Does the Media Impact Athletic Performance?

“It is not the critic who counts, nor the man who points out how the strong man stumbles or where the doer of deeds could have done them better. The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena, whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood, who strives valiantly, who errs and comes up short again and again because there is no effort without error and shortcomings, who knows the great devotion, who spends himself in a worthy cause, who at best knows in the end the high achievement of triumph and who at worst, if he fails while daring greatly, knows his place shall never be with those timid and cold souls who know neither victory or defeat.”–26th President Theodore Roosevelt

Introduction

Many books, articles, and papers have been published relative to the relationship between an athlete’s mental state and his or her performance. A point of consensus clearly stated in these sources is that athletic performance efficiency is reduced by distraction. It is believed that distractions interfere with an athlete’s ability to focus. Distractions evoke negative mood responses, detrimental arousal and anxiety levels, and stress, thus resulting in the consumption of mental energy. Mental energy is a vital element needed to be able to concentrate one’s attention and maintain a positive mental attitude. By concentrating effectively, an athlete can conserve physical energy by maintaining good technique and focus, executing skills properly, and pushing the body through pain and fatigue barriers. Time spent fretting over distractions drains mental energy so that performance suffers (Manktelow, 2006). As Haverstraw (2002) noted, distractions may arise from various sources including: the presence of loved ones you want to impress, family or relationship problems, teammates and other competitors, coaches, underperformance or unexpected high performance, frustration at mistakes, poor refereeing decisions, changes in familiar patterns, unjust criticism, and the media.

The purpose of this paper is to initiate an examination of the influence of the media as a distraction and its impact on athletic performance. For the purposes of this paper it is important to have a common definition and understanding of media, arousal, stress, anxiety, and mood. Media will be defined as individuals who publicly report or make public statements relative to an athlete’s performance. In this context, media can be newspaper reporters, paparazzi, television newscasters, or fans and critics who publicize their critiques of athletic performance through the use of public forums and blogs.

In order to differentiate between arousal, anxiety, and stress in this text, specific definitions will be used. Arousal will refer to a state of alertness as the body prepares itself for action. It is associated with increases in physiological and psychological activity, such as heart rate and attention (Landers, 1980). Stress is defined as a state that results from the demands that are placed on the individual which require that person to engage in some coping behavior (Jones, 1990). Anxiety results when one doubts his or her ability to cope with the situation that causes him or her stress (Hardy et al., 1996). Additionally, for this text, mood is defined as a group of persistent feelings associated with evaluative and cognitive states which influence all the future evaluations, feelings, and actions (Amado-Boccara et al., 1993). Now that there is a common understanding of these terms, it is important to understand their relationship to athletic performance.

Arousal and Anxiety

In the field of Sport Psychology, many models have been created to explore arousal and anxiety levels as they relate to athletic performance. Following criticisms of lack of support, popular unidimensional models such as the Inverted U-Theory and the Catastrophe Theory are being replaced with multidimensional-type models (Weinberg, 1990). The Multidimensional Anxiety Theory by Martens et al. (1990), for instance, focuses on the anxiety response that accompanies high levels of stress. It takes into consideration two different elements: cognitive anxiety and somatic anxiety. Cognitive anxiety signifies distractions which involve inability to concentrate, disruptions in attention, and negative performance expectations (Martens et al., 1990). Additionally, the somatic anxiety element signifies perceived physiological arousal such as elevated heart rate and increased perspiration (Martens et al., 1990). In general, The Multidimensional Anxiety Theory hypothesizes that as cognitive anxiety increases, athletic performance decreases. Also, it concludes that an inverted-U relationship explains the correlation between somatic anxiety and athletic performance. This inverted-U relationship illustrates that as somatic anxiety increases from low to moderate levels, there is an associated improvement in performance. Performance level decreases, however, once intensity levels either exceed or fall below this moderate range (Davidson & Schwartz, 1976).

Arousal and Stress

In sport competition, athletes must often think fast and make sharp decisions regarding the task at hand. For example, when a basketball player is receiving a pass from a teammate, he or she must complete necessary cognitive functions quickly in order to catch the pass. According to a model created by A.F. Sanders, one entity that may affect one’s cognitive functions is arousal level. If the basketball player exhibits a low level of arousal, his or her perception declines. However, the player’s perception is sped up with a high level of arousal. When the arousal level is too high, though, perception becomes less efficient. Additionally, Sanders proposes that stress commonly results from one’s failed efforts in correcting a level of arousal that is too high or too low. Moreover, high levels of stress accompany increased anxiety (Sanders, 1983).

Mood

Sport psychologists, coaches, and others are eager to learn how to tailor athletes to perform at the highest level possible. In their attempts to accomplish this, mood in relationship to performance is being studied. Lane and Terry (2000) created a conceptual model of mood and performance. In this model, the authors focus on mood during pre-competition and its effects on subsequent performance. It is suggested that pre-competitive mood influences athletic behavior. Depressed mood, specifically, acts as a catalyst for reduced vigor, increased anger, confusion, fatigue, and tension, thereby debilitating performance (Mellalieu, 2003). These depressive symptoms involve negative cognitive views individuals have of themselves in relation to their past, present, and future social experiences.

To examine influences on elite athlete performance, Greenleaf et al. (2001) interviewed Olympians from the Atlanta and Nagano Olympic Games. Although positive factors existed, the Olympians cited many negative factors influencing performance. One such factor noted was media distractions. It was found that factors, such as media distraction, are psychological in nature, thus, demonstrating the importance that mental factors play in elite sport performance (Greenleaf et al., 2001).

The theoretical and empirical data regarding arousal, anxiety, stress, and mood will be used to explore the influence media may have on athletic performance. In order to apply this information, it is necessary to first provide the following individual examples where media may have impacted athletic performance.

Media’s Influence on Athletic Performance

Many athletes are targets of media prey. Win or lose, their performance and life is publicly dissected by the media. Winning brings about media glorification and expectation, and/or jealousy and criticism. Losing brings forth negative judgment and more criticism. Howard Ferguson (1990) in his book, The Edge, said, “Criticism can be easily avoided by saying nothing, doing nothing, and being nothing. Mediocre people play it safe and avoid criticism at all costs. Champions risk criticism every time they perform.” One such athlete who risked media criticism was Miki Ando.

Miki Ando was a two-time Japanese national figure skating champion and 2004 Junior World champion. She also became the first female skater to successfully complete a quadruple jump in competition. Ando is very popular in Japan and receives a lot of attention from gossip magazines and other Japanese media. Ando’s athletic performance struggled in 2005 and 2006, and media coverage turned negative. When the Japanese Skating Federation (JSF) selected her to be on its 2006 Olympic woman’s figure skating team, the press said she did not deserve to go to Torino. They also frowned on her for wearing mini skirts. The JSF was so concerned media coverage would negatively affect Ando as she prepared for the Olympics, they sent formal written requests to several magazine publishers asking them to cut back on their coverage (NBC, 2006).

The JSF was not the only organization concerned with media impact on their 2006 Olympic athletes. The Canadian Olympic Committee (2006) recognized the potential of the media as a distraction to their athletes as well. In an effort to divert any negative media influence, the Committee publicly announced the following communications objective in their victory management plan: A media training section emphasizing the notion to support athletic performance by removing media as a distraction (Canadian Olympic Committee, 2006).

Were these concerns founded? Some in the Republic of China believe so. After China won the first gold medal in the 2004 Olympic Games and had some major unexpected wins during the first few days of Olympic competition, Chinese newspaper and television stations touted predictions of gold medals their athletes would claim. The predictions, however, did not come to fruition. Athletes the media advertised would take first, such as the Chinese male gymnasts, did not even make it to the award stand. Badminton player Lin Dan was beaten in the first round of competition and Ma Lin, China’s top table tennis player, was defeated by 20th-ranked Swede Jan-Ove Waldner (China Daily, 2004).

On August 19, 2004, China Daily blamed the losses on exaggerated hypes of gold made by the media. The editorial claimed the hype caused the athletes to become overconfident and resulted in athletic incompetence. Chinese diver Peng Bo agreed. After his partner’s last-minute error cost the men’s springboard double gold, Peng Bo said, “We’re ordinary people. We feel pressure, and sometimes we can’t help having some distracting thoughts. Please understand us” (China Daily, 2004).

At the 2006 Torino Olympics, Ando did not quite meet the gold medal goal coveted by all Olympian athletes. She placed eighth in the Ladies figure skating short program and 15th in the freestyle competition. Canada’s athletes, however, exceeded the expectations of many by leaving Torino with a best-ever 24 medals, the third-most of any country (CBC, 2006). Whether or not Ando’s less than expected performance was a result of media distraction, or the Canadian athletes’ successes were a direct result of media discipline is hard to say, but should be explored further.

Because there have been no empirical examinations on the influence of the media on athletic performance, the following will provide examples of some famous athletes who have been subjected to intense media scrutiny, provide their reaction to the media attention, and present the impact, if any, the media had on their athletic performance.

The Stones that Critics Hurl

Kenny Rogers

Baseball player Kenny Rogers has had a volatile relationship with media. During the 2005 season, Rogers refused to talk to media after they published a report saying he would retire if the Rangers did not give him a contract extension. Then on June 29, 2005, while walking onto the field for a pre-game warm-up, he had an altercation with two cameramen. Rogers first shoved Fox Sports Net Southwest photographer David Mammeli, yelling at him to get the cameras out of his face. Next, Rogers charged cameraman Larry Rodriguez, wrestled the camera from him, threw it to the ground, and kicked it.

As a result of the tirade, Rodgers was suspended and fined. Before all of his run-ins with the media, Rogers was having a career best season. However, following the suspension, in his August 11, 2005 return to the mound, Rogers allowed five runs and seven hits in five innings, on the way to a 16 to 5 loss. He also gave up a two-run homer in the all star game where he was booed by the crowd.

This indicates a possible causal relationship between stress and the media influence on Rogers. His adversarial relationship with the press caused him to publicly lose his temper and become violent, which cost him playing time, salary, and the respect of the fans. Moreover, it affected his performance and his season’s statistics declined (ESPN, 2006).

Ricky Williams

David Swerdlick’s editorial Ricky Williams – Just Let Him Be, discusses how the constant pressure of the media drove collegiate and professional football standout, Ricky Williams, to quit the sport he loved. According to Swerdlick (2005), Ricky Williams suffered with a debilitating social anxiety disorder and extreme shyness. The aggressive media attention was uncomfortable and frightening for him. In his early pro years he dreaded doing interviews so much he wore his helmet and an eye shade inside his face mask.

The article claims that in order to cope with all the unwanted media attention Williams smoked marijuana. As a result, he failed three NFL drug tests and experienced further embarrassing press. Superstar NFLer, Ricky Williams, loved the sport, but couldn’t handle the media attention that comes with greatness. Swerlick asserts that the media negatively impacted this athlete. Ricky Williams walked out on the Miami Dolphins; lost millions of dollars; lost the respect of his teammates and fans; and still finds himself as media fodder (Swerdlick, 2005). Many disagree with this conclusion, however, as is indicated on numerous blogs. One such blog critic instead credits Williams’s early departure with his overriding desire to smoke marijuana (Sportscolumn.com, 2004).

Mike Tyson

Iron Mike Tyson’s quick rise to the top of professional boxing made him one of the most publicized and admired boxers of all times. His personal turmoil, however, such as being convicted of raping Miss Black America and his volatile escapades such as biting off the ear of opponent, Evander Holyfield, made him one of the most media criticized boxers of all times.

Up until the early 1990s, Tyson, to many boxing enthusiasts, seemed unbeatable. He earned numerous championship titles such as: World Boxing Council (WBC) Heavyweight Title, World Boxing Association (WBA) Heavyweight Title, and International Boxing Federation (IBF) Heavyweight Title. However, as his personal life became mired in legal difficulties, the media had an increased negative focus when reporting about him, and concurrently, Tyson lost all of his previously earned professional boxing titles. His sudden decline in performance may be tied to negative and excessive media attention, effecting his training and mental state. Days prior to a comeback fight, in an interview by writer John Raygoza, Tyson was asked if it bothers him when the media writes negative things about him. He responded, “It’s my job to beat people and win fights…and it’s their job to sell papers. Everything that could’ve been said about Mike Tyson has already been said. I don’t take it personally like I use to.” Here, Tyson admits that the media criticism did impact him but he is beyond that. One has to wonder, though, as Tyson was knocked out in the fourth round of that fight, and his boxing career ended on that night (Raygoza, 2004).

Only the Mentally Strong Survive

The above were examples of athletes whose performance was negatively impacted by media. Tony Dorsett, legendary NFL halfback, said: “You can turn the negative around and use it as a motivating force in your life. One of my biggest desires has always been to prove certain people wrong-to prove to them I can do it despite what they think or say” (Ferguson, 1990).

Like Dorsett, some athletes are able to strive under intense media scrutiny by using it as motivation to achieve success. The following are several reports of athletes who have been able to survive and thrive in spite of the media.

Venus And Serena

In the world of tennis, two standout sisters have received more than their share of negative press. Venus and Serena Williams are not your typical small, cutesy, white, female tennis players. They are black, muscular, and solid. They win with their hard hitting, hard return, power-games. Not only does the media write and talk about them due to them not fitting the stereotypical construct of the usual tennis player, Venus and Serena are also known and criticized for the exotic, colorful, and tight fitting attire they wear on the court.

The two girls grew up in a poor, Los Angeles neighborhood. They could not afford tennis lessons or even tennis balls. Their dad taught them the game from books; they used worn equipment; and they practiced on rundown tennis courts. To illustrate, Venus and Serena’s father comments on the environment and conditions his daughters experienced during practices in East Compton Park, California: “It’s a radical neighborhood. A lot of dope is sold. We play on two courts — that’s all there is –and they look like trash, they’re so slippery” (Sports Illustrated, 2006).

Instead of being commended for overcoming disadvantage, Venus and Serena are criticized and negatively portrayed by media. Those in the tennis world and media constantly criticize that Venus and Serena are not skilled athletes…just hard hitting. Through all of the media attention, however, Venus and Serena have proven tremendous mental toughness that has served them well in their progress and maturation. The girls countered the media by rising to the top of their games and raising the bar for all (Loving, 2002).

Colin Montgomerie

Colin Montgomerie, one of Europe’s top golf pros, has had his share of ups and downs. Among his many accomplishments are victories at the European Tour Order of Merit every year from 1993 to 1999. During this era, he was consistently ranked in the top 10 in the Official World Golf Rankings, reaching the number two ranking at his peak. Then in 2003 and 2004, he began having personal and performance problems, and his ranking slumped to the eighties. To make matters worse, he became the victim of media and fan abuse. Media publicly questioned his ability, and fans called him names, such as Mrs. Doubtfire, because of his noticeable weight gain.

Initially, the negative media and fan criticism had an impact on him and his performance. According to an article written in Golf Today, not only was he performing really badly in an Open Tournament, he was so upset by media criticism he threatened to pull out of the Scandinavian Masters (Lexus Internet Limited, 2002). Moreover, Martin (2002) reported that because of negative media coverage Montgomerie even considered taking a break from the sport.

Eventually though, Montgomerie overcame the criticism and made a comeback in 2005, where he won another European Tour Order of Merit and returned to the top ten in the World Golf Rankings.

Clinton Portis

Washington Redskins running back, Clinton Portis, during the 2005-2006 season, was known for wearing outrageous costumes and playing odd characters during media interviews. In one such costume, he dressed up as a made-up character named “Sheriff Gonna Getcha”. He wore a long, black wig, glasses with oversized eyes, a Led Zeppelin T-shirt, a star-shaped badge, and an unusual necklace. In another interview, he showed up in a black cape, black Lone Ranger mask, clown-style oversized yellow sunglasses, a shaggy black wig, and fake gold teeth. He also created outrageous names for his costumes such as: Dr. I Don’t Know, Dolla Bill, Rev Gonna Change, Kid Bro Sweets, and Coach Janky Spanky (Solomon, 2006).

The stand-out athlete started this charade of characters after being traded by the Denver Broncos to the Washington Redskins in 2004. He was uncomfortable on this new team and had trouble scoring touchdowns. To deflect negative press questions he began dressing up in costumes, and had fun with the press. Five of his teammates got in on the act as well. During one interview, they joined Portis by dressing up in crazy get-ups calling themselves “Clinton’s” Angels. Many may view these stunts as foolish, however, Portis’s tactics proved successful. Instead of negative reporting by the press, the press had fun with the parade of characters and concentrated on this instead of the team’s performance. Portis not only started scoring touchdowns, he broke the Redskins’ record for the most rushing yards in a season in 2006 and became the third runner in league history to reach 1,500 yards in three of his first four seasons (Solomon, 2006). With media criticism gone, the team went from a losing record to playoff contenders. This is a case where media impact could have contributed to poor performance on the field. Instead, Portis used the media to have fun, loosen up the team, and motivate himself (Solomon, 2006).

Application to Theory

Throughout this paper there have been examples of athletes whose performance was impacted by media. Some let media distraction impact them negatively. Kenny Rogers’s ordeal may be explained by Lane and Terry’s (2000) conceptual model of mood and performance. In Roger’s case, media distraction triggered his increased anger and tension, a result of depressed mood. Lane and Terry’s finding that depressed mood is debilitating to performance is evident as Rogers’s potentially career best season quickly declined following the media incident. Ricky Williams experienced much stress as he struggled with the constant pressure and media attention. According to The Multidimensional Anxiety Theory, by Marten et al. (1990), the anxiety responses Williams encountered may be due to elevated stress levels. Specifically, Williams’s increased cognitive anxiety response, due to disruptions in attention and concentration, led to decreased performance. However, Williams tried to counteract his increased cognitive anxiety with the calming effects of marijuana. In Mike Tyson’s situation, The Multidimensional Anxiety Theory and Lane and Terry’s conceptual model of mood and performance are essential in explaining the impact media had on Tyson’s drastic change in performance. Following the extensive media criticisms relating to many of Tyson’s problems and controversial incidents, Tyson’s legendary boxing performances rapidly declined. Decreased concentration, a result of increased cognitive anxiety, affected Tyson’s training prior to competition. Also, during performance, Tyson experienced somatic anxiety levels above a moderate range, thus decreasing his performance. This is evident from the inverted U-relationship. Furthermore, Tyson’s mental state prior to competition, negatively affected his performance. Tyson may have exhibited depressive symptoms which include negative cognitive views individuals take of themselves in relation to their past, present, and future social experiences. If Tyson possessed depressive mood, the effects of increased anger, heightened fatigue, increased confusion, and reduced vigor immensely hindered his performance.

Other athletes, however, used media distraction as inspiration to succeed. Venus and Serena Williams, Colin Montgomerie, and Clinton Portis employed their own coping strategies to deal with the media while flourishing in competition. There are many techniques an athlete can use to overcome the media hurdles. Many hire sports psychologists or counselors. Sport psychology consultants can work with athletes to strengthen their mental preparedness in order to enhance and improve athletic performance. Sport psychology consultants are trained to help athletes understand how pressure affects them, and then introduce them to strategies to help them overcome the effects of pressure. The consultant educates athletes on mental techniques such as goal setting, motivation, confidence, relaxation, focus and concentration, team cohesion, and communication (Dunn, 2005). Moreover, sport psychologists are interested not only in helping athletes use psychological principles to enhance athletic performance, but also to achieve optimal mental health when facing tough situations brought about by sport such as pressure from family and fans, harsh comments from coaches, or media criticism.

Positive Vibes

While media has potential to negatively impact athletic performance, this medium can also be used to cultivate or bring out the best in an athlete. In an excerpt from the book, Coaching Wrestling Successfully, Dan Gable, a gold medalist in freestyle wrestling in the 1972 Olympics and former head wrestling coach for the University of Iowa, discuses various ways to motivate wrestlers. Of specific note is his view on using the media as a tool to positively motivate wrestlers. He believes athletes get pumped up from positive media, and media forums should be used extensively as a tool to motivate athletic performance. One specific media outlet he references is the collegiate team’s annual poster. He suggests that if athletes know they will get their picture on the poster if they become an All-American, they are motivated to excel and attain some deserved recognition. He also discussed the advantages of having a media day before the first competition each year. He says this not only serves as a good motivator, but also assists to enhance the athlete’s communication skills in responding to the media. Most importantly, Gable stresses the importance of a coach’s statements to the media and how they can serve as motivators. He believes athletes are inspired when they hear their coach’s positive comments about them (Gable, 1999).

Conclusion

The examples and cases above support the premise that media does impact athletic performance. The cases also reveal or recognize that athletes have two choices: 1) they can succumb to the challenges of media distractions, or 2) they can meet the challenges of media.

American poet Arthur Guiterman wrote, “The stones that critics hurl with harsh intent – a man may use to build a monument”’. As evidenced above, we suggest that a champion can use those stones as momentum to win. Research into the specific mechanisms of how the media influences athletic performance is warranted.

2017-04-18T08:56:37-05:00March 14th, 2008|Contemporary Sports Issues, Sports Management, Sports Studies and Sports Psychology|Comments Off on Does the Media Impact Athletic Performance?

The Olympic Odyssey

Athens, Greece – I am starting the writing of this President’s Column from a small island in the Aegean Sea, an hour out of Athens, and am enjoying the magnificent villa home of Joe and Mina Valyraki. Joe has served in the Greek government for more than 25 years. He was the Minister of Sport when they signed the agreement to bring the Athens Olympiad 2004 to its original home in Greece. He then served twice as a Minister of the Interior – security is a specialty of his. His beautiful wife, Mina, was the Academy’s Sport Artist of the Year in 2002 (see picture above).

This is my first stop in a world sports tour to view Academy programs throughout the world. Currently, I am here as an observer of the Games. But this is far from my first visit to Athens as the Academy has had various projects in Greece in the past and several in the last eight years.

I feel like my travels are an ongoing “Odyssey” not unlike Homer’s tale of Odysseus after the Trojan War. Webster describes an odyssey as “a long wandering trek marked by many changes of fortune.”

My odyssey has been one of sport that has taken me to every Olympiad since Melbourne 1956, when I was a U.S. Marine Corps Officer and the All Service Coach. At that period of time, the majority of the athletes on the U.S. Track and Field Team were from the military because the draft was very much a part of life in America. Since then, during the past 50 years, I have had the privilege of visiting over 100 countries, and the Academy has developed sport programs in one form or another in more than half of them.

This has been an exciting Olympics in Greece. Each day, we have driven from Eretria on the island of Evia to take in a variety of Olympic events, e.g. water polo,

volleyball, and of course, track and field, the centerpiece of all Olympiads. (Incidentally, for anyone interested in what the original games were really all about, I recommend “The Naked Olympics” by Tony Perrottet).

I believe this to be the best Olympics I have seen in the last 48 years and probably the best in modern times. In many ways it was a miracle. I have been coming to Athens continuously over the last eight years, and I thought that Jacques Rogge, the President of the IOC, was correct when he almost took the Games away from the Greeks, fearing that they would not be ready. However, apparently if you tell the Greeks they can’t do something, they will go out and prove that they can indeed do it – and they did it in spades with these Games. I rate them A-plus – even better than the Seoul Olympics of 1988, which I thought was the best to date, except for the Korean language problem.

The Greeks made it all come together in the very end. I have never traveled so easily around Athens! Not long ago, it was nothing short of a nightmare just getting from Athens to their beautiful new airport. The underground trains were not useable except for small segments within the city, and many ring roads led to nowhere. But by magic, it all hooked up with the kind of “discipline” you usually only find in Asian cultures like Japan.

The ring roads around Athens cleared the gridlock, a trademark of the city. These roads were built with private money, which will be repaid through tolls in the coming years. This is a classic example of the private sector working with the government to achieve a common goal. Incidentally, all of these new roads lead from a beautifully built Olympic village, designed like a city – complete with shops, hospitals and all the normal city services; certainly one of the biggest and best ever built. The roads through the stadiums have a lane marked off with orange paint for Olympic vehicles only, and any violation of that policy carries a stiff $157 fine. A real coup by the Olympic committee is that, if you have an Olympic ticket, you can get on all public transport free of charge.

The Olympic complex, particularly the main stadium, is spectacular and architecturally brilliant, displaying the artistic hand of the Spanish architect, Santiago Clatrava. The stadium grounds are immaculate. They are set off by reflecting pools and a Spanish art piece, called the “WAVING WALL,” 100 meters long, that chimes throughout the night and serves as the backdrop for endless projected Olympic competitions, like a giant outdoor movie theater.

The grounds surrounding the sport complex are impeccable. At midnight, after a track and field event, I watched as 72,000 spectators (basically Greeks) carried their trash and bottles (from vendors like McDonald’s and Coca Cola – the major sponsors of the Games) and put them into the bins provided outside the stadium. Where else have you seen this?

A diverse group of some 65,000 volunteers, including the disabled in wheelchairs, was organized to help everyone and anyone attending the Games. It was one of the best-trained and most helpful “Corps of Volunteers” I have ever seen at a Games. Originally, the goal was for 45,000 volunteers but the foreign volunteers increased the total to some 65,000. All were dressed in an attractive common uniform, including some 15,000 “extras.” As spectators left the stadium and the Olympic grounds, dozens of well-groomed and cordial ladies called out from judges chairs “good night,” “goodbye,” “sweet dreams,” “travel safely” and other such hospitable farewells.

Before I leave the topic of the Olympic complex and the grounds, I would like to congratulate the Greeks on how they laid out and installed their shopping centers – again, some of the best that I have seen. Major sponsors paid millions to use the Olympic Rings and the remarkable thing was that there was no “ambush marketing.” The prices were standardized for all the Olympic clothing and mementos. They were the same whether they were sold on the Olympic grounds, in the city of Athens, or indeed on the outer islands. I particularly was aware of this as I shopped for family, staff and friends. Even more important, bottled water, for instance, was cheaper on the Olympic grounds than in the normal grocery store.

Unfortunately, this was a total reverse of what happened in Atlanta in 1996, where vendors were selling the same items at different prices five feet from each other down every side street. I rated the Atlanta Olympics as a C-minus, at best, as so did the rest of the world, I believe.

Throughout the streets of Athens there were continuous athletic and cultural programs late into the night for weeks, and there was a mass of well-behaved crowds. Again, this was not only throughout Athens but in the suburbs and on the outer islands, all well run without rowdy crowds.

What Athens did was rebuild itself for years to come. I call this the “Barcelona Model.” I watched Barcelona during the early 90’s and certainly during the Games, as it built new roads, airports, hotels, streets and apartments; while eliminating slums and the factory district, and recapturing the polluted Mediterranean, much like Sydney rebuilt itself in 2000. The only city that was not able to take the great opportunity of the Olympics to rebuild its inner structure was Atlanta. In fact, they ended up as probably the only Olympic city that lost their Olympic stadium, which in this case is now Turner’s Field for the Atlanta Braves baseball team.

I thought that Athens not only did a remarkable job of rebuilding itself but it did so without destroying its great antiquities, such as the Acropolis. (I, for one, hope the British give back the marble facings they took at the time of the Turkish occupation.)

Incidentally, I was in Barcelona earlier this year for Olympic meetings with the IOC Culture and Olympic Education Commission, on which I am privileged to serve. The reconstruction and the development of Barcelona that was done for the 1992 Olympic Games has not stopped. I hope that will be true with Athens.

Lastly, the greatest miracle of the Olympiad was the security. Guards and special electronic equipment were everywhere at an estimated cost of $1.6 billion. Security was everywhere, from helicopters above to cameras sliding on cable over every stadium, with checkpoints throughout the Olympic sites. It was subtle but with a touch of class. Such a touch of class is needed with our TSA people managing airport security throughout the USA.

The greatest problem in this Olympiad was drugs, as the Greeks lost some of their best sprinters at the beginning of the Games. Performance enhancing drugs could destroy the Games, along with violence and corruption.

There is no question that these were the best Games ever. It didn’t come cheap! The estimated cost was $12 billion – the most costly Games ever and a debt the Greek people will pay for generations. But from my perspective, the Greeks are prepared to do so.

In the Closing Ceremonies, Gianna Angelopaulos-Daskalaki, President of the Athens 2004 Organizing Committee, told of the achievements of the Greek people in bringing these Games together, which did in fact conclude once again with one of the most spectacular closing ceremonies that the world has ever seen. The opening ceremonies were equally spectacular. Rogge said at the end of the Games: “The Greek people have won!” and indeed they had!

Most importantly for us, after the Games, the Academy will have ongoing sport education programs in Greece with both the Greek Olympic Committee and some of the country’s better colleges and universities via distance learning.

I left Greece the following day for Cyprus, a Greek-speaking island nation some 45 minutes south of Greece by air. As we traveled to the airport everyone forgot the orange line on the highway, and we were back to driving like the Greek people of old. Some things will never change.

2013-11-26T19:27:43-06:00March 3rd, 2008|Contemporary Sports Issues, Sports Facilities, Sports Management|Comments Off on The Olympic Odyssey

A Personal Odyssey to Greece and the 2004 Olympic Games

Abstract

An extensive body of research examines the importance of a golfer’s
shot-making skills to the player’s overall performance, where performance
is measured as either tournament money winnings or average score per round
of golf. Independent of the performance measure, existing studies find
that a player’s shot-making skills contribute significantly to explaining
the variability in a golfer’s performance. To date, this research
has focused exclusively on the professional golfer. This study attempts
to extend the findings in the literature by examining the performance
determinants of amateur golfers. Using a sample of NCAA Division I male
golfers, various shot-making skills are analyzed and correlated with average
score per round of golf. Overall, the findings validate those dealing
with professional golfers. In particular, the results suggest that, like
professional golfers, amateurs must possess a variety of shot-making skills
to be successful. Moreover, relative to driving ability, putting skills
and reaching greens in regulation contribute more to explaining the variability
in a player’s success.

Introduction

Davidson and Templin (1986) present one of the first statistical investigations
of the major determinants of a professional golfer’s success. Using
U.S. Professional Golf Association (PGA) data, these researchers find
that a player’s shot-making skills explain approximately 86 percent
of the variability in a player’s average score and about 59 percent
of the variance in a player’s earnings. Based on these results,
Davidson and Templin conclude that a professional golfer must possess
a variety of shot-making skills to be successful as a tournament player.
They further offer strong empirical support that hitting greens in regulation
and putting were the two most important factors in explaining scoring
average variability across players, with driving ability showing up as
a distant third.

Following Davidson and Templin (1986), a number of researchers have
continued to investigate the determinants of a professional golfer’s
overall performance. Examples include Jones (1990), Shmanske (1992), Belkin,
Gansneder, Pickens, Rotella, and Striegel (1994), Wiseman, Chatterjee,
Wiseman, and Chatterjee (1994), Engelhardt (1995, 1997), Moy and Liaw
(1998), and more recently Nero (2001), Dorsel and Rotunda (2001), and
Engelhardt (2002). Overall, these studies support the major conclusion
presented by Davidson and Templin (1986), which is that a professional
golfer must exhibit a variety of shot-making skills to be successful as
a touring professional. While the relative importance of these skills
to player performance is not uniform across these studies, there is a
developing consensus that shot-making skills like putting and hitting
greens in regulation are more important to a player’s success than
driving distance.

Interestingly, while there is an accumulating literature investigating
professional golfers, no analogous studies have examined the amateur player,
despite the fact that Davidson and Templin (1986) explicitly state that
this avenue of investigation would be a useful direction for future research.
More recently, Belkin, et al. (1994) specifically raise this point, suggesting
that:

“It would also be intriguing to examine whether the same
skills which differentiate successful professionals also contribute
in the same manner to the fortunes of amateurs of differing capabilities.”
(p. 1280).

By way of response, this study fills that particular void in the literature
by empirically estimating the relationship between an amateur golfer’s
overall performance and various shot-making skills. To facilitate direct
comparisons to the existing literature on the determinants of professional
golfers’ performance, we employ the basic approach used by Davidson
and Templin (1986) and Belkin, et al. (1994), among others.

Method

Sample

The sample used for this analysis is a subset of NCAA Division I male
golfers who participated in at least one tournament during the 2002–2003
season. Table 1 presents a listing of the colleges and universities represented
in the study and the number of players from each institution. The specific
data on these collegiate golfers are obtained from Golfstat, Inc. (2003)
(accessible on the Internet at www.golfstat.com), and/or from the respective
colleges and universities directly. The colleges and universities included
in the analysis are a subset of the college teams participating in National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) Division I Men’s Golf. While
it would be preferable to examine all Division I teams, the individual
player statistics needed to perform the analysis are not available. However,
since it is reasonable to assume that the schools listed in Table 1 are
a representative sample of all Division I men’s teams, the data
sample is appropriate for this study.

TABLE 1
Sample of Schools Included in the Study

School
Number of Golfers
Conference
Golfweek/Sagarin Ranking
Clemson University
5
Atlantic Coast
1
University of Arizona
11
Pacific 10
7
University of Southern CA
9
Pacific 10
23
Duke University
8
Atlantic Coast
25
Vanderbilt University
7
Southeastern
31
California State -Fresno
9
Western Athletic
33
University of Kentucky
9
Southeastern
45
Georgia State University
8
Atlantic Sun
51
Texas A&M University
9
Big 12
60
Southeastern Louisiana Univ.
8
Southland
71
Coastal Carolina University
10
Big South
76

Sources: Golfstat, Inc. (2003) “Customized Team Pages-Men.”
www.golfstat.com/2003-2004/men/mstop10.htm, (accessed June 16, 2003),
various teams; Golfweek. (2003) “Golfweek/Sagarin Performance Index –
Men’s Team Ratings.” www.golfweek.com/college/mens1/teamrankings.asp,
(accessed July 1, 2003).

Measures

For the schools represented in this study, Golfstat, Inc. collects and
reports individual player statistics necessary to complete a performance
analysis. For this study we used statistics for the 2002 – 2003
NCAA Division I tournament season. Among the available data are the average
score per round (AS) for each amateur player in the sample. This statistic
provides the performance measure needed for the dependent variable in
this study, since earnings are not relevant to amateurs. Specifically,
according to the United States Golf Association (2003, p. 1) and the Royal
and Ancient Golf Club of St. Andrews (2003, p.1), an amateur golfer is
defined as:

“…one who plays the game as a non-remunerative and
non-profit-making sport and who does not receive remuneration for teaching
golf or for other activities because of golf skill or reputation, except
as provided in the Rules.”

Although studies of professional golfers examine scoring average and/or
earnings as performance measures, Wiseman et al. (1994) argue that correlation
results are stronger when scoring average is used. Hence, the use of scoring
average for this study of amateurs is soundly supported by the literature
examining professional golfers.

Statistics for the primary shot-making skills typically used in the
literature are collected and reported by Golfstat, Inc. and by some colleges
and universities. These include measures of driving accuracy, greens in
regulation, putting average, sand saves, and short game.

To capture amateurs’ long game skills, we use one of the classic
measures, which is driving accuracy. Specifically, we use the variable
Fairways Hit, which is defined as the percentage of fairways hit on par
4 and par 5 holes during a round of golf. Data on driving distance for
the amateur sample are not available. However, Dorsel and Rotunda (2001)
present evidence suggesting that the number of eagles (i.e., two strokes
under par on any hole) a player makes is positively correlated with the
player’s average driving distance. Hence, we use the variable Eagles,
the total number of eagles a player makes during the season, to control
for each player’s average driving distance. Following the literature,
we also include the variable Greens in Regulation (GIR) to measure the
percentage of greens a player reaches in regulation for the season. This
is defined as one stroke for a par three, two strokes or less for a par
four, and three strokes or less for a par five. As discussed in Belkin
et al. (1994), this GIR variable captures a player’s iron play and
their success at reading a green within the regulation number of strokes.

With regard to the short game, several variables are used in the analysis.
In keeping with the literature, we use two measures of putting skill –
Putts per Round, defined as the average number of putts per round, and
GIR Putts, which is the average number of putts measured only on greens
reached in regulation. Belkin, et al. (1994) is one study that uses the
former measure, while Dorsel and Rotunda (2001) is an example of a study
using the latter. Interestingly, Shmanske (1992) argues that the latter
statistic, GIR Putts, is superior because it correctly accounts for the
longer putting distances associated with a player who achieves a higher
number of greens in regulation. By including one of these measures in
different regression models, we can assess the validity of that argument.
We also include the variable Sand Saves (SS), which measures the percentage
of time a golfer makes par or better when hitting from a sand bunker.
In certain specifications of our regression analysis, we experiment with
the variable Short Game as an alternative measure to Sand Saves. Short
Game measures the percentage of time a player makes par or better when
not reaching the green in the regulation number of strokes.

In addition to a player’s shot-making skills, Belkin, et al. (1994)
and others note the importance of experience in determining a player’s
success. To control for this factor, two experience measures are used.
First, we define the variable Rounds as the number of tournament rounds
completed by each player during the 2002–2003 season. In a sense,
this measure captures a player’s short-term experience, in that
it measures how each additional round played in a season increases the
experience that a player can call upon in subsequent rounds. Second, to
control for longer-term cumulative experience, we construct a set of dummy
variables to reflect the player’s academic age, (i.e., Freshman,
Sophomore, Junior, or Senior). It is hypothesized that the higher a player’s
academic age, the more collegiate golfing experience has been gained,
and therefore the lower the expected average score.

Finally, since golf at the collegiate level is a team sport, it is important
to capture any associated team effects. That is, a player’s performance
might be affected by the team with which they are associated. At least
two plausible explanations for this team effect are viable – one
relating to the team’s coach and the other relating to the courses
played. With regard to the former, each team’s coach is expected
to uniquely affect the success of each team member through mentoring,
leadership, instruction, and overall direction. In fact, Dirks (2000)
and Giacobbi, Roper, Whitney, and Butryn (2002) present evidence supporting
the importance of a coach’s influence on the performance of a collegiate
athlete. Primarily, the coach acts as the team leader and instructor.
As a leader, the coach is responsible for the overall team strategy and
for ultimately determining a player’s tournament participation.
As an instructor, the more experienced coach may be better able to teach
players and to motivate them to improve their play.

As for courses played, we expect a player’s scoring average to
be affected by the specific golf courses played, which in turn are not
consistent across collegiate teams. Indeed, it is highly plausible that
some teams might, for example, play easier courses throughout a given
tournament season, which may lower a team member’s score. To account
for these team effects, dummy variables are constructed, whereby each
dummy variable identifies the team to which each player belongs.

Procedure

Following the literature, multiple regression analysis is used to estimate
the relationship between an amateur golfer’s average score and various
shot-making skills. In addition, each regression model is specified to
control for player experience and team factors. Ordinary least squares
(OLS) is used to derive the regression estimates for four different models.
These models are distinguished by the selection of shot-making skill statistics
used for certain variables. Specifically, each model is distinguished
by its use of Sand Saves (SS) versus Short Game and Putts per Round versus
GIR putts. We also generate simple Pearson correlation coefficients between
the measure of player performance and each of the independent variables
in the study.

Results and Discussion

Basic descriptive statistics for the sample of 93 golfers are presented
in Table 2. At the collegiate level, most tournaments consist of three
rounds of golf, and, like the professionals, each round comprises eighteen
holes. The average NCAA Division I male golfer in the sample participated
in approximately nine tournaments, played slightly less than 26 rounds
of golf, and had an average score per round of approximately 75 strokes
during the 2002 – 2003 season.

TABLE 2
Basic Descriptive Statistics

MEASURES
Mean Std. Dev
Tournaments
8.72043
4.22818
Rounds
25.78495
12.62318
Average Score (AS)
75.04548
2.20730
Fairways Hit
0.68033
0.08356
Greens in Regulation (GIR)
0.60471
0.07985
Putts per round
31.02602
1.23018
GIR Putts
1.87653
0.07043
Sand Saves (SS)
0.41998
0.12239
Short Game
0.51377
0.08947
Eagles
1.50538
1.80352
Academic Age Dummy Variable
Mean Std. Dev
Senior
0.19355
0.39722
Junior
0.23656
0.42727
Sophomore
0.31183
0.46575
Freshman
0.25806
0.43994
Team Dummy Variables
Mean Std. Dev
University of Arizona
0.11828
0.32469
Clemson University
0.05376
0.22677
Duke University
0.08602
0.28192
California State -Fresno
0.09677
0.29725
Georgia State University
0.08602
0.28192
University of Kentucky
0.09677
0.29725
Southeastern Louisiana University
0.08602
0.28192
University of Southern CA
0.09677
0.29725
Texas A& M University
0.09677
0.29725
Vanderbilt University
0.07527
0.26525
Coastal Carolina University
0.10753
0.31146

With regard to specific shot-making skills, the average amateur hits
approximately 68 percent of the fairways and reaches the green in the
regulation number of strokes 60 percent of the time. Of the greens reached
in regulation, the average player needs 1.88 putts to finish a hole, and
over the course of a round, each needs to take slightly more than 31 putts.
On average, an amateur golfer makes par or better when hitting from a
sand bunker 42 percent of the time and makes par or better when not on
a green in regulation 51 percent of the time. Over the course of the 2002
– 2003 season, the average player made 1.5 eagles.

Table 3 presents the results of the correlation analysis among an amateur’s
average score (AS) and various shot-making skills, experience, and team
effects. Notice that all shot-making skills are significantly correlated
with a player’s average score. Somewhat predictably, GIR is the
variable that is most highly correlated with an amateur golfer’s
average score. This finding is analogous to what has been found for professional
golfers by Davidson and Templin (1986) and others. We also find that the
Short Game variable and GIR Putts rank second and third respectively in
terms of the strength of correlation among shot-making skills. Notice
that across the two putting measures – GIR Putts and Putts per Round,
the correlation for GIR Putts is higher, which may support Shmanske’s
(1992) assertion that this is a more accurate measure of putting skill.
We also find that both the short-term and long-term experience measures
are statistically correlated with a player’s performance. With regard
to the Rounds variable, the correlation shows a significant negative relationship
with a player’s average score, which follows our expectations. Also,
as anticipated, the dummy variable for academic age is positively correlated
with the player’s average score for freshmen and negatively correlated
for seniors. Lastly, for certain colleges and universities, there is a
significant correlation between a team effect and a player’s average
score.

TABLE 3
Pearson Correlation Coefficients

MEASURES Correlation with Average Score (AS)
Fairways Hit
-0.42884***
Greens in Regulation (GIR)
-0.77499***
Putts per Round
0.35983***
GIR Putts
0.58234***
Sand Saves (SS)
-0.32141***
Short Game
-0.61039***
Eagles
-0.48784***
Rounds
-0.68418***
Academic Age Dummy Variables
Senior
-0.22301**
Junior
-0.12563
Sophomore
0.07899
Freshman
0.23974**
Team Dummy Variables
University of Arizona
-0.14242
Clemson University
-0.29896***
Duke University
-0.02609
California State – Fresno
-0.01887
Georgia State University
-0.02679
University of Kentucky
0.15855
Southeastern Louisiana University
-0.10522
University of Southern CA
-0.10022
Texas A& M University
0.18837*
Vanderbilt University
-0.03283
Coastal Carolina University
0.31977***

* significant at the 0.10 level
** significant at the 0.05 level
*** significant at the 0.01 level

In Table 4, we present the multiple regression results for four alternative
models. As previously noted, these models vary by which putting statistic
is used and by whether Short Game or Sand Saves is used in the estimation.
Model 1 uses Putts per Round and Sand Saves (SS), Model 2 uses Putts per
Round and Short Game, Model 3 uses GIR Putts and Sand Saves (SS), and
Model 4 uses GIR Putts and Short Game.

TABLE 4
Regression Analysis (Standardized Beta Coefficients in parentheses)

MEASURE
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Fairways Hit -0.28 -0.43 -0.99 -0.53
(-0.01) (-0.02) (-0.04) (-0.02)
Greens in Regulation (GIR) -22.34*** -21.60*** -15.73*** -14.97***
(-0.81) (-0.78) (-0.57) (-0.54)
Putts per Round 1.00*** 0.94*** —– ——
(0.56) (0.52)
GIR Putts —– —– 13.27*** 8.92***
(0.42) (0.28)
Sand Saves (SS) 0.67 —– -0.32 —–
(0.04) (-0.02)
Short Game —- -0.70 —– -7.09***
(-0.03) (-0.29)
Eagles 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (-0.01) (-0.02)
Rounds -0.01 -0.01 -0.02** -0.01
(-0.04) (-0.04) (-0.12) (-0.07)
Academic Age Dummy Variables
Senior -0.40* -0.42* -0.20 -0.19
Junior -0.33* -0.36* -0.22 -0.20
Sophomore -0.48** -0.50** -0.46* -0.51**
Team Dummy Variables
University of Arizona -0.02 0.01 -0.23 -0.11
Duke University -0.06 -0.01 -0.33 -0.17
California State -Fresno -0.11 -0.10 -0.11 0.00
Georgia State University -0.79** -0.71* -1.25** -0.66
University of Kentucky 1.44*** 1.43*** 0.85* 1.18**
Southeastern Louisiana University -0.11 0.04 -0.50 0.40
University of Southern CA -0.13 -0.15 -0.45 -0.29
Texas A& M University -0.26 -0.20 -0.49 -0.14
Vanderbilt University 0.28 0.25 -0.37 -0.27
Coastal Carolina University 0.78** 0.79** 0.42 0.84*
F-Statistic 46.73*** 46.23*** 21.78*** 32.09***
R-Square 0.92 0.92 0.85 0.89
Adjusted R-Square 0.90 0.90 0.81 0.87
F-Statistic (full versus reduced) 4.38*** 4.16*** 1.93** 2.78***

* significant at the 0.10 level, assuming a one-tailed
test of hypothesis
** significant at the 0.05 level, assuming a one-tailed test of hypothesis
*** significant at the 0.01 level, assuming a one-tailed test of hypothesis

Overall, we observe that shot-making skills, player experience, and
team effects collectively explain a large proportion of the variability
in an amateur’s scoring average independent of the model specified.
Specifically, the adjusted R2 statistics across the four models range
from 0.81 to 0.90, values that are similar to those reported in Davidson
and Templin (1986) and Belkin, et al. (1994).

Of the specific shot-making skills, GIR and putting (either Putts per
Round or GIR Putts), are the most consistent predictors of an amateur’s
average score across the four models. In each case, GIR is significant
at the 1 percent level, as are both putting variables. However, the standardized
beta coefficients show that GIR is the most important predictor, as was
the case for the models estimated by Davidson and Templin (1986) and Belkin,
et al. (1994). Both putting variables also are significant at the 1 percent
level, though the standardized beta coefficients suggest that Putts per
Round might be a superior measure of amateur putting, which runs counter
to Shmanske’s (1992) view of these variable definitions, as noted
previously.

Interestingly, Short Game is a significant predictor of average score,
but only when the variable GIR Putts is included in the model, which is
Model 4 specifically. With regard to Sand Saves (SS), we find that it
is not a significant factor in predicting a player’s performance
in either Model 1 or Model 3. Davidson and Templin (1986) and, more recently,
Moy and Liaw (1998) find analogous results for their respective samples
of professional golfers. One explanation put forth by Moy and Liaw is
that all golfers have similar abilities in this skill category. Another
more likely justification is one presented by Dorsal and Rotunda (2001),
which is that bunker play is less frequent and, as a result, has a negligible
effect on a player’s overall performance.

To the extent that the number of eagles over the season captures driving
distance, the results indicate that driving distance is not a major factor
in determining a player’s performance. In general, this conclusion
agrees with the findings of Davidson and Templin (1986), Belkin, et al.
(1994), and Dorsel and Rotunda (2001). Hence, this finding seems to be
independent of whether the golfer is an NCAA amateur or a professional
player. However, such an assertion has to be made with caution, since
no direct measure of driving distance was available to include in this
amateur study.

In addition to a player’s shot-making skills, experience and team
effects appear to have an influence on an NCAA golfer’s performance.
With regard to the experience measures, the total number of rounds played
in the 2002-2003 season improves a player’s overall performance.
This assertion is based on the consistently negative coefficient on Rounds
across models, though the result is statistically significant only in
Model 3. As for longer-term experience, sophomore players consistently
achieve a lower average score than their freshman counterparts, and this
effect is statistically significant across the four models. Juniors and
seniors are found to enjoy the same performance effect linked to experience,
but the influence is found to be statistically significant only in Models
1 and 2.

As for individual team effects, the results suggest that a statistically
significant influence exists for certain collegiate programs. For example,
holding all else constant, all four models indicate that players on the
University of Kentucky team have higher and statistically significant
average scores relative to players on the Clemson team (the suppressed
dummy variable), who are the 2002-2003 NCAA Division I Champions. Conversely,
players at Georgia State University achieve lower average scores than
players at Clemson, independent of individual shot-making skills or experience,
and three of the four models show this finding to be statistically significant.
The absence of statistical significance for the other teams might be attributable
to limited variability of team effects within a single NCAA division.

Finally, an F-test comparing the full model to a reduced version was
conducted across each model specification, where the reduced model assumes
that the academic age and team effects are jointly zero. As noted in Table
4, the null hypothesis was rejected across all four models, indicating
that these two experience variables collectively help to explain the variability
of an amateur player’s performance. This outcome validates the belief
of other researchers, including Belkin et al. (1994) and Shmanske (1992).

Conclusions

The importance of shot-making skills to a professional golfer’s
success has been well documented in the literature. In general, research
studies point to the fact that a variety of shot-making skills are important
to a player’s overall performance. More specifically, four shot-making
skills – GIR, putting, driving accuracy, and driving distance –
are responsible for the majority of variation in a professional golfer’s
scoring performance. Of these four, GIR and putting have consistently
been found to be the more important factors. On occasion, driving accuracy
and driving distance have been found to statistically impact a professional
golfer’s average score, but typically the influence is weaker than
for GIR and putting skills.

Despite an accumulating literature seeking to validate or refine these
results, we know of no study that has extended this analysis beyond the
realm of professional golfers. To that end, we attempt to fill this void
in the literature by empirically identifying performance determinants
for amateur golfers. Using a sample of NCAA Division I male golfers, we
hypothesize that a variety of shot-making skills along with player experience
and team membership are expected to influence an amateur golfer’s
performance measured as average score per round. Using multiple regression
analysis, our results indicate that all these factors collectively explain
a large percentage of the variability in an NCAA golfer’s average
score. This is evidenced by R-squared values ranging from 0.81 to 0.90
across four different models distinguished by varying variable definitions.

We further find that the amateur golfer’s shot-making skills measured
through GIR and putting are the most important factors to explaining average
score per round. These findings offer an important contribution to the
growing literature on professional golfer performance in that they validate
and extend much of what has been shown in existing studies. Future research
should attempt to further extend these findings to other amateur data,
as they become available.

References

  1. Belkin, D.S., Gansneder, B., Pickens, M., Rotella, R.J., & Striegel,
    D. (1994) “Predictability and Stability of Professional Golf Association
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    Success Among Professional Golfers.” Research Quarterly for Exercise
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  3. Dirks, K. T. (2000) “Trust in Leadership and Team Performance:
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    Finishes, and Big Money: An Analysis of Professional Golf Association
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2016-04-01T09:45:27-05:00March 3rd, 2008|Contemporary Sports Issues, Sports Studies and Sports Psychology|Comments Off on A Personal Odyssey to Greece and the 2004 Olympic Games

A Survey Among Youth High Performance Athletes at Different Coubertin Schools, Olympic Talent Training Centers and at Other Spor

INTRODUCTION

The high performance sport system of the former German Democratic Republic
(GDR) was based on a well organized and supported search and support for
talents. The “Sport Schools for Children and Youth,” which
were invented in 1952 and extended into perfectly organized places of
training for future Olympic winners, represented the main branch of this
system. 80% of the Olympic participants of the GDR were “formed”
in these 24 “Sport Schools for Children and Youth” and won
the main part of the 572 Olympic medals reached by the GDR at Olympic
Games.

After the German reunification this form of elite shaping was considered
skeptically especially when it became obvious and public by Prof. Franke
(Heidelberg, Germany) that the majority of the athletes training and living
at these sport schools were involved – consciously and unconsciously
– in a secret doping system. The scientific analysis of these schools
revealed in spite of many positive aspects also a frequent disregard of
ethical standards.

In the meantime sport high schools, again, have become one of the main
institutions in training Olympic talents in Germany. It is now of interest
if ethical standards are considered in the trainers’ behavior and
if ethical standards and Olympic values play an important role in the
pedagogical formation of the young athletes.

In 1984, Meinberg developed a set of principles for a humane high-performance
sport for children in the wake of a public debate on the participation
of children and teenagers in high-performance sports. Many institutions
published different demanding catalogues of ethical principles but Meinberg’s
principles are of such a given broad-based character that these principles
can also be taken as outlining an ethical foundation of other catalogues.

The following ethical principles were published by Meinberg:

  1. The call for using the other person as a purpose of himself instead
    of using him as a means to an end,
  2. the principle of respect,
  3. the principle of equality,
  4. the principle of solidarity,
  5. the principle of fairness,
  6. the principle of suitability for children (youth),
  7. the principle of reasonableness,
  8. the principle of helping,
  9. the principle of confidence/trust,
  10. the principle of participation,
  11. the principle of responsibility,
  12. the principle of achievement and the call for avoiding a fetishism
    of achievement,
  13. call for a child (youth) suitable body ethic and the avoidance of
    the exploitation of the
    body.

The paper investigates which status Olympic values have for teenage high-performance
athletes and in how far these values are taught by their trainer and their
engagement in high performance sport.

In addition to that the paper is supposed to show whether the athletes
think that their trainers observe Meinberg’s 13 ethical principles
and whether there is a correlation between their implementation and other
factors such as the kind of sport, gender, etc.

METHODS

Research data were collected through a survey using a standardized questionnaire.
Under this survey, 181 students (age 14-18) of different sports high schools
(Coubertin-High School Berlin, Pierre-de-Coubertin-High School Erfurt,
Heinrich-Heine-High School Kaiserslautern, Karthause High School Koblenz
and the House of Athletes at the Olympic Centre Frankfurt-Rhein-Main)
in Germany replied to the questionnaire in writing. The replies were analysed
with the statistics programme SPSS 11.0.

RESULTS

The evaluation of values shows that the youth high performance athletes
consider those values to be more important which are closely connected
to the achievement principle (for example ambition, competitiveness, ability
of pushing through…). In addition to that the trainers teach those
values connected with the achievement principle more often than other
values like for example honesty, fairness, equal opportunities or luck.

The results regarding the implementation of ethical standards show that
the majority of trainers are largely guided by ethical principles in their
work with the young high-performance athletes. At the same time, however,
the athletes also noted incidences of unethical behavior. In the implementation
of the individual principles, up to 40% of the trainers transgress ethical
boundaries. Only in isolated incidences, correlations between the kind
of sport and transgressions of individual principles could be found. As
no broader patterns could be observed, this indicates that the adherence
to ethical principles depends more on the individual personality of the
trainer rather than on other factors.

DISCUSSION/CONCLUSIONS

The survey results show that ethical principles should not be developed
and verified for specific kinds of sports. The general ethical principles
are flexible enough to adapt the trainer’s behavior to the individual
athlete and the specific situation. In analysing the implementation of
ethical principles, more attention should be given to a teleological ethic
alongside the ethic of principles, as this allows for more focus on the
individual athlete and the specific situation in the trainer’s behavior.
The limitations of this empirical research are that the standardized questionnaire
is not able to register situation-specific behavior. It was tried to counteract
this problem by taking into consideration the teleological aspects at
the interpretation of the results.

The partial disregard of ethical standards makes it obvious that the
conditions and the situations of young high performance athletes have
to be examined regularly and at all kinds of sports even at those institutions
which are closely connected to Olympic values and the pedagogical emphasis
of their work.

REFERENCES (A SELECTION)

  1. Anders, G./Hartmann, W. (Red.): Sozialkompetenz von Trainerinnen und
    Trainern. Dokumentation des Workshops vom 28. September 1996. Köln
    1997.
  2. Bette, K.-H.: Die Trainerrolle im Hochleistungssport. System- und
    rollentheoretische Überlegungen zur Sozialfigur des Trainers. St.
    Augustin 1984.
  3. Birnbacher, D./Hoerster, N. (Hrsg.): Texte zur Ethik. München
    19939.
  4. Court, J.: Kritik ethischer Modelle des Leistungssports. Köln
    1994.
  5. Digel, H.: Ist der Hochleistungssport verantwortbar? In: Leistungssport
    32 (2002) 1, 9-13.
  6. Gerhardt, V.: Die Moral des Sports. In: Caysa, V. (Hrsg.): Sportphilosophie.
    Leipzig 1997, 172-203.
  7. Grupe, O./Mieth, D. (Hrsg.): Lexikon der Ethik im Sport. Schorndorf
    1998.
  8. Kaminski, G./Mayer, R./Ruoff, B. A.: Kinder und Jugendliche im Hochleistungssport.
    Schorndorf 1984.
  9. Kant, I.: Der kategorische Imperativ. In: Birnbacher, D./Hoerster,
    N. (Hrsg.): Texte zur Ethik. München 19939, 236-253.
  10. Kohlberg, L.: The Philosophy of Moral Development. Moral Stages and
    the Idea of Justice. San Francisco 1981.
  11. Lenk, H.: Manipulation oder Emanzipation im Leistungssport? Schorndorf
    1973.
  12. McNamee, M.J./Parry, S.J.: Ethics and Sport. London – New York 1998.
  13. Meinberg, E.: Kinderhochleistungssport: Fremdbestimmung oder Selbstentfaltung?
    Köln 1984.
  14. Meinberg, E.: Die Moral im Sport. Bausteine einer neuen Sportethik.
    Aachen 1991.
  15. Meinberg, E.: Trainerethos und Trainerethik. Köln 2001
  16. Müller, N.: Olympische erziehung.In: Lexikon der Ethik im Sport.
    Schorndorf 2003, 5th ed., 385-395.
  17. Sinnreich, J.: Sportethik auf der Grundlage des Kategorischen Imperativs.
    In: Sportonomics 5 (1999) 2, 62-68.
2017-08-07T11:49:43-05:00March 3rd, 2008|Sports Facilities, Sports Management, Sports Studies and Sports Psychology|Comments Off on A Survey Among Youth High Performance Athletes at Different Coubertin Schools, Olympic Talent Training Centers and at Other Spor

Soccer Hooliganism in England Between the Wars

Hooliganism has long been associated with soccer in England and has been
a common occurrence from the late nineteenth century onwards. Yet following
the end of the First World War, incidents of crowd disorder appeared to
fall resulting in a period of calm and orderly behavior up until the
Second World War. The purpose of this study is to focus upon the inter-war
period, examining the theories proposed that explain the apparent calm
amongst the spectators of English soccer.

INTRODUCTION

Prior to the introduction of the organized and professional game in the
latter half of the nineteenth century, English soccer had been something
of a savage affair, involving large unruly mobs indulging in mass violence.
Although the codification of soccer and the establishment of the Football
Association (FA) in 1863 brought a sense of order to the game, crowd disorder
remained prevalent throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century. However, following the end of the First World War in 1918, incidents
of crowd disorder and hooliganism appeared to fall, resulting in a period
of calm and orderly behavior right up until the Second World War in 1939
(Dunning et al., 1993). Post-war Britain once again witnessed crowd trouble
with the re-emergence of disorder, which was to continue until the present
day (Sleap, 1998).

The intention of this paper is to therefore focus upon the inter-war
period, examining the theories proposed that explain the apparent calm
amongst the spectators of English soccer. First, issues relating to the
social composition of the crowd will be discussed. This will be followed
by considering how crowd disorder was reported upon by both official and
media sources. Lastly, consideration will be given to how unruly behavior
was dealt with by the different parties concerned.

SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF THE CROWD

The incorporation of the working class into mainstream respectable society
has been offered by Figurational Sociologists as a significant reason
why soccer spectators behaved in a more civilized way between the wars
(Dunning et al., 1988, Maguire 1986, Murphy et al., 1990). The idea is
posited that the working class between the wars wished to convey to higher
class members of society (and presumably show each other) that they could
collectively interact at a large social gathering without disorder being
created. Maguire (1986) points out that the FA actually believed that
soccer was especially capable of achieving civilized and orderly behavior
among the working classes, particularly in difficult social climates.
During the General Strike of 1926 for instance, the “FA committee
argued that the playing of soccer would prove helpful in the present unsettled
condition of industrial affairs of the country” (Maguire, 1986, p.
230).

In respect to the class structure, another main theme that becomes apparent,
is the idea that soccer spectatorship was becoming increasingly respectable
as a result of the re-emergence of the middle classes attending soccer
matches. Both Walvin (1986) and Mason (1979), in particular, refer to
mixed classes being apparent at soccer matches during the inter-war period.
These are significant observations, as before the First World War, middle
class men would mostly watch rugby during the traditional soccer season
(Lowerson, 1995). The appearance of women at soccer matches also indicates
too that crowds were becoming more middle class (Hayward, 1995). Evidence
indicates that the women present would most likely have been middle class,
as during the inter-war period, working class women did not spend their
limited leisure time at sporting occasions (Jones, 1992).

Although little else can be derived from the specific composition of
inter-war crowds, not least because of the lack of recorded data (Holt,
1990), it is possible to consider how spectators were organized. In respect
of where and how a soccer fan would spectate, a factor that became more
evident in the 1920s and 1930s was not so much the social class of an
individual but their ability to pay. What resulted according to Bale (1993)
was the first case of physical segregation determined by prices, with
seating and shelter demanding a higher price. Hargreaves (1986) suggests
that such segregation was a necessary demarcation of social position that
existed as much within classes as between them. It is argued that the
visible social hierarchy which was evident in the later part of the nineteenth
century within soccer, needed to be re-established, particularly by the
‘petit bourgeois’ in order that their new found social status be acknowledged.
Whether the new fashion of segregation somehow pacified and ordered the
crowd would be a contentious suggestion but Hutchinson (1982) certainly
considers that such physical features as turnstiles and fences helped
to control such large numbers.

THE REPORTING OF CROWD DISORDER

In examining how incidents of crowd disorder were reported between the
wars most research concerns itself with the examination of FA minutes
and press reports. During the inter-war period, FA records show a marked
fall in hooliganism (Dunning et al., 1988). Between 1921 and 1939 there
were a total of seventy one incidents of crowd misconduct recorded by
the FA (an average of just under four per season). Moreover, between 1930
and 1934 there were merely five cases, none of which resulted in ground
closure (ground closure was a common punishment by the FA after violence
at matches). In total there were in fact eight ground closures in the
twenty years after the First World War, whereas there is evidence to suggest
that there could have been as many as forty six in the twenty years preceding
it. Post-war statistics again show recorded incidents rising steadily,
up to as many as twenty five cases per season (Dunning et al., 1988, p.
134). It can be assumed perhaps, that the FA took a softer line on crowd
disorder during the inter-war period, again perhaps in a bid to make soccer
appear more respectable, given the poor reputation it was trying to shed.
However, it must be said that the incidents recorded are ‘sketchy’ at
best (Dunning et al., 1988).

According to Murphy et al. (1990) the press too under reported incidents
of crowd disorder between the wars, though this was less to do with becoming
more civilized but more to do with the new commercial pressures being
placed upon editors. As the 1920s and 1930s heralded a new era of consumption
and consumerism, advertising became an increasingly significant means
of revenue for newspapers. As a result, headlines and print grew in size
and more photographs were included. As Murphy et al. (1990, p. 110) point
out “under the twin constraints of lessened space and the emerging,
competition-induced desire for a more attractive presentation, editors
seem to have become more sensitive to the issue of ‘newsworthiness’ and
the need for selectivity”. Therefore, given that soccer hooliganism
was not seen to be a social problem at that time, it would therefore have
been deemed to hold little or no interest to a newspaper reader.

DEALING WITH UNRULY behavior

According to Williams et al. (1991), at a time of soaring attendances
the “patterns of spectating of the period were indicative of considerably
more self policing and internal discipline within soccer crowds compared
with those of twenty years or more later and, indeed, those in the early
years of the century” (Williams et al., 1991, p. 164).

This is supported by Maguire (1986) who makes reference to a number of
FA minutes recorded in the 1920s which indicate that ‘respectable’ people
should exercise self control and aid in the controlling of fellow spectators,
allowing what was agreed upon, to be ‘permissible’. Maguire (1986, p.
230) suggests that “attempts to promote self regulation and increasing
agreement over what was considered permissible may well have reflected
the continuing successful endeavours of the middle classes to impose their
values on society as a whole”.

When self regulation failed however, the police themselves restored law
and order, with Walvin (1986) indicating that stricter and more rigorous
policing methods were employed during the inter-war period. This raises
a number of interesting questions. First, were the police reacting to
an apparently more uncontrollable crowd? Secondly, did the implementation
of such strategies represent a shift in police policies during the inter-war
period? Thirdly, did the action taken during this period in fact result
in there being less spectator disorder?

Although, as mentioned in the introduction that crowd disorder always
existed there is little evidence to suggest that the police were unduly
concerned. Hooliganism was not the social phenomenon that it later became.
However, it would be reasonable to suggest that more effective methods
of general crowd control indicated by Walvin (1986) were probably more
to do with personal safety than outbreaks of violence. Whether or not
the action taken by the police in any way quieted crowd disturbances is
questionable, though they may have contributed through their presence,
as relations between the police and the public were considered to be at
there most harmonious during the inter-war period (Reiner, 1985).

Relations between the fans and the club itself between 1919 and 1939
were also considered to be closer than they had ever been. Taylor (1971)
proposes that this is based upon the perceptions of the sub culture of
the working class that would be most likely to create trouble. His theory
of   ‘Participatory Democracy’ details that “in the inter-war
years, the illusion persisted that power – over the future of the club
and particularly over the possibility of victory was distributed between
management, directors, players and the sub culture, all of whom were seen
as standing in some kind of unambiguous relationship to the working class
of the area as a whole” (Taylor, 1971, p. 362). It must be remembered
however that those that administered the club were markedly middle class
and had only the watching of soccer in common with the working class on
the terraces. After the Second World War, as soccer became more professional
and affluent (Bourgeoisification), more overt and frequent hooliganism
resulted, which was considered a working class reaction to not being consulted
over the new direction of soccer (Taylor, 1971).

Clarke (1978) too believes that the subsequent professionalisation, along
with the transformation of the social situation experienced by young working
class people, together resulted in the breaking of ties between members
of the same family or community which were strong amongst the pre-war
working class. Consequently as Clarke (1978, p. 25) points out “working
class boys before the Second World War typically went to soccer with their
fathers, uncles, older brothers or neighbours; in that context, their
behavior was subject to relatively effective control”. Working class
youth, the most likely group to engage in hooliganism, were therefore
effectively babysat for most, if not all of the inter-war period. It was
only later in the century when they went to matches in gangs with their
peers that control from elders ceased to be exercised effectively.

CONCLUSION

In summary, after examining the theories proposed that explain the apparent
calm amongst the spectators of English soccer during the inter-war period,
it would appear to be somewhat naïve to suggest that one overriding
idea could be held accountable. An interplay and evolution of a great
number of social factors such as Clarke’s (1978) idea of the ‘family on
the terrace’, coupled with a general willingness to implement more effective
regulation by all parties concerned, would seem to offer a more plausible
but less clear cut explanation.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

  1. Bale, J. (1993)   Sport, Space and the City. London: Routledge.
  2. Clarke, J. (1978) Football and Working Class Fans: Tradition and Change.
    In Ingham, R. (Ed.) Football Hooliganism. London: Inter-Action.
  3. Dunning, E., Murphy, P., Willaims, J. (1988) The Roots of Football
    Hooliganism. London: Routledge.
  4. Dunning, E., Maguire, J., Pearton, R. (Eds.) (1993) The Sports Process.
    Leeds: Human Kinetics.
  5. Hargreaves, J. (1986) Sport, Power and Culture. Cambridge: Polity
    Press.
  6. Hayward, T. (1995) Women and Football Factsheet: A History of Female
    Football Fans. Leicester: Leicester University.
  7. Holt, R. (1990) Sport and the British. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  8. Hutchinson, J. (1982) The Football Industry. Glasgow: RD.
  9. Jones, S (1992) Sport, Politics and the Working Class. Manchester:
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  10. Lowerson, J. (1995) Sport and the English Middle Classes 1870 – 1914.
    Manchester: Manchester University Press.
  11. Maguire, J. (1986) ‘The Emergence of Football Spectating as a Social
    Problem 1880 – 1985: A Figurational and Developmental Perspective’.
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  12. Mason, A. (1979) Association football and English Society 1863 – 1915.
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  13. Murphy, P., Williams, J., Dunning, E. (1990) Football on Trial. London:
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  14. Reiner, R. (1985) The Politics of the Police. Brighton: Wheatsheaf.
  15. Sleap, M. (1998) Social Issues in Sport. London: Macmillan.
  16. Taylor, I. (1971) Football Mad: A Speculative Sociology of Football
    Hooliganism.   In Dunning, E. (Ed.) The Sociology of Sport. London:
    Frank Cass & Co.
  17. Walvin, J. (1986) Football and the Decline of Britain. London: Macmillan.
  18. Williams, J., Wagg, S. (1991) British Football and Social Change.
    Leicester:   Leicester University Press.
2015-11-06T20:23:17-06:00March 3rd, 2008|Contemporary Sports Issues, Sports Management, Sports Studies and Sports Psychology|Comments Off on Soccer Hooliganism in England Between the Wars
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