Contemporary Sports Issues – Page 59

Upon Further Review: An Examination of Sporting Event Economic Impact Studies

Submitted by: Victor A. Matheson

As pointed out by Soonhwan Lee (2001) in a recent issue of The Sport Journal, there exists a great deal of debate about the validity of economic impact studies of sporting events. Economists widely believe that studies sponsored by leagues and events exaggerate the economic impact that professional franchises and large sporting events make on local communities. Such overstatement results from several factors.

First, the studies often ignore the substitution effect. To the extent that attendees at a sporting event spend their money on that event instead of on other activities in the local economy, the sporting event simply results in reallocation of expenditures in the economy, rather than in real net increases in economic activity. Next, the studies usually ignore the crowd out effect. Many large sporting events are staged in communities that are already popular destinations for tourists. If hotels and restaurants in a host city normally tend to be at or near capacity during the period in which a competition takes place, that contest may simply supplant, not supplement, the regular tourist economy. Third, the studies may fail to address whether money spent at a sporting event stays within the local economy. Much of the money spent by out-of-town visitors pays for hotel rooms, rental cars, and restaurants. To the extent that hotels, car rental agencies, and restaurants are national chains, their profits associated with a sporting event do not further the welfare of the local citizens, but rather accrue to stockholders around the country. Similarly, revenue from ticket sales is often paid to a league or to a sport’s ruling body instead of local organizers. Fourth, sporting events’ non-economic costs—traffic congestion, vandalism, environmental degradation, disruption of residents’ lifestyle, and so on—are rarely reported (Lee, 2001). Finally, since economic impact studies are often used by sports boosters to justify public expenditures on sports infrastructure, the ultimate question for anyone reading such studies is whether analysis conducted by agents with a vested interest in the research outcome can ever be considered an objective examination of events’ true economic impacts.

Empirical Analyses of Economic Impact Statements

It is one thing to point out bias that could potentially be introduced in impact studies. It is another thing altogether to examine whether actual economic impact studies are, in practice, truly flawed. One tool that can be used to determine the accuracy of economic impact studies is ex post comparisons of predicted economic gains to actual economic performance of cities hosting sporting events. Empirical studies have been conducted on the observed economic impacts of large sporting events as well as on the construction of new sport facilities.

On the sport facility side, numerous researchers have examined the relationship between new facilities and economic growth in metropolitan areas (Baade & Dye, 1990; Rosentraub, 1994; Baade, 1996; Noll & Zimbalist, 1997; Coates & Humphreys, 1999). In every case, independent analysis of economic impacts made by newly built stadiums and arenas has uniformly found no statistically significant positive correlation between sport facility construction and economic development (Siegfried & Zimbalist, 2000). This stands in stark contrast to the claims of teams and leagues, who assert that the large economic benefits of professional franchises merit considerable public expenditures on stadiums and arenas.

On the events side, nearly every national or international sporting event elicits claims of huge benefits accruing to the host city. For example, the National Football League typically claims an economic impact from the Super Bowl of around $400 million (National Football League, 1999), Major League Baseball attaches a $75 million benefit to the All-Star Game (Selig et al., 1999), and the NCAA Final Four in Men’s Basketball is estimated to generate from $30 million to $110 million (Mensheha, 1998; Anderson, 2001). Multi-day events such as the Olympics or soccer World Cup produce even larger figures. The pre-Olympics estimates for Atlanta’s Games in 1996 suggested the event would generate $5.1 billion in direct and indirect economic activity and 77,000 new jobs in Georgia (Humphreys & Plummer, 1995).

In many cases, variation in the estimates of benefits alone raises questions about the validity of studies. A series of economic impact studies of the NBA All-Star game produced numbers ranging from a $3 million windfall for the 1992 game in Orlando to a $35 million bonanza for the game three years earlier in Houston (Houck, 2000). The ten-fold disparity in the estimated impact of the event in different years serves to illustrate the ad hoc nature of these studies. Similarly, ahead of the 1997 NCAA Women’s Basketball Final Four, an economic impact of $7 million was estimated for the local economy in Cincinnati, while the same event two years later was predicted to produce a $32 million impact on the San Jose economy (Knight Ridder News Service, 1999). Such increases cannot be explained by changes in general price levels or growth in the popularity of the tournament. Instead, they are explained by the fact that economic impact studies are highly subjective and vulnerable to significant error as well as manipulation.

In further cases, the size of an estimate can strain credulity. The Sports Management Research Institute estimated the direct economic benefit of the U. S. Open tennis tournament in Flushing Meadows, NY, to be $420 million for the tri-state area, more than any other sporting or entertainment event in any city in the United States; this sum represents 3% of the total annual direct economic impact of tourism for New York (United States Tennis Association, 2001). It is simply impossible to believe that 1 in 30 tourists to New York City in any given year are visiting the city solely to attend the U. S. Open. Similarly, the projected $6 billion impact of a proposed World Cup in South Africa in 2006 would suggest that soccer games and their ancillary activities would represent over 4% of the entire gross domestic product of the country in that year (South Africa Football Association, 2000).

As in the case of sports facilities, independent work on the economic impact of mega–sporting events has routinely found the effect of these events on host communities to be either insignificant or an order of magnitude less than the figures espoused by the sports promoters. In a study of six Super Bowls dating back to 1979, Porter (1999) found no increase in taxable sales in the host community compared to previous years without the game. Similarly, Baade and Matheson (2000) found that hosting the Super Bowl was associated with an increase in employment in host cities of 537 jobs, for a total impact of approximately $32 million, less than one-tenth the figure trumpeted by the NFL. In a study of 25 Major League Baseball all-star games held between 1973 and 1997, Baade and Matheson (2001) found that, in the case of three all-star games in California (1987, 1989, 1992), the events were correlated with worse-than-expected employment growth in host cities and were furthermore associated with an average reduction in taxable sales of nearly $30 million. Finally, Baade and Matheson’s examination (1999) of the Olympic Games held in Los Angeles in 1984 and Atlanta in 1996 found total observed increases in economic activity of $100 million and of $440 million to $1.7 billion, respectively. While the range of the economic impact for Atlanta exhibits a great deal of uncertainty, even the most favorable figure is only one-third of the amount claimed by the host committee.

Discussion and Recommendation

There are theoretical reasons to believe that economic impact studies of large sporting events may overstate those events’ true impact. In addition, evidence suggests that in practice the ex ante estimates of economic benefits far exceed the ex post observed economic development of communities that host mega–sporting events or stadium construction. The best recommendation is simply for cities to view with extreme caution any economic impact estimates provided by sports franchises, sponsoring leagues, or event-organizing committees.

References

Anderson, T. (2001, January 19). St. Louis ready to raise NCAA flag if Atlanta can’t. St. Louis Business Journal.

Baade, R. A. (1996). Professional sports as a catalyst for metropolitan economic development. Journal of Urban Affairs, 18(1), 1–17.

Baade, R. A., & Dye, R. (1990). The impact of stadiums and professional sports on metropolitan area development. Growth and Change, 21(2), 1–14.

Baade, R. A., & Matheson, V. A. (2000). An assessment of the economic impact of American football, Reflets et Perspectives, 34(2–3), 35–46.

Baade, R. A., & Matheson, V. A. (2001). Home run or wild pitch? Assessing the economic impact of Major League Baseball’s All-Star Game. Journal of Sports Economics, 2(4), 307–327.

Baade, R. A., & Matheson, V. A. (in press). Assessing the economic impact of the summer Olympic Games: The experience of Los Angeles and Atlanta. Proceedings of the 1999 International Conference on the Economic Impact of Sports, Athens, Greece.

Coates, D., & Humphreys, B. (1999). The growth effects of sports franchises, stadia, and arenas. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 14(4), 601–624.

Enquirer Sports Coverage. (1999, March 25). Final Four’s financial impact hard to gauge. Retrieved August 30, 2001, from http://www.enquirer.com/editions/1999/02/25/spt_final_fours.html.

Houck, J. (2000, January 21). High-stake courtship. FoxSportsBiz.com. Retrieved September 14, 2000, from http://www.foxsports.com/business/trends/z000120allstar1.sml.

Humphreys, J. M., & Plummer, M. K. (1995). The economic impact on the state of Georgia of hosting the 1996 summer Olympic Games (mimeograph). Athens, GA: University of Georgia, Selig Center for Economic Growth.

Lee, S. (2001). A review of economic impact study on sport events. The Sport Journal, 4(2).

Mensheha, M. (1998, March 27). Home-court edge: Final Four promises to be economic slam dunk. San Antonio Business Journal.

National Football League. (1999). Super Bowl XXXIII generates $396 million for South Florida [Report 58(7)].

Noll, R., & Zimbalist, A. (1997). Economic impact of sports teams and facilities. In Sports, Jobs and Taxes. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.

Porter, P. (1999). Mega–sports events as municipal investments: A critique of impact analysis. In Fizel, J., Gustafson, E., & Hadley, L. (Eds.), Sports economics: Current research. Westport, CT: Praeger.

Rosentraub, M. (1994). Sport and downtown development strategy. Journal of Urban Affairs, 16(3), 228–239.

Seigfried, J., and Zimbalist, A. (2000). Economics of sports facilities and their communities. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(3), 95–114.

Selig, B., Harrington, J., & Healey, J. (1999, July 12). New ballpark press briefing. Retrieved August 29, 2000, from http://www.asapsports.com/baseball/1999allstar/071299BS.html.

South Africa Football Association. (2000). World Cup bid details. Retrieved January 9, 2002, from http://www.safa.ord.za/html/bid_det.htm.

United States Tennis Association. (2001). 2000 U.S. Open nets record $420 million in economic benefits for New York. Retrieved January 9, 2002, from http://www.usta.com/pagesup/news12494.html.

U.S. Sports Academy2016-10-12T11:40:57-05:00February 14th, 2008|Contemporary Sports Issues, Sports Facilities, Sports Management, Sports Studies and Sports Psychology|Comments Off

Drug Use by College Athletes: Is Random Testing an Effective Deterrent?

Submitted by: Russell Meldrum, MD, and Judy R. Feinberg, PhD

Abstract

Incidence
of anabolic steroid use among college athletes is about 1%,
with another 12% considered at-risk in that they would use
such drugs under the right circumstances. This study aimed
to determine if volunteer drug testing, without fear of penalty,
would result in positive identification of drug use, or if
the testing alone is a deterrent. A group of 197 college athletes,
all of who denied drug use, voluntarily and anonymously supplied
urine samples. Average T/E ratio was 1.33 ± 0.86, with
two cases (1.1%) above the accepted ratio. We conclude that
T/E ratio testing is effective in detecting use of performance-enhancing
drugs and that testing itself, although an effective deterrent
to drug use, may not eliminate drug use among college athletes.

Introduction

Athletes
have used performance-enhancing drugs for decades. In 1968
the International Olympic Committee (IOC) banned the use of
performance-enhancing substances to promote fair play in competition.
At that time the banned substances were primarily anabolic
steroids and amphetamines. Other athletic associations and
sport governing bodies soon followed suit by adopting similar
bans, including the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA) which adopted a drug-testing program to promote fair
and equitable competition and to safeguard the health and
safety of student-athletes. Since then the specified number
of banned substances has risen dramatically as athletes are
driven to finding new ways to obtain a competitive edge and/or
to avoid detection. Currently the NCAA promotes drug education
and mandates that each athletic department conduct a drug
and alcohol education program once a semester, presumably
to increase the athletes’ understanding of the drug-testing
program and to promote the avoidance of drug use.

Despite
these regulations, the incidence of anabolic steroid use among
athletes has not decreased, and, in some instances, has increased
(Catlin & Murray, 1996). In general, the decision to not
use drugs is felt to be related more to the fear of reprisal
than to health issues, and users continue to look for ways
to avoid detection rather than decide not to use these banned
substances. Tricker and Connolly (1997) reported an 8% rate
of anabolic steroid use in college athletes over a lifetime
and a 1% use within the past six months. In addition they
identified about 12% at-risk athletes, i.e., they would use
steroids under the right circumstances. Those circumstances
were largely defined as the ability to achieve their athletic
potential without testing positive for use.

The
purpose of this study was to examine T/E ratios in a group
of college athletes who volunteered for testing under the
conditions of anonymity and therefore had no fear of reprisal.
The T/E ratio was chosen because of its low false-positive
rate (0.1%). We aimed to determine if the anticipated results
of no positive test results would occur, or if there might
be any positive test results with the threat of reprisal removed.

Method

Subjects

A
group of 206 male varsity or junior varsity NCAA Division
I college athletes identified themselves as not currently
taking nutritional supplements or performance-enhancing drugs
and volunteered to provide a urine sample for testing. Because
the testing was done anonymously, there was no fear of reprisal
from submitting to the testing. Nine samples were contaminated
during processing and were eliminated, leaving a study group
of 197 college athletes, all of whom would presumably have
negative test results.

Testing
Procedure

Urinary
specimens were examined for the ratio of testosterone (T)
to epitestosterone (E). The accepted standard for identifying
anabolic steroid use was used with a T/E ratio above 6:1 as
a positive indication of doping (Catlin et al.,1996; International
Olympic Committee, 1982). All urine specimens were run on
HP 599SC gas chromatography – mass spectrometry (Hewlett Packard
Company, Avondale, Pennsylvania) using standard testing procedures
(Borts & Bowers, 2000; Dehennin, 1994; Ismail & Harkness,
1966; van de Kerkhof, De Boer, Thijssen, & Maes, 2000).
Because there is a small incidence of false positive results,
it is recommended that additional testing be done on those
whose T/E ratios exceed 6:1 before legal action is considered
(Dehennin & Scholler, 1990). However, in this study, no
additional testing was done as the athlete could not be identified
and there would be no punitive action. It is also known that
there are athletes who use exogenous testosterone, yet their
T/E ratio never exceeds 6:1 (Garle, Ocka, Palonek, & Bjorkhem,
1996).

Results

The
average testosterone/epitestosterone (T/E) ratio was 1.33:1
± 0.86 (mean ± standard deviation). Two of the
197 (1.1%) athletes tested had T/E ratios greater than the
accepted international standard (12:1 and 9:1) and, thus,
had positive test results. Thus, the specificity of the T/E
testing in this study group was 195/197 (98%) as all subjects
were presumably drug-free.

Discussion

Our
data confirms that the T/E ratio testing is at least 98% accurate,
depending upon the true drug status of the two individuals
who had abnormal T/E ratios in this study. The two specimens
with ratios higher than the accepted norm were not verified
with further testing, and, therefore, it is not know whether
these two cases represented true or false positives. If we
assume that those two athletes were, in fact, taking performance
enhancing drugs, the accuracy, sensitivity, specificity, of
the T/E ratio testing becomes 100%.

The
fact that two athletes tested positive under the study conditions
is interesting. Although only those who professed that they
did not use any performance-enhancing drugs were recruited
for the study, perhaps those two athletes thought they might
draw attention by their lack of participation and possibly
be singled out for sanctioned testing in the future if they
chose not to participate. Since there was no fear of personal
identification or of reprisal for positive test results, they
may have felt participation was risk-free regardless, or they
simply may have felt that they could beat the system or wanted
to test the system to see if they might go undetected.

Confirmation
or refutation in the two positive cases was not pursued. However
it is felt that most likely these were true positives. The
reasons for this assumption are based on known percentages
of drug use among college athletes and previous reports of
the incidence of false positive results on initial testing.
Tricker and Connolly (1997) reported a 1% use of anabolic
steroids within the past six months in their survey of 563
college athletes. Catlin and Murray (1996) reported a similar
percentage in Olympic athletes over a nine-year period and,
over a three-year period in NCAA football players, the average
was also approximately 1%. On the other hand, Dehennin and
Scholler (1990) reported the incidence of false positives
at 15 per 10,000 (0.15%). The two positive results in this
group of 197 college athletes represented 1.1% of the study
group, and this percentage would be consistent with the anticipated
number of positive results in a random sample of male college
athletes.

The
more important issue is that the use of anabolic steroids
among athletes, although not increasing, has not diminished
under the current testing programs. Even in this study, where
volunteer athletes were recruited to participate only if they
were non-users, positive test results occurred. This is not
to say that the testing programs are ineffective, but they
are not entirely effective in acting as a deterrent to drug
use. The fear of testing positive and risking disqualification
or sanction clearly deters a certain percentage of athletes
considered at risk for drug use, but others continue to use
drugs and either hope to or try to beat the system. Testing
programs vary among sports governing agencies. At the 1996
Olympics Games in Atlanta, approximately 18% of athletes were
tested after their events including all medallists and one
or two others at random (Catlin and Murray, 1996). Random
testing leaves a chance for an athlete to avoid detection,
yet testing of all athletes one or more times during a season
is cost-prohibitive. In addition, those motivated to gain
a competitive edge, legal or otherwise, will seek novel ways
to avoid detection, including taking masking substances.

Drug
use is a serious concern, not only for the concepts of integrity
and fair play in competitive sports, but because of the health
threats to the athletes. Certainly drug testing programs should
continue with increasing numbers of athletes being tested
and increasing penalties for detection, since these are most
likely means of deterrence. Drug education programs must also
continue in a further attempt to curtail the use of illegal
performance-enhancing drugs by empowering the young athlete
with the information and skills to make responsible and healthy
decisions.

Conclusion

Drug
testing programs are designed to promote fair play and deter
drug use among athletes. Under conditions of anonymity a group
of professed non-user athletes volunteered for drug testing.
Two positive results were identified indicating the importance
of continued testing and need for further testing and education,
as testing alone is not a sufficient deterrent to eliminate
drug use among college athletes.

Acknowledgement

This
study was supported by a student institutional grant by and
performed at Brigham Young University in Provo, Utah.
References

Borts, D. J., & Bowers, L. D. (2000). Direct measurement
of urinary testosterone and epitestosterone conjugates using
high-performance liquid chromatography/tandem mass spectrometry.
Journal of Mass Spectrometry, 35, 50-61.
Catlin, D. H., Cowan. D.A., De la Torre. R., Donike, M.,
Fraisse, D., Oftebro H., Hatton, C.K., Starcevic, B., Becchi,
M., de la Torre, X., Norli, H., Geyer, H., & Walker,
C.J. (1996). Urinary testosterone (T) to epitestosterone
(E) ratios by GC/MS. I. Initial comparison of uncorrected
T/E in six international laboratories. Journal of Mass Spectrometry,
31, 297-402.
Catlin, D. H., & Murray, T. H. (1996). Performance-enhancing
drugs, fair competition, and Olympic sport. Journal of the
American Medical Association, 276, 231-237.
Dehennin, L. (1994). On the origin of physiologically high
ratios of urinary testosterone to epitestosterone: consequences
for reliable detection of testosterone administration by
male athletes. Journal of Endocrinology, 142, 353-360.
Dehennin, L., & Scholler, R. (1990) Detection of self-administration
of testosterone as an anabolic by determination of the ratio
of urinary testosterone to urinary epitestosterone in adolescents.
Pathologie Biologie (Paris), 38, 920-922.
Garle, M., Ocka, R., Palonek, E., & Bjorkhem, I. (1996).
Increased urinary testosterone/epitestosterone ratios found
in Swedish athletes in connection with a national control
program. Evaluation of 28 cases. Journal of Chromatography
B Biomedical Applications, 687, 55-59.
International Olympic Committee. (1982). International Olympic
Committee Definition of Doping and List of Doping Classes
and Methods. Lausanne, Switzerland.
Ismail, A. A., & Harkness, R.A. (1966). A method for
the estimation of urinary testosterone. Biochemistry Journal,
99, 717-725.
Tricker, R., & Connolly, D. (1997). Drugs and the college
athlete: An analysis of the attitudes of student athletes
at risk. Journal of Drug Education, 27,105-119.
van de Kerkhof, D.H., de Boer, D., Thijssen, J. H., &
Maes, R. (2000). Evaluation of testosterone/epitestosterone
ratio influential factors as determined in doping analysis.
Journal of Analytical Toxicology, 24,102-115.

Russell
Meldrum, MD, and
Judy R. Feinberg, PhD
Indiana University
School of Medicine
Department of Orthopedic Surgery
541 Clinical Drive
Suite 600
Indianapolis, IN 46202-5111
Phone: 317-274-8318
Fax: 317-274-3702
Email: rmeldrum@iupui.edu

U.S. Sports Academy2013-11-26T21:45:07-06:00February 14th, 2008|Contemporary Sports Issues, Sports Management, Sports Studies and Sports Psychology|Comments Off

Minority Hiring Practices in Professional Sports

Submitted by: Brad Muster

Introduction

Professional sports provide a source of entertainment for millions of people. Players and games are seen as diversions to everyday life. Yet to athletes, and to those who work behind the scenes in the front-offices, professional sport is a job. Running and managing sports teams and leagues is big business. As such, hiring practices of these institutions should be of societal concern. Franchises impact the lives of not only those whom they employ, but entire cities as well. From the construction and operation of stadiums to the local merchants who take care of the fans, sports teams greatly affect a city’s economy. A glance at the rosters can quickly show what the players’ demographics are, but a closer look is needed to see the racial and gender make-up of these various teams and leagues.

Statement of the Problem

The purpose of this paper is to review the demographic hiring history of various professional sports teams and leagues. The demographic make-up of players, front-office and league personnel will be compared to the overall labor market to determine how professional sports fare in creating jobs for minority groups.

Independent Variable

The percentage of minority hiring across gender and racial lines will serve as the independent variable in this study.

Dependent Variables

The various professional sports organizations (NFL, NBA, MLB) and the population rates for each selected minority group will serve as the dependent variables in this study.

Hypothesis

Sports organizations will likely fare well in terms of minority hiring where players are concerned. African-Americans comprise a majority on most teams’ rosters, and Hispanics fare well in Major League Baseball. More opportunities are emerging for women. Front-office positions will most likely be under-represented in minority hiring, particularly among females.

Assumptions

This study assumes no one is excluded from pursuing jobs in the professional sports field due to gender or race.

Limitations

This study is delimited to professional sports teams, their players and league personnel.

Significance of the Study

The overall labor force is becoming more diverse. Professional athletes have traditionally been male and, for the most part, Caucasian or African-American. The emergence of new professional sports organizations for women have increased opportunities for female athletes. But who is working off-field for these organizations? How have sports teams and leagues staffed their organizations? Are they in line with the national labor hiring practices? Or, are they in stark contrast with the real world? A minority unfriendly hiring practice could have a negative impact on the popularity and support for each league.

Review of Literature

A review of the literature reveals that the data can be interpreted in a multitude of ways. At first glance professional sports seem to epitomize a system of racial harmony and equality. One needs only to look at the rosters of various teams in the National Basketball Association (NBA), the National Football League (NFL), or Major League Baseball (MLB) to find a healthy mix of minority participation. A closer inspection reveals some disturbing observations. True, while minority participation is high, it seems relegated to one particular minority group, the African-American male. The opportunities for female athletes to participate have increased due to the formation of various sports leagues, most notably the Women’s National Basketball Association (WNBA), but their numbers still far trail those of their male counterparts. Hispanic and Asian-American participation seems limited to MLB, where their numbers are not reflective of their presence in the overall population. A look at the team and league offices reveals that the true position of power in these sports is predominately dominated by the white male.

The Northeastern University Center for the Study of Sport in Society has been issuing racial report cards for professional team sports. The report has evolved from grading minority participation and employment in a few select leagues (NFL, NBA, MLB), to grading minority and gender participation in collegiate and other professional sports. The report also emphasizes the various levels of authority from coaching to ownership. An early report in 1992 found that the top management hiring practices of the NBA earned a B-, the NFL a C, and MLB an F (Clay, 1994). In a more comprehensive 1997 report, the overall grades for the three sports leagues were NBA an A, NFL a B, and MLB a C. In terms of playing opportunities for minorities the NFL and NBA each earned A+ grades, while MLB received an A. Coaching opportunities found the NBA leading the way again with an A, the NFL received a C+, and MLB a B. No league fared exceptionally well in terms of top management positions held by minorities. These positions include owners and executive officers. The NBA received a C, the NFL a C, and MLB an F (Hubbard, 1998). The 1998 report card included gender grades as well as looking at the National Hockey League (NHL), Major League Soccer (MLS), and the WNBA. Grades for colleges were included as well. The NBA once again scored the highest receiving an A- for minority hiring, and a B for gender hiring. The NFL graded a B+ for minority and a D+ for gender. MLB earned a B for minority hiring practices, but did not receive a gender grade due to a lack of available information. In any event, in terms of race, each league either maintained (MLB) or improved their scores. Other key findings were that soccer had the best record for minority group diversity; the NHL held the best opportunities for women; and that the WNBA had a good record for both minority group and gender diversity (“NBA Scores Highest”, 1999). Sport in Society Director Richard Lapchick stated after his tenth study that “While the hiring practices in sport have gotten better for people of color and women, there is clearly significant room for progress in all sports. Nonetheless, pro sports is measurably ahead of society in these matters.” (“NBA Scores Highest”, 1999).

Compiling statistics on such matters is not unique to Northeastern University. The Women’s Sports Foundation Gender Equity Report Card of 1997 found female involvement to be rare at higher levels of sports management, and opportunities were generally confined to director level positions in two jobs in particular. The Director of Promotions is 58.8% female, and the Director of Marketing is 29.9% female (Delpy, 1998). The Foundation also studied female spectatorship in the various leagues. Statistics showed that despite high levels of interest, the opportunities to work for these sports clubs were not there.

League Females Team/League Executives Female TV Audience
MLB 11/ 190 (5.8%)44%
NBA 19 /203 (9.4%)40%
NFL 10/171 (5.8%)40%
NHL 13/187 (6.9%)41%
–refers to women in CEO, CFO, COO, President or Vice President positions (Delpy, 1998).

The numbers look a little better for women when considering all senior front office positions, especially when compared to their African-American counterparts. Women held 16% of such jobs as compared to 10% for African-Americans in the NFL, and 31% to 11% in the NBA (Holder,1999).

The perceptions of racial discrimination arise when one considers the vast discrepancy between the number of minorities who participate as players to those who help organize and run organizations at team or league levels. “The number of minorities hired . . . doesn’t come anywhere close to the number of Black athletes who play the games . . . On the field sports have as much equal opportunity as anything America has to offer. Off the field, sports are very segregated.” (Greenlee, 1998). As of 1996, African-Americans comprised 12.2% of the United States population, but were represented on 75% of the NBA rosters, 63% of the NFL’s, and 33% of MLB’s (Evans, 1997). Presently there are 4 African-American head coaches in the NFL (13% of such positions), 7 in the NBA (24%), and 3 African-American (11%) and 1 Hispanic (3%) in MLB. African-American assistant coaches account for 25% of NFL staffs, 34% of the NBA’s, and 14% of MLB’s (Holder, 1999). Furthermore, of the 221 officiating positions in professional sports, 25 were filled by African-Americans (Lyons, 1992). Until 1997, there were no female officials. In that year, Violet Palmer and Dee Kantner made history by becoming the first women to officiate an NBA game.

There are numerous theories and opinions as to the importance of these statistics. One such theory is the Key Functionaries Theory where “key functionaries are positions within a social system that are capable of influencing and performing crucial activities” (Evans, 1997). The key functionary roles in sport include positions such as sportscaster, executive, coach or a paid endorser. The scarcity of African-Americans in these roles in sport is seen as proof that discriminatory barriers have not been abolished, but replaced by barriers in institutional practices that involve key functionary positions. Discrimination has shifted from criteria based on ascription (race) to achievement (or holding proper necessities for the job) (Evans, 1997). This institutional bias has led to African-Americans being under-represented in other prominent sport categories such as fans, referees, writers, program producers, directors, senior executives, printers of programs and/or tickets, agents, attorneys and vendors. Others who echo these discriminatory practices are in place are sports luminaries such as John Thompson and Joe Morgan. Thompson, long time coach at Georgetown University, questions the lack of minorities in front office positions and sarcastically quips African-Americans are “competent as a player, but so incompetent that his knowledge leaves him once he graduates from a university” (“Is there a double standard”, 1998). Joe Morgan, Hall of Fame baseball player of the Cincinnati Reds, points out that not one minority was even interviewed for the last thirty three managerial positions in MLB (“Is there a double standard”, 1997). The situation on the playing fields may not be as rosy as some would believe either. Tony Banks and Rodney Peete comment on the low number of African-American quarterbacks in the NFL, and Peete says, “We don’t often get the opportunity to go and make mistakes or get three or four years to develop” (“Is there a double standard”, 1997). Sherman Lewis, long time NFL assistant coach and Offensive Coordinator of the Green Bay Packers, ponders his situation. Lewis has seen two of his understudies, Steve Mariucci and Jon Gruden, given head coaching jobs ahead of him. Of Gruden, Lewis comments, “If you think Jon Gruden is more qualified for a head coaching position than me, it’s like saying I am more qualified to be president than Bill Clinton” (Hubbard, 1998). “Black athletes have taken pro sports to a higher level. But when it comes to who coaches, who manages, and who gets administration positions, athletics is strictly a white mans’ game” (Greenlee, 1998). Others view the numbers differently, and see no real discriminatory practices at work. A study to examine the relationship between the racial composition of NBA, NFL, and MLB teams and the racial composition of the franchise cities found that there were no systematic correlations (Leonard II, 1997). Previous theories held that cities with lower African-American populations fielded teams with lower percentages of African-American players, i.e., “The whiter the city, the whiter the team” (Leonard II, 1997). Leonard II’s study showed no such correlation and thus no directed bias or intentional segregation against African-American players on the part of NBA owners. Another study found no systematical bias of fan voting for MLB All-Stars in relation to race or ethnicity. The historical study found that by 1996 African-American players appeared to have an edge in fan selections which is “striking in light of the fact that black attendance at ball games is not only quite small but seems to have declined over the period” (“Color-Blind”, 1999). Still others feel that if there is a bias it is against white players. “If imbalances betoken bias, and if underrepresentation of various ethnic groups is a big, big problem, what shall we do about the scandalous underrepresentation of whites in most big-league sports?” (Seligman, 1987). Seligman’s true contention is that African-American athletes are simply better at their jobs, and that charges of bias and discrimination, and movements to enact affirmative action policies are brought up too readily.

Conclusion

Professional sports is not only entertainment but big business as well. As a business, the teams and leagues must concern themselves with dominant public issues. One such issue discussed in this paper are minority hiring practices. Comments by sports executives such as those made by Cincinnati Reds owner Marge Schott and former Los Angeles Dodger executive Al Campanis have led many to believe that racist and sexist beliefs run rampant among those who manage and run professional sports. A look at the numbers shows that this may or may not be the case.

At first glance, the rosters of pro sports teams seem to symbolize an ethnic diversity that should be admired and emulated. African-Americans could certainly think so, as this group comprises 75% of NBA rosters, 63% of the NFL’s, and 33% of MLB. But what of Hispanics and Asian-Americans whose only impact is in MLB, and even there at low levels of participation. These minority groups are under-represented at the collegiate level as well. In fact, only 1,400 Hispanics competed in major college sports in 1993-94 (Lapchick, 1995). Women, as a minority group, are faring much better, although their numbers still fall well behind those of their male counterparts. Thanks to Title IX, interest and participation has increased in women’s athletics. These opportunities have led to the formation of the WNBA, with other leagues to follow. Female athletes will continue to strive for equal compensation and endorsement opportunities in relation to their male peers, but their opportunity of expansion into new sports leagues far excels those of males.

The question of discrimination arises when one looks at the number of minorities who hold coaching and front office positions. Many observers feel the numbers should be more reflective of the people who actually play in the games. Presently, African-Americans constitute 13% of all head coaches in the NFL, 24% in the NBA, and 11% in MLB. These numbers are more in line with the overall African-American population in the U.S. of 12.2%, and are much more reflective of a truly diverse organization. The lack of other minority groups, where only one Hispanic holds a managerial position in MLB, should be more of a concern to the Reverend Jesse Jackson and the Rainbow Commission for Fairness in Sport. Senior front office positions are another story. One could assume that the knowledge of sports issues among minority groups is increasing due to participation and would be reflected in an increase in front office hiring. African-Americans hold 10% of the front office positions in the NFL and 11% in the NBA. Women hold 16% and 31% respectively. However, these positions are usually pigeonholed in particular jobs such as Director of Promotions, or Director of Marketing. Diversity demands an increase in these numbers and job titles.

Minority of hiring practices of professional sports teams and leagues should reflect society as a whole and not be based on the athletes who play the game. Yet, participation is important because it reduces the barriers in hiring relating to on-the-field experience and knowledge of competition. Before focusing on the private sector of professional sports, much progress can and should be made in the public sector, namely college athletics. At these mostly publically funded institutions of learning, experience can be gained by minorities in all areas from playing to management. Increased minority opportunities at the collegiate level will enable professional sports teams to identify successful candidates to fill similar positions in their organizations. According to the Northeastern University Report Card, professional sports have outperformed colleges in terms of minority and gender hiring. Professional sports teams and leagues should be credited with the work they have done, and continue to do through their internship programs for minorities. Minority hiring practices will be easier to monitor as professional sports leagues continue to expand. Expansion allows for teams to build their managerial staffs from the ground up rather than trying to fill one position at a time. More important, expansion presents the opportunity for minority ownership of teams.
A hiring practice that mirrors a society’s population cannot be labeled biased or discriminatory. Furthermore, if said hiring practice does not meet societal levels it does not necessarily mean that the organization is biased or discriminatory. Candidates for jobs not only have to be willing to participate but must meet all the qualifications for that position. Applicants must have the interest, ability, knowledge, experience and aptitude to carry out the job duties. In terms of professional rosters, one can easily argue that teams are simply employing the best available talent. The fact that so few Hispanics and Asian-Americans are competing in football, basketball and some respects baseball at the collegiate level makes the argument of having these groups more fairly represented at the professional level a moot point. As far as head coaching positions are concerned, one must remember that these are very exclusive and competitive jobs. Only thirty-one positions are available in the NFL. The four African-Americans who currently hold head coaching positions (13%) clearly mirror the overall U.S. population of this minority group. Are there more qualified African-American candidates to assume these roles? Most certainly. Should the number of African-American head coaches be raised simply to reflect the over-representation of African-American athletes participating in the games? Absolutely not!

Owners must be given credit for running their organizations. If owners are putting the best available talent on the field, and are color-blind enough to bolster their rosters with African-Americans, then it is just as conceivable that they are staffing their front offices with the best talent that they know. Ownership in sports league franchises is also an ultra-exclusive fraternity. Franchises are very expensive assets, and teams, for the most part, are run to win championships and generate income. To inflict a quota system on these privately held “corporations” is not only unfair, but does not allow these individuals to exercise all their business acumen that enabled them to become successful enough to buy a team in the first place. As more people compete and take part in athletics, particularly females, the greater the talent pool for jobs in sport will grow. In a perfect world we would all get the jobs we wished for. The fact is, if a professional sports team/league is hiring minority groups in a manner which mirrors their societal population, and they are hiring qualified personnel, then charging them with discriminatory behavior is difficult to justify.

References

Chappell, Kevin. (January, 1996). Scoring on the Expansion Teams: blacks named to key positions with newly formed professional sports clubs. Ebony, 51(3), 52-55.

Clay, Bobby. (February, 1994). How Do We Score in the Front Office? While blacks have landed some high-profile posts, few are getting the jobs that really count. Black Enterprise, 24(7), 144-149.

Color-Blind at the Ballpark. (July 5, 1999). Business Week, p.18.

Deacon, James, & Hawaleshka, Danylo. (April 7, 1997). Leagues of Their Own; women are finally breaking the old boy stranglehold on sports. Maclean’s, 110(14), 62-66.

Delpy, Lisa A. (September, 1998). Career Opportunities in Sport: women on the mark. JOPERD – The Journal of Physical Education, Recreation & Dance, 69(7), 17-22.

Evans Jr., Arthur S. (September, 1997). Blacks As Key Functionaries: a study of racial stratification on professional sport. Journal of Black Studies, 29(1), 43-59.

Greenlee, Craig T. (April 16, 1998). In Sports, Those Making the Off-the Field Decisions Remain Overwhelmingly White. Black Issues in Higher Education, 15(4), 23-24.

Holder, Sherre. (February, 1999). First & Goal! Black Enterprise, 29(7), 121.

Hubbard, Lee. (May 28, 1998). In Sports, Whites Abandon Limelight for Behind the Scenes Power. Los Angeles Sentinel, p. B1.

Is There a Double Standard for Blacks in Sport? (May 4, 1998). Jet, pp. 52-56.

Lapchick, Richard. (July 5, 1995). HO Perspectives: college sports and race. The Hispanic Outlook in Higher Education, 5(22), 16.

Leonard II, Wilbert M. (December, 1997). Racial Composition of NBA, NFL, and MLB Teams and Racial Composition of Franchise Cities. Journal of Sport Behavior, 20(4), 424-434.

Lyons, Douglas C. (February, 1992). Blowing the Whistle. Ebony, 47(4), 96-99.

NBA Scores the Highest in Hiring Minority Groups. (August 16, 1999). Jet, p. 46.

Seligman, Daniel. (April 27, 1987). Bias on Ice, and Quite a Few Other Places. Fortune, p. 286.

U.S. Sports Academy2013-11-26T21:46:34-06:00February 14th, 2008|Contemporary Sports Issues, Sports Facilities, Sports Management|Comments Off

Hardball-hardbat: A call for change from aluminum to wooden baseball bats in the NCAA

Submitted by: Matt Kelly, M.A. and Paul Pedersen, Ph.D.

Ever since hits and home runs increased significantly after a leading aluminum bat manufacturer introduced the ABlack Magic bat in 1985, a controversy has raged in the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) concerning the use of aluminum baseball bats. The first Abat summit with members of the NCAA Baseball Rules Committee and executives of aluminum-bat manufacturers was held in the summer of 1994. From this point on it was evident that the ability of manufacturers to manipulate the size and weight of baseball bats created an injury hazard and a player-development problem for collegiate-level baseball players. Although small steps have taken place to limit the hazardous equipment, a final solution would be found in a mandate by the NCAA for its member institutions to make a permanent and exclusive switch from aluminum bats to wooden bats. Specifically, this mandate should be directed to those programs at the Division I level where the baseball players are strong enough, fast enough, and skilled enough to injure one another by their use of aluminum bats.

Call for Change: Player Safety

Baseball bat manufacturers, through advances in modern technology, have been able to create aluminum bats that are lighter in weight than wooden bats yet still meet the required measurement and size standards. These lighter bats allow for faster bat speeds during swings that result in a greater hit-ball velocity. Because the ball exits the aluminum bat with a higher velocity than would a ball from a wooden bat, there is naturally a greater danger of injury to defensive players. “Any idiot can see that the ball jumps off an aluminum bat faster than off of a wooden bat,” said Jim Morris, head baseball coach at the University of Miami. This favors hitters but is obviously dangerous to pitchers and infielders (Heavy Metal, p. 27, 1997).

Although the NCAA is aware of the danger involved with aluminum baseball bats, the organization has refused to make a permanent switch to wooden bats. The rationale postulated by the NCAA for its stance is that there are risks in all sports and that pitchers and infielders are aware of those risks (Bloomberg, 1998). While the NCAA is steadfast in opposing a switch, its Baseball Rules Committee did agree in 1998 to stricter guidelines on performance standards for aluminum bats in order to provide a safer player environment. The committee had received research that illustrated the recent rising rate of serious injury to pitchers from batted infield line drives. The new standards prohibit the development and use of an aluminum bat that produces a batted ball speed of over 93 miles per hour. The interesting fact here is that this was the established standard for wooden batted ball speeds. The obvious question here is, instead of creating wooden bat standards for aluminum bats, why not just use wooden bats?

Easton Sports, Inc., one of the industry’s leading aluminum bat manufacturers, filed a restraint-of-trade lawsuit against the NCAA and is seeking $267 million in damages and injunctive relief. The suit was filed in the United States District Court in Kansas City, Kansas.

Ultimately, the adoption of revised aluminum-bat regulations brought lawsuits from aluminum and wooden bat manufacturers who sued under the premise that the NCAA had conspired to lock the other out of the bat market (Hawes, 2000). The Baum Company, a manufacturer of wood composite baseball bats, claimed the NCAA aluminum standards were lax and that in addition to being unsafe, aluminum bats were also preventing the Baum Company from selling wooden bats to NCAA schools (Kan, 1999). The Baum Company also accused the NCAA of conspiring with aluminum bat manufacturers in order to eliminate competition from wooden bat makers. In this case, the court ruled that the NCAA’s refusal to change rules further or to ban aluminum bats is lawful (Kan, 1999). As a result of the Baum Company ruling, Hillerich and Bradsby and Easton Sports, Inc., the industry’s leading manufacturers of both aluminum and wooden bats, dropped their restraint-of-trade lawsuits against the NCAA. Within the ruling against the Baum Company the court illustrated how the NCAA had the lawful right of refusal and the lawful right to adopt bat standards for the protection of players (Kan, 2000). Therefore, the NCAA has the right to modify its aluminum-bat requirements or make the switch to wooden bats.

In July of 2000, the NCAA Baseball Rules Committee ruled that there would be no immediate changes in the specifications for manufacturing baseball bats. This rule was based on the recommendations of the NCAA Baseball Research Panel, which reviewed results from laboratory testing and performance during the 2000 intercollegiate season. Don Kessinger, associate athletics director for internal affairs at the University of Mississippi and chair of the rules committee, stated that the recommendations of 1999 restored balance to the game and made the aluminum bats perform more like wooden bats.

While higher standards are better than no standards, because the standards can be circumvented there is a need for the outright elimination of the use of aluminum bats at the college level. A recent study by the University of Massachusetts found that a loophole exists in the new aluminum bat standards (Hawes, 2000). This research shows that it is possible to physically change the center of swing gravity with an aluminum bat. This is done using a technological weight-shifting technique in manufacturing the aluminum bat. This center of gravity change allows the aluminum bat to still meet bat standards but when used in the field, the batted ball speed may greatly exceed the standard ball exit speed. With wooden bats, however, it is not possible to shift the center of gravity in order to achieve this advantage. This loophole in the aluminum-bat rules will allow manufacturers to create an aluminum Ahot bat capable of harder hits which will again lead to a greater safety hazard for infielders and pitchers (Hawes, 2000).

Call for Change: Player Development

Although potential injuries are the most important factor, there are other reasons that call for a switch to wooden bats. Studies show that with an aluminum bat, a hitter can make contact with the ball at almost any point on the bat and achieve the same effect as a hit on the Asweet spot of a wooden bat (Forbes, 1998). This fact is evident by an examination of offensive production. Over the last five years (1995-1999), batting averages, scoring, and home runs have all increased in NCAA baseball. Batting averages increased to .301 (from an average of .296 over the previous 15 years), scoring jumped from 6.49 to 6.81 per game, and home runs from .80 to .91 per game. Therefore, not only are aluminum bats lethal against defensive baseball players, they are also distorting the development of college pitchers who have to use drastically different strategies when pitching against players using aluminum bats than they would if they were pitching against players using wooden bats. This is creating development problems for pitchers who are trying to make the transition from collegiate-level pitching to professional-level pitching where the only bats allowed are wooden.

There are also batter-development issues at stake. Many young baseball players use their college baseball careers to refine their skills in attempts to prepare for professional baseball. Fortunately, the extensive farm system of Major League Baseball allows many Division I players opportunities to play at the professional level. Wooden bats, which are used exclusively by professionals, are much more challenging to hit successfully with than are aluminum bats. The banning of aluminum bats and the use of wooden bats in the NCAA at the Division I level would help college baseball players become better prepared for either possible failure or a possible future in professional baseball (Killer Bats, 2000).

A prime example of this case is that of Marshal McDougall, a second baseman at Florida State University from 1998 through 2000. In May of 1999, McDougall hit six home runs and collected 16 RBI and 25 total bases in a game against the University of Maryland. All three of these feats, which are all NCAA records, were accomplished through the use of an aluminum bat (Bechtel, 2000). For the year, McDougall used his aluminum bat to secure a .419 batting average and record 28 homeruns. Despite the outstanding game and season, baseball teams passed on McDougall until the 26th round of the 1999 draft. Pro baseball scouts feared that he might not make the immediate impact they needed from a higher-round draftee. They also feared he would have a difficult adjustment to the use of wooden bats. In McDougall’s first summer of minor-league baseball, their skepticism was affirmed as his wooden bat produced only a .248 batting average and one home run. Most likely, an NCAA wooden-bat mandate would have never allowed for McDougall’s six home run game. However, if he had been allowed to play and practice with a wooden bat over his college career, he would have been much better prepared for the wooden-bat demand of professional baseball.

Call for Change: Cost

Lastly, when a mandate such as this is suggested, the question of cost also becomes an integral issue. It can argued that aluminum bats last longer than wooden bats and can be used in games for several years. In fact, a $1200 investment in aluminum bats can be enough for an entire team and will last three to five seasons. Conversely, a $1200 investment into wooden bats might not last one whole season. Because of the obvious differences in cost, the proposed mandate for change from aluminum bats to wooden bats is directed only at the elite level Division I teams. The Division II and Division III levels of non-elite athletes do not pose the same high risk of injury as do the players in the Division I programs. Furthermore, Division I programs that are top-25 caliber would have the added benefit of receiving sponsorships from wooden bat manufacturers.

Unfortunately, the Anon-elite Division I teams would have to adjust and absorb the cost of wooden bat use. For the safety and development of their players, however, this would have to be accepted. Division I hockey programs do not try to save money by wearing hockey helmets without face shields. That would be unsafe. Universities do not complain about the cost of football helmets. Swimming programs do not stop using chlorine in the pools to save money. It is then very justifiable to ban aluminum bats and spend the extra money to use wooden ones. The health and safety of the student athlete, in addition to the development of his skills, should be the primary concern.

Call for Change

The solution to this baseball conundrum is for the NCAA to institute a ban on the use of aluminum baseball bats at the Division I level of competition. There are several reasons for this suggested mandate for change. Because the exit speed of a baseball hit off of an aluminum bat is much faster than the exit speed of a ball hit off of a wooden bat, the safety of players (infielder and pitchers) should be reason enough for a change. There is also a need for a switch from aluminum bats because the use of wooden bats would contribute to the development of college baseball players, both the hitters and pitchers. Furthermore, if the NCAA wants to move in the direction of an aluminum-bat mandate, it has the legal authority to do such. The Association can lawfully institute such a ban under legal product selection. Finally, although the change might increase equipment costs for some institutions of higher learning, the cost is a minor price to pay for the safety and development advantages that would be obtained through the use of wooden bats.

References

Bechtel, M. (2000). Heavy metal rap: Ruthian feats by Florida States Marshall McDougall went largely unrewarded. Sports Illustrated, 92, 11.

Bloomberg, S. (1998). NCAA approves new rules for bats. The Legal Intelligencer, 13, 4.

Forbes, S. (1998). Strike em out. Forbes, 31, 1-4.

Hawes, K. (2000). Baseball bat standards return to the examination table. The NCAA News, 14, 1-8.

Heavy Metal. (1997). Sports Illustrated, 86, 27.

Kan, D. (1999). Recent cases. The Entertainment Law Reporter, 21 (3), 2.

Kan, D. (2000). Recent cases. The Entertainment Law Reporter, 21 (11), 19.

Killer Bats. (2000). Sports Illustrated, 91, 20.

NCAA Revises Bat Rules. (2000). The Journal of Physical Education, Recreation, and Dance, 71 (1), 8.

U.S. Sports Academy2015-10-02T23:26:27-05:00February 14th, 2008|Contemporary Sports Issues, Sports Management|Comments Off

British Soccer Superhooligans: Emergence and Establishment: 1982-2000

Submitted by:

By
defining match days and football grounds as times and places
in which fighting could be engaged in and aggressive forms
of masculinity displayed, the media, especially the national
tabloid press, played a part of some moment in stimulating
and shaping the development of soccer hooliganism (p. 122).

Murphy et al., (1990), believe that the amount of publicity
given to the superhooligan groups and their leaders increased
the membership ranks with “hardcases and other socio-pathic
nutters” (Murphy et al., 1990, p. 168), who were not
previously involved with soccer hooliganism.

The
media was not only engaged in reporting and predicting soccer
superhooliganism, but it also led the call for remedial action
against the soccer thugs. However, the media-advocated policy
measures introduced to combat soccer superhooliganism “tended
to displace the disorder on to the streets outside football
grounds, sometimes at considerable distances from them, rather
than to eradicate it” (Murphy et al., 1990, p. 122).

Involvement
by the media in soccer hooliganism included publishing their
own ‘league tables of hooligan notoriety.’ The Daily
Mail September, 1986, ran a headline, “Chelsea tops thugs
league” Murphy (1990), or, the Evening Standard had a
center spread page on July 29, 1985, which read, “London
league of violence” Murphy et al., (1990). The impact
these articles have had on the reader depends on individual
motivations. Superhooligans view the publicity as validating
their activity. When an article is published, identifying
the Chelsea Headhunters as the top superhooligan group, other
superhooligans view this as a challenge to knock Chelsea off
of the top spot.

The
root causes of present-day soccer superhooliganism are deep
and complex. Newspapers, in particular the tabloid press,
“have made a contribution of some significance to the
rise of present-day hooliganism and to giving it its distinctively
contemporary form” (Murphy et al., 1990, p. 124). Articles
featuring stories on superhooligan group leaders, although
not necessarily condoning them, rarely condemned their activities
either. The press undoubtedly contributed to the “intensification
of the status competition between rival hooligan groups”
(Murphy et al., 1990, p. 124), and the tabloid press has been
responsible for feature stories portraying superhooligan leaders
as prosperous and from middle class backgrounds. Exaggeration
on the part of the press, according to Canter (1989), further
sensationalized the leaders concerned, which consequently
attracted to superhooliganism some ‘non-typical’ hooligan
types. That the popular press is responsible for aiding and
abetting the soccer superhooliganism phenomenon by its extensive
and sensationalized coverage is patently obvious. The press
could have played a key role in diffusing the soccer hooligan
movement during its early stages – but it chose instead to
use hooliganism to sell papers and, consequently, led in the
emergence and establishment of Britian’s soccer super-hooligans.

References

Buford,
B. (1991). Among the thugs. London: Seker and Warburg.

Canter,
D., Comber, M., and Uzzell, D. (1989). Football in its place:
an environmental psychology of football grounds. London: Routledge.

Cohen,
P. (1988). Policing the working class city, in Capitalism
and the rule of law. London: Hutchinson, pps. 118-36.

Dunning,
E. (1994). The Social Roots of football Hooliganism: A reply
to the Critics of “The Leicester School,” in N.
Bonney, R. Giulanotti, M. Hepworth (eds), Football, violence
and social identity. Routledge, London.

Dunning,
E., Murphy, P. and Williams, J. (1986). Spectator violence
at football matches: towards a sociological explanation. British
Journal of Sociology, 37, (2).

Dunning,
E., Murphy, P. and Williams, J. (1988). The roots of football
hooliganism. London: Routledge.

Harrington,
J. (1968). Soccer hooliganism. Bristol: John Wright.

Keating,
F. (1985, August 16). Fans who get their kicks off the field.
The Guardian.

Keel,
P. (1987, January 8). Slashed fan identified mob boss, court
told. The Guardian.

Kerr,
J. H. (1994). Understanding soccer hooliganism. Milton Keynes:
Open University Press.

Murphy,
P., Williams, J., & Dunning, E. (1990). Football on trial:
spectator violence and development in the football world.
London: Routledge.

Pearson,
G. (1983). Hooligan: a history of respectable fears. Basingstoke:
Macmillan.

Popplewell,
O. (1986). Committee of enquiry into crowd safety and control
at sports grounds. Final report. London: HMSO, 6.

Robins,
D. (1984). We hate humans. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Taylor,
I., & Ingham, R. (Eds) (1978). Football hooliganism: the
wider context. London: Inter-Action.

Taylor,
I. (1988). British soccer after Brussels. Sociology of Sport
Journal No. 4, pps. 171-91.

Taylor,
R. (1993). Football and its fans: supporters and their relations
with the game, 1885-1985. Leicester: Leicester University
Press.

Trivizas,
E. 1980. Offences and offenders in football crowd disorders.
British Journal of Criminology, 20, (3).

Van
Limbergen, K., & Walgrave, L. (1988). ‘Euro’ 88:
Fans and hooligans. Youth criminology research group report
commissioned by the Belgian minister of interior.

Wagg,
S. (1984). The football world: a contemporary social history.
Brighton: Harvester Press.

Walvin,
J. (1986). Football and the decline of Britain. London: Macmillan
Press Ltd.

Walvin,
J. (1994). The people’s game: the history of football revisited.
London: Mainstream Publishing.

Ward,
C. (1996). All quiet on the hooligan front. Edinburgh: Mainstream.

Williams,
J., & Wagg, S. (Eds) (1991). British football and social
change: getting into Europe.

Leicester:
Leicester University Press.

Williams,
J., Dunning, E., & Murphy, P. J. (1984). Hooligans abroad:
the behavior and control of English fans in continental Europe.
London: Routledge and Keegan Paul.

U.S. Sports Academy2013-11-26T21:53:54-06:00February 14th, 2008|Contemporary Sports Issues, Sports Studies and Sports Psychology|Comments Off