the fates of both the Los Angeles and New Orleans markets. Although expansion is not a current short term goal for the NFL, relocation of teams in weak markets remains an annual possibility. The researchers have estimated a model that identifies those weak teams based on economic and demographic factors, and, more importantly, identifies candidate cities for new or relocated teams. Buffalo, Jacksonville, and a depopulated New Orleans are vulnerable to losing their teams, while Los Angeles and San Antonio are viable candidates to offer new homes to teams. What happens next depends on the interests of the current owners and the investor groups in the candidate cities, as well as the state and local government support for new stadiums in the old or new locations.

Endnotes:

¹ “The most recent NFL expansion, when the league was deciding between Houston and Los Angeles, is instructive on this point. In general terms, the decision between the two locations hinged on two considerations regarding the Houston and Los Angeles markets. First, the league considered the financial contribution that either location would make to the league. Second, it considered the value of an open location and the negotiating advantages it provided to current league membership. Keeping the best believable threat location helps owners in negotiations with their current host cities (Fort, 2006, p. 393).

² Gary Roberts, a professor at Tulane University Law School and an expert in sports business issues, states “Everyone knows New Orleans was a marginal major league market. More and more, the NFL has come to rely on corporate dollars and New Orleans doesn’t have a very large corporate base” (Isidore, 2005).

Then Football Commissioner Tagliabue comments on whether New Orleans can support an NFL team long term: “[team owner] Benson has strong personal and professional ties to San Antonio, the suspicion remains that he would prefer to permanently locate the franchise there. Benson fears that the rebuilding of New Orleans, a process expected to take years, will threaten the team’s financial viability” (Pasquarelli, 2005).

³ A Nielsen TV rating is the percentage of households watching that particular television program out of all households with televisions. A TV share is the percentage of televisions in use that are watching that particular program.

⁴ The population growth variable was not altered because its coefficient 1) had the wrong sign, 2) a very small magnitude, and 3) was highly insignificant statistically.

⁵ “As a city in flux New Orleans remains statistically murky, but demographers generally that the population replenishment after the storm, as measured by things like the amount of mail sent and employment in main economic sectors, has leveled off” (Dewan. 2007).

⁶ The Census Bureau is “just not equipped to provide real time population estimates in a situation that is changing as rapidly as New Orleans” (Plyer, 2007).

References:

Brooks, Rick A celebration at the Superdome, Wall Street Journal Online September
23, 2006

Bruggink, Thomas H. and Justin Zamparelli Emerging markets in baseball: An
econometric model for predicting the expansion teams’ new cities, Economics:
Current Research Praeger Press (1999): 49-59.

Dewan, Shaila Fed-Up New Orleans residents are giving up, New York Times
February 16, 2007. www.nytimes.com/2007/02/16/us/nationalspecial/16orleans

Fort, Rodney, Sports Economics, Pearson Prentice-Hall (2006)

Hage, Jim A city is up and running, washingtonpost.com January 1, 2006

Isidore, Chris New Orleans’ muddy sports future, Money.cnn.com September 22,
2005

Maske, Mark, and Leonard Shapiro, Saints could end up in L.A.
Washingtonpost.com October 27, 2005

NFL.com NFL eyes Los Angeles for 2008, NFL.com wire reports May 25, 2004.

Orsborn, Tom. Football: The San Antonio…Chargers? Mysantonio.com January 13, 2006

Pasquarelli, Len. New Orleans Saints, ESPN.com December 30, 2005.

Plyer, Allison. Correspondence with Allison Plyer of Greater New Orleans Nonprofit
Knowledge Works (gnocdc.org) January 19, 2007.

Rascher, Daniel, and Heather Rascher Optimal markets for NBA expansion and
relocation, Sports Economics Perspectives Issue 2 November 2005

Savidge, Martin New Orleans returning slowly, MSNBC.com December 20, 2006.

Wetzel, Dan. Calling a T.O. for N.O., Sports.yahoo.com September 4, 2005

Abstract:

The purpose of this study was two-fold: 1) to investigate the coaching certification status for high school athletic leagues’ head baseball coaches and 2) to recommend a model high school certification program for head baseball coaches in the State of Hawaii. To meet selection criteria, the participating high schools must compete in both varsity and junior varsity baseball. The population surveyed for this study included all 59 athletic directors from the five athletic leagues within the Hawaii High School Athletic Association (HHSAA). The 14-item survey instrument contained four sections: (1) certifications, (2) experience, (3) professional growth, and (4) education. The results indicated that a small percentage of HHSAA athletic directors required a national coaching certification. Secondary findings indicated that a small percentage of HHSAA athletic directors required previous playing and coaching experiences, attendance at coaching-training seminars, and a high school diploma. Importantly, 95% of HHSAA members required background checks from their head baseball coaches.

Introduction:

There are about 6.5 million U.S. athletes that participate in interscholastic sports each year (National Federation of High School Association {NFHSA, n.d.}, 2004). Approximately 800,000 men and women coached these athletes in the school system (NFHSA, 2004). Thirty years ago, the majority of coaches were certified teachers. Today, most high school coaches are not certified (National Association of State Boards of Education {NASBE}, 2003). Currently, less than 8% of school coaches receive a specific education to coach (Martens, Flannery, and Roetert, 2003). Only 13 states specify that coaches must have a teaching certificate, and all of these states allow exceptions to this rule (NASBE, 2003).

Advocating for U.S. quality coaching and coaching education began in the 1960’s from the National Association for Sport and Physical Education (National Association for Sport and Physical Education {NASPE}, 2006). Over the next 40 years, NASPE would partner with various national organizations in spearheading the national movement for high school coaching certification. By the mid-1980’s, this national coaching movement was advanced by the American Sport Education Program (American Sport Education Program {ASEP}, 2007). ASEP, founded by Rainer Martens in the early 1970’s, had by 1986, 1,400 certified instructors who trained more than 50,000 coaches across America (ASEP, 2006). In 1991, this coaching educational movement was expanded when AESP joined forces with the National Federation of State High School Association (NFHS) (ASEP, 2006).

In addition to ASEP advancing the coaching educational movement in the 1990’s, in 1991, another U.S. national coaching certification program, called the Program for Athletic Coaches Education (PACE), was adopted (Seefeldt and Brown, 1991). Currently, PACE consists of six coaching areas: (1) Philosophy, (2) Growth and Development, (3) Sports Medicine, (4) Psychology, (5) Litigation/Liability, and (6) Sports Management (Seefeldt and Brown, 1991).

As a result of the 1990’s coaching education movement, by 1998, 66% of state agencies provided funding for or offered staff educational development to high school coaches (Burgeson, Wechsler, Brener, Young, & Spain, 2001). By 2000, 40% of the states required coaches to be certified in first aid and CPR, and 34% required coaches to complete a coaches’ training course (Burgeson et al., 2001).

As a result of the lack of the states’ initiative of requiring or recommending CPR and first-aid certification for all coaches, in 2003, the NFHS recommended that all coaches (experienced and non-experienced): (1) possess a current and valid CPR and first aid certification and (2) complete a planned systematic coaching education curriculum by 2006 (NASBE, 2003). In addition, the NFHS recommended that even certified teachers serving as head coaches maintain their professional development by completing a minimum of one coaching education course per year during their coaching tenure (NASBE, 2003).

In 2005 the NFHS, in partnership with ASEP, adopted NASPE’s National Standards for Sport Coaches (NASPE, 2006). The purpose of the guide was to “provide direction for coaching educators, sport administrators, coaches, athletes and their families, and the public regarding the skills and knowledge that coaches should possess” (NASPE, 2006). In addition, NASPE oversees the National Council for Accreditation of Coaching Education (NCACE) (NASPE, 2006). NCACE reviews coaching education and certification programs that seek accreditation based on compliance with the National Standards for Athletic Coaches (NASPE, 2006).

Due to the relentless national efforts of NASPE, NCACE, NFHS, ASEP, and PACE, in 2001, high schools began emphasizing coaching education primarily for their respective head coaches. Among the co-ed middle/junior and senior high schools that offered co-ed interscholastic sports (99.2%), 51.7% required their head coaches to complete a coaches’ training course (Burgeson et al., 2001). In addition, 51.3% and 45.6% of these secondary schools required head coaches to be certified in first aid and CPR, respectively (Burgeson et al., 2001).

Currently, there are 40 states that have adopted, recommended, or required one of two national certification programs (ASEP or PACE) for their respective head coaches (Jackowiak, 2003). Currently, ASEP continues to work with 40 state high school associations to provide coaching educational information for more than 25,000 coaches per year (ASEP, 2006).

If Hawaii’s secondary high school coaching environments are similar to the U.S. coaching scene, Hawaii’s high school athletes may be exposed to unqualified coaches. Since baseball is played in all Hawaii’s high schools that compete in interscholastic sports, the investigators examined Hawaii’s head baseball coaches’ educational status to determine Hawaii’s high schools’ coaching certification status.

Purpose:

The purpose of this study was two-fold: 1) to investigate the coaching certification status for high school athletic leagues and 2) to recommend a model high school certification program for head baseball coaches in the State of Hawaii. To meet selection criteria, the participating high schools must compete in varsity and junior varsity baseball. The study specifically addressed the following research questions:

(1) What types of coaching qualifications or certifications exist within the 50 states’ high school athletic associations?

(2) What types of coaching qualifications or certifications exist in Hawaii’s public and private highs schools?

Method:

Every athletic director in all 59 public and private high schools in the state of Hawaii completed the survey. The 14-item survey contained four sections: (1) certifications, (2) experience, (3) professional growth, and (4) education. Each question had a yes or no response. Frequency distributions and percentages of the athletic directors’ responses were determined in order to compare the similarities and differences among the five high school leagues, and between public and private high school leagues. Data were analyzed using descriptive statistics.

Results:

A total of 59 athletic directors completed usable questionnaires, which represented a 100% return rate. Table 1 highlights the responses among HHSAA’s five high school leagues. Table 2 compares collectively the similarities and differences between public and private school leagues. In addition, Table 3 indicates the certification status among the 50 states.

Table 1: HHSAA League Comparisons

As indicated in Tables 1 and 2, comparison of HHSAA’s leagues’ athletic directors’ (n=59) responses with regards to their respective head baseball coaches’ four-area certification status is as follows: (1) In Certifications, HHSAA high school leagues’ athletic directors (88.14%) did not require any formal coaching certification for their respective head baseball coaches, and interestingly, 67.8% didn’t require CPR and First Aid certification; (2) In Experience, HHSAA (84.75% and 84.5%, respectively) did not require their respective head coaches to have any past high school playing experience nor previous coaching experience, but HHSAA (94.92%) did require their league officials to conduct substance abuse and criminal background checks on their respective head baseball coaches prior to their coaching; (3) In Professional Growth, only 13.56% of HHSAA required their respective coaches to participate in any coaching education-training program prior to becoming a head baseball coach. Only 33.9% and 35.59% respectively of HHSAA required annual coaching education-training seminars and passing a rules/regulations examination; in contrast, HHSAA (94.92%) required parental-coaching meetings where head coaches addressed team goals, parent-coaching behavior, team rules, player responsibilities, and player discipline issues; and (4) In Experience, HHSAA (57.63 %) required at least a high school diploma from their respective head baseball coaches.

Table 2: Private vs. Public

Data in Table 2 revealed the following findings comparing the HHSAA pubic high schools’ and private high schools’ athletic directors’ collective responses in the four-area coaching standards: (1) Certification– Only public (13.64%) and private (6.67%) high schools’ athletic directors required their respective head baseball coaches to have national coaching certification and CPR/First Aid (38.64%, 13.33% respectively); (2) Experience– Interestingly, only a small remnant public or private high schools’ athletic directors’ required their respective head baseball coaches to have any previous high school playing experience (18.18% and 6.67% respectively) and previous coaching experience (11.36% and 26.67%, respectively); in contrast, HHSAA required substance abuse and criminal background checks (95.45% and 93.33%, respectively); (3) Professional Growth– Only public (15.91%) and private (6.67%) athletic directors required their respective head baseball coaches to attend coaching education-training seminars prior to employment and to attend annual coaching education-training seminars (34.09% and 33.33%, respectively); and (4) Education– The majority of public (61.36%) athletic directors required their respective high school head baseball coaches to have at least a high school diploma, in contrast to private athletic directors (46.67%).

Table 3: Head Coaching Requirements by StateX = Required, R=Recommended

Discussion:

In the Certifications section of the questionnaire, the findings indicated that a very small percent of HHSAA’s leagues’ athletic directors required a national certification policy and CPR/First-Aid certification. In contrast, HHSAA (84.75%) offered coaching education-training seminars for its head baseball coaches. If HHSAA doesn’t’ require its respective coaches to complete a recognizable national certification program, including CPR and First Aid, then coaches have to further their professional growth by attending their leagues’ recommended coaching education-training sessions.

In the Experience section of the questionnaire, a small percent of HHSAA’s athletic directors required previous high school playing and coaching experience in baseball. Nevertheless, nearly all (94.92%) HHSAA’s athletic directors required substance abuse and criminal background checks on their head baseball coaches. The difference in these requirements may be due to the importance of coaches’ character, rather than playing and coaching experience.

In the Professional section of the questionnaire, a minimal percent of HHSAA’s athletic directors required their head baseball coaches to attend coaching education-training seminars prior to employment, and to attend annual coaching education-training seminars after employment. A related finding revealed that a high percent of HHSAA’s athletic directors (84.75%) offered coaching education-training sessions for their head baseball coaches. Obviously, HHSAA recognized the importance of coaching education-training sessions, but HHSAA possibly encountered attendance problems in the past in coaches or baseball coaches who have not positively reviewed the coaching education-training curriculum.

The Education section of the questionnaire indicated that over half (57.63%) of the HHSAA’s athletic directors required at least a high school diploma for their head baseball coaches. This low percentage may be due to a lack in initiating a standard policy requiring all potential head baseball coaches to have a high school diploma. Certainly, high school dropouts would encounter more difficulties in obtaining high school head-coaching jobs than a high school graduate.

An interestingly supplemental finding revealed that there were only two nationally-certified high school strength and conditioning coaches. No HHSAA league athletic director required his or her respective high school to have a certified strength and conditioning coach on staff.

In Hawaii, 92 high schools compete in men and women interscholastic sports. In 2005, 34,758 student-athletes participated in Hawaii’s 24 state high school sports programs (K. Amemiya, personal communication, January 15, 2007). Not one head coach had a national strength and conditioning certification credential. Yet in any of these 92 high schools, if the athletes participated in any on-campus formal off-season or in-season strength and conditioning programs, unqualified sport-coaches conducted these regiments, thereby increasing the risk of injury to these 34,758 student-athletes. In a progressive state, like Hawaii, which was the first and only state to require every athletic high school to have on staff two-full time nationally certified athletic trainers, the HHSAA should recognize the need to require and fund one full-time certified strength and conditioning coach on every high school staff.

Conclusions and Recommendations:

In conclusion, there is a national movement toward high school coaching certification. To date, there are 40 states that have adopted, recommended, or required one of two national certification programs — ASEP or PACE. There seems to be a disparity in Hawaii’s high school athletic departments. There is no movement to adopt, recommend, or require national certification for Hawaii’s coaches, yet Hawaii is the only state to require two athletic trainers in every high school. Therefore, Hawaii’s athletic departments should seriously consider the following recommendations: (1) HHSAA should adopt either the American Sport Education Program’s (ASEP) or the Program for Athletic Coaches Education (PACE) national coaching certification requirements for their head baseball coaches; and (2) The National Standards for Athletic Coaches created by the National Association for Sport and Physical Education (NASPE) should be incorporated into HHSAA’s ASEP or PACE national accreditation-coaching program. The national standards should be used as a basis or framework for design of selection, evaluation, and education programs.

References:

American Sport Education Program (2006). ASEP’s Beginnings. Retrieved November 20, 2006, from http://www.asep.com/about.cfm

Brylinsky, J., (2002). National standards for athletic coaches. ERIC Digest, Oct.2002. Retrieved Nov. 12, 2005, from http://www.ericdigests.org/2004-1/coaches.htm

Burgeson, C., Wechsler, H., Brener, N.D., Young, J.C., & Spain, C.G. (2001). Physical education and activity: Results from the school health policies and programs study 2000. Journal of School Health, 71, 279-293.

Gilbert, W. & Trudel, P., (1999). An evaluation strategy for coach education programs. Journal of Sport Behavior, 22, 234-250.

Jackowiak, L., (2003). Developing an athletic program based on sound principles. Incorporating the national federation coaching education program. Retrieved Sept.23, 2006, from http://www.nfhs.org

Martens, R., Flannery, T., & Retort, P. (2003). The future of coaching Education in America, Retrieved May 11, 2006, from http://www.nfhs.org/cep/articles/future_coaching.htm

National Association for Sport and Physical Education (1995). National Standards for Athletic Coaches. Dubuque: Kendall/Hunt.

National Association of State Boards of Education (NASBE) (2003). Education requirements for athletic coaches. NASBE policy update, 11 (4). Retrieved May 12, 2006, from http://www.nasbe.org/Educational_Issues/Policy_Updates/11_4.html

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